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Crossing Identities and the Turkish Military: Revolutionists, Guardians and Depoliticals A comparative historical analysis on Turkish military culture and civil-military relations

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Crossing Identities and the Turkish Military: Revolutionists, Guardians and Depoliticals

A comparative historical analysis on Turkish military culture and
civil-military relations

Hakkı Göker Önen

4/14/2016

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Bath

Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies

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ABSTRACT

One US senior marine notes that “military cultures are like great ocean liners or aircraft carriers: they require an enormous effort to change direction”. Indeed, in most nations, military cultures are known for their resistance against change. The military ethos, which includes features such as absolute obedience, hierarchy, collectivism, and sacrificing oneself for all, makes military cultures less likely to adopt liberal and democratic values. In this regard, Turkey is in an interesting position in that military culture has constantly experienced transitions between three different identities: revolutionists, guardians, and depoliticals. The first identity is modernist, progressive, and staunchly secular; the second is more conservative, less tolerant of the notion of individual rights and liberties, and more likely to maintain the status quo; the third is being politically neutral, committed to civilian supremacy, and likely to work in harmony with the politicians. Indeed, because of the role it played during the Liberation War, the military has had an unwritten legitimacy in national politics as the nation builder. Related to this, the military’s privileged position in the eyes of the people has enabled any change in military culture to make fundamental changes in politics. Yet, if one observes most cases of civil-military relations, one may see that the relationship between militaries and states tends to follow a stable, positive, or negative path regarding democratisation. But in the Turkish case this relationship does not draw a steady line. Rather, it can show very different results depending on time and developments. Hence, the main purpose of this thesis is to identify the relationship between military culture and Turkish politics regarding our five civil-military models: the *positive-undemocratic*, *negative-undemocratic*, *positive-democratic*, *negative-democratic*, and *variable* relationships.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The leading founder and first president of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, once stated that the Turkish military should be considered as “the soul and basis” of the national institution.¹ Indeed, if one observes Turkey and makes a short investigation about its culture, history, and politics, one would see the military’s importance in Turkey. Perhaps because of this special position, the Turkish nation is defined as a “military-nation” by the experts. The impact of militarism is easily observable in Turkish language, idioms, customs and traditions, religion, celebrations, and even in children’s street games. The close ties between the military and society actually go back to the time of the earliest Turkish tribes (around the fourth century BC). In Central Asia, the Turkish ancestors were living a nomadic life. Accordingly, the members of the tribes were raised within military discipline to make their community resistant against the harsh conditions of nature, and possible conflicts. The historical sources report that both men and women were expert sword-wielders, riders, and archers. Due to this soldierly discipline, the tribes did not produce a separate armed unit. Every member of the society was simultaneously a warrior. Conceivably, this warrior lifestyle has made militarist values highly dominant in the later Turkish states. The military had also been the core institution within the first Turkish-Islamic states: the Seljuks and the Ottomans.

The strong impact of militarism in national culture caused the military to become politically keen and active. Especially, during the declining years of the Ottoman Empire, the Janissaries army often attempted rebellion against the state’s authority. Eventually, the undisciplined behaviour of the Janissaries led them to be replaced by

¹ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk* (The Speech), Ministry of Culture, 1927.

the new units, which were trained under a more secular and progressive system by imitating the methods used in the European military academies. The positivist environment within the military academy led the officers to experience a major mental revolution. The young officers tended to believe that the backwardness of the state was derived from the traditional religious law (sharia), the powers of the religious class (Ulama), and the absolute authority of the Sultan. This changing worldview caused the officers to become politically more active. The strong protest from revolutionist officers and civilian intellectuals, forced the authoritarian Sultan Abdulhamit II to twice declare a constitutional monarchy, and to eventually leave the throne. Especially, after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and re-declaration of the constitutional monarchy, the Sultan became a symbolic figure. Nevertheless, in the wake of the 1909 and 1913 coups d'état, the liberal environment that had been created after the 1908 revolution declined. Especially, after the 1913 coup d'état (known as the Raid on the Sublime Court), the revolutionist officers ruled the state under a type of "half-military dictatorship" until the end of the First World War (WWI).²

WWI marked the end of the Ottoman Empire. Being on the defeated side, the remaining lands of the Ottoman Empire – now comprising the modern Turkish territory – was shared between the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, France, and Armenia. On 19 May 1919, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – a revolutionist officer – organised the resistance known as the "Turkish Independence War" by collecting active and retired officers, as well as local guerrillas. At the end of this process, he managed to found the modern Turkish state. Following the war, Atatürk changed

² According to the leading civil-military scholar Samuel Finer, the Committee of Union and Progress era was an 'indirect-complete' military regime; see: Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, Transaction Publishers, 2002 edition, p.202. (The first edition was in 1962.)

Turkey's image from a theocratic monarchy to a secular republic. He implemented a series of reforms to make Turkey a modern Western-orientated state. Among the most important of these reforms, one may mention abolishing the Caliphate and the monarchy, replacing sharia with the modern civil law, the equality of women and men before the law, the enfranchisement of women and their right to stand for election, the replacement of Arabic letters with the Latin alphabet, the adoption of modern dress instead of religious and traditional dress, replacing the state's official religion (Islam) with the principle of secularism, and declaring Turkey as a Republic vested in the hands of public sovereignty. Atatürk's reforms were formalised under six principles as the main state doctrine: *Republicanism*, *Secularism*, *Nationalism*, *Populism*, *Statism*, and *Revolutionism*.³ Even during his lifetime, these principles were deeply embedded in military culture as "unchangeable tenets" of the new Turkish republic. Thereafter, the military intervened in democracy four times (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997) by indicating that the Kemalist principles were at risk. During these interventions, the revolutionist identity of the military began to change toward a more conservative tendency, which can be defined as "guardianship" of the status quo. Ultimately, the military's strong supervision over politics lasted until the end of the 2000s.

In 1999, Turkey was officially accepted as a potential candidate for membership of the European Union. Especially, under AKP (Justice and Development Party) rule, the military's powers were restricted in order to meet the EU criteria. Since 2011, the AKP government has been taming the military into a subordinate position. Indeed, the military's rapid depoliticisation was something which could not have been predicted. Despite events such as the EU negotiations, the 2007 website

³ In Turkish: *Cumhuriyetçilik*, *Laiklik*, *Milliyetçilik*, *Halkçilik*, *Devletçilik*, *İnkılapçılık*.

memorandum, and the Ergenekon-Balyoz indictments accelerating this process, the experts have not been able to give a certain answer why or how the military stepped back. Is it a tactical manoeuvring to hide praetorian tendencies, or is there a change in the institution's mentality toward depoliticisation? What may be its future outcomes? Under the current conditions, these questions cannot be answered in a satisfactory way. But, if one considers the deep relations between the military, society, and politics, any change in military policies is likely to make important changes in national politics. From among the plethora of explanatory factors that have been used in analysing Turkish civil-military (CIV-MIL) relations, this thesis employs military culture as the main explanatory notion. While coding the nature of the relationship between military culture and politics, the thesis also aims to understand whether or not there is a change in military culture toward political neutrality.

In general, military culture can be defined as the main *ethoi* – including ideas, beliefs, symbols, rituals, and values – that shape the worldview of a nation's military.⁴ These *ethoi* shapes the officer's main positioning toward outside events. Military cultures can be a combination of several factors, including social culture, strategic concerns, historical experiences, and religious values. Due to the existence of more than one “resistant” factor, they are likely to be rooted very deeply and cannot easily be changed. Even in the greatest national revolutions, militaries have

⁴ Indeed, the *Cambridge Dictionary* defines the word ‘ethos’ as: ‘The set of beliefs, ideas, etc. about the social behaviour and relationships of a person or group’. Hence, it is possible to use the word in a more comprehensive format than Snider's. Thus, this thesis uses martial *ethoi* to refer to every type of variable, including ideas, norms, values, beliefs, ideals, ideologies, rituals, objects, persons, disciplines, and similar factors that create the dynamics of military cultures. For an exact dictionary meaning of the word see: Cambridge Dictionary, *Ethos*, Cambridge University Press, 2016. Available at: <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/ethos> (The plural form of *ethos* is ‘*ethoi*’, which is also used throughout the thesis when different sets of *ethos* combine together. ‘Professional Ethos’ is always used in singular form to refer to the combination of aforementioned norms and principles. On the other hand, ‘military ethos’ or ‘military *ethoi*’, and ‘martial ethos’ or ‘martial *ethoi*’ are used in both singular and plural forms, depending on the context.)

tended to be the institutions which do not experience much change. One senior US marine, General Paul Van Riper, defines this resistant nature by stating that “military cultures are like great ocean liners or aircraft carriers: they require an enormous effort to change direction”.⁵ Indeed, there are well-known cases that may evidence the unwavering nature of military cultures. For instance, the strong Prussian discipline, namely rational understanding and professional mentality, remained in the German armies for a long time without change.⁶ Similarly, the ancient Samurai culture of the earliest Japanese warriors led the first modern Japanese armies to be highly political.⁷ Also, the liberal and democratic ethos that have been embedded in the armies of the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) prevent these armies from interfering in civilian matters. Yet, these cases do not mean that military cultures never change; they may change, but doing so generally involves long processes. However, some extraordinary events, such as revolutions, war experiences, economic deadlock, technological innovations, and charismatic leadership, can cause more sudden changes.

Turkey is a remarkable case, which can provide significant academic clues for how military culture can emerge, and under what conditions it may experience changes. That is to say, since the first decade of the nineteenth century, Turkish military culture has seen transitions between three identities, namely: *revolutionism*, *guardianship*, and *depolitical*. The earliest example of this division was the strife between the *Mekteplis* and *Alaylis* that began in the late nineteenth century. After the 1908 revolution, the Mektepli/Alayli dichotomy continued to exist between the Unionist (Ittihatci) and the Saviour (Halaskar Zabitan) officers. Accordingly, after

⁵ General Paul Van Riper, USMC, July 1995. Quoted in: M. Williamson, *The Future of American Military Culture: Does Military Culture Matter?*, Orbis, 2000: 28.

⁶ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Oxford University Press, 1957, pp.30-34, 99-100.

⁷ Ibid., 123, 125, 135.

the 1913 coup d'état, the revolutionist officers gained a permanent victory over the monarchist officers and, eventually, led the nation to a republican regime.

Indeed, since the beginning of the parliamentary regime in 1908 – or, in its traditional title, the Second Constitutional Monarchy – Turkey has been an arena of strife between the liberals and monarchists. Thus, the military could not stay away from this development, and became involved as ‘the principal actor’. Especially, the period between 1908-1913 saw a power struggle between the supporters and opponents of the new parliamentary regime.⁸ More or less, this strife became embedded in Turkish political culture and military culture and continued to be present under different names and ideologies in the later terms.

Related to the arguments above, the history of the Turkish military is infamous for its internal political disagreements. If one observes the history, there is always one group that is more conservative or moderate and another group that is more radical and revolutionary: the Janissaries versus Nizami Cedit; Mekteplis versus Alaylis; Unionists versus Saviours; Republicans versus Monarchists; Juntaists versus Democrats; Nationalist Kemalists versus Moderate Kemalists; and so on. These examples can be broadened under different names and groupings. Thus, many strict mechanisms have been established within the military to remove officers who have political interests. The vital point here, for the purpose of this research, is that the dominant group within the military used every opportunity to eliminate the opponent group either by side-lining or expelling them. Interestingly, the direction of Turkish politics also changed in step with the dominant group's political purposes.

⁸ For a relevant analysis see: Aykut Kansu, *Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey*, Iletisim Press, 2016, p.11.

At this point, I have contextualised the ongoing identity strife within the military as ‘crossing identities’, because, within this thesis, we will see an ongoing power struggle between two different ideologies that dominated military culture since the beginning of twentieth century. Sometimes, these ideologies will be blurred by alien ideologies and will become intertwined with each other. As was suggested by Samuel Huntington (1957), most scholars tend to perceive military ideologies as ‘conservative’ with respect to their hierarchical, disciplinary, and altruist ethoi.⁹ The uncertainty of the enemy’s next step, according to Huntington, makes militaries highly sceptical and causes them to demand large armies. Conversely, the anti-militarist nature of liberal societies makes them opponents to large militaries and conscription. For these reasons, militaries tend to be conservative. Yet, the Turkish case disproves Huntington in that a liberal, secular, and modernist officership class guided Turkey through a similar universal process as the modern secular-democratic European states. Following the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, democratisation and secularisation became the main tenets of military discourse. In the second half of the twentieth century, the Turkish military intervened in politics four times to maintain the secular and democratic characteristics of Turkey and created essential tools to make Turkey a modern capitalist nation state.

Theoretically, military identity and its relationship with political ideologies should be the research area of military culture studies. Yet, in the literature, the studies in this vein are relatively limited. As was the case with Huntington, many scholars tend to see militaries as naturally conservative and status quoist. At this point, one of the earliest studies to place an emphasis on the progressive and modernist side of military cultures was by Amos Perlmutter (1977). In his classic, *Military and Politics*

⁹ Huntington (1957), see: the political ideologies and militaries in Chapter 4.

in *Modern Times*, Perlmutter separated the characteristic features of modern armies into three: 'revolutionary', 'praetorian', and 'professional'. According to his theory, the revolutionary militaries act together with a political revolutionary party with which they share the same revolutionist ideals; and after the revolution, the military subordinates itself to the party. That is to say, the revolutionary military shares the same ideology with the pioneer party of the revolution.¹⁰ In other words, it is not always true that they are conservative and traditionalist, as Huntington suggested. Instead, they can be liberal, socialist, fascist, or religious depending on the character of the regime.

The praetorian armies, on the other hand, are traditionally closer to Huntington's categorisation, in that they tend to be traditionalist, praetorianist, and anti-Communist.¹¹ As one can see from this scheme, there are similarities between Perlmutter's model and the Turkish case. Yet, unlike Perlmutter, I preferred to use 'guardian' instead of 'praetorian' given the speciality of the Turkish case. Although Perlmutter's definition of praetorian mostly explains the second stage of Turkish military culture, still there are some differences. This is because, in Turkey, the identity change after the 1950s was not completely against the revolutionist ideals of Kemalist ideology. The military still preserved its commitment to secularism and democratisation; but, given the NATO influence, anti-Communism and capitalism are also embedded in Turkish military culture while eliminating the left-orientated officers from the military.

The high political nature of the Turkish military, on the other hand, should be analysed by taking into account two motives: the first motive is the impact of

¹⁰ Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians and Revolutionary Soldiers*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977, p.9-17.

¹¹ Ibid. (see Table 1.1, p.16).

militarism within the society; the second motive is the revolutionary ethos, which penetrated into military culture during the declining years of the Ottomans. Perhaps these motives caused both civilians and officers to consider the military as the “principal” institution of the state. Indeed, there is some historical evidence that supports this belief, because the military has always undertaken important roles in every attempted revolution, sometimes being the “organiser”. Indeed, Atatürk himself recalled this opinion as the national perception when he said “the Turkish nation has always looked to its military ... as the leader of the movements ... to achieve its lofty national ideals”.¹² On the other hand, this line of national perception has perhaps had negative impacts on Turkey’s political culture.¹³ In other words, strong commitment to the military and militarism may be one reason that made civilians “hesitant” and made the officers “confident”, especially during national deadlocks.

By and large, the institutional behaviours of the Turkish military should be analysed by defining the aforementioned revolutionary ethos that has been rooted in its culture. This ethos has perhaps left a self-perception or, rather, a dogmatic belief that the officers should take responsibility whenever politicians were incapable of governing the state. Again, this possible perception can be the outcome of the militarist past of the Turkish nation, as well as the values and meanings that the people have imposed on the military centuries ago. In every act of the military, one can see the impacts of this revolutionist self-perception. Nonetheless, given the aforementioned reasons, changes in military culture tend to affect Turkish politics

¹² Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk’un Soylev ve Demeçleri* (The speeches and statements of Atatürk), Ankara: The Institute of the History of Turkish Revolution, 1952.

¹³ Political culture can be seen as a concept to define beliefs, ideas, assumptions and emotions that govern the political behaviour of people within a political system. See: Jo Freedman, ‘The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties’, *Political Science Quarterly* (1986), Vol. 101, No.3, Fall 1986, pp. 327-356. For a detailed analysis of the political culture concept, see: 65-68.

radically. As a result, the purpose of this thesis can be summarised as exploring the origins, characteristics, and outcomes of the relationship between military culture and Turkish politics. While discussing the complex and continuous relations between military, state, and society, the thesis will also seek for the answers to questions such as: Why does military culture show changes from time to time? What kind of political factors trigger changes in the officer ethos and what kind of factors have started current military depoliticisation? The thesis will be divided into seven chapters. The first four chapters will give the purpose and theoretical and conceptual backgrounds of the thesis. The subsequent chapters will analyse the process under three different case study headings: Revolutionism (1908-1945); Guardianship (1945-1999); and Toward Depoliticisation? (1999-2013). Within this first chapter, the general framework of the thesis will be outlined. Firstly, the chapter identifies the main research questions. Secondly, it defines the suggestions, contributions, and methods of the thesis.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The Gap: The military's role in Turkish politics has been analysed by a large variety of disciplines including history, sociology, politics, and international relations, as well as security and strategy. These studies have explored several factors to explain the complex relations between the military, politics, and society in Turkey. Yet, when one examines the literature, one may observe that the number of studies that have used military culture as an explanatory factor is relatively limited. Hence, this study aims to make a contribution to the field by employing military culture as an explanatory factor with reference to Samuel Huntington's definition of professional military ethic. Accordingly, the key research question, for which an answer will be sought, is this:

KEY RESEARCH QUESTION: What is the relationship between military culture and Turkish politics?

Definition: The key question connects with five analytical models that have been developed to define CIV-MIL relations. Hence, the research question directly addresses these models by questioning which of these five best defines Turkey. The models are *positive-democratic*, *negative-democratic*, *positive-undemocratic*, *negative-undemocratic*, and *variable*. These models are particularly developed to consider the military's relationship with democratic regimes. Related to this, military culture is taken as the leading aspect that shapes a military's attitude toward civilians. Definitions of these models will be given in the subsequent parts of this thesis. While discussing the relationship between military culture and Turkish politics, the questions below will also be evaluated:

- How can one define military culture? How it is related to CIV-MIL relations?
- What is the definition of professionalism in CIV-MIL relations? How should a professional military behave in a democratic regime?
- What are the foundations of Turkish military culture?
- Has the Turkish military depoliticised? And, if so, what may the driving factors be?

1.3 WHY THE RESEARCH IS IMPORTANT

1.3.1 Why Military Culture?

Military culture is an explanatory factor in CIV-MIL relations which aims to explain that relationship by analysing the “traditions, values, customs, and leadership

behaviours” of the militaries.¹⁴ Although scholars have used similar definitions, such as “military ethic”, “military honour”, “military style”, “military tradition”, and “organisational culture”, none of these descriptions completely meet the meaning that has been imposed on the military culture. This is because military culture is more specific than organisational culture (since the latter can refer to any type of organisation), and more comprehensive than ethic or tradition (these two terms perhaps represent several parts of military culture, but not the whole). Military culture can briefly be explained as a combination of several *martial ethoi* which bring its members a basic perception of “self” and “others”. These ethoi can be referring to several values, ideas, ideals, sacred objects and persons, and rituals, as well as political ideologies. The martial ethos tends to be shaped by various internal and external stimulants, namely, historical experiences, bureaucratic interests, strategical concerns, and political culture. Thus, military culture can be employed to understand each type of external and internal activity of the institution, including politics.¹⁵

The military culture concept has had an increasing influence in the CIV-MIL literature since the 1990s, especially in the United States.¹⁶ Yet, in Turkey, military culture has not been broadly analysed. Rather, scholars have focused on various areas of military sociology, such as masculinity, life in the barracks, homosexuality, discrimination, non-Muslims, the military mentality, ideology, values, ideas, ideals, and similar aspects. Although all of these concepts are related to military culture, none of them represent military culture on their own. Rather, military culture is a

¹⁴ Peter D. Feaver, ‘Civil-Military Relations’, *Annual Review Political Science*, 2, 1999: 211-41, p.233. For the importance of the military culture variable in determining a nation’s civil-military relations, for instance, it can be seen in: Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, p.11.

¹⁵See: Anthony King, ‘Toward a European Military Culture?’, *Defence Studies*, Vol.6, No.3, September 2006, p.259.

¹⁶ Feaver (1999): 233.

comprehensive concept which comprises all of these constituent parts and so shapes officers' political behaviour. Although there are several works that discuss military culture, this coverage tends to be limited to the form of short paragraphs or chapters, as well as small booklets. Hence, this thesis has a distinct difference to these other works in that it analyses the concept not only more substantially but also more theoretically, by taking into account relevant academic works. Additionally, this thesis examines military culture's relationship to CIV-MIL relations under a systematic discipline. That is to say, the thesis divides military culture into three categories (*revolutionary*, *guardian*, and *depolitical*) by considering the Turkish case.¹⁷ Additionally, the thesis separates the relationship between military culture and politics into five models (*positive-democratic*, *negative-democratic*, *positive-undemocratic*, *negative-undemocratic*, and *variable*) regarding its impact on democratic regimes.

Military cultures tend to be in mutual interaction with civilian, political, and strategic cultures. Hence, this variable puts "the role of culture (both civilian and military)" into the centre of relevant researches.¹⁸ In advanced democracies, military cultures are dominated by a *professional ethos*. Professional ethos refers to the rooted beliefs, ideas, and ideals that prevent militaries from interfering in politics, and convince them to consider *civilian supremacy* as part of professional discipline. Conversely, in political armies, military cultures are dominated by an *ideological ethos*. The

¹⁷ For a relatively similar categorisation see: Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians and Revolutionary Soldiers*, pp.9-17. (As aforementioned, in this dissertation, revolutionary acts are also categorised under the title of 'praetorian' in that, according to my classification, both guardian and revolutionist armies are considered interventionist; the difference is that the revolutionist officers intend to create a new regime while the guardians aim to protect the current regime and the status quo. In addition to this, in my categorisation, the military ideology and its relationship with the regime type are taken as the main criteria. However, Perlmutter employs other variables such as conscription, hierarchical status, and corporatism while he is making his categorisations, which I did not take into account. For further debate on this issue see: Chapter 3.

¹⁸ Feaver (1999): 233.

ideological ethos can be appeared as a rooted belief, ideal, or loyalty to a certain type of political view. This ideological ethos can be both written and unwritten, or a mixture of both. For instance, in Turkey, military ideology has “rhetorically” appeared as *Kemalism* (Atatürkism), which is driven by the six principles: *Secularism, Republicanism, Nationalism, Statism, Revolutionism, and Populism*.¹⁹ In China and the Soviet Union, the ideological ethoi were formed according to the party doctrine of the Communist Party. In the Indonesian army, the ideological ethos is embedded in the state doctrine ‘Pancasila’, and in the Japanese army, before World War II, the military ideology was affected by the ‘Bushido’ doctrine of ancient Samurai warriors.²⁰

There is large variety of scholarly debates around the main CIV-MIL problems, such as “what a professional military is” and “what separation of powers is”. Some of the works in this area concentrate on *normative* factors, while some others focus on *rational* factors.²¹ This thesis follows the first path by employing Samuel Huntington’s normative theory. In his landmark study *The Soldier and the State* (1957), Huntington argues that a professional military should have its own autonomous area apart from the civilian world, and should stay politically neutral and passive. Huntington titles this normative discipline as the *professional ethic*. The professional ethic enables the military to develop expertise within its own field, increasing its combat effectiveness.²²

One important purpose of the thesis is to bring a different approach to the CIV-MIL puzzle by connecting the military culture variable to Huntington’s professional ethic.

¹⁹ Walter Posch, ‘Ideology and the Ongoing Crisis in Turkey’, *European Union Institute for Security Studies*. Available at: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/de/publikationen/detail/article/ideology-and-the-ongoing-crisis-in-turkey/> (accessed: 13 June 2007).

²⁰ For the details see: Chapter 2.

²¹ Feaver (1999): 212-213.

²² See: Huntington (1957): 83.

As aforementioned, military cultures are shaped by a specific martial ethos, which then shapes officers' general worldview. These ethoi emerge, develop, and are embedded within long processes and are not changed easily. Given the role that they have played in history, identifying the military ethoi is especially important in order to understand Turkish politics. The role that the Turkish military played in the nation's history was summarised by Atatürk with these arguably "idealist" words: "leading the nation for achieving its lofty goals".²³

The political activism of the Turkish military developed many centuries ago. Beginning with the earliest Turkish states, the strong influence of militarism in Turkish societies, and the militaries' roles as nation builders, can be observed. The strong linkage between society and military caused soldiers to be politically keen, and ideologically divided. As a result of this political nature, and the variety of different worldviews, military culture has experienced transformations between revolutionism, guardianship, and depoliticisation. Yet again, this thesis argues that the military's "half-unofficial" political legitimacy does not only come from laws and regulations.²⁴ It also comes from the values and meanings that the Turkish society imposed on the military and militarism centuries ago. Both the officers and civilians seem, perhaps reluctantly, to have accepted this legitimacy.

In addition to the militarist values of society, the victory in the Liberation War further increased the military's importance in the eyes of people. As has been suggested by the birthright principle of Koonings and Kruijt (2002) in the CIV-MIL

²³ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *The speeches and statements of Atatürk*, Ankara: The Institute of the History of Turkish Revolution, 1952.

²⁴ Although there are some regulations in the military's Internal Service Act (1961) and the constitution which impose on the military the duty to protect the nation against internal and external enemies, these regulations are very open to subjective interpretations. The military has tended to use these regulations as an 'excuse' to intervene. Hence, 'half-unofficial' seems to be the right word to describe this case.

literature, the military has had a type of “unwritten legitimacy” in politics as being the “nation builder”.²⁵ Accordingly, the military declared that the protection of Kemalist principles is its duty before anything else. Arguably, the main factor behind this perception is the rooted, dogmatic belief that “politicians care for their own personal interests before the national ones”. Therefore, politicians were “not trustable” and had to be supervised by the military, whether they were doing their duty appropriately or not.²⁶

Briefly, one cannot define military culture without considering the militarist past of the nation. These two concepts (military culture and civil culture) are deeply intertwined. The words of Ilker Basbug and Isik Kosaner (former chief commanders) support this argument:

*The fundamental source of power... (for the Turkish military) ... is
the nation's trust and love...*

(Ilker Basbug, 2008).²⁷

*The TAF cannot be compared to the armed forces of any other
country due to ... the national and sentimental values of our public*

(Isik Kosaner, 2010).²⁸

²⁵ See the comparison between the Algerian Army and the Turkish army in: Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, London and New York: Zed Books, pp.179, 201.

²⁶ Salih Akyurek, Serap Koydemir, Esra Atalay, Adnan Bicaksiz, *Sivil-Asker Iliskileri ve Ordu Toplum Mesafesi* (Civil-Military Relations and the Distance of Military and Society), Ankara: Bilgesam Press, 2014, p.216. Textual Note: For Turkish sources referenced in this thesis, I have given firstly the original Turkish titles, and then appended their English translations in brackets. For subsequent uses of the same sources, they appear only by their English translations. In the bibliography, I give only the original titles. For the sources that have been translated into English in commercially available/official editions, I have preferred the English titles. Additionally, for those sources that are globally known by their original titles, such as *Nutuk* and *Mein Kampf*, I have used these original titles. Lastly, as Atatürk is at the very heart of this thesis, I have used the Turkish spelling in at least this instance; for other ‘non-English’ names, titles, and phrases, I have favoured the ‘Anglicised’ spelling to prevent confusion.

²⁷ Zeki Sarigil, ‘Civil-Military Relations Beyond Dichotomy: With Special Reference to Turkey’, *Turkish Studies*, 12, No. 2, 2011, p.274 (emphasis by the author).

These speeches evidence the notion that commanders put forward so-called “strong emotional ties” between the military and society in order to seek public support against politicians. To put it simply, when considering whether one should apply military culture to analyse Turkish CIV-MIL relations, one can draw on the ex-Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Ozkok’s statement below:

*The Turkish military has some unwritten rules, because some rules are not decided by laws and procedures. (But) both sides (can discuss) whether those unwritten rules can change or not...*²⁹

(Hilmi Ozkok, 2007)

In this statement, Hilmi Ozkok talks about some “unwritten rules”, distinct from written ones, and he implies that implementing civilian supremacy is only possible by taking into account these rules within a mutual agreement. These unwritten rules can be taken as the combination of the main ethoi that create military culture. Thus, decoding this set of military ethoi can be beneficial toward a sufficient understanding the Turkish CIV-MIL relationship.

²⁸ The Turkish General Staff, ‘Isik Kusaner’s speech at the Chief of Staff’s Transfer of Duty Ceremony’. Available at: www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2010/org_isikkosaner_d_vrtslkonusmasi_27082010.html (accessed: August 27, 2010). (In English, ‘Commander in Chief’ is generally used as a title for the top person in the military. However, in the Turkish army there are two different positions: ‘Baskomutanlık’ and ‘Genelkurmay Baskanligi’. The title of Baskomutanlık was held by the Sultan in the Ottoman Empire and is now used by the President of the Republic of Turkey. Baskomutanlık refers to the ultimate commandership of the Turkish army and is a higher position than the Genelkurmay Baskanı. Baskomutanlık also became the position of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the Liberation War. Therefore, Baskomutanlık has been translated as ‘the Commander in Chief’ and Genelkurmay Baskanligi was translated as ‘the Chief of the General Staff’ throughout the thesis, to show the difference between the two titles).

²⁹ Ozkok makes this statement in an interview with the journalist Fikret Bila. The full text of the interview is available in: Fikret Bila, *Komutanlar Cephesi (Commanders’ Front)*, Dogan Kitap, 2007, p.185.

1.3.2 Why Turkey?

One of the purposes of this thesis is to bring a different approach to the CIV-MIL discussion by connecting Huntington's professional ethic to the military culture concept. Hence, the evolution of the Turkish military from political activism to depoliticisation can present a variety of examples in that context. When one observes the history, one may see the impacts of strong militarism in the Turkish societies. The earliest Turks were living a nomadic life and were being trained, from their childhood, as warriors. Both men and women learned how to use weapons and how to ride horses. Hence, militarism, sympathy for soldiers, and the profession of soldiery were deeply embedded in Turkish culture centuries ago. Also, historians note that the early Turkish communities did not have a specific military class – every member of society had to be a warrior simultaneously. This militarist tradition was also inherited by the successor Turkish states, including the Seljuks, Ottomans, and modern Turkey. Therefore, both the Turkish academics and military authorities regularly use the definition of “military nation” to indicate that military culture and civilian culture are mixed with and intertwined with each other.

Due to the aforementioned reasons, the military has remained as politically keen and active since the earlier Ottoman centuries. Yet, the developments during the declining years of the Ottoman Empire brought radical changes within military culture by turning it into a revolutionary army. Starting from the seventeenth century, the Ottoman armies began to become outdated compared to the European armies. In contradiction to the developments in science and technology in Europe, the Ottoman Empire, under the strict oppression of traditionalism, entirely closed its doors to modernisation. Discipline and order had collapsed in the military. The decline of the army continued until the removal of the traditional Janissaries army.

After the removal of the Janissaries army in 1826, the modern military units were arranged according to the European system. The reforms in the education system, technology, and the art of war started a mental secularisation among the young officers. In particular, the movement known as the “Young Turks”, which combined revolutionist officers and civil intellectuals, opened the path toward founding the current, secular Turkey. The Young Turks firstly forced Sultan Abdulhamit II to declare a constitutional monarchy by carrying out the 1908 revolution.³⁰ Then, they overthrew him, after suppressing the monarchist 31 March 1909 rebellion. Indeed, the 1908 revolution brought a short-term experience of democracy to the Ottoman state with a constitution, parliament, different parties and a symbolic monarch. However, the 1909, 1912, and 1913 coups d’état blocked this process while increasing the influence of the military. Especially, after the 1913 coup d’état following the Sublime Court Riot, the state was ruled by a half-military dictatorship. Through the support of revolutionist officers, the secular CUP (Committee of Union and Progress – Ittihad ve Terakki) party suppressed opponents by applying to authoritarian methods. The dictatorship of the CUP ended in 1918 following the defeat of the Ottoman state in WWI.

Immediately after the defeat in WWI, a military elite organised the Turkish Independence War (1919-1923) under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), and managed to establish current Turkey as a secular republic. Accordingly, Turkey’s political system rapidly changed, after a series of reforms. Among the most important reforms were the abolition of the monarchy, adopting the secularism principle, the equality of women and men before the law, the enfranchisement of

³⁰ For a very detailed analysis of the 1908 revolution, together with its causes and consequences see: Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*.

women and their right to stand for election, and adopting the Latin alphabet and Western dress.

Theoretically, Atatürk kept the military away from political strife during his lifetime, but also he managed to hold full authority over the commanding elite by applying political manoeuvrings. Nevertheless, the military's role in founding Turkey and its deterrent image as "guardian of revolutions" can easily be observed. Founding fathers Atatürk and İsmet İnönü were, indeed, retired commanders of the Liberation War. Also, the coercive power of the military was occasionally used during the implementation of the revolutions. Thus, in the further chapters, historical examples will often be given to indicate the military's role in the Turkish revolution.

During the Cold War years, the military's political activism began to give it a more conservative and authoritarian image, as the "guardians of the status quo". In particular, a claim of responsibility for protecting the regime that they had founded became observable in the military discourse. Similarly, the six principles of Atatürk appeared as a kind of "military ideology" in their statements.³¹ The Turkish military has intervened in democracy four times since the Independence War – in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 – by stating that it was its constitutional duty to "guard" Kemalist principles.³² Nonetheless, starting from the Helsinki European Council in 1999, the military was tamed by the European Union (EU) reforms. The process of depoliticisation accelerated after the unsuccessful website memorandum (2007) and the Ergenekon-Balyoz Indictments (2008-2010). Especially, during Necdet Özal's tenure as Chief of the General Staff (2011-2015), the military completely stopped

³¹ Walter Posch, 'Ideology and the Ongoing Crisis in Turkey', 2007.

³² After the 1960 military intervention, the military authorities regulated Article 35 of Internal Service Act, which gave the military the duty of protecting the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish constitution. The article was redesigned in 2013 by limiting the military's responsibility to defending the state against external threats.

giving political statements by working in harmony with the government. In this regard, the military has ostensibly appeared as “professional” in Huntington’s term, which is similar to the Western models. However, the question of whether the Turkish military has actually been professionalised or not is still debatable. Given the freshness of the case, sufficient empirical data for answering this question is limited. Hence, at this stage, I will employ Huntington’s theory more as a criterion by which to compare the Turkish military’s level of depoliticisation to the professional armies in West. Again, because of the difficulty of predicting whether the Turkish military has actually been professionalised or not, I will define this last stage of military culture as “depoliticised” (or “depolitical”) instead of “professional” to prevent confusion. While making this classification, I will also seek for an answer as to which one of the objective or subjective models best explains the current depoliticisation.

Overall, Turkey provides the researcher with varied case studies to analyse the nature of military cultures and their relationship with Huntington’s professional ethic. The transition periods – from revolutionism to guardianship, politicisation to depoliticisation – can be supportive in understanding how the officer ethoi have emerged, developed, and changed, and under what conditions they can evolve toward Huntington’s professional ethic.

1.3.3 Why Huntington?

Throughout the thesis, Huntington’s definition of professionalism and his ideas of CIV-MIL separation will be taken as the main theories to test depoliticisation in military culture. There is one general and one specific reason for choosing Huntington. The general reason is that Samuel Huntington’s definition of professionalism, in his work *The Soldier and the State* (1957), stands in a special

position within the relevant academic debates.³³ His definition was not only one of the earliest contributions to the literature, but it also opened a new theoretical field. Before Huntington, military professionalism tended to be understood as meaning a well-trained, disciplinary, and technically expert army.³⁴ Therefore, for instance, Prussian military discipline was exemplified as a model of professionalism. Arguably, the relationship of professional officers with politics had not been much analysed, academically, under a theoretical framework.³⁵ Huntington made a new contribution to the understanding of professionalism, which requires officers to be ethically above politics, and neutral.³⁶ His objective control model offered that an autonomous expertise area should be created for the militaries. By this means, the officers will be professional and will not interfere in the civilian sphere. This theory can be understood as *separation of powers* by drawing certain borders between civilians and militaries.³⁷ After Huntington's thesis, there was a sudden increase in relevant works. Most of the subsequent theories have been developed by taking Huntington's work as the main criteria and either by criticising or supporting his ideas.³⁸

One may easily observe that Huntington's theory always comes onto the agenda at some point when scholars analyse CIV-MIL relations. Arguably, Huntington defines

³³ As an example to evidence how Huntington's professionalism is used as the main definition in the literature see: Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, Zed Books, 2002: 17; Suzanne C. Nielsen, 'American Civil-Military Relations Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*', *International Affairs* 88, No.2, March 2012: 369.

³⁴ See: Peter D. Feaver, 'The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control', *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.23, No.2, Winter 1996:149-178, p.158. Also see: Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, p.ix.

³⁵ Perlmutter (1977): 32.

³⁶ Feaver (1996): 158.

³⁷ Huntington (1957): 83-85.

³⁸ See: Feaver (1999): 212 (Although military subordination had always been the main case since the earliest CIV-MIL studies, Huntington's work in 1957 might be taken as the first study which broadly analysed the paths to military depoliticisation by employing a theoretical framework. Also, Clausewitz's *On War* (1876) has had a special place in the literature. But his work mostly concentrated on political nature of war and militaries; rather than civil-military separation).

the most ideal CIV-MIL model, which normally can be very hard to implement, even for the most mature democracies.³⁹ Due to the military's political nature as a security organisation, and its close relations with the politicians, it is highly contested whether or not it is likely to block military partiality in politics. If it is possible, what can be the best way for achieving and maintaining this? At this point, scholars have developed several criticisms against Huntington by arguing that, in several countries, professionalisation of the militaries could not prevent them from politicisation.⁴⁰

Considering the aforementioned criticisms, this thesis argues for Huntington's professionalism by taking into account the concept of military culture. That is to say, the officers should adopt the professional ethos as a mental discipline, and should stay in their own, autonomous area. The military's institutional subordination to civilians may be maintained through the ministries of Defence or Security. To achieve this aim, a professional ethos should be embedded in military culture irreversibly. The injection of a professional ethos into military culture can be achieved in several ways. First and foremost, the education curriculum in academies may be shaped according to the civilian supremacy principle.⁴¹ This practice should be supplemented by regular inspection, by civilians, over the education in academies. Naturally, civilian supervision should be limited to the lectures and course books related to politics. By this way, Huntington's ideal can be achieved and maintained, because, unless the officer absorbs political neutrality as a mental discipline, he can still engage in political strife despite what he has received from professional training

³⁹ See: Desch (1999): 4, 14.

⁴⁰ For instance: the Chilean army (late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries) and Greek and Turkish armies (after NATO membership). The criticisms of Huntington will be elaborated in the next chapter. Hence, a short introduction only has been given in this chapter, to provide an outline of the issue.

⁴¹ Indeed, the leading civil-military scholar Samuel Finer argues that 'professionalism' is not strong enough by itself for maintaining civilian control, because the military should also absorb the idea of 'the principle of the supremacy of civilian power', which, according to Finer, is a different concept to professionalism. See: Samuel Finer, *Man on the Horseback* (2002 edition with Jay Stanley's new introduction), Transaction Publishers, p.28. For a detailed argument of the subject, see Chapter 2.

in academies. Perhaps this is the reason why some armies still remained political after having professional military training. This line of thinking also requires the separation of *professional mentality* from *professional training*, because the former refers to a *normative* discipline while the latter refers to a *technical* expertise in a certain profession.

Additionally, the specific reason for choosing Huntington is the case study's relevance. The Turkish military has had long-term relations with the Western armies. Starting from the Ottoman Empire's last decades, the officers considered the Western system as an ideal model for increasing military effectiveness. After the foundation of Turkey, the military's long-term flirtation with the Western military system continued through NATO membership. During the Cold War era, the Turkish military was in close relations with the American military. Both armies conducted mutual operations and campaigns. Naturally, Turkish officers benefited from the professional ethos of the American military. Professionalisation in the young officers became observable shortly after NATO membership. Indeed, this change created a mental gap between the younger and older officers during the early 1950s. Close partnership with the NATO armies has continued during the post-Cold War era. In the literature, one can notice that most of the relevant scholars take Huntington's writings into account while analysing the Turkish case. More interestingly, the same approach is not only used by the academics but also by the military authorities. The former Chief of the General Staff Ilker Basbug argues that Huntington's professionalism, and his objective control model, should be the military's main goal, for a better democracy in Turkey:

According to Huntington, the most effective control over the military is "objective control". Objective control means rendering

the military a professional institution and thus putting a distance between the military and politics... (The military's duty is) determining the military's needs and formulating policy options and proposing them to the civilian government, and implementing the relevant decisions made by the government.⁴² (Ilker Basbug, 14 April 2009)

Basbug's speech, excerpted above, can be taken as the military's formal view, as he was the supreme commander of the military at the time. Basbug explicitly considers that Huntington's objective control model is an ideal blueprint for democratic CIV-MIL relations. He agrees with Huntington by maintaining that the military should isolate itself from politics, by staying within its own, autonomous area. The relationship with politics should be limited to implementing the duties given by politicians and submitting regular reports about military requirements. That requires the military to give its ideas about current issues, but leaves the last word to civilians.

1.4 WHAT ARE THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH?

1.4.1 Propositions

The main suggestions that the thesis aims to address are as follows:

P1 *There is a mutual interaction between military culture and Turkish politics. The nature of this relationship can be very variable in terms of regime type, and it can make either positive or negative impacts on democracy.*

Definition:

The primary suggestion of the thesis is to evidence the variable interactions between military culture and Turkish politics by observing their impacts on democracy.

⁴² See: Chapter 7.

Employing the relevant historical examples, by considering the typology of five analytical models, the thesis will investigate the changeable relations between these two variables. As will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, military politicisation can bring different results at different times. Turkish military culture shows a changeable nature regarding its approach to politics. Firstly, the military founded the republic and established the democracy – but then it has frequently violated that democracy. This paradoxical situation indeed presents the researcher with important clues to understand the nature of military cultures. The changing trends within military culture with regard to its three different identities – revolutionism, guardianship, and depoliticisation – and their reflections on changing Turkish politics will give us varied case studies, to analyse how the officer ethoi emerges, develops, and roots itself in military cultures, and how this rooted ethoi shapes the officer's approach to politics.

P2 *According to Atatürk, the military's separation from politics and its subordination to civilians are necessary for maintaining a stable parliamentary system and effective military power.*

Definition:

The secondary suggestion of the thesis is Atatürk's idea of separating the military from politics. This is an important issue for Turkish CIV-MIL relations. Since the Independence War (1919-1923), Atatürk has been the symbolic and connective figure of military culture. After each military intervention, the military defended its actions by stating that it was their constitutional duty to protect Atatürk's reforms from internal and external threats. Hence, Atatürk's main ideas about the relevant issues will be analysed in the further chapters to discover whether the military was right or wrong, while rooting their actions on a Kemalist legacy. The CIV-MIL

scholars in Turkey have different theories about Atatürk's ideas on military politicisation and the guardianship of revolutions. By considering his speech in Konya (1931), one group of authors suggest that, according to Atatürk, the Turkish military is the "ultimate" guardian of revolutions. The details of this speech will be discussed in Chapter 3. On the other hand, a second group of scholars contend that Atatürk believed in the necessity of CIV-MIL separation. This thesis also defends the second group's view. That is to say, Atatürk was against military involvements in politics. There are varied examples to evidence this idea. Atatürk's sayings, writings, and practices give us clear ideas about his main views on that issue. The most well-known evidence is Atatürk's 'Speech to the Youth' (1927). In that speech, Atatürk directly speaks to the next generations by stating that the guardian of the Republic must be the Turkish youth, not the military. Other than this speech, there is other evidence, which will be presented in the relevant chapters. Accordingly, Atatürk's ideas on the theory of war, soldiery, militarism, and CIV-MIL relations will be broadly evaluated by comparing them with the relevant scholars' ideas, including those of Huntington and Clausewitz.

P3 *Huntington's objective control model can be a more sustainable model of civil-military relations by injecting the professional ethos (normative professionalism) into military cultures. This requires the officer to accept political neutrality as a primary obligation for a stable democracy. After embedding a liberal and democratic ethos, the officer perceives military depoliticisation as a crucial part of professional mental discipline.*

Definition:

Huntington's separation theory has been discussed extensively by the following scholars. The scholars have made their own contributions either by defending or

criticising Huntington. Nonetheless, Huntington's theory has remained the most influential one in the relevant studies. Even the critical thinkers have had more or less similar results with Huntington.⁴³ The reason for this is that Huntington built his theory by considering a number of factors, such as social values, foreign affairs, military culture, political culture, and institutional mechanisms.⁴⁴ As a result, it is not easy to develop a new theory with completely neglects his opinions.⁴⁵

One problem with Huntington's theory tends to be the methodology.⁴⁶ In other words, how to embed a professional ethic into an officer's mind. Huntington claims that separating civilian and military spheres will maximise military professionalism, and a professional ethic will emerge as a natural result. That is to say, the institutional autonomy of the military in its own separate place also reduces its political interests.⁴⁷ At that point, the critical thinkers are consistent in assuming that Huntington developed his theory by taking into account the American model. The strong liberal ideals in that society perhaps enable this system to work without serious challenge.⁴⁸ However, in the developing nations, such as those of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia, this system can be problematic, because both the civilian and military cultures of these nations have just begun to absorb the democratic and liberal ethoi. Naturally, it may take some time for these nations to implement a Western type of democracy. Indeed, Huntington himself mentions in *The Soldier and the State* that the American military adopted professionalism in its

⁴³ Feaver (1999): 212.

⁴⁴ Definitions similar to Huntington's, such as 'military ethic', 'military mind', and 'military tradition', more or less meet with the ethoi that shapes military cultures. Additionally, for the inclusiveness and importance of Huntington's theories, see: Feaver (1996): 158; and Desch (1999): 10.

⁴⁵ Feaver (1999): 212.

⁴⁶ According to Feaver, not only Huntington but all CIV-MIL literature is rich in terms of case studies, but they are relatively weaker in methodology. See: Feaver (1999): 236.

⁴⁷ Huntington (1957): 83-85.

⁴⁸ For the traditional American approach to military, militarism, and liberalism see: Huntington (1957): 156, 304, 309, 311-312.

current form after experiencing several incidents, such as the American Revolution and their Civil War.⁴⁹

This thesis aims to bring a different approach to Huntington's theory, by connecting it to the *military culture* concept. Normally, Huntington's theory suggests that the civilians should also avoid interfering in the military's autonomous area in order to maintain the *objective* civilian model. If civilians cross the border and intervene in military affairs, that would be *subjective* control.⁵⁰ The paradox is that, even in an ideal democracy, civilians should sometimes intervene in military affairs in order to maintain military subordination. Huntington and the other scholars accept this reality. Even in the Western systems, including that of the US, civilians intervene in military affairs if necessary. As a result, a complete separation is unlikely, even in democracies. In this regard, by considering the relevant arguments, I made the distinction of *normative* and *technical* professionalism. Normative professionalism, which refers to a *professional ethos* – composed by the principles of political neutrality and supremacy of civilian power – should be the main aspect that should be absorbed by militaries to maintain objective control.

At this point, I consider that the education of officers should be the primary area that civilians should regularly inspect, because the military academies are the primary institutions that create, maintain, and preserve the traditional ethoi of military cultures.⁵¹ For this reason, it can be risky to hide military education from civilian supervision completely. Inspecting the military curriculum in the academies is not against Huntington's objective control, in that the civilians should only follow the

⁴⁹ See: Huntington (1957): 161, 203, 211, 254-261.

⁵⁰ For a similar evaluation on Huntington's objective and subjective models, for example, see: Feaver (1999): 227.

⁵¹ See: Janowitz (1960): 127; Peter H. Wilson, 'Defining Military Culture', *Journal of Military History*, Vol.72, No.1, January 2008: 37.

instructions that are related to politics. The important thing is the context of political textbooks and political argumentations in the lecture rooms.

In summary, this thesis argues that ethical approach is still the most sustainable solution to the CIV-MIL problems.⁵² While this thesis agrees with Huntington's definition of professional military ethic, it also brings an additional suggestion to his objective control model by assuming that embedding a *professional ethos* into military cultures can strengthen separation of powers. The main reason for that, even the most advanced institutional control mechanisms can be inadequate to prevent military disobedience, in that the militaries have coercive weaponry power and there is not any stronger force which can prevent the militaries' arbitrary moves. As a result, the civilian control -as Huntington suggested- tends to be an ethical issue than an institutional and legislative one. Hence, the officers should absorb a professional ethos in the military academies to see the necessities for military subordination in a democratic regime. That is to say, military curriculums should be designed according to democratic and liberal ideals, to convince officers that military subordination is a primary obligation for both an ideal democracy and combat effectiveness. Naturally, this method is preferable for the nations who make efforts toward a better democracy. In a rapidly democratising society, civilians should supervise the military curriculum regularly, to ascertain whether the instructions are confirming with democratic principles or not.

⁵² Huntington suggests that the ideas of 'military ethic' and 'professionalism' are universal concepts. He assumes that, as far as 'military function' stays as the same, military ethic will be an objective criterion by which to test military professionalism without looking at time, conditions, cultures, and locations. See: Huntington (1957): 62.

1.4.2 Contributions

1.4.2.1 Conceptual Contribution

The first contribution of the research is to the study of military culture and concept of professionalism with reference to the Turkish case. Military culture can be defined as a combination of martial *ethoi*, which are shaped through history by inside and outside stimulants. These stimulants can cover a large area, including national experiences, religious values, geopolitical positions, and institutional interests. These *ethoi* shape the officer's worldviews and reactions to outside stimulants. Military culture is also significant in determining militaries' political positions between *praetorian* and *professional* identities. Praetorian is a term that came from the Roman Empire to describe political armies. The term refers to a group of elite forces known as the "Praetorian Guard" protecting senior officers. Often, members of the Praetorian Guard were rebelling and overthrowing the Empire. Hence, the term 'praetorian' can be used for both *revolutionist* (regime constructors) and *guardian* (regime guards) armies.⁵³

On the other hand, professionalism in military culture can be defined as adopting a professional ethos, which requires a normative absorbance of political neutrality and depoliticisation. By and large, the main conceptual contribution of the thesis is bringing a different approach to professionalism in military culture by separating it into two, namely *normative* and *technical*, with reference to Samuel Huntington's theory of professional military ethic. In other words, after defining the concept of military culture as regards relevant theoretical debate, this thesis aims to explore the relationship between military culture and two different aspects of professionalism by observing the Turkish case.

⁵³ For a more detailed analysis see: Chapters 2 and 3.

According to Huntington (1957), military depoliticisation should be achieved by absorbing a moral code: the professional military ethic. The professional ethic requires the officer to stay politically passive and neutral by implementing the duties given by the civilian rulers. On the other hand, Huntington's theory has been strictly challenged by subsequent scholars, although it retains its influential position. The main criticism to Huntington is taking the American military culture and social values as the main criteria and applying them to every case in order to build a universal theory. The critical approaches suggested that Huntington's model was not comprehensive enough to explain the cases in the Third World states due to these states' different social values and historical experiences. For instance, the professionalisation of the Turkish and Greek armies after joining NATO did not prevent them being involved in politics and carrying out coups d'état. Additionally, Huntington's suggestion that the United States would adopt a more anti-liberal policy throughout the Cold War became wrong. The United States preserved its liberal rhetoric in its foreign discourse until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Hence, the latter developments oblige one to reconsider Huntington's theory. Indeed, one may still claim that the theory of Huntington brings the most effective way for maintaining civilian supremacy. Yet, the different social and political structures of different nations can seriously harm the practicability of this model.

There are several alternative approaches to Huntington's theory. According to Morris Janowitz (1960), keeping the military in an isolated space, as suggested by Huntington, disregards the political nature of militaries. Instead, Janowitz suggests that the professional military should be, at the same time, the "nation's army" (citizen soldier ideal) by integrating itself into the society and by absorbing its social values. By this means, the military members would learn that they should be

subordinated to the civilians for the common national benefits (professional military honour). Additionally, Feaver offers a mutual contract between the civilian and military authorities to prevent the military from “shirking”. Anthony King, on the other hand, defines military professionalism as a moral attitude that motivates its members to act professionally to protect their pride toward other group members (professional military pride).

One common aspect that reconciles the critical thinkers with Huntington is that most thinkers take military professionalism as a normative issue rather than an institutional or legislative one. The main reason for that is the military’s weaponry power. Since there is no institution more powerful than the military within a nation, only institutional and legislative mechanisms can stop a potential threat from the military. The only solution, because of the aforementioned reasons, is absorbance of a professional ethos by the military cultures that effectively prevent them from disobedience. On the other hand, the critics show that the variables that create a professional military ethic should be reconsidered and, if necessary, should be enlarged. As mentioned above, Janowitz offers a code of “professional honour”, which prevents militaries from political involvements. Similarly, King argues that a code of “professional pride” obliges military members to act professionally. Samuel Finer, on the other hand, argues that the major weakness of Huntington’s theory is his negligence of “the principle of supremacy of civilian power” which is, according to Finer, a different and distinct moral ethos than Huntington’s professional ethic and should also be absorbed by the military members.

At this point, by considering the arguments above, the thesis will separate the definition of professionalism into two: *normative* and *technical* professionalism. The normative professionalism refers to the principles of political neutrality, political

passivism and the principle of supremacy of civilian power. The technical professionalism, on the other hand, refers to an advanced level of technical combat power, military discipline, and expertise in the art of war. In the literature, despite some authors, such as Anthony King and Morris Janowitz, stressing the normative and technical sides of professionalism, still there is not a distinct conceptual separation of these two elements.⁵⁴ In addition to this, the thesis enlarges Huntington's professional military ethic by taking into account the military culture variable and the relevant critical approaches. Again, this thesis equates normative professionalism with the cultural absorbance of a 'professional ethos', which is defined as a combination of political neutrality, passivism, and the principle of the supremacy of civilian power.

Last but not least, since the foundation of the Republic, Turkish military culture has experienced changes between revolutionist, guardian, and depolitical identities. In this regard, another conceptual contribution is positioning military culture at the centre of the CIV-MIL problematic in Turkey. Despite there being a number of varied works about the topic, the social and cultural nature of the Turkish military needs further analysis in order to understand the military's relationship with Turkish politics. In the world literature, military culture has been an important explanatory factor to solve puzzles about related issues. The number of related works has been continuously increasing. Yet, in Turkey, the concept has not been observed in detail. Indeed, the concept has been mentioned only rarely by Turkish CIV-MIL scholars. Although there are some works on military sociology in Turkey, this thesis still has a

⁵⁴ According to the civil-military scholar Anthony King, both Huntington and Morris Janowitz consider professionalism as a combination of practical expertise and a moral ethic. King also argues that sometimes the divide between technical and professional military expertise cannot be clear. See: Anthony King, *The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp.342-343.

relative difference, with its central focus on military culture as an ontological concept.

1.4.2.2 Analytical Contribution

The second contribution of this thesis is the analytical classification. The thesis separates military culture and its relationship with CIV-MIL relations into a typology of five different models regarding democratic regimes: the *positive-democratic*, *negative-democratic*, *positive-undemocratic*, *negative-undemocratic*, and *variable* models. *Positive-democratic* refers to cases in which both civilians and militaries know their lines and work in harmony. This one is arguably the closest to Huntington's objective control. *Negative-democratic* refers to the military being politically passive, but where the impacts of this passivity tend to be negative in terms of consolidating and maintaining democracy. *Positive-undemocratic* is the model wherein the military involves itself in politics for founding a new democratic regime or for preserving an existent one. *Negative-undemocratic* refers to cases where the military is politically active and its politicisation undermines democracy. Lastly, the *variable* model can be a combination of more than one model at the same time. Also, the *variable* model can be seen in highly political armies when there were strong ideological differences amongst the officers. These ideological divisions can affect democracy either positively or negatively, depending on time and conditions. While deciding which one of these five models best explains CIV-MIL relations in a given case, the researcher can investigate the history of the regime from beginning to end; or, rather, the researcher can separate the history of the regime into several time periods and investigate each time period separately, making a general suggestion at the end.

1.5 METHODOLOGY

Studies on the Turkish military are mostly based on comparative, historical, and discourse analysis methods. In addition to this, some works apply surveys and interviews. This work also follows that path. Starting from Chapter 5, comparative historical analysis is employed on three different case studies: ‘Revolutionism’; ‘Guardianship’; and ‘Toward Depoliticisation?’ The consequences derived from the case studies will be discussed through the empirical chapters and in their conclusions. Additionally, the findings will be shown in analytical tables, which can be seen at the end of each case study. Analytical schemes will be prepared according to the five models: *positive-democratic*, *negative-democratic*, *positive-undemocratic*, *negative-undemocratic*, and *variable*. The data collection for the three case studies is based on articles, archives, books, journals, newspapers, official websites, documentaries, and interviews with experienced former military figures and academic authorities carried out by the author of this thesis. In addition to this, a formal request – which is available in the Appendices A – for interviewing active officers and observing the current military curriculum was made to, but refused by, the Head Command of the Turkish Armed Forces.⁵⁵

1.5.1 Comparative Historical Analysis

The thesis employs comparative historical analysis to answer the research questions. The main reason for choosing this method is the historical nature of the topic. Comparative historical analysis can be defined as a social science method that analyses historical events by bringing rational explanations to them. These

⁵⁵ The request letter and the original copies of information that have been provided from the military’s archive room are attached to the Appendices together with their translations. Interviews have been conducted with retired officers, politicians, and journalists. Some of the data collected from the interviews is used in the following chapters. A signature from the interviewees was provided to be used when required. The research has been made under the guidance of the ethical rules of the University of Bath.

explanations can be made by comparing the relevant case studies with each other, from different periods of times.⁵⁶ In this way, the researcher can build a specific theory, and can explain it by referring to the present time. Therefore, this method is suitable with regard to the research goals. By employing comparative historical analysis, the aim is to indicate the dynamics of Turkish military culture, its interaction with Turkish politics, its transformations within different decades, and its relationship to the current depoliticisation of the Turkish military. Comparative historical analysis needs more than one case study with which to make comparisons.⁵⁷ Hence, the thesis will separate the historical analysis into three case studies, as follows: ‘revolutionism’ (1908-1945); ‘guardianship’ (1945-1999); and ‘toward professionalism?’ (1999-2013).

1.5.2 Analytical Framework

The type of relationship between military culture and Turkish politics will be identified in the empirical chapters (Chapters 5-7). The identification of this relationship will be made according to the five analytical models (*positive-democratic*, *negative-democratic*, *positive-undemocratic*, *negative-undemocratic*, and *variable*). To do that, relevant periods of each case study will be analysed under the titles ‘analysis’ according to the normative and technical elements of professional military culture and Huntington’s objective and subjective models. Additionally, the findings that are derived from each chapter will be shown in an analytical chart, which can be found at the end of each case study. The analytical chart will be

⁵⁶ See: James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.13-14.

⁵⁷ See: *ibid.*

prepared according to some criteria, including the types of military culture, state regime, economic policy, secularism, and nationalism.⁵⁸

1.6 CONCLUSION

The first chapter briefly introduced the research questions, the methods, and the contributions of the thesis. The main purpose of the research is to identify the type of relationship between military culture and politics in Turkey. To make a tangible identification, the thesis suggests five types of CIV-MIL relationship, namely *positive-undemocratic*, *negative-democratic*, *positive-undemocratic*, *negative-undemocratic*, and *variable*. To explore which one of these models best defines Turkey, the thesis will be divided into seven separate chapters. The second chapter will analyse the relevant literature about military culture and CIV-MIL relations. The third and fourth chapters will discuss the main tenets of military culture in Turkey. With this approach, the first four chapters will provide essential background to answer the research question. Consequently, the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters will empirically test the type of relationship with regard to the five models which have been mentioned.

Military culture increases its popularity within CIV-MIL studies as an explanatory factor which aims to understand military behaviour by analysing martial ethoi, namely customs, values, ideas, and ideals. According to the relevant studies, military culture can be used to explain each type of internal and external military behaviour, including politics. On that point, the Turkish case still requires an extended theoretical analysis, as the relevant scholars have not analysed the military culture concept within a detailed format. Indeed, the Turkish military's evolution from a

⁵⁸ The analytical tables will be prepared according to Atatürkist principles, because they are both the founding dynamics of Turkey and the basis of its military discourse.

highly political structure to a Huntington type of professionalism presents researchers with a wide variety of examples with which to test how, and under what conditions, the military culture emerges, changes, and affects CIV-MIL relations.

By and large, the thesis aims to make contributions in two areas: conceptual and analytical. The conceptual contribution is putting the *military culture* variable into the centre for understanding the Turkish military's praetorian and depoliticised behaviours. Political passivism in military culture is defined regarding Samuel Huntington's theory of professional military ethic. The intended purpose is analysing the relationship between military culture and professional military ethic with reference to the Turkish case. Additionally, the thesis separates the definition of professionalism into two: *normative* and *technical*. Normative professionalism refers to the idea of political neutrality and passivism. On the other hand, technical professionalism refers to the high level of expertise in combat power and the art of war.

The analytical contribution, on the other hand is to the civil-military studies. The thesis identifies a typology of five different civil-military relationship models as regards its impact on democracy namely *positive-democratic*, *negative-democratic*, *positive-undemocratic*, *negative-undemocratic*, and *variable*. *Positive-democratic* refers to the case in which the military is subordinated to the civilians, and democracy works without a remarkable problem. *Negative-Democratic* happens when the military is depoliticised but the regime became vulnerable to the civilian abuses. *Positive-Undemocratic* is the case when the military involves in politics to establish a democratic regime or to protect an existed democracy. Conversely, *Negative-Undemocratic* refers to the situation when the military undermined or

destroyed democracy. Lastly, *Variable* is the case when more than one of these models were observed at the same time or in different times but frequently.

CHAPTER 2: DEFINITION OF MILITARY CULTURE: THEORIES AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Institutional cultures can comprise various ethical rules which give the relevant organisation a distinct character. That rooted character leads the organisation to adopt a consistent behaviour toward outside stimulants. Hence, the outside observer can more or less determine the institution's next step by taking into account its culture. These ethical rules are generally shaped around the institution's foundation purpose, and the experiences it has gained. All institutions – among them big companies, civil institutions, state foundations, and sports clubs – have certain ethical rules. These rules can be written or unwritten. Hence, the military, being the main institution for national security, cannot be excluded from this general rule.

Indeed, militaries tend to have very strong values, beliefs, norms, and ideals which are rooted deeply due to the experiences that they have had for many centuries. Additionally, militaries are very different to other institutions, because their members should be ready to die for the national interests, if necessary. To send somebody to die necessarily requires a highly strict, disciplined, and different education. Thus, military cultures are extensively enveloped with the ideas of altruism, collectivism, self-sacrifice, patriotism, and masculinity. Mostly, the ideas, beliefs, values, symbols, and rituals in the barracks are constructed to convince soldiers that “dying is more honourable than living under specific circumstances”. Hence, one can likely observe major incompatibilities between democratic values and military cultures.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, in a democratic regime, the military should be subordinated to the

⁵⁹ Huntington (1957): 309

civilians, because militaries have coercive powers, and they have the potential to use this power against the elected civil authorities. Therefore, political scientists have developed theories to find the best solution for preventing officers from interrupting the natural progress of democracy. Among the relevant studies, Samuel Huntington's milestone *The Soldier and the State* (1957) has a distinguished place. His definition of professional officership and his theory of objective control became inspirational for the works that followed. Huntington argues that the best way of separating civilian and military domains is to professionalise officers. Staying within its own area, the military adopts a professional ethic and remains politically neutral. The increasing professionalism of officers also strengthens the military's combat power.

As a result, this chapter has three targeted contributions which are related to the issues that have been mentioned above. Firstly, it will define the theoretical backgrounds of the military culture variable, under the guidance of relevant scholarly debate. Additionally, the main martial ethoi that shapes military cultures will be elaborated. Secondly, the chapter will discuss Huntington's theory of professional officership and objective civilian control. In this way, the aim is to discuss how Huntington's ideas can be connected to the military culture concept in order to maintain military subordination. Lastly, the chapter will compare Huntington's theories with those of the other critical scholars. By doing this, the chapter will explain why Huntington's definition of professionalism is used in this thesis, what its strengths and weaknesses are, and what this thesis aims to contribute to Huntington's theory. To implement these contributions, the first part of the chapter looks at the definition and main ethoi of military culture. Then, the chapter will define the professional ethos in military culture, by taking into account Samuel Huntington's opinions. Thirdly, the chapter will compare Huntington's theories with those of the

other CIV-MIL scholars. Lastly, a final evaluation will be carried out by recalling the main ideas and contributions that derive from this chapter.

2.2 DEFINITION OF MILITARY CULTURE

Before giving a definition of military culture, it may be helpful to explain what culture is as a sociological term. Culture is defined as rooted values, ideas, norms, ethics, traditions, and beliefs that, over time, have created a worldview for a group or organisation and have led them into action.⁶⁰ Culture may comprise “unwritten but largely accepted rules” and create a typical lifestyle for the members of that organisation, which transfers from one generation to the next.⁶¹ Hofstede defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind, which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another”.⁶² Culture is a learned process, it is not inherited. It originates from environmental factors, not from biological ones such as genes.⁶³ Similarly, if one makes a comprehensive definition, military culture is a combination of rooted norms, values, ideas, beliefs, and ideals that give officers a general worldview and shape their behaviours toward outside stimulants. Military cultures tend to be affected by civil, political, and strategic cultures.⁶⁴ In other words, customs, traditions, religious values, vulnerability of

⁶⁰ Christopher Dandeker James Gow, ‘Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping’. In: *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, London: Department of War Studies, King’s College, 2007, p.59. Also, see: Dale R. Herspring, ‘Creating Shared Responsibility through Respect for Military Culture: The Russian and American Cases’, *Public Administration Review* 71, No.4, July 2011: 521. Quoted from: Edgar Schein, ‘Organizational Culture and Leadership’, 2004: 226; Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*, Zed Books, 2002, p. 20; Don M. Snider, ‘An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture’, *Orbis*, 43, No.1, 1999: 13-14.

⁶¹ Victoria Langston, Matthew Gould, and Neil Greenberg, ‘Culture: What is its Effect on Stress in the Military’, *Mil Med*, 172, No.9, 2007: 932.

⁶² Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, Michael Minkov, *Cultures and Organisations: Software of the Mind*, McGraw-Hill Education, 1991, p. 5.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Feaver (1999): 233.

geographical position, historical experiences, and dominant ideologies of political cultures may all be determinative.⁶⁵

Military culture can also be referred to by similar terms such as “organisational culture”, “military tradition”, “military ethic”, “military ethos/ethoi”, “military honour”, “military style”, “army culture”, “military doctrine”, and similar.⁶⁶ Yet, “military culture” gives arguably a more comprehensive connotation, combining all of the relevant concepts such as “ethic”, “tradition”, “ethos”, and more within. In other words, the term can be associated with any kind of activity that has a military involved.⁶⁷ In all types of organisations, whether civil or military, the members may gain stable characteristic behaviours distinct from the rest of society, because they have been living in the same environment for long time.⁶⁸ However, within military organisations, these differences tend to be stronger than in civil ones, because their members do not only work in the military bases, but they also live there with their

⁶⁵ All of these factors can be important in the emergence of military culture. Samuel Finer (1962) explains military involvement in politics with the level of a nation’s political culture. Additionally, Colin S. Gray (2007) defines ‘strategic cultures’ of nations as a combination of military/organisational cultures, public cultures, and historical and geographical variables. Therefore, all these political, cultural, and strategic values can be evaluated as intertwined and co-dependent. Colin Gray implies that national disasters such as wars may be triggering the change in cultures. Religious factors can also be explanatory in understanding military cultures, because some armies glorify war due to the ‘martyrship’ concept. For instance, both the Ottoman and Turkish armies are culturally affected by Sunni Muslim beliefs. For these reasons, there have been strong criticisms against the Turkish army claiming that non-Muslims and Alevis are not allowed to enter the military, and they are faced with discrimination during their compulsory military service. Additionally, Islamic references can be seen in the military trainings and campaigns that glorify martyrship. Related to this, Atatürk often applied religious symbols during the Liberation War to increase the military’s motivation. Similar examples were also seen during the Korean War (1950) and the Cyprus War (1974). For a detailed analysis on the case see: Chapter 3. Also see: Schein’s definition quoted in Don M. Snider (1999): 14.

⁶⁶ For instance: Morris Janowitz uses the term ‘the code of professional military honour’ to identify the martial ethoi that specifies how an officer ought to behave. See: Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, Free Press Paperback, 1960: 215. According to Janowitz, the code of professional military honour requires the officer to be above politics and committed to the status quo. Also, the officers cannot be members of political parties and they cannot explicitly show partisanship (ibid.: 233-234, 374).

⁶⁷ Anthony King, ‘Toward a European Military Culture?’ *Defence Studies*, 6, No.3, September 2006: 259. For instance, Dandeker, et al. (2007) make a comparison between the Swedish and American militaries, regarding their reaction to peacekeeping operations, by taking into account their military cultures. See: Dandeker, et al. (2007): 64.

⁶⁸ Salih Akyurek, Serap Koydemir, Esra Atalay, Adnan Bicaksiz, *Civil-Military Relations and the Distance of Military and Society*, Center of Strategic Researches, Ankara: Bilgesam Press, 2014, p.16.

families.⁶⁹ Additionally, they are trained in specific schools and academies, and dress in the same uniforms. As Samuel Huntington noted:

*People who act the same way over a long period of time tend to develop distinctive and persistent habits of thought. Their unique relation to the world gives them a unique perspective on the world and leads them to rationalize their behaviour and role.*⁷⁰

The institutional character of militaries enables them to have a collective consciousness, which is different to that of other organisations because it compels their members to be involved in violence, to kill and, if necessary, to die.⁷¹ In other words, “the management of violence” is the major characteristic of military culture, which completely sets it apart from other organisational cultures.⁷²

Naturally, military culture plays a major role in shaping how its members perceive the environment, and how they adapt themselves to tackle possible future threats.⁷³ Therefore, “culture is to an organisation what personality is to an individual”.⁷⁴ It is possible to make a separation between formal and informal rules that shape military culture. The former leads the organisation’s vision, policies, and missions in ways that are stated in their formal announcements and legal procedures.⁷⁵ The latter describes the shared values, beliefs, and historical myths, which are unwritten, which generally shape the identical patterns within the military.⁷⁶ In particular, military schools have a determining role in the creation of these unwritten rules. In the

⁶⁹ Janowitz (1960): 175, 178, 220-221.

⁷⁰ Huntington (1957): 61.

⁷¹ Peter H. Wilson, ‘Defining Military Culture’, *Journal of Military History*, 72, No.1, 2008: 14.

⁷² Huntington, (1957): 61.

⁷³ Michael B. Siegl, ‘Military Culture and Transformation’, *JFQ*, 49, 2008, p.103.

⁷⁴ Ibid..

⁷⁵ For instance, for the written ones: Turkish Military’s Internal Service Act; for unwritten ones: the “military-nation” concept. As was mentioned in the very beginning, former Chief of the General Staff Basbug stated that the Turkish military takes its legitimacy from some so-called unwritten rules.

⁷⁶ Dandeker and Gow, *ibid.*: 59.

military schools, officers find themselves in a very different environment, which is entirely different than the civilian one with strict rules and discipline. After a short period of time, officer candidates adopt the lifestyle inside the military schools, and their personalities are shaped by the basic patterns of the military institution. After graduating from the academy, these patterns become an indispensable part of their lives. The repetitive behaviours of the officers, followed each day in the military, also affect their social life in the civil world, even after they retire.⁷⁷

2.2.1 Main Characteristics of Military Culture

Military culture is a combination of several elements that oblige its members to adopt a distinct behaviour. As observed from the civil-military literature, it is possible to investigate armies under three categories regarding their relations with politics and status of regime, namely, revolutionist, guardian, and professional armies.⁷⁸ The revolutionist and guardian armies can also be grouped as “politically active armies”, while professional armies are grouped as “politically passive armies”. On the other hand, one should consider that this type of politically passive armies mostly represent the normative side of professionalism, because some armies who have strong technical professional education can still be politically active if they did not absorb normative version of professionalism.

In addition to this, the militaries which founded a new state or changed the extant political structure can be classified as *revolutionist* armies. Accordingly, the

⁷⁷ Ismail H. Pekin and Ahmed Yavuz, *Asker ve Siyaset: Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Sivil-Asker İlişkileri* (Soldier and Politics: The Civil-Military Relations from the Ottoman to Today), Kaynak Press, Istanbul 2014, pp.251; İlhan Uzgöl, ‘Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy’ *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 34, 2003: 186.; Ersel Aydınli, ‘A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey,’ *The Middle East Journal*, 63, No.4, 2009: 590.

⁷⁸ For the impact of military cultures to the emergence of current professional armies see: Peter H. Wilson (2008): 13; Herspring (2011): 522-524. (In this article, Herspring argues that the Russian military culture obliged the commanding elite to adopt a more apolitical tradition both in Afghanistan and Georgia, while the US military culture forced its members to adopt a more politically active role in national security decision-making.)

militaries which act as watchdogs of the existing regime can be classified as *guardian* armies. Some thinkers can unite revolutionist and guardian armies under one group, named *praetorian*.⁷⁹ Praetorian armies can take over the rule of state directly or indirectly; therefore, the ruling types that they established following their interventions are formalised by names such as *guardian regime*, *veto regime*, *authoritarian regime*, *semi-authoritarian regime*, and similar.⁸⁰ Amos Perlmutter's work *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (1977) is one of the earlier contributions to the field which emphasised both the progressive and conservative sides of interventionist armies by considering their political ideology and relationship with the status of the regime.⁸¹ Unlike Perlmutter, I employed 'praetorian' for both revolutionist and guardian armies and defined the second stage of Turkish military culture as 'guardian'. I explained the reasons of making this distinct categorisation in Chapters 1 and 3. Therefore, I do not go into details in this section. On the other hand, the militaries idealised by liberal democratic states are known as *professional armies*, implementing their tasks as a profession in which they become experts in military science, and ethically avoid involving themselves in politics. This type of army is formalised by Samuel Huntington in his landmark work *The Soldier and the State* (1957) and this definition involves both normative and professional sides of professionalism.

Don M. Snider's categorisation of "key elements of militaries" may be helpful in seeking to define the main ethoi of military culture. Snider mentions "a professional

⁷⁹ As has been noted in the introduction chapter, the name comes from the special guards of the Roman Empire. These guards were notorious with their mutinies. Hence, the name is used by scholars to refer all type of political armies.

⁸⁰ For a comprehensive analysis of military regimes, see: Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Prentice Hall, 1977. Also, for a different categorisation see: Finer (2002): 164-190. (In the latter work, the author identifies five types of military regimes, namely *indirect-limited*, *indirect-complete*, *dual*, *direct*, and *direct-quasi-civilianised*.)

⁸¹ See: Perlmutter (1977): 1, 9-17 and 93-95.

ethos” as one of his four elements; however, this thesis imposes on the term “military ethos” a more comprehensive meaning than Snider allows for, which comprises all the elements that shape an officer’s behaviours. According to Snider, the first element is *discipline*, which refers to “the orderly conduct of military personnel”; it aims to “minimise the confusion and disintegrative consequences of battle by imposing order on it”.⁸² The hierarchical system “obey-command chain” is the natural result of discipline and order within the militaries. Normally, hierarchy can be observable in all organisations; however, none of them tend to be as strict as in the militaries. The lower ranks have no right to hesitate or give their personal opinion after their superiors gave a command, which may include killing or dying.⁸³ Therefore, even in the beginning, military culture distinguishes itself from civilian equivalents.

The second one is a *professional military ethos*, which, according to Snider, can be defined as “a set of normative self-understandings”, which defines the “profession’s corporate identity”, “its code of conduct”, and its “social worth”.⁸⁴ If military culture is dominated by the professional ethos, the military tends to remain politically passive and neutral.⁸⁵ The professional ethos can be defined as the absorbance of a set of principles, namely political neutrality, political passivism, and civilian supremacy, which oblige the military members to stay in their barracks for the sake of democracy. Conversely, if military culture is dominated by an ideological ethos, the military can form itself into a guardian or revolutionary role. The ideological ethos, therefore, can be seen as rooted political beliefs, ideals, and commitment to a certain type of ideology. For instance, professional military ethos in the US army is

⁸² Snider, 1999: 15.

⁸³ Herspring, ‘Creating Shared Responsibility through Respect for Military Culture’, 521.

⁸⁴ Snider (1999): 16.

⁸⁵ Snider (1999): 17.

affected by American society's republican values, such as liberty, equality, and the dignity of the individual. The American ethos requires the military to be used for external defence and to be subordinate to the civilians.⁸⁶ On the other hand, Huntington (1957) argued that Japan (before the end of Second World War) had "the most political army" in the world, because their moral code of *Bushido*, which is inherited from the ancient Samurai warriors, glorifies militarism, nationalism, and authoritarianism – ideas that were similar to the Japan state ideology. The similarity between military ethos and political culture enabled the Japanese military to involve itself in politics.⁸⁷ With regard to the Indonesian army, the military ethos is embedded in the state ideology, which is known as *Pancasila*, and the doctrine of *Dwifungsi*. The former is a combination of five principles: "belief in one god"; "national unity"; "social justice"; "civilised humanity"; "democracy by consensus"; the latter is based on the acceptance that the military is the founder of the Republic.⁸⁸

The third characteristic shown by Snider is "military rituals". These rituals have a significant role in combining military units under a common identity. Snider quotes James Burk's definition to define rituals:

These ceremonies and etiquette make up an elaborate ritual and play the role that ritual typically plays in society: to control or mask our anxieties and ignorance; to affirm our solidarity with one

⁸⁶Snider (1999): 17. For the importance of a specific ethos in the military's social prestige, self-perception, and political character see: Morris Janowitz (1960): 11-12. For the dominance of liberal values in US army see: *ibid.*: 23.

⁸⁷ Huntington (1957): 125-126, 128. (Huntington's assumption about the Japanese military has been criticised by several scholars. In any case, his categorisation should be limited to the WWII and the period prior to it.)

⁸⁸ Karabekir Akkoyunlu, *Military Reform and Democratisation: Turkish and Indonesian Experiences at the Turn of the Millennium*, Routledge, 2007: 46.

*another; and to celebrate our being, usually in conjunction with a larger universe.*⁸⁹

*Military weddings, retirements, and funerals mark the life cycle of soldiers just as bugle calls and formations at dawn and dusk mark the passing of the soldiers' working day. Such rituals mark collective identity and group affiliation, forge a common identity and symbolise a common fate...*⁹⁰

One can observe that the symbolic language used in these ceremonies is specifically designed to imply militarist references, such as altruism, self-sacrifice, brotherhood, and perhaps military supremacy. The fourth element is “cohesion and esprit de corps”. Military cohesion refers to perceptions such as “feelings of identity” and “comradeship” among the military units, while “esprit de corps” refers to “feelings of commitment”, “interdependency”, “mutual support”, and “pride”.⁹¹

Another significant aspect in militaries is “symbols”, which play a connective role among its members. There can be different examples of symbols, such as words, gestures, pictures, flags, and heroic figures. For instance, the Duke of Wellington and Admiral Horatio Nelson for the British; George Washington for the US; Charles de Gaulle for the French; and Atatürk for the Turkish militaries.⁹² The symbols can easily be observed by outsiders in the organisation's practices.⁹³ Hence, one is likely

⁸⁹ James Burk “Military Culture” in: *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict*, ed. Lester Kurtz (San Diego, California: Academic Press, 1999).

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Snider, ‘An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture’, 18; Anthony King, *The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries*, Oxford: OUP, 2013: 18. Also, Janowitz (1960): 42, 220.

⁹² King, ‘Toward a European Military Culture?’, 265.

⁹³ Geert Hofstede, et al., ‘Measuring Organizational Cultures: A Qualitative and Quantitative Study Across Twenty Cases’, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 35, No.2, June 1990: 291.

to observe a close relationship between rituals and symbols, in that the former has strong references to the latter.

In all social groups, symbols and rituals play a significant role in producing collective values.⁹⁴ Through the rituals, the common values gain holiness, and the members of the social groups commit themselves to these values. The groups periodically repeat these rituals to prevent a fragmentation.⁹⁵ The military members commit themselves to their colleagues and use certain unifying symbols to create a common culture.⁹⁶ The example of Admiral Nelson indicates how a symbolic figure became a unifying “key totem” for the British Navy. Although the British military has changed a lot since 1805, it still preserves the Nelson figure to protect its cultural background.⁹⁷

One visible impact of these repetitive symbols and rituals for the militaries is their negative effects on change. Military traditions and acceptances are not easily changed, because these routine practices and lifestyle make the officers inadaptable to changes. As previously noted, military cultures are like slow moving machines that require enormous effort to change direction.⁹⁸ Yet, some extraordinary factors may trigger rapid changes in military cultures. These extraordinary changes may be technological improvements, transformation in social culture, wars, and charismatic leadership.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Emile Durkheim ‘The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life’, London: Allen & Unwin, 1964.

⁹⁵ King, ‘Toward a European Military Culture?’

⁹⁶ Durkheim, *ibid.*

⁹⁷ King, ‘Toward a European Military Culture?’, 266.

⁹⁸ For instance, Colin Gray argues that sudden changes are not very observable in cultures including organisational ones; see: Gray (2007). For the resistant nature of military cultures it can also be seen: Janowitz (1960): 22

⁹⁹ Murray, ‘Does Military Culture Matter?’ 28; Michael B. Siegl (2008): 106; Also see: Theo Farrell, *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. (The author gives the Japanese and Ottoman cases to show how external threats and defeats in warfare may trigger military modernisation.)

In summary, military cultures have a determining role in a number of issues, including: how officers interact with each other; how they conduct their tasks; how they perceive the civil world; what their expectations from the civil world are; and, lastly, how they should treat civilians.¹⁰⁰ The main difference separating military cultures from all others is that the values they gained in the military do not only affect their occupational life, but also their private life. However, that case slowly tends to change with the definition of modern and post-modern army, when soldiery is begun to be considered a “profession” rather than a “lifestyle”, as it was called in the past.¹⁰¹

2.3 HUNTINGTON’S CONTRIBUTIONS

Due to the aforementioned reasons, sharp differences may emerge between civil and military cultures. Indeed, the differences between these two can be deeper in democracies, because militaries are founded on hierarchy and obedience, as opposed to the liberal and equal values of democratic theory.¹⁰² Moreover, militaries are also different to civilian organisations due to their management of violence. Yet, subordination of the military to civilians is a fundamental requirement in democratic regimes. Accordingly, CIV-MIL literature has been developed to enable and maintain this subordination. As aforementioned, this thesis analyses the puzzle by connecting the military culture variable to Huntington’s professional ethic. Hence, before discussing the suggestions of the thesis, it may be helpful to look at Huntington’s opinions on the relevant issues.

¹⁰⁰ Herspring (2011): 521.

¹⁰¹ Salih Akyurek, et al., *ibid.*: 2014: 18-19.

¹⁰² Desch (1999): 5.

2.3.1 Huntington and Professional Ethic

Before stating how Huntington defines professionalism, it may be helpful to see how the term is understood by an ordinary person. The interviews that have been carried out for the purpose of this thesis have indicated that the term is understood in two different ways:

- The soldier who does his job just as others in other professions. He/she is paid regularly and maintains his/her job permanently, until retirement age. After retirement, he/she also has a retirement salary. (Technical definition.)
- The soldier who just focuses on doing the tasks which are given to him such as: combat and training. He does not interfere in civilian spheres, which are defined in the legal procedures, and he remains politically neutral. He can give advice only when required by the civilians. (Normative definition.)

The third option can be a mixture of these two. In other words, a professional, salaried soldier avoids involvement in political interests. Huntington's definition is also a mixture of both of the above understandings. Nevertheless, he gives more importance to the normative side of the definition in *The Soldier and the State* (1957). According to Huntington, a professional man "is an expert with specialised knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavour".¹⁰³ Just as with other professions, officership has its own technical specialists. Hence, Huntington argues that military subordination can be maintainable by professionalising it within its own autonomous area. In other words, civilian control can be achieved by separating the civilian and military spheres. Civilians will enable military subordination by

¹⁰³ Huntington, (1957): 8.

professionalising the military. That does not necessarily mean that the military should be entirely apolitical. It can give advice, especially in matters of security – but only when required to do so by the civilians.¹⁰⁴

The main difficulty against the separation of powers derives from the close ties between military and politics. The German philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831) defines war as the natural result of an unsolved political crisis, because it starts when diplomatic solutions become unsuccessful, and when politicians leave their place to the generals.¹⁰⁵ Related to this, philosopher Oswald Spengler notes that “life is a drama of war which includes every person on earth including soldiers; thus no soldier can be separated from politics”.¹⁰⁶ Hence, each soldier may have political views of their own. Especially, militaries have always remained in close contact with politics and politicians due to their natures.¹⁰⁷ Consequently, none of the militaries can be entirely apolitical. In the words of CIV-MIL scholar Robin Luckham: “being non-political is a different kind of politics”.¹⁰⁸ Huntington also accepts that officers may have their own social, economic, political, or religious ideas. As a solution, he offers that military members should design their minds according to the professional ethic. The professional ethic requires a certain objectivity, impartiality, and political passivism to increase combat effectiveness.¹⁰⁹ Huntington defines the professional military mind as “disciplined, rigid, logical, scientific; but not flexible, tolerant,

¹⁰⁴ Huntington (1957): 11. Huntington defines ‘the management of violence’ as the ‘central skill’ of the military profession.

¹⁰⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 69; Beatrice Heuser, *Reading Clausewitz*, Random House, 2011: 146.

¹⁰⁶ Quoted from Oswald Spengler in Turfan (2000): 21.

¹⁰⁷ Huntington (1957): 60-61.

¹⁰⁸ Koonings and Kruijt, 2002: 238.

¹⁰⁹ Huntington (1957): 60.

intuitive, emotional”.¹¹⁰ Hence, staying disciplined and logical in that sense requires subordination to civilians.¹¹¹

After Huntington, the relevant works gained a new momentum. The authors following him were divided into two different groups: the first group focused on ethical and normative concerns; the second focused on rational and legislative ones.¹¹² Indeed, the best way for civilian control should naturally be a combination of both legislative and normative factors. That is to say, militaries should absorb civilian supremacy as a normative discipline, but they should also be restrained by several regulations. Yet, ethical considerations are arguably more determinative than legislative regulations, in that militaries are the strongest institutions in states, due to their coercive weaponry, and they always conceal the potential of intervening in regimes and dissolving governments. Although state authorities need their military’s power to protect themselves from external threats, there is always a risk that the threat can turn to them from the same institution that they created for protection.¹¹³ Additionally, in some cases, officers can be better educated and more capable than civilians in many respects. Accordingly, in some cases, military intervention in politics can be on behalf of the state. Thus, what kind of motivations can prevent officers from involving themselves in politics, even when they believe that they should be involved? At this point, the importance of ethical discipline comes into the agenda. According to CIV-MIL scholar Douglas Bland (1999), a disciplined military should protect the state without giving harm.¹¹⁴ Similarly, an army without discipline

¹¹⁰ Ibid.: 60.

¹¹¹ Ibid.: 61-62.

¹¹² Feaver (1999): 212-213.

¹¹³ Peter D. Feaver, ‘The Civil Military Problematic: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control’, *Armed Forces & Society*, Winter 1996, Vol.23 No. 2: 149-178, p.150.

¹¹⁴ Douglas L. Bland, ‘A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations’, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.26, No.1, Fall 1999: 7-26, p.13.

can create serious problems by “exaggerating the threats”.¹¹⁵ Hence, we argue that Huntington’s suggestion of embedding a professional military ethic is the most stable and maintainable solution to the issue.

Accordingly, this thesis aims to bring a different approach to Huntington’s theory by connecting it to the military culture variable. That is to say, the professional ethos (normative aspects of professionalism) should be embedded in military cultures. The professional ethos can be defined as democratic and liberal values that are absorbed by officers. This ethos motivates officers with a strong belief in the requirement of political passivism and civilian supremacy for the sake of democracy. In the words of Peter D. Feaver, professional ethos leads officers to think that “civilians have a right to be wrong”.¹¹⁶ Thus, one sustainable way of raising professional officers can be by designing the education curriculum in the academies according to a professional ethos. Naturally, the curriculum, discussions during the lectures, and the instructions of officer trainers should be inspected by civilian authorities regularly. However, this supervision should be limited to the instruction related to politics. Accordingly, this line of inspection should not be seen against objective control, since lectures about politics are directly related to the civilian sphere.

2.3.2 Huntington and Military Culture

In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington uses the descriptions “military ethic” and “military mind” to formalise a set of ethoi that affect the military profession.¹¹⁷

Basically, there are similarities between Huntington’s military man and the basic tenets of military culture discussed previously. Essentially, Huntington sees “the art

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Feaver (1996): 154.

¹¹⁷ For the usage of the relevant terms in Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* see the following pages: ‘professional military ethic’: 62, 86; ‘military ethic’: 63; ‘military virtues’: 73; ‘military mind’: 59-62; ‘professionalism and Western culture’: 19.

of fighting” as a natural phenomenon of humanity since ancient times; but the military profession, he assumes, is a modern development, which separates modern officers from the ancient fighters.¹¹⁸ According to Huntington, the “military ethic” should consider humankind in a Hobbesian way, which is naturally egoist – motivated by personal pleasures such as wealth and power. “Conflict” and “violence” are natural results of his biological evolution. Additionally, Huntington argues, humankind is naturally weak and limited. Hence, our weaknesses compel us to act together and institute organisations under discipline and leadership. In this regard, the military should be seen as an institution that aims to suppress individual fears, and which compels its members to implement their tasks professionally, without failure.¹¹⁹ The uncertainty of the enemy’s next act makes the military man sceptical toward humankind.¹²⁰ Thus, the military opinion of men is pessimistic. Although mankind may have attributes such as “goodness”, “strength”, and “reason”, it also tends to be “evil”, “weak”, and “irrational”.¹²¹ Perhaps because of this pessimistic framework, Huntington defines militaries as the organisations that are culturally closer to conservative ideology.¹²²

In accordance to the ideas above, Huntington considers that the military man indicates the importance of group as against the individual. Egoism must be the biggest enemy of the soldier. Humankind is a social animal, and it only survives within groups. Its members may only overcome their weaknesses and gain moral satisfaction by joining into an organic body.¹²³ Naturally, “loyalty” and “obedience” should be the key norms of military mind, because, when the soldier receives an

¹¹⁸ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp.7, 19.

¹¹⁹ Huntington (1957): 63

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Huntington (1957): 93. Janowitz is another author who associates military mind with conservatism. See: Janowitz (1960): 236-255.

¹²³ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 64.

order from his commander, he does not have a right to argue, to show hesitation, or to reveal his own ideas.¹²⁴ Therefore, it is possible to say that the army man must be a “man of logic”, not a “man of emotions”, in order to implement the tasks he has taken. Hence, Huntington gives the Prussian army as a typical example of professionalism, with their “scientific” and “rational” training. In this regard, Huntington associates the Prussian army with strong professional characteristics, namely “superb technical competence”, “high intellectual achievement”, “and unwavering devotion to duty”.¹²⁵

2.3.3 The Ways of Civilian Control

According to Huntington, there are two different ways for implementing civilian control over the militaries: the *subjective* and *objective* models.

2.3.3.1 Subjective Civilian Control

This is based on maximising civilian power. Subjective control enables civilian supremacy by minimising military power and maximising civilian power. The civilian groups can be governmental institutions, social classes, or constitutional forms. There are several difficulties of this model, because conflicting interests of civilian groups can prevent them from combining their powers against militaries. According to Huntington, the best way for implementing subjective control is to enhance the power of one civilian group at the expense of other civilian groups.¹²⁶

2.3.3.2 Objective Civilian Control

This model is based on maximising military professionalism. Professional behaviour and attitudes are adopted and the military accepts soldiery as a profession. Huntington defines this model as the opposite of the subjective model. He argues that

¹²⁴ Ibid.: 73.

¹²⁵ Ibid.: 99. Also see: Perlmutter (1977): 31.

¹²⁶ Huntington (1957): 80-81.

the subjective model achieves civilian control over the military by civilianising the military and making it “the mirror of the state”, while the objective model achieves it by militarising the military and making it a “tool of the state”. The antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics, in that civilian control is minimised while the military increasingly intervenes in politics. In other words, objective civilian control is “the recognition of autonomous military professionalism”, while subjective control is “the denial of an independent military”.¹²⁷ Objective control is occasionally referred to as “Huntington’s Normative Theory” by scholars.¹²⁸ The objective civilian model professionalises the military and makes it politically impartial. Huntington interestingly notes that objective civilian control was not yet very common, even in the Western democracies during the period in which he was writing the book. The main reason for that is that civilians tend to subordinate militaries to their own “interests and principles”.¹²⁹

2.3.4 Main Criticisms of Huntington

Huntington explained American CIV-MIL relations as a conflict between “functional imperatives” and “the social imperatives” that began with the Cold War.¹³⁰ Functional imperatives refers to the external threats that the country came up against, while societal imperatives refers to the constitutional structure and the ideological background of the society.¹³¹ The main functional imperative for the United States during the Cold War was the Soviet threat, which forced it to have larger military units. On the other hand, the social imperative was the liberal anti-military ideology

¹²⁷ Ibid.: 83.

¹²⁸ Patricia M. Shields, ‘Civil-Military Relations: Changing Frontiers’, *Public Administration Review*, Vol.66, No.6, 2006: 924-28, p.925.

¹²⁹ Huntington, (1957): 85.

¹³⁰ Suzanne C. Nielsen, ‘American Civil-Military Relations Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State’, *International Affairs*, 88, No.2, 2012: 373.

¹³¹ Ibid.

of the American people, which had been seen an obstacle against having larger militaries. As a solution, Huntington offered that the Soviet threat would weaken the liberalist ideology and push decision-makers to practise more conservative policies, to defend the nation against the Soviet threat.¹³² However, this suggestion of Huntington's became incorrect through the later years of the Cold War. The politicians did not adopt conservative policies; in contrast, they promoted liberalism to the developing countries, but they did not lose the Cold War. The Soviets became the losing side, dissolving in the end.¹³³ Therefore, Huntington's failure in predicting the future of the United States' Cold War policy became one of the main criticisms against his work by subsequent authors.

Another critique to Huntington focuses on his efforts to create a general theory by taking the American system as a template. The dominance of liberal and anti-militarist legacy in the society enables the separation of forces in the United States. But, in the other cases, maximising professionalism cannot be a solution.¹³⁴ For instance, the professionalisation of the Turkish and Greek armies following NATO membership made them more political, in contrast to what Huntington said. Indeed, these two armies made coups d'état: Turkey in 1960 and Greece in 1967.¹³⁵ Accordingly, the professionalisation and modernisation of the Chilean Army at the end of nineteenth century caused it to be politically more active in the following century.¹³⁶ A similar thing happened to the Indonesian Army during the 1950s.¹³⁷

¹³² Huntington (1957): 456-457; Shields (2006): 925.

¹³³ The collapse of Communism in the Soviets' territory and the Eastern Europe as well as dissolving of the Soviets can be seen as an ideologic victory for the United States.

¹³⁴ See: Schiff (2012): 321. The author indirectly defines separation theory as 'imposing the Western model of civil-military relationship to the indigenous cultures'.

¹³⁵ See: Ozkan Duman and Dimitris Tsarouhas, "'Civilianization' in Greece versus 'Demilitarisation' in Turkey: A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Relations and the Impact of the European Union', *Armed Forces & Society*, 32, No.3, April 2006.

¹³⁶ See the critics in Koonings and Kruijt (2002): 114.

¹³⁷ Ibid.: 148.

According to Finer, the main weakness of Huntington's thesis is, indeed, his negligence of *the principle of supremacy of civil power*, which Finer assumes is a distinct and separate concept to the definition of professionalism, and is obligatory for maintaining military subordination. Hence, Finer argues that the idea of civilian supremacy should also be absorbed by the officers.¹³⁸

As has been mentioned at the beginning of this section, there should be two different definitions of professionalism – one *technical* and the other *normative*. Sometimes military trainings do not involve both. That is to say, members of a military can have strong technical training in the academies, colleges, and barracks, but that does not mean that they also have certain ethical instructions to accept civilian supremacy as part of their professionalism. Doubtless, most militaries have some ethical rules about politics. Still, the intensity of these rules may not be strong enough to subordinate the military. This is the main reason why this thesis suggests regular civilian supervision over military education. In this way, civilians can observe whether the instructions are strong enough to enable political neutrality or not. The politicisation of the Turkish, Greek, German, Japanese, Chilean, and Indonesian armies evidence this. The aforementioned armies had, perhaps, a strong professional training in technical terms, but arguably their trainings were not strong enough to keep them politically neutral. For example, the Prussian Army was regarded as a model professional army during the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries due to its discipline and technical capabilities. But the same army was not associated with political neutrality and passivism. Rather, the German Army, as the inheritor of the Prussian Army, was also associated with a strong level of political power.¹³⁹ Thus, these examples may

¹³⁸ See: Finer (2002): 27-28.

¹³⁹ Huntington (1957): 96-97. (According to Huntington, the Prussian military always had a strong political power, but still objective military control was successfully practised until WWI. Yet, during

lead one to think that technical professionalism is different to ethical professionalism. Sometimes one army cannot have both at the same time.

2.4 ALTERNATIVE THEORIES

Due to the criticisms that have been mentioned above, several authors came up with alternative theories. In particular, regime changes and the end of Cold War accelerated efforts for building a more comprehensive theory.¹⁴⁰ The most well-known work after Huntington is *The Professional Soldier* (1960) by Morris Janowitz. Janowitz argued that technological innovations and sociological changes offered the militaries a more political role than that described by Huntington. Janowitz argued that the military accepts civilian supremacy not only because of the “rule of law or tradition” but through the military’s absorption of “self-imposed professional standards” (professional military honour) and “meaningful integration with civilian values”.¹⁴¹ Therefore, unlike Huntington, Janowitz considers that the military does not have to isolate itself from the civilian sphere; rather, the military should be integrated into society’s demands to implement its tasks professionally. Through this means, civilian control over the military will be achieved. Thus, the military has to increase its political interests due to changing circumstances, and needs to be closer to civilian values and procedures.¹⁴²

WWI, the German military were deeply involved in politics.) Also, for the politicisation of Japanese and German armies despite their professional nature see: Finer (2002): 25, 146. For the German Army also see: Janowitz (1960): 14.

¹⁴⁰ For the difficulty of creating a unified theory which is applicable to each case see: Özkan Duman and Dimitris Tsarouhas, “‘Civilianization’ in Greece versus ‘Demilitarisation’ in Turkey: A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Relations and the Impact of the European Union”, *Armed Forces & Society*, 32, No.3, April 2006: 405-407; and Metin Heper and Aylin Guney, ‘The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 26, No.4, July 2000: 635.

¹⁴¹ Janowitz (1960): 420.

¹⁴² Janowitz (1960): 402, 426. Also see: Akyurek, et al., (2014): 70 and J. Burk, ‘Morris Janowitz and the Origins of Sociological Research on Armed Forces & Society’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 19, No.2, January 1993: 420.

After Huntington, Janowitz has also received criticisms from subsequent scholars. One common critical approach to both Huntington and Janowitz was published by James Burk, in ‘Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations’ (2002). This article contends that Huntington’s theory fails to explain how democratic principles and values will be preserved.¹⁴³ Huntington, according to Burk, made the mistake of assuming that the United States would adopt a more conservative policy to protect itself from the Cold War’s risks, because the United States continued to support liberal policies.¹⁴⁴ Secondly, Janowitz’s “Citizen Soldier” idea has some fallacies, because that theory – which is normally intended to protect democratic values by integrating the military into society – does not explain how this will be achieved in the absence of mass mobilisation.¹⁴⁵ Accordingly, the idea of training professional forces under a political education programme for national and transnational aims is unrealistic.¹⁴⁶ In summary, Huntington’s theory mostly focuses on protecting democracy, but does not offer enough of a solution on how to protect democratic values. Conversely, Janowitz focuses on preserving democratic values, but neglects the issue of protecting democracy.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, there are two paths – choosing one of these two theories or creating a unified theory which gives equal importance to both democratic regime and democratic values.¹⁴⁸

Another alternative approach is the *principal-agent* approach by Peter D. Feaver, which suggests that the civilians should be the “principal” and the military should be the “agent”. That is to say, the principal must have the authority over the agent to prevent possible disharmonies. On the other hand, it is sometimes problematic to

¹⁴³ Burke, ‘Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations’, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.29, No.1, Fall 2002: 7-29, p.13.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Burk (2002): 14.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.: 14-15.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

maintain this authority in that the agent has weapons and coercive power.¹⁴⁹ According to Feaver, Huntington's and Janowitz's theories were written during the first quarter of the Cold War and are consequently not sufficient bases on which to build civilian supremacy in the post-Cold War era.¹⁵⁰ Feaver argues that the military should be strong enough to protect the state from external threats, but it should not use its powers to destroy its own society, which indeed it has to protect.¹⁵¹ Thus, Feaver contends, the state mechanisms should be created in favour of the civilians, to enable that control, and both Huntington and Janowitz overlooked this very important issue.¹⁵²

In this regard, Feaver argues that there should be a "contract" between the civilian principals and the military agents for using military power to defend civilian interests. After the contract is made, the civilian principals regularly monitor the military agent to ensure that they follow the civilian directives. In this way, the civilians can prevent any potential abuse of power by the agent.¹⁵³ Feaver puts forward two concepts "working" and "shirking" to follow the status of CIV-MIL relations. Shirking happens when the military neglects its responsibilities and when the civilians have lost supervision over the agent. Conversely, working means the agent acts in the way that the principal demands from it.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, the principal's responsibility is to monitor the agent, whether it is working or shirking, in order to maintain professional CIV-MIL relations. However, Feaver also maintains that the military may sometimes disagree with the civilians, but that this does not mean

¹⁴⁹ Peter D. Feaver, 'The Civil-Military Problematic: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control', *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.23, No.2, Winter 1996: 149-178, p.149.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*: 151-152.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵² *Ibid.*: 153.

¹⁵³ Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 57-65.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

“shirking”, because the civilians should consider the military’s advice to a certain extent.¹⁵⁵ Related to this, Rebecca L. Schiff’s *Concordance Theory* (1995) argues that military subordination should be achieved by cooperation between three actors: “the military, the political elites and the citizens”.¹⁵⁶ This cooperation should be achieved by exploring the shared values and goals among these actors, through dialogue.¹⁵⁷

Alternatively, Finer analyses the case by observing *political cultures* of states. In his classic work *The Man on Horseback* in 1962, he argues that the states with “traditional and rooted democratic cultures”, such as the advanced democracies in the West, do not allow their militaries to interfere in civilian affairs. Conversely, coups and military regimes are mostly visible in the states with “lower political cultures”, due to the lack of respect of the society toward the governmental and legal institutions of the state.¹⁵⁸

Indeed, throughout the thesis, I occasionally refer to political culture as a significant variable that determines the nature of military culture and its relationship with civilians. Hence, at this point, it may be beneficial to give a clear definition of political culture. Principally, political culture refers to a set of beliefs and values that determine a society’s political orientations.¹⁵⁹ In other words, political culture is a concept that defines beliefs, ideas, assumptions and emotions that govern the

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Rebecca L. Schiff, ‘Concordance Theory, Targeted Partnership, and Counterinsurgency Strategy’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 38, No.2, April 2012: 323.

¹⁵⁷ Feaver, *ibid.*: 99-112.

¹⁵⁸ See: Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, London, 1962. (Indeed, Finer separates lower political cultures into two groups, namely ‘minimal’ and ‘low’ political cultures, and higher political cultures into two groups, namely ‘developed’ and ‘mature’ political cultures. Finer identifies Turkey as a nation with low political culture.)

¹⁵⁹ Christopher W. Hughes and Lai Yew Meng, *Security Studies: A Reader*, Routledge, 2011.

political behaviour of people within a political system.¹⁶⁰ The notion of political culture suggests that political behaviours and preferences of each individual are not the result of random developments but are the consequences of empirical historical experiences, emotions, symbols, and values that fit together, create a meaningful whole, and transfer from one generation to the next.¹⁶¹

Accordingly, political culture might be affected by a number of variables such as security concerns, geopolitical positions, and social values. Especially, the national security and the level of trust or distrust toward other states have crucial importance in constructing political culture.¹⁶² Hence, one may explore a close relationship between military culture and political culture.¹⁶³ For instance, the Soviet threat and its policy of reaching hot waters had a crucial impact in the Turkish political and military cultures. That is to say, while anti-Communism increased its influence after the end of World War II, an overwhelming majority of Turkish people saw the United States as a trustful partner against the Soviet threat. Related to this, the Turkish military culture was deeply influenced by the anti-Communist ideology, especially after NATO membership.

On the other hand, there is a well-known work by Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond (1963) that separated political cultures into three – *parochial*, *subject*, and *participant* – by considering the people's political roles and their level of participation in the policy making. In the parochial political culture, the people do not have a remarkable understanding of the political system and political actors do not have differentiated specific political roles. In this model, the political

¹⁶⁰ Jo Freeman, 'The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 101, No. 3, Fall 1986, 327-356.

¹⁶¹ Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development*, Princeton University Press, 1965, p.7

¹⁶² Pye and Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development*, 22.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*:7.

participation tends to be low. This model is arguably applicable to the primitive societies and has major similarities with the Finer's definition of "minimal" political culture. The subject political culture, on the other hand, is observed in monarchies or semi-independent (subject) states. In this model, people are more aware of the political system but their influence and participation are limited. Lastly, in the participant model, people's participation in politics is high and people have a considerable power to influence politics. Hence, the last is found in rooted democracies.¹⁶⁴

On the other hand, Finer's theory offers a positive relationship between high political culture and high democratic culture, as opposed to the close relations between low political culture and authoritarian regimes. Related to this, one may see similarities between Finer's categorisation of "immature and mature political cultures" and Almond and Vera's "parochial, subject and participant political cultures". Parochial military culture meets with Finer's categorisation of "minimal" and perhaps "low" political cultures, which are likely to be seen in primitive or authoritarian regimes. Subject political culture, on the other hand, is likely to be seen in the societies wherein people have a relative influence in policy making, which can be seen in "low" and perhaps "developed" political cultures according to Finer's categorisation. Subject political culture, therefore, can be positioned in a specific place between democratic and authoritarian regimes. Lastly, participant political culture meets with "developed" political culture, according to Finer's categorisation, which is seen in democratic regimes.

Overall, by taking into account Finer's theory with reference to the definitions of Almond and Vera, one may argue that the militaries of the experienced democracies

¹⁶⁴ See: Sidney Verba; Gabriel Almond, *The Civic Culture*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

are more likely to embed the professional ethos into their military cultures than are the authoritarian or developing regimes. Additionally, as has also been mentioned before, Finer criticises Huntington by arguing that professionalism by itself is not strong enough to keep the military politically passive, in that the principle of the supremacy of the civil power should also be absorbed by the military. According to Finer, the principle of civilian power is not part of the definition of professionalism but is a separate matter. Finer defines the absorption of the civilian supremacy principle by quoting these words, “both formally and effectively, the major policies and programmes of government ... should be decided by the nation’s political responsible civilian leaders”.¹⁶⁵ On the other hand, in contrast to Finer’s argument, I consider that absorbing the principle of civilian supremacy is one vital requirement of military professionalism and, therefore, it should also be embedded in military cultures together with the other principles that create professional ethos.

In addition to the above mentioned studies, there are some scholars who have analysed the impacts of *internal* and *external* threats. An early classic, *The Garrison State* (1941) by Harold Laswell, focuses on the impact of external threats in implementing civilian supremacy. When there is a foreign threat, such as war, enemy attack, or invasion, the militaries are likely to interfere in state matters by considering security excuses, and can create “garrison states”.¹⁶⁶ Nevertheless, according to Stanislaw Andrzejewski’s (1954) *Military Organization and Society*, the opposite situation can also be problematic. In the absence of external threat, the military can show more interest in domestic politics.¹⁶⁷ There is also an alternative suggestion by Michael Desch’s (1999) *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security*

¹⁶⁵ Finer, *The Man on the Horseback*, 2002 (ed.) p. 28.

¹⁶⁶ See: Harold Lasswell, ‘the Garrison State’, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.46, No.4, Jan 1941: 455-468.

¹⁶⁷ See: Stanislaw Andrzejewski, *Military Organization and Society*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954.

Environment that explains the military subordination by finding a balance between the *external* and *internal* threats. According to this suggestion, there should be a relationship between “the strength of civilian control and the levels of internal and external threat”. Thus, high levels of external threat and low levels of internal threat cause stronger civilian control, while high levels of both threats lead to poor civilian control; low levels of external threat and high levels of internal threat result in weak civil control, while low levels of both threats cause mixed civilian control.¹⁶⁸

Lastly, Douglas Bland’s *A Unified Theory of Civil Military Relations* (1999) focuses on creating a general theory, which should be applicable to different cultures and geographies. According to Bland, one reason that prevent authors from developing a unified theory is that they focus too much on preventing “coups d’état” and neglect other variables. This situation creates a misperception such as “no coup means no problem”.¹⁶⁹ Indeed, the outline of a grand theory has been given by Feaver. A unified theory, according to Feaver, should have certain characteristics to be successful, such as: it should crucially “separate the civilian and military spheres”; it should briefly “explore the dynamics that give civilians power and control over military”; it needs to make “a clear definition of professionalism”; and, finally, it should be “empirically probable”.¹⁷⁰ The ultimate goal of the unified theory is to give a response to “all the problems” of CIV-MIL relations under one model. Nevertheless, Bland argues, this is a difficult task to achieve; because this kind of theory needs to be applicable for all state models, and needs to revise itself as regards the ever-changing circumstances of global politics.¹⁷¹ Bland’s suggestion is *the*

¹⁶⁸ See: Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*, Johns Hopkins University, 1999.

¹⁶⁹ Douglas L. Bland, ‘A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,’ *Armed Forces & Society*, 26, No.1, October 1999, p.8.

¹⁷⁰ Feaver (1996): 168-170.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

shared responsibility which asserts that military subordination should be sustained through the sharing of responsibility between civilian leaders and military officers. That means that both civilians and the military leaders have responsibilities for the different stages of the civilian supremacy.¹⁷²

2.5 ANALYSIS

2.5.1 Why Huntington?

As explained in the introductory chapter, this thesis employs Huntington's definition to explain professionalism in CIV-MIL relations. Additionally, any transition between praetorian to professional within Turkish military culture is evaluated according to Huntington's theory. There are distinct reasons for doing that: not least, his definition of "professional military ethic" arguably preserves its dominant position in the literature.¹⁷³ Although it has several weaknesses, and has faced serious challenges, none of the subsequent theories have been as influential as Huntington's over subsequent scholars.¹⁷⁴

Among the various criticisms, perhaps the most important one for the purpose of this thesis is Huntington's assumed mistake in equating professionalism with depoliticisation. Some states such as Greece, Turkey, Indonesia, Germany, Japan, and Chile witnessed a high level of military politicisation after their armies had professional training. However, there is one point that perhaps most critics do not take into account. Huntington's theory is a normative theory. That is why he defines it as professional military ethic. Indeed, Huntington himself argues that any military can be apolitical.¹⁷⁵ However, members of the military can remain politically passive

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Feaver (1999): 212.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ On the other hand, there are some scholars who interpret Huntington's theories as attempting to create an apolitical military such as Bengt Abrahamsson. See: Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military*

and neutral by adopting the professional ethic.¹⁷⁶ To prevent confusion, perhaps it is beneficial to make two different definitions of professionalism, namely *technical* and *normative*. The former refers to professionalising in the military profession, including combat skills, strategy, art of war, and so on. The latter refers to staying politically neutral and absorbing the civilian supremacy ideal.¹⁷⁷ Sometimes, some militaries cannot have both technical and normative professionalism at the same time. Perhaps, for instance, the politicisation of the Turkish and Greek armies after benefitting from the technical expertise of the NATO armies can be explained with this reality. Despite these two armies technically having experienced a sudden improvement, perhaps they could not completely absorb the professional ethic, as defined by Huntington.

Lastly, most of the approaches described by the subsequent scholars had already been argued by Huntington. For example, Huntington took into account the impact of external and internal variables by functional and social imperatives before Finer, Lasswell, Desch, and Andrzejewski.¹⁷⁸ Also, a similar argument to the mutual responsibility, concordance, and mutual contract of Bland, Schiff, and Feather had been made by Huntington, because his objective model requires a “complex balancing of power” and a “recognition and acceptance” of military autonomy in its own professional area.¹⁷⁹ Lastly, Huntington argues that the dominant ideology within a state can affect its CIV-MIL relations in a positive or negative way. Thus, if

Professionalisation and Political Power, Beverly Hills & London: Sage Publications, 1972, p. 160. Unlike Abrahamsson, we argue that Huntington does not offer an apolitical army; rather, he accepts that an officer can have political orientations, but he argues that the officer must be ethically neutral and passive. See: Huntington (1957): 60-61.

¹⁷⁶ Huntington (1957): 60-64.

¹⁷⁷ Again, according to Finer, the ideal of civilian supremacy is a concept distinct from the definition of professionalism. Unlike Finer, I preferred to consider it as one essential part of the professional ethos in military cultures.

¹⁷⁸ See: Huntington (1957): 94.

¹⁷⁹ Bland (1999): 11.

one conceives a possible linkage between the dominant ideology and the aforementioned foundations of political culture, one may also assume that the political culture variable was considered by Huntington before it was by Finer.¹⁸⁰

2.5.2 Propositions

After elaborating the background literature related to military culture and CIV-MIL relations, it may be worthwhile to remember the main propositions of this thesis on relevant issues. Firstly, military culture can be defined as a combination of several martial ethoi, which are based on specific ideas, norms, values, beliefs, and ideals that shape the institution's behaviour toward internal and external variables. Hence, military culture can be applied for analysing every type of military activity. The martial ethoi that shapes military culture plays a significant role in determining the military's position between praetorianism and professionalism. This chapter argues that those militaries that are dominated by a professional ethos are more likely to preserve their political neutrality and passivism.

Indeed, the professional ethos is more or less similar to Huntington's definition of professional military ethic, which enables the achievement of objective civilian control over militaries. However, unlike Huntington and Finer, I also consider the absorbing of the principle of the supremacy of civil power as one crucial requirement of professional military ethos. In addition to this, this chapter brings a different approach to Huntington's theory by explaining it under the guidance of the military culture variable and by separating professionalism into two, namely *normative* and *technical*. In other words, Huntington's idea of professional ethic and objective civilian control can be more sustainable and effective by embedding the professional ethos into military cultures. One effective way of implementing that can be the

¹⁸⁰ Huntington (1957): 94.

preparation of the military curriculum according to the professional ethos.¹⁸¹ The professional ethos – the combination of democratic-liberal values, civilian supremacy, political passivism, political neutrality, and military subordination – can be absorbed by officer candidates in the military academies. The same absorption can be made by non-commissioned officers in the military colleges and by the privates in the barrack trainings.

Additionally, the military curriculum can be extended with relevant theories about CIV-MIL relations, including Huntington's ideas.¹⁸² In this way, the officers can be aware of relevant scholarly debate, and perhaps they can find opportunities to make their own theoretical contributions to maintain civilian supremacy. In my interviews, I have seen that the retired officers do not know much about Huntington's professionalism and other CIV-MIL theories. This proves that, at least in Turkey, the military academies were not giving theoretical instruction until more recent years.¹⁸³ Indeed, Janowitz (1960) suggested that the civilian values of the nation should be

¹⁸¹ The importance of military academies for achieving military professionalism was mentioned by Huntington in his later works. For instance see: Samuel Huntington, *Third Wave of Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp.244-245.

¹⁸² It is necessary to mention Mesut Uyar and A. Kadir Varoglu's investigations into the history of Turkish military academy. The authors elaborate on which kind of lectures that the officers began to take since the declining years of the Ottoman Empire, and how changing academy curricula triggered modernism within military culture. The authors also point out that still there is not any remarkable change in the Turkish academy curricula to train officers on what professionalism is, regarding Huntingtonian terms. For details see: Mesut Uyar and A. Kadir Varoglu, 'In Search of Modernity and Rationality: The Evolution of Turkish Military Academy Curricula in a Historical Perspective', *Armed Forces & Society*, 35, April 2008: 180.

¹⁸³ In this regard, there are two well-known speeches by the former Chiefs of the General Staff Hilmi Ozkok and Ilker Basbug on the relevant issues. Once, Hilmi Ozkok stated that the academy curriculum should be reformed and redesigned according to the principle of civilian supremacy and professionalism. Also, Ilker Basbug once stated that Huntington's objective control model and professional ethic are the most stable and effective solutions for depoliticising the military and, thus, Huntington's theories should be taken as the ultimate goal to maintain democratic civil-military relations. For Ilker Basbug's speech, see the Introduction; for Hilmi Ozkok's speech see Chapter 7. In addition, in one of my interviews on 3 March 2016, the retired Turkish officer Abidin Onen stated that there was not sufficient theoretical education in the military academies about civilian supremacy in his tenure (1969-2000). Because of that, Onen mentioned that the officers who aimed to be a general were being sent to the NATO armies to learn professional ethics. Onen also stated that it would be more beneficial to bring NATO officers to the Turkish academies to teach Turkish officers about professional ethics instead of sending officers abroad.

absorbed by the officers through a “meaningful” integration.¹⁸⁴ However, imposing civilian values on the military, according to Huntington, tends to be a subjective civilian control, in that civilians maintain military subordination by civilianising the military, through imposing their own civilian values. Hence, although Janowitz offered an effective solution to the problem, we assume that integrating with civilian values is not vital to maintain military professionalism. Rather, as Huntington offered, it would be sufficient to make an instruction to the officers that political neutrality and commitment to civilian supremacy are part and parcel of officership. Lastly, this type of injection of professional ethos may require a stable supervision by the civilian authorities to prevent shirking. This supervision should be limited to the instructions that are relevant to politics, to prevent subjectivity in CIV-MIL relations. Naturally, this kind of supervision may be more applicable in the advanced democracies, in that accountability and transparency would be higher than in developing democracies.

Accordingly, the thesis suggests a typology of five different CIV-MIL relationships, by taking into account the relevant literature. This typology has been made by taking democracy and democratisation as the main determining criteria. The first model is the *negative-undemocratic relationship*, which emerges when political armies involve themselves in politics with the purposes of overthrowing or protecting the government or the regime. These military interventions make democratic elements unlikely to develop. Related to this, this model usually causes long-term rule by military juntas. Thus, there is a negative relationship between military politicisation and democracy. There are many examples of this model, such as the Dirty Wars in

¹⁸⁴ Janowitz (1960): 420.

Argentina, the Pinochet regime in Chile, and Fujimori's rule in Peru, which are infamous for their strictly authoritarian nature and human rights violations.¹⁸⁵

The second model is the *positive-undemocratic relationship*, which refers to the case in which the military is politically active but the impacts of this political activism are positive in regard to the development of democratic elements. This model can be seen both in revolutionary and guardian armies who involve themselves in politics for establishing a democratic regime, or for preserving the democratic elements of state. This type of relationship is, arguably, not as common as the *negative-democratic relationship*, though there are still some examples. For instance, the Algerian coup in early 1992 against the Islamic Salvation Front can be given as one example.¹⁸⁶ Additionally, the Brazilian army's removal of the Emperor Pedro II and establishment of a republic in 1889 is an example of the *positive-undemocratic model*.¹⁸⁷ Similarly, the Chilean army's efforts for expanding public services, incorporating labour organisations into the political system, and creating a national constabulary between 1924 and 1932 is another example of military-backed democratisation.¹⁸⁸ There are also other revolutionary coups in the Middle East, whereby monarchies were replaced by republican regimes, but which were subsequently turned into dictatorships. Examples include the Egyptian revolution in 1952, the Iraq revolution in 1958, the Libyan revolution in 1969, and the Iranian revolution in 1979.¹⁸⁹ It is not likely that these revolutions can be associated with the

¹⁸⁵ See: Wendy Hunter, 'Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru', *Political Science Quarterly*, 112, No.3, October 1997: 453-75; Koonings and Kruijt, *Political Armies*, pp.35-58, 111-131; David Pion-Berlin, 'Between Confrontation and Accommodation: Military and Government Policy in Democratic Argentina', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 23, No.03, October 1991: 543; 560.

¹⁸⁶ Koonings and Kruijt, *Political Armies*, 187-199; Lahouari Addi, 'Algeria's Army, Algeria's Agony', *Foreign Affairs*, 77, No.4, July 1998: 44.

¹⁸⁷ See: Wilson (2008): 18-19.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.: 114.

¹⁸⁹ George Lenczowski, 'Radical Regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq: Some Comparative Observations on Ideologies and Practices', *The Journal of Politics*, 28, No.1, February 1966: 29-56; 'Iraq: Seven

positive-undemocratic relationship due to their long-term undemocratic results. Furthermore, in some revolutions such as Guatemala's October Revolution (1944), the Mexican Revolution (1910), and even the French Revolution (1789), it is likely to encounter revolutionary officers, and a strong military support both in fighting and administration, who connected their powers with the civilian groups. But these kinds of cases are unlikely to be taken as military revolutions, because still in the background there is an organised and impulsive big civilian force (villagers, labourers, miners, civil institutions, intellectuals, merchants, etc.).¹⁹⁰ As a result, the restriction of Sultan's powers by the Young Turks, foundation of Turkey as a secular republic, and then the military's several attempts at protecting democracy, can also be given as examples of this model.¹⁹¹

The third model is the *negative-democratic relationship*, in which militaries adapt themselves to professionalism with Huntingtonian terms, though this does make a negative impact on democracy. Due to military depoliticisation, democratic

Years of Revolution', *ProQuest*, 281, accessed 17 September 2015; Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, I.B. Tauris, 2006: 106-135; Fahir Armaoglu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, (Political History of the 20. Century) accessed 18 September 2015; Hun Joon Kim and J.C. Sharman, 'Accounts and Accountability: Corruption, Human Rights, and Individual Accountability Norms', *International Organization*, 68, No.02, March 2014: 417-418.

¹⁹⁰ For the Guatemalan Revolution, its democratic results and the roles of revolutionist soldiers and civilians in the revolution see: Jim Handy, 'National Policy, Agrarian Reform, and the Corporate Community during the Guatemalan Revolution, 1944-1954', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Cambridge University Press, 1988: pp.1,5. Also see: Cindy Forster, *The Time of Freedom: Campesino Workers in Guatemala's October Revolution*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001: 33. For the Mexican Revolution and the role of villagers, miners, workers, agrarians and so on in the armed rebellion see: John Mason Hart, *Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution*, University of California Press, 1987, pp.12-14. And for a comparison between Turkey's 1960 military coup d'état and post-revolutionary process in Mexico see: Finer (2002): 197-204.

¹⁹¹ See: Koonings and Kruijt, *Political Armies*, 2. (This work argues that examples of armies that paved the way for democracy are very limited, and that the Turkey of Atatürk is one example. The other cases which fit this criteria, according to the author, are Peru under the Velasco government (1968-75) and Nigeria from 1966 until the end of its civil war.); Nil Satana, 2007, p.365. It is necessary to mention that the 1908 Young Turk Revolution had a considerable support from civilians. Indeed, according to Aykut Kansu (2001), the revolution was started after civilian protests against Sultan Abdulhamid's oppressive rule and policy of high taxes. However, one should also consider that following the unsuccessful 1909 counter-revolution by the monarchists, the revolutionist wing of the military began to increase its influence as 'the guardians of the parliamentary regime' and eventually they became the motor force of the Turkish Revolution. The details of this process will be discussed in Chapter 5.

mechanisms become open to vulnerabilities. The reason for that can arguably be – in particular in the younger democracies (with immature political cultures), which have been founded by military support – that the democratic system may not be fixed easily, and often needs military supervision. Therefore, when the military have stepped back from politics, democracy can easily be challenged by the extreme ideologies. The short-term political passivism of the Turkish military in the early 1950s and the Democrat Party's increasing authoritarianism, as well as the current military depoliticisation and the AKP's alleged non-democratic implementations, can be given as examples of this model.¹⁹²

The fourth model is the *positive-democratic relationship*, which can be summarised as this: military cultures adopt the professional ethos and democratic mechanisms work properly to block any possible challenge to the regime. In these types of regimes, political cultures tend to be higher (i.e. mature political cultures). As a result, this type of relationship enables Huntington's objective control model to be implemented. The advanced democracies managed to build this type of relationship a long time ago. For instance, in the United Kingdom and United States, it is hardly possible for the militaries to disobey civilians and to involve themselves in any type of praetorian act against the government. This is because, in these states, the liberal ethoi of the society, such as civilian supremacy and freedom of opinion, are deeply embedded in the military cultures.¹⁹³

¹⁹² For the Democrat Party's alleged anti-secular implementations see: Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, Walter de Gruyter, 1988: 123-124; for an argument about the alleged AKP oppression of the media as well as bans on YouTube and Twitter see: Murat Akser and Banu Baybars-Hawks, 'Media and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Model of Neoliberal Media Autocracy', *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication*, 5, No. 3, January 2012: 302-21; Kristin Fabbe, 'Doing More with Less: The Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkish Elections, and the Uncertain Future of Turkish Politics', *Nationalities Papers*, 39, No.5, September 2011: 664-665.

¹⁹³ Don M. Snider, 'An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture', *Orbis*, 43, No.1, 2000: 17.

The last model is the *variable relationship*, which defines the cases in which the relations follow a more complex trend by experiencing two or more of the aforementioned models. In other words, military culture does not follow a stable line, and its interactions with society and politics change a lot. Normally, each nation's CIV-MIL relations can experience periodic changes. The difference described by the *variable* model is that the changes happen more often than usual, and do not follow a stable line. Indeed, when there is an internal conflict (factionalism) within the military, two or more of the mentioned models can be seen simultaneously.¹⁹⁴ Turkey's military culture changing between the revolutionist, guardian, and depolitical identities can be given as one typical example. Lastly, to understand which of the aforementioned models best suits with a case study, the researcher can follow two ways. In the first way, the researcher can divide the nation's history into different time periods depending on the changes in politics and analyse each period separately. In the end, the researcher can make a general suggestion by taking into account the results that came from each period. In the second way, the researcher analyses the nation's history from beginning to the end without dividing and makes a general suggestion. Accordingly, this thesis will follow the first way in the empirical chapters: Chapters 5, 6, and 7.

2.6 CONCLUSION

As was mentioned in the introductory section, this chapter has aimed to bring three main contributions. The first contribution is the theoretical definition of military culture. Basically, military culture is a combination of specific martial ethoi, namely values, ideas, and ideals, that has been embedded in the institution and which shape

¹⁹⁴ For the variability of military ethos and existence of more than one military culture simultaneously in the same army see: Wilson (2008): 18. Additionally, for the existence of different factions within a military and their inconsistent impacts on civil-military relations, see: Desch (1999): 16-17.

every officer's responses to inside and outside stimulants. Additionally, military cultures can be affected by regime changes, wars, national deadlocks, social and political cultures, geographic positions, and religious values. In the political armies, military ethos may offer further roles than that of defending the state. These roles can change depending on time and conditions, such as protection of regimes, ideologies, or the military's own institutional interests. Conversely, in the professional armies, military ethoi are shaped to enable political neutrality, passivism, and civilian supremacy. Additionally, by taking into account the military culture variable and its impact on CIV-MIL relations, the chapter has suggested five typologies of CIV-MIL relations regarding military culture and its impacts on democratisation. The *positive-undemocratic relationship* refers to cases in which the military is politically active but its impact on democratisation is positive. The *negative-undemocratic relationship* refers to cases in which the military is politically passive but where the impacts of this passivism tend to be negative to democracy. The *negative-democratic relationship* denotes cases wherein that the military is politically active and its impacts on democratisation are negative. The *positive-democratic relationship* describes cases where the military is politically passive and its passivism strengthens the democracy. Finally, the *variable relationship* refers to cases where more than one of the aforementioned relationships occurs at the same time, or within different times, with periodic frequency. This typology will also be our main criteria while answering the main research question. In other words, the empirical chapters (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) will divide Turkish history into different time periods, and will associate each period with the relevant one of the five types of relationships. At the end of Chapter 7, a general evaluation will be made. The changes in each time period

will also be shown in an analytical chart, which will be available in the final part of each section.

The second contribution of this chapter is in defining Huntington's theory of professionalism and its relationship with military culture. That is to say, the professional ethos that is meant to be in military cultures can be better identified by taking into account Huntington's normative theory. In his landmark study *The Soldier and the State* (1957), Huntington proposed that civilians should create an autonomous area for soldiers and maximise their professionalism. By isolating the military in a separate, independent domain, the aim is to weaken the military's interests in politics. As a result, civilians would enable an objective control over the military in which both sides would know their autonomous limits and not intervene in each other's autonomous spheres. That separation will necessarily bring a normative discipline, which was defined as the professional ethic by Huntington, which restricts officers from mixing their political interests with their job. Similarly, the professional military mind and professional ethic, in Huntington's terms, can be taken as the main martial ethos that leads a professional military culture.

On the other hand, Huntington's theory received severe criticisms by the subsequent scholars because in some cases, professionalism with technical terms did not prevent officers from political interests. Hence, this thesis separates professionalism into two namely *technical* and *normative* professionalism. Technical professionalism refers to an advanced level of combat power and technique, high discipline and expertise in the art of war. Normative professionalism, on the other hand, refers to the principles of political neutrality and passivism. Sometimes one army cannot have both versions of professionalism and can be politically active despite having a professional training

in the academies. In this regard, the professional ethos that is meant to be in military cultures -predominantly- refers to the normative side of military professionalism.

The final contribution of the chapter is to bring to Huntington's theory a different approach, by explaining it with the military culture variable. That approach can be summarised as embedding the professional ethos into military culture to keep the military in its own autonomous area. By considering Finer's criticisms of Huntington, the chapter also considers the absorption of the principle of the supremacy of civil power as one essential part of the professional ethos. We also argue that education systems of militaries should be the civilian authorities' primary focus, in order to embed the professional ethos into military cultures. By dominating military curriculums with the professional ethos, namely the combination of democratic-liberal ethoi, political passivism, military subordination, and civilian supremacy, the officer candidate will consider political neutrality as one fundamental part of professional officership, and will defer from interfering in civilian affairs. Additionally, the military curriculum might be extended with the relevant CIV-MIL theories, including Huntington's objective control. In this way, officers can be aware of relevant scholarly debate and may involve themselves in a brainstorming process by making their own contributions. Additionally, we argue that civilian inspection over military academies can be extended in a way to prevent shirking. However, civilian supervision may be limited to those instructions that are related to the civilian domain, to prevent subjectivity in civilian control.

Lastly, the first and second chapters have defined military culture and the martial ethoi under the guidance of Huntington's theories and relevant CIV-MIL scholarly debate. Hence, the third and fourth chapters will focus on the Turkish military and military culture by applying the main conclusions that have been derived from the

first two chapters. The next chapter aims to define the martial ethoi of the Turkish military, the roles and meanings that have been imposed on its military culture by Turkish society, as well as Atatürk's own ideas about war, officership, CIV-MIL relations, and his contributions on Turkish military culture.

CHAPTER 3: CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH MILITARY CULTURE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The first and second chapters analysed the relevant literature about military culture and civil-military relations. The relevant scholarly debates define military culture as a combination of specific martial ethoi, namely the ideas, rituals, values, ideals, and beliefs that shape the institution's every type of reactions toward inside and outside stimulants, including politics. These ethoi are created, developed, and rooted in the military through history. Military cultures can be affected by a number of variables, including social-political culture, wars, national crises and victories, leader figures, geopolitical concerns, and religious values. Due to the existence of more than one resistive variable, military cultures root deeply and are not changed easily. At this point, Turkish military culture becomes an interesting case, with its military culture changeable between three different identities: revolutionist, guardian, and depolitical. Hence, this chapter aims to make three contributions which are related to the mentioned points.

The first contribution is to identify the martial ethoi that creates Turkish military culture. To do this, the chapter will firstly review the relevant literature. Then, it will continue by observing the main military ideas, rituals, symbols, and life in barracks. In this way, the chapter aims to explore what the main ideas and beliefs are that give the Turkish military a strong political character. The second contribution is related to Atatürk. The ideas of Atatürk about military culture, officership, war, and civil-military relations will be analysed by taking into account Huntington's and Clausewitz's ideas. In this way, it aims to explore which identity – revolutionist, guardian, or depolitical – best fits with Atatürk's original ideas. The third

contribution of the chapter is to analyse the assumed close linkage between the military and society. That is to say, the so-called military-nation assumption, namely the roles and meanings imposed on the military by the people, and the so-called unwritten political legitimacy that was offered to the military by society, will be broadly discussed. As a result, this chapter and the next chapter will give the reader essential background about Turkish military culture and will prepare the foundations for the empirical process.

3.2 TURKISH MILITARY AND OFFICER ETHOS: IDEAS, RITUALS, SYMBOLS AND LIFE IN THE BARRACKS

3.2.1 Introduction

In the Turkish CIV-MIL literature, there are several important studies on military sociology. Most of these works do not directly mention “military culture” as a complete concept. Rather, they focus on specific considerations of military culture on issues such as masculinity, homosexuality, women officers, conscription, rotten reports, non-Muslim soldiers, lives in barracks, militarism, and so on. Although most of these terms are related with military culture, still none of them can meet the military culture concept alone. This is because military culture is a more general and unified concept, which also shapes the meanings that are given to these terms. In the world literature, military culture has become an applicable variable in recent decades. Especially, the research project by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies for defining “American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century” has been an important development for the relevant studies.¹⁹⁵ This research project aims to explore “how traditions, values, customs, and leadership behaviours of the military

¹⁹⁵ Feaver (1999): 233.

influence military effectiveness”.¹⁹⁶ Additionally, the same research explores a mutual interaction between military and civilian cultures.¹⁹⁷ Similarly, Turkey can be shown as one characteristic example of how civilian and military cultures can shape each other. However, the related works about the Turkish military are still relatively limited.

Some of the well-known studies about Turkish military sociology can be mentioned: Mehmet Ali Birand’s *Emret Komutanim!* (Yes Sir!, 1987), which summarises the officer’s worldview, life in barracks, and the perception of self and others; Ayse Gul Altinay’s comprehensive academic work *The Myth of the Military Nation* (1971), which analyses “militarist” appearances in Turkish culture and their reflections on gender and education. In this work, she sociologically analyses the concept of “military-nation” and considers the concept as a “myth”. Additionally, Iletisim Press’s *Erkek Millet Asker Millet* (Men’s Nation Soldier’s Nation, 2013) analyses masculinity, the behaviour toward homosexuality, life in barracks, and the close relations between the military and society. That work is a combination of numerous articles by a group of writers including Murat Belge, Baris Coban, Ayse Gul Altinay, Omer Turan, Senem Kaptan, Alp Biricik, Nurseli Yesim Sunbuluoglu, Salih Can Aciksoz, Tanil Bora, Zulal Nazan Ustundag, and Arus Yumul. Bilgesam Press’ *Sivil-Asker Iliskileri ve Ordu-Toplum Mesafesi* (Civil-Military Relations and the Distance between Military and Society, 2014) is another notable work that makes attributions to Turkish military culture. That work is written by Salih Akyurek, Serap Koydemir, Esra Atalay, and Adnan Bicaksiz. Also, Gareth Jenkins’ *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics* (2001) includes sections about military ethos, the military-nation concept, and its historical role. Lastly, *2000’li Yillara Girerken Turk*

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

Ordusu (Turkish Military into the 2000s, 1999), published under the supervision of the Ministry of Culture, includes a specific chapter titled ‘Turkish Military Culture’.¹⁹⁸

3.2.2 Ideas, Rituals, Ethoi and Symbols

As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, there are officer ethoi which shape military culture. Similarly, in the Turkish case, there are certain beliefs, ideas, rituals, and behaviours of the Turkish military which are traditionally stereotyped and generally practised without questioning. Most of these ethoi are similar to the ones that can be encountered in any military. Firstly, the Turkish officers are considered as being sceptical against politicians.¹⁹⁹ This suspicion is based on the military’s alleged consideration of only itself being able to know “what is wrong or what is right for the state”.²⁰⁰ Most of these assumptions about the military are based on the Young Turks’ revolutionist legacy, in that the officers consider themselves more capable than most politicians, and do not trust their decisions. The words of Mehmet Ali Birand, who is a very famous journalist and a researcher on civil-military relations in Turkey, evidence this:

¹⁹⁸ Cited in: Ayse Gul Altinay, *The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey* (Palgrave Macmillan New York, 2004): 2. (Altinay notices that the book was introduced by the Minister of Culture, not by Minister of Defence, which is an important point in seeing how military and national cultures are intertwined. Additionally, she quotes the Minister’s words: ‘Turks have been known as a military nation throughout history’; ‘The Turkish military is synonymous with Turkish national identity’.)

¹⁹⁹ Tanel Demirel, ‘Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40, No.1, 2004: 131.

²⁰⁰ Salih Akyurek, Serap Koydemir, Esra Atalay, Adnan Bicaksiz, *Civil-Military Relations and the Distance of Military and Society*, Ankara: Bilgesam Press, 2014: 265; Aylin Güney and Petek Karatekelioğlu, ‘Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 31, No.3, April 2005: 443; Nasser Momayezi, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, *International Journal on World Peace*, 15, No.3, September 1998: 25; Tanel Demirel, ‘The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 29, No.2, January 2003: 263.

*[F]or the officer, the politics is not a very clean job, honesty is not something that can be seen very often. Even the individual interests can be considered more important than the national interests.*²⁰¹

Indeed, rhetorically, the Turkish officer is loyal to the democratic regime, and they believe that the best regime is democracy.²⁰² Accordingly, the military authorities never accept that coups and military regimes are the right things for a stable state. Therefore, they intensively reject the ideas that they are juntaists (or guardians); rather, they prefer to be titled as the “revolutionist army of Mustafa Kemal”.²⁰³ According to one famous retired officer Erol Mutercimler, while “juntaist” (*darbeci*) gives a negative connotation, “revolutionist” (*ihtilalci*) makes a progressive impact.²⁰⁴ The officers suggest a specific type of democracy, which is entirely different to the civilian’s world. The officers imagine a system that is a mixture of the military life and military thinking. That means an extremely well organised, well-disciplined society, in which each citizen only works for the good of their nation which can, arguably, remind one of socialism or equalitarianism.²⁰⁵ The scholars generally confer upon the ideal democratic regime in the officers’ minds the name “rational democracy”.²⁰⁶ Umit Cizre Sakallioğlu argues that:

²⁰¹ Mehmet Ali Birand, *Yes Sir!*, 10th ed., Istanbul: Milliyet Press, 1987, p.115.

²⁰² See: Demirel, ‘The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene’, 256.

²⁰³ Ibid., 264; Demirel, ‘Soldiers and Civilians’, 132. (The author particularly stresses the Turkish military’s opposition to long-term military rule.)

²⁰⁴ Erol Mutercimler, quoted in Ceviz Kabuğu, 7 March 2014. (Erol Mutercimler is a retired major; he was among the alleged suspects of the Ergenekon case who was later released, and he gave lectures about Atatürk, his revolutions, and his principles in several universities and wrote biographical books about Atatürk. I also attended his lectures during my university education. He made a comment in Hulki Cevizoglu’s programme *Ceviz Kabuğu*, a famous TV discussion programme about politics in Turkey. He argues a difference between ‘revolutionism’ and ‘juntaism’ by making the mentioned comment.)

²⁰⁵ Birand, *ibid.*: 132.

²⁰⁶ According to the Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori (1987) “rational democracy” is a terminology which means preferring ‘rational interests’ to ‘liberal ones’. Accordingly, in the Turkish case, the military considers itself as the guardian of Atatürk’s six ‘constitutional principles’, and it assumes that the state policies should be made according to these six principles, which is the ‘rational’ way of preserving ‘national interests’. For rational democracy also see: Mehran Kamrava, ‘Military

The military defines the civilian world as the place of instability, clumsiness, populism, irresponsibility, passion for promotion and administration, corruption and imprudence.²⁰⁷

Secondly, in the military, the commanders demand a strong level of loyalty, obedience, and a sense of altruism. The nation is considered above everything, even above the family. The soldier should sacrifice his life with happiness for his country if there is a necessity. These expectations can clearly be seen in the “the oath of the military academy”:

I swear on my honour that, during the times of war and peace, in the land, sea and sky, always and everywhere I will serve my nation and republic with honesty and happiness, and will obey the laws and regulations and my commanders, and I will appreciate the honour of soldiery, the glory of the Turkish flag as more sacred than my life, and I will gladly sacrifice my life for the nation, republic, and duty if necessary.²⁰⁸

In the same sense, Mehmet Ali Birand notes these speeches of the commanders in the military:

Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East’, *Political Science Quarterly*, 115, No.1, March 2000: 73; Güney and Karatekelioğlu, ‘Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations’, 443; Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, ‘The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 26, No.4, July 2000: 650; Demirel, ‘Soldiers and Civilians’, 127-128. (The author argues that the Turkish military mentality is not praetorian; conversely, they support democracy, but act in an ambivalent way, because there is a lack of trust in civilians.)

²⁰⁷ Umit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, *Muktedirlerin Siyaseti: Merkez Sağ – Ordu – İslamcılık (The Politics of Sovereigns: Central Right – Military - Islamism)*, İletisim Press, 2014 (3rd ed.), p. 67.

²⁰⁸ Birand (1987): 54-55.

*You will devote yourself to the state without any condition. You will only think of the nation and subordinate your family and yourself.*²⁰⁹

According to Mehmet Ali Birand, the ethoi which are mostly referenced within the military are: “Military knowledge, general culture, cleanness, honesty, honour, loyalty, full of love to the nation and country, absolute loyalty to Atatürk’s principles and the refusing of all other ideologies...”²¹⁰ Mehmet Ali Birand evaluates this situation with these words:

*They try to create an ideal Turk, a Turk who does not have any weakness ... wise, durable, honest, hard-working and disciplined.*²¹¹

The writer maintains that the officer candidates in the military academy often listen to these words:

*You are an officer, you are different, superior... never forget that you are above everything and everybody ... you are trained here as superior and wise ... devote your life to your country with happiness, altruist and honest ... As a Turkish soldier you are different than your civilian friends and other officers in the world.*²¹²

Birand argues that the officer candidate seriously begins to consider himself different to the civilians:

²⁰⁹ Ibid.: 22.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.: 60-61.

²¹² Ibid.: 80-81.

*In his final year, the officer candidate begins to see himself
different ... deeply commits to the military and his friends.*²¹³

In addition to these statements, when one observes the barracks and military academies one can see that the most of the military personnel think that they are not only different to the civilians, but that they are also different to all other militaries in the world. The Turkish officers claim that, unlike other militaries, they do not consider their duty just as a “profession” but also as an “emotional responsibility” to protect the state.²¹⁴

Also, there are religious references in the military. Although, following the foundation of the republic, the military has been titled as the “guardian of secularism”, it is still possible to observe the references from Islam and even the ancient Turkish religion Shamanism. The primary reason for that can arguably be to motivate troops during warfare. Being a “martyr” is a sacred place according to Muslim beliefs, and its reward has been promised as “Heaven”. Therefore, the military applies to the religious concepts, particularly during war time, and does not completely remove them from the barracks. For instance, the nickname for a Turkish soldier is “mehmetcik”, which is a different name for the prophet Mohammad, and the barracks are known as “the prophet’s houses” among the public. In the masts of each warship, there is a Quran hidden on the top. The meals start with a prayer and soldiers start to attack during warfare by shouting the name of “Allah”.²¹⁵ Indeed, it is likely to assume that Atatürk himself was provided with these religious symbols.

²¹³ Ibid.: 81-82.

²¹⁴ See the statement of an officer who was instigator during 1960 Junta in: Tanel Demirel, ‘The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 29, No.2, January 2003: 255-256.

²¹⁵ Omer Turan, “Esas Durus!”: Kısla Deneyimleri ya da Türkiye’de Zorunlu Askerligin Antropolojisi’ (“At Attention!”: Experiences from the Barracks or the Anthropology of Compulsory Military Service in Turkey), in: *Erkek Millet Asker Millet* (Men’s Nation Soldier’s Nation), Istanbul: İletişim Press, 2013: 326.

Atatürk's rising image as a war hero after the Gallipoli Campaign and his increasing leadership in the military, as well as the 'Gazi' title that he had after the Sakarya War (1922), which is a sacred religious rank for those who were wounded in the holy war, can be considered as the elements that strengthened Atatürk's legitimacy as the leader of the nation.

3.2.3 Personal Observations in the Military Barracks

If I were to draw my own subjective ideas, I was in the military service as a sergeant between December 2006 and May 2007. Therefore, I had first-hand experiences by observing rituals and symbols. My observations largely confirm the arguments that have been discussed thus far. Most of the rituals are the same as in all other militaries, such as routinely waking up at the same hour, having breakfast, trainings and chanting, several marches which glorifies being a "Turkish soldier", sacrificing yourself for "the good of nation" and "loyalty to Atatürk". Most of these rituals are applied to inject the common military ethos to the soldiers without questioning. The Turkish flag, Turkish nation, Atatürk and his principles are sanctified by these repetitive rituals and ceremonies. Atatürk is, naturally, the greatest symbol who connects the whole organisation under the same ideal.²¹⁶ However, according to my personal observations, only some of the officers – particularly those with the higher ranks – had a clear idea about Atatürk and his ideas. Most of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers did not really know much about Atatürk's principles, and were not taking them very seriously. Their commitment to Atatürk was mostly procedural, as a type of obligation to obey without questioning. Having conversations about politics and religion were formally prohibited. The books that were read by the

²¹⁶ Other than Atatürk, there are also other symbolic figures. For example: for the air forces, the first woman Turkish combat pilot and Atatürk's daughter Sabiha Gökçen; for the naval forces, Admiral Barbaros Hayrettin Pasha who was Commander of the Ottoman Navy during the Empire's most successful times.

soldiers were inspected. Formally, apart from the ones in the military library, books about politics and religion were not allowed, but the soldiers were occasionally bringing these types of books to the barracks discreetly, and were reading them.

As with all militaries, there were many references to the sacredness of self-sacrificing, obeying the commanders, completing the soldierly duties, and loving the nation in every corner of the barracks. There were mentions and depictions about the warrior character of the Turkish nation, and the idea of the military-nation, which offered that the “Turkish nation are soldiers, they put their country above everything and sacrifice their life with happiness for their country if necessary”. Additionally, the military was like a school for the people who came from rural places and villages; some were even learning reading and writing, how to eat with forks and spoons, and how to take responsibility in society. Perhaps that aspect is one of the reasons which enable a close tie between the military and every class of society.

There was a tolerance toward the religious people in the barracks. There were small mosques and people might go to prayer when they needed. However, normally, praying and other religious practices were allowed only in the mosque. Outside the mosque, in the barracks, there was a serious secular discipline. The soldiers were cautious when they were speaking about religion, and most of them were still worried when they were praying – even within the mosque – because of strict secular inspection. Additionally, there have always been claims that the Alevis and non-Muslims feel isolation because of the majority of Sunni Muslim soldiers in the barracks. According to these assertions, the Alevis generally tend to hide their

identity. Accordingly, some claim that there is still discrimination toward non-Muslims in the military and the reasons behind that should be explored.²¹⁷

As a result, it is not easy to make a clear prediction about the military's political interests by observing life in barracks. In the barracks, talking politics and religion are not tolerated by the superiors. In addition to this, the commanders are also careful to prevent themselves from talking differently to the formal state ideology of Kemalism. On the other hand, my observations date back 10 years, before current era, and I do not know whether or not any change has happened recently in the military's general restrictions and tolerations on these issues. Other than the political issues, the aforementioned main characteristics of Turkish military culture can be observed easily by everybody.

3.3 MILITARY AND IDENTITY: THE LEGACY OF ATATÜRK

3.3.1 Introduction

Protecting Atatürk's principles and revolutions have been indicated as the main reason behind military interventions. Kemalist references can easily be observed in the military discourse during the periods of junta rule.²¹⁸ However, the juntaist officers omitted an important reality while carrying out these interventions. The coups d'état were indeed against Atatürk's ideals. Atatürk explicitly states his target of separating the military from politics in both his statements and practices. Therefore, the military was already acting against Atatürk's principles when it carried out the first coup d'état. Yet, the scholars on the relevant issue are divided into two groups. One group suggests that the military's guardian legacy comes from

²¹⁷ Salih Akyurek, et al, (2014): 258.

²¹⁸ Nuran Yildiz, *Tanks and Words* (Tanklar ve Sozcukler), Alfa Press, 2010: 21. (In this work, the author argues that the Turkish military became the pioneer of modernism after the victory in the Liberation War.)

Atatürk, because in a speech in Konya he directly offered this duty to the military. A second group suggests that Atatürk was against military politicisation; hence, military interventions cannot be associated with the Kemalist legacy. This thesis also defends the idea of the second group. Atatürk clearly indicates his belief in military subordination and civilian supremacy. Therefore, the military's so-called idea of "protecting Atatürkist legacy" by coups d'état is a misjudgement from the start. The following process will suggest several evidences to show Atatürk's main opinions about the issue. Additionally, Atatürk's general ideas about militarism, military profession, the military-nation idea, and CIV-MIL relations will be evaluated by taking into account Huntington's and Clausewitz's ideas.

3.3.2 Three Different Identities: Revolutionism, Guardianship, Depolitical

In Turkey, the military interventions have made different impacts depending on period and regime type. Some involvements, such as the 31 March 1909 Event and the Liberation War (1919-1923), led to the foundation of a secular regime. Conversely, some had opposite impacts; for instance, after the 1980 coup d'état, the Islamic movement was strengthened. Additionally, there were times that the military remained politically passive. Therefore, it is beneficial to analyse military culture under three different categories: revolutionist, guardian, and depolitical.

According to William Hale, the historical legacy of the Turkish military has three main aspects: firstly, the military have been deeply associated with the state since the early years of the Ottoman Empire; secondly, a new belief emerged during the last years of the Ottoman Empire that suggested that the only way of achieving modernisation was accepting the military officers as the leaders of the modernist movements, because these officers were well informed about contemporary ideas and

technology; and thirdly, the legacy of Atatürk and the republic, which offers that the military should remain in their barracks and only if the state security is under risk should they intervene in politics.²¹⁹ If one observes Hale's categorisation, one may see that he gives the main pillars of the three different identities. The first one is guardianship, which refers to the traditional Ottoman legacy of maintaining the status quo – protecting the throne and sharia regime. The second group refers to the revolutionist tradition of the Young Turks, in which military officers had a perception that they should be the leaders of modernist attempts. The last one is depolitical status, which is the continuation of the Kemalist tradition of separating the military from politics.

As is also illustrated in Chapter 1, the members of these three identities have been in a constant struggle for dominance. The beginning of this conflict dates back to the strife between the supporters of the parliamentary regime and the monarch, which is traditionally known as the Mekteplis and Alaylis conflict. Other than these two conflicting groups, there were a limited number of politically neutral officers. After the foundation of modern Turkey, these two conflicting ideologies were blurred by alien ideologies including socialism, ultra-nationalism, and capitalism. Hence, I contextualised these conflicting and intertwined ideologies with the title of 'crossing identities'. Indeed, the relationship between identity politics and the militaries should be one crucial research area of military culture studies. Yet, the studies on that aspect are still limited. According to Janowitz (1976) and Huntington (1957), the militaries are ideologically closer to conservatism because of their hierarchical, authoritarian,

²¹⁹ William Hale, *The Military and Politics in Turkey: From 1789 to today*, Istanbul: Hil Press, 1996; There is an alternative approach to Hale's categorisation, which was made by Guney and Karatekelioglu. Guney and Karatekelioglu argue that there are three historical legacies: the Young Turk tradition, the Liberation War, and Kemalist principles. But the Liberation War and Kemalist heritage can indeed be taken as the same legacy (see: Guney and Karatekelioglu, 2005: 442).

sceptical, and communitarian nature.²²⁰ Accordingly, Huntington argues that the militaries are ideologically against liberalism because of the liberals' anti-militaries tendency. At this point, the Turkish case disproves Huntington's approach, because a secular and liberal officer elite led Turkey through a similar democratisation and secularisation process with the Western states. In other words, after the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the revolutionist officers became the watchdogs of the new parliamentary regime and guarded the regime against the monarchist officers. After the foundation of Turkey, secularism and democratisation became the rhetorical tenets of military culture. Indeed, the military intervened four times by claiming responsibility to protect the secular and democratic dynamics of Turkey. In addition to this, by creating the OYAK and imposing a liberal economy during the Cold War years, the military undertook the principal role for leading Turkey into a modern capitalist state. As a result, the Turkish military has shown a character distinct from most praetorian armies.

Indeed, unlike Huntington and Janowitz, Amos Perlmutter (1977) stresses both progressive and conservative sides of political armies by separating them into two: revolutionary and praetorian. Yet, praetorian is not an exact title for describing the conservative transformation within military culture because the Turkish military continued to maintain its commitment to the founding philosophy of Turkey. Normally, Perlmutter argues that a praetorian army should act oppositely to the existing regime and benefit from a weakening status quo and anarchy. However, in contrast to what Perlmutter said, the Turkish military has never completely lost its ties with the Kemalist ideology; rather, it has aimed to bring an alternative interpretation to Kemalism by the Turkish-Islam synthesis and a more capitalist

²²⁰ See: Huntington (1957): Chapter 4.

system. As a result, guardianship will be the word for defining the second stage of military culture, which has similarities with Perlmutter's praetorianism but is not completely the same. In this second stage of military culture, capitalism and anti-Communism are also embedded in the military as new ideologies, alongside Atatürkism, to maintain Turkey's belonging to the Western bloc during the Cold War years. Yet, unfortunately, although the military maintained its discursive commitment to Atatürk's principles, most of their acts conflicted with these principles, and secularism did not go further than creating an excuse for the military to maintain a capitalist system and the military's economic privileges.

In modern Turkish history, the foundations of revolutionist transformation might be extended back to the earliest military reforms, namely the foundation of the Muhendishanei Bahri Humayun (the Navy Engineering of the Empire) in 1773, under the governance of Sultan Mustafa III. The establishment was opened with the aim of conveying Western military technology to Turkey.²²¹ This was followed by the modern military academies in the nineteenth century. The new military schools rapidly increased the young officers' level of education, and made important changes in their worldviews about religion, sharia, secularism, and liberalism. Most of the graduated officers began to think that the main reason behind the state's decline was religious influence. The fatwas and propaganda of the Ulama against the Western reforms were blocking any progressive attempt within the state.²²² The changing worldviews pushed the young officers to show interest in politics, because they

²²¹ For the reform attempts see: Theo Farrell, *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002: 47-53. In this book, the author shows the exact date of such modernising attempts as the Austrian defeat in 1717.

²²² The historical background of the military modernisation will be elaborated in Chapter 6: 'Origins of Modernist Culture'.

began to think that only they had enough capability to liberate the state.²²³ As a result, revolutionary orientations began to emerge within the military. The officers showed interest in Western literature, philosophy, and science. The developments in those years created a tradition which has lasted until the twenty-first century. That tradition is the military's Western-orientated, secular, and revolutionist legacy. Additionally, the military considered itself responsible for protecting secularism whenever there was a challenge. Conceivably, because of these reasons, Mehran Kamrava (1998) explains the culture of the Turkish military as 'too deeply ingrained in secularism' among the officers.²²⁴ Principally, the revolutionist officers had shown several efforts to interfere in politics through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet, these efforts – such as the First Constitutional Monarchy era – had remained relatively weak or unsuccessful. Hence, the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 can be argued as the first significant and successful political attempt by the revolutionist officers. For this reason, I began the revolutionary period in 1908 and extended it until 1945.

On the other hand, starting from the Cold War, the military began to adopt the aforementioned conservative character. Hence, the process from the 1945s to the AKP has been identified as guardianship. Inside the process, the military has faced allegations of authoritarianism, human rights breaches, and oppression. Arguably, through the impact of NATO, the military was influenced by anti-Communist ideology.²²⁵ Only the 1960 intervention had a more revolutionist character which was

²²³ Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, 119. (The author notes that the military, with the support of a civil bureaucratic cadre, became the pioneer of the modernist moves in the Ottoman Empire, and also the founder of the Republic. Also, in the same work, George Harris argues that modernist identity of the Turkish military dates back to the abolishment of the Janissaries just after the foundation of the modern military institutions.)

²²⁴ Kamrava (1998): 293.

²²⁵ In the following chapters, the growing anti-Communist ideology after the NATO membership will be evaluated by academic references.

made for building a better democratic regime, but its long-term effects became the opposite of what had been intended.²²⁶ Perhaps these interventions protected the regime from excessive ideologies, including sharia, Communism, and Fascism. However, they could not make any stable contribution to the future of democracy. At some points they even became very harmful. Accordingly, the military's politically active status continued until the late 2000s.

3.3.3 Atatürk's Legacy and the Military

The military statements before the previous coups d'état claimed constitutional responsibility for protecting Atatürk's revolutions. Therefore, the military authorities have never described their political involvements as "illegal" moves. Hence, it can now be beneficial to observe the origins of this perception. In other words, did Atatürk offer a guardianship role to the military? What kind of developments led the military to claim this guardianship? As has been noticed before, secularisation of military began before Atatürk's time. Indeed, Atatürk himself was a member of the revolutionist Young Turks movement. Yet, his ideas and practices during the last years of the Ottoman Empire give explicit clues about what he thought on the military profession, military culture, and civil-military relations. Hence, this section and the following two sections will discuss Atatürk's opinions on the relevant issues.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's military career started in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Even within the academy, it is known that Atatürk and some of his friends founded a secret committee to proselytise their opinions in politics with a manuscript newspaper.²²⁷ Atatürk explains the situation with these words:

²²⁶ The negative impacts of the military coups will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.

²²⁷ Patrick Kinross, *Atatürk*, Hachette UK, 2012, 18.

*It was the time of the Sultan Abdulhamit II ... we were extremely worried for the future of the nation ... the only cure for the officer candidates was ... organising a pioneer force ... (for saving the state)...*²²⁸

Atatürk commanded the Turkish armies in a number of battles including the Libya War (1911-1912), the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the First World War (1914-1918), and finally the Turkish Liberation War (1919-1922). During these wars, he had opportunities to observe different regions of the Empire. After the foundation of modern Turkey on 29 October 1923, his revolutions, ideas, and principles were embedded in military culture. The relevant sources indicate that Atatürk was intensively affected by both the famous Western philosophers and the revolutionist Turkish intellectuals of his time. Some of the intellectuals who influenced Atatürk are Voltaire, Jan Jacques Rousseau, Descartes, Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill, as well as Turkish nationalists such as Namik Kemal, Ziya Gokalp, and Tevfik Fikret.²²⁹ The ideas of these intellectuals played a significant role when Atatürk was identifying his six principles (*Republicanism, Secularism, Populism, Statism, Nationalism, and Revolutionism*). Additionally, the ideals of French Revolution, such as equality, liberty, and fraternity, according to the historians, played a major role in shaping Atatürk's ideas. Just as with revolutionary officers of his time, Atatürk saw sharia and monarchy as reasons for backwardness.²³⁰

If one visits garrisons, barracks, and other military units in Turkey today, one easily observes the impact of Atatürk. Everywhere is decorated by Atatürk's sentences, busts, and pictures. All the formal ceremonies start with commemorating Atatürk and

²²⁸ Tulay Hergunlu, '1283... İcimizde' (1283... he is here), *Milliyet*. Available at: <http://blog.milliyet.com.tr/----1283-----icimizde--/Blog/?BlogNo=295058> (accessed: 12 March 2011).

²²⁹ Kinross, *Atatürk*, 17; Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 34.

²³⁰ Kinross, *Atatürk*, 45.

his principles.²³¹ On the main page of the Turkish Armed Forces' website, there is a big picture of Atatürk in his military uniform. Even a special ceremony to remind students of Atatürk is carried out in the military academy on 13 March every year: after reading the names of all the officers, the commander from the platform reads the number "1283", which was the number of Atatürk when he was in the military academy, and everybody loudly says "he is here".²³² Although Atatürk's principles were embedded in the constitution as a kind of formal "state ideology" and were also referred to regularly by the civil politicians, no other institution within the state showed the same rhetorical commitment to Kemalism than the military, even including the Republican Party, which was founded by Atatürk himself.

3.3.3.1 Atatürk and Military Culture

Atatürk's definition of military culture has many similarities with Huntington's. Despite his acceptance of notions such as rationalism, technical capability, discipline, strict obedience, and collective mind, his strong emphasis on moral ethics makes him somewhat different to Huntington. In other words, Atatürk's idea that an officer at the same time should have a "high level of morality and character" separates him from most of the war philosophers.²³³ Additionally, it is observable that, while Atatürk was describing Turkish soldiers, he often makes reference to the traditions, literature, and lifestyle of the pre-Islamic and Islamic Turkish societies. Arguably, Atatürk's words indicate that he was deeply influenced by the German/Prussian military culture, as were all other Ottoman military officers of his time. The values of

²³¹ Pekin and Yavuz (2014): 320-321

²³² Hergunlu, *ibid.*

²³³ See: Yusuf Oguzoglu, 'Ordu-Millet Dayanışması Bağlamında Türk Askeri Çağdaşlaşma Kültürünün Oluşması' (The formation of modernism in the Turkish military culture by the cooperation of military and nation), in: *Kuruluşundan Günümüze Türk Ordusu: Onikinci Askeri Tarih Sempozyumu Bildirileri-1* (Turkish Army from the Foundation, Declarations from the 12th Military History Symposium-1), Ankara: The Presidency of General Staff, 2009, p.57. Also see: Pekin and Yavuz (2014): 260-261.

strong discipline, rationalism, and being aware of the latest scientific and technological developments are the main aspects of German military culture according to Huntington, just as Atatürk mentioned.²³⁴

Atatürk considered that a strong military is an obligation for the survival of a nation; but if one observes his statements, he severely restricts himself from glorifying war and militarism; his words that a soldier should have “strong moral values” during times of peace evidence that. He also implies that the behaviour of the officer toward the soldier should be kind, and he should avoid giving out humiliating treatments.²³⁵ His ideas about war are crystallised in his well-known sentence:

*War is nothing but just a murder if there is no need to defend the nation.*²³⁶

Related to this, Atatürk’s ideas show a strong disagreement with the Ottoman Empire’s expansionist foreign policy, and he states that the armed forces should only be used for defensive concerns:

*From now on, our soldiery is only for defending our sacred lands, but not for some peoples’ arbitrary passion for personal power and fame as it used to be in the past.*²³⁷

Arguably, in that speech, Atatürk associates past Ottoman conquerors with a desire for glory, power, and hegemony. Therefore, his basic principle for Turkish Foreign Policy is categorised under his famous words: “Peace at home, Peace in the World”, which can clearly be seen on the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s official website’s

²³⁴ See: Huntington (1957): 99.

²³⁵ Pekin and Yavuz, *ibid.*: 260-261.

²³⁶ Atatürk, *The Speeches and Statements of Atatürk: Vol: 2*, Ankara: Atatürk Research Centre, 1997:128. (That speech was made in Adana in 1923.)

²³⁷ Atatürk, *The Speeches and Statements of Atatürk: Vol: 2*, Ankara: Atatürk Research Centre, 1997:135. (That speech was made in Tarsus in 1923.)

opening page under the picture of Atatürk.²³⁸ However, he assumes, if the conditions compel a nation to defend itself, that a soldier should be ready to sacrifice himself for the nation. He considers that strict obedience in the militaries can be regarded as despotic from outside; however, he continues by saying that there is no other way for success during wartime. Additionally, his idea that “Military action starts when political resolutions came into a deadlock [become hopeless]” might be considered as a view similar to Clausewitz’s idea that “war is nothing but continuation of politics”.²³⁹

Atatürk argues that a military should be strong and its soldiers ready to die without hesitation, if necessary. In the Gallipoli battles in 1915 during the First World War, his career dramatically changed after his successful commandership, and he became a national hero. In that war, he ordered his soldiers: “I am not ordering you to attack, I am ordering you to die”.²⁴⁰ Also, the following speeches by him show that he saw militaries as obligatory institutions for security and surviving: “If a nation does not demand any military forces or does not give the necessary financial and emotional support to their military, they tie their neck with a chain of slavery”;²⁴¹ and “Military is the natural result of the surviving instinct of a nation”.²⁴² Atatürk defines the profession of soldiery in his work *Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal*:

*The basic thing is the holy sense of altruism and the aspiration for heroism. ... Being an officer means to be ready to sacrifice oneself.
... An officer will not give importance to his life for the art of the*

²³⁸ See: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Home Page’. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/default.tr.mfa> (accessed: 2011).

²³⁹ Atatürk, *The Speeches and Statements of Atatürk: Vol: 3*, Ankara: Atatürk Research Centre, 1997: 61-62. (This statement was made by Atatürk in Izmir in 1922).

²⁴⁰ For Atatürk’s commandership in the Gallipoli battles see: Kinross, *Atatürk*, 73-95, 143-153.

²⁴¹ Afet Inan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Atatürk’un Elyazmaları* (Modern Knowledge and the Handwritings of Atatürk), Ankara: The Turkish Historical Institution Press, 1969: 118. (This book was directly dictated to Afet Inan by Atatürk himself).

²⁴² Ibid.: 116.

military. ... In the military, the right to refuse, object, giving opinions or adding ideas is not given to the subordinates.²⁴³

What is more, Atatürk considers military forces as the tools that carry the nations to the “actual” goal. The main aim, according to Atatürk, was “catching the level of contemporary civilisations”, which only possible with a strong army. A strong army guarantees the independence and security of the state, and provides the necessary circumstances for the victory of an “education army”, which includes teachers, scientists, artisans, scholars, philosophers, poets, and the rest of the enlightened class. There are many sayings of Atatürk in that sense; for instance, these words of Atatürk offer proof that:

*A nation must be strong in spirit, knowledge, science and morals.
Military strength comes last ... Today it is not enough to have arms
in hand in order to take one's place in the world as a human
being.*²⁴⁴

3.3.3.2 Atatürk and Civil-Military Relations

According to Atatürk, military subordination to civilians is one of the main requirements of professionalism. In all of his statements, he clearly expresses his distinct commitment to the separation of the military from politics. Therefore, it is likely for one to think that Atatürk's ideas about civil-military relations have remarkable similarities to Huntington's. One may even claim that one of Atatürk's main goals after founding the Republic was making the military completely professional (both technical and normative).²⁴⁵ In the earlier days of his carrier, in

²⁴³ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal* (A conversation between the soldier and the commander), İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Press, 2011.

²⁴⁴ Andrew Mango, *Atatürk*, Hachette UK, 2011: 219.

²⁴⁵ Once, Sinan Meydan (a Turkish historian) discussed Atatürk's plans of separating the military from politics in an interview. See: TV8, 19 May 2014. Meydan's arguments about Atatürk and civil-

1909, at an annual party (the Committee of Union and Progress - CUP) meeting in Salonika, Atatürk stated:

*As long as officers remain in the Party, we shall build neither a strong Party nor a strong Army. In the 3rd Army, most of the officers are also members of the Party ... Let us resolve here and now that all officers wishing to remain in the Party must resign from the Army. We must also adopt a law forbidding all future officers having political affiliations.*²⁴⁶

Again, in his speech which was published by the newspaper *Minber* on 17 November 1918, Atatürk stated that a strong military should be “moral”, “scientific”, “civilised”, but also “subordinated” to the civilians who rule the state. Since his years in the military academy, his ideas had not changed on that issue:²⁴⁷

*From my standpoint, a strong army means: with its all members – particularly with its officers and the commanders – a staff with a high level of morality which grasp the requirements of contemporary civilisation and science and arrange their behaviours according to these considerations. Naturally, the primary goal, duty and preparation of the (military) staff is to defend the nation ... (By following) the orders of the authorities who rule the state...*²⁴⁸

military relations are available in: Sinan Meydan, *Akli Kemal Book: 1*, (the Mind of Kemal), Inkilap Press, 2015 p: 207-221. Also, for Atatürk’s strong opposition to the military’s politicisation in the Union and Progress era, and his preference for the National Assembly instead of the military power to implement the Liberation War and republican revolutions, see: Finer (2002): 202-203.

²⁴⁶ Sevket Sureyya Aydemir, *Tek Adam (One Man) Book: 1*, Remzi Kitabevi, 1963, pp.134-135. (According to Aydemir, the original records of this speech remain in Celal Bayar’s personal archive.)

²⁴⁷ Kinross, *Atatürk*, 19, 38, 40.

²⁴⁸ Yusuf Oguzoglu (2009): 57.

Similarly, for the establishment of Turkish Grand National Assembly on 23 April 1920, Atatürk mentioned these words in a telegram:

*From this date (23 April 1923) on, the highest institution for both civilian and military authorities ... to apply will be the Grand National Assembly...*²⁴⁹

Indeed, in a speech on 28 November 2012, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (later to be president) evaluated this telegram of Mustafa Kemal as evidence of Atatürk's commitment to "public sovereignty" and his "anti-juntaist" opinions.²⁵⁰

This is from another speech by Atatürk, made in Ankara in 1924, which clearly indicates what he thought about CIV-MIL relations:

*Keeping the military out of the political sphere in our country's daily agenda (should be) an important principle of (our) republic, which has been (successfully) implemented until this day...*²⁵¹

Accordingly, while the military officers were rapidly politicised during the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) era, he avoided involving himself in politics. While the military officers were increasing their influence in the party, Atatürk made a presentation at the annual congress of the CUP in Salonika in 1909; he stated that the military and the civilians must be separated for the good of both. He made a suggestion that the military officers must decide whether to stay in the

²⁴⁹ See: Atatürk, *Nutuk*, (1927) and also see: Recep Tayyip Erdogan's speech available at: www.receptayyiperdogan.tv (accessed: 28 November 2012).

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Atatürk, *The Speeches and Statements of Atatürk: Vol: 1*, Ankara: Atatürk Research Centre, 1997: 348.

party as politicians, by resigning from the Army, or continue their military job by resigning from the party.²⁵² Atatürk states that:

*The leaders of the CUP revolution, who ... entered the government (after the revolution) ... were our close friends. In the beginning (during the revolutions), we acted together (with the leaders of the movement). After the Revolution, we fall apart ... (we warned them that) ... we should not have been mixed in politics as army officers.*²⁵³

The same behaviour can be seen during the Liberation War. After moving to Anatolia to organise national resistance, he retired from the military and continued his obligation as “the chief of the Grand National Assembly”. Then, the Assembly assigned him to the position of “the commander in chief”. Once, in an interview, Murat Karayalcin implied that: “During the Liberation War, Atatürk took all the decisions under the inspection of the Public Assembly. Even his assignment to the position of commander in chief was implemented by the demand of the Assembly and by the majority of votes.”²⁵⁴ By the same token, on 21 January 1921, Atatürk had an interview with the secretary of the Soviet representation in Ankara, Upmal Angorsky. Angorsky criticised Atatürk for his determination of keeping the military out of politics, and Atatürk responded:

I myself was interested in politics when I was in the military and I (saw) that this can be very risky ... Thus, I consider that the military completely should be separated from politics. If ... the

²⁵² Gwynne Dyer, ‘The Origins of the Nationalist Group of Officers in Turkey 1908-18’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.8, No.4, October 1973, p.126.

²⁵³ İsmet İnönü, *İnönü’s Memories: Book I*, 2nd edition, İstanbul, 1969, p: 211-212.

²⁵⁴ Stated by Murat Karayalcin (former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Deputy Prime Minister) in an interview, June 2014.

military involves (itself) in politics, this may cause the emergence of (ideological) divisions (inside the military) ... (Therefore) when a commander orders (a soldier) from the opposite (political ideology), that person can say that: 'this order is conflicting with my (ideological thought), so I cannot obey this order'. (As a result), these (ideological conflicts) can slow the combative capacity of the military.²⁵⁵

Atatürk's certain determination in subordinating the military to civil rule continued after the foundation of the Republic. He stated that the military officers who served in the Assembly during the Liberation War had to choose between a military career and a political one. Thus, the officers who continued with their profession as soldiers resigned from their position in the Assembly. Additionally, Atatürk dressed only in civilian clothes during his presidency. He avoided dressing in military uniforms apart from some specific cases. Ismet Inonu also showed the same determination. Marshall Fevzi Cakmak retired from politics and continued his duty as the "Chief of the General Staff".

Consequently, there are clear evidences to demonstrate that Atatürk supported full separation of the military from politics.²⁵⁶ However, there is one recorded speech of Atatürk, in Konya (1931), which describes the military as the "true owner of the state" and "the guardian of the national ideals". The original formation of that speech includes the following:

²⁵⁵ Turgay Sen, *Atatürk and Organizing*, Istanbul: Kaynak Press, 2013, p.122-123. For Atatürk's opinion of the political neutrality of the military see: Mango, *Atatürk*, 204.

²⁵⁶ Momayezi, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey', 3;60; Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 160. (The author argues that the Atatürkist tradition of separating the military from politics was broken with the 1960 coup, for the first time in the history of the Republic.)

*The Turkish nation has ... always looked to the military ... as the leader of movements to achieve (its) lofty national ideals ... When speaking of the army, I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are the true owners of this country ... (The) Turkish nation ... considers its army the guardian of its ideals”.*²⁵⁷

How should one understand this speech when comparing it to the previous statements, which implied the separation of the military from politics? This speech has been discussed by some scholars who claim that Atatürk offered the duty of “guardianship of the revolutions” directly to the military. However, I consider that this speech does not evidence the suggestion that Atatürk demands an army that frequently interferes in civilian affairs. Indeed, in the speech, Atatürk does not mention “guardian of revolutions”, he only mentions “guardian of national ideals”, which debatably gives a softer meaning than guardianship, because the latter can also include defending national interests from external attacks.

In this speech, Atatürk states that the Turkish nation looks to his army before starting a revolutionist attempt for achieving its “lofty ideals”. I consider that Atatürk does not want to say that the military should intervene in politics. Arguably, he refers to a well-known assumption that was embedded in national culture many centuries ago. This assumption is the belief in the military’s central role for nation building, and the role it had played in the foundation of the previous Turkish states. Perhaps, Atatürk wanted to preserve this unique national image of the military – at least symbolically – as a connective symbol. In this way, the strong links between the military and society would be protected, and the military would remain as the “symbolic” defender of republican ideals. Yet, Atatürk’s real ideas on this issue are observable in

²⁵⁷ Atatürk, *The Speeches and Statements of Atatürk: Vol: 2*, Ankara: Atatürk Research Centre, 1997: 303.

his sayings, writings, and practices. His actual purpose was to impose irrevocably a high democratic culture to the Turkish citizens, and make the Turkish regime completely civilian. In other words, after dominating society with a democratic conscience, the public could guard the Republic and secularism by using democratic mechanisms, and they would not need military support. But perhaps he thought that military power was still necessary, until the Turkish people adopted such a democratic conscience. Accordingly, if one looks at Atatürk's 'Speech to the Youth' (*Nutuk*, 1927), Atatürk explicitly states that protecting the revolutions from the internal and external threats should be the civilians' responsibility. The relevant passage in this speech states: "Even if all the national militaries were dispersed ... the duty of protecting the revolutions and independence belongs to the Turkish Youth..."²⁵⁸ This shows that Atatürk considers that the duty of protecting the regime should belong to the civilians. I discuss that well-known speech of Atatürk's broadly in the next part of this chapter, under the title "Concept of military-nation".

In summary, there are a considerable number of historical archives which support Atatürk's commitment to civilian supremacy. He proved this both by his formal statements and by his practices. Hence, it may be historically doubtful to assert that Atatürk offered the "guardianship of the republic" to the military only by considering one piece of evidence, namely the Konya speech. Also, the Konya speech was directly made to officers; it is possible to take this speech as one of Atatürk's "encouragement speeches" for a specific group of people, to grace them. As with all other founding politicians, Atatürk's speeches and statements involve similar encouragements for different sections of society, including women, villagers,

²⁵⁸ Atatürk, 'Gençliğe Hitabe' (the Speech to the Youth) in *Nutuk*, 1927

artisans, policemen, teachers, and musicians.²⁵⁹ Therefore, I will finish this section by giving the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Murat Karayalçin's view on the matter:

*We need to evaluate that speech under the conditions of those years. We know that he explicitly left the duty of protecting the Republic to the younger generations (in the 'Speech to the Youth'). How many political leaders gave such an inheritance to his nation? He makes a legacy for the Turkish young. If he was thinking that the military has a guardianship mission as it was argued by some "anti-Atatürkist" academics, he could mention that for the military.*²⁶⁰

3.3.3.3 Analysis

During his lifetime and after his death, the military ethoi (at least officially) were embedded in Atatürk's ideas.²⁶¹ Whenever the military intervened in politics the military authorities stated that the military's duty is "protecting the principles of Atatürk which are regulated in the constitution". Hence, it is possible to say that there are both written and unwritten rules upon which the military relies for legitimacy. Unwritten rules, principally, are based on people's aforementioned assumptions about the military and the idea of army-nation.²⁶² The written ones, on

²⁵⁹ For instance: Atatürk made a similar encouragement speech to the students of Faculty of Law in Ankara University by stating that they are the guardians of the Republic. See: Sinan Meydan, *Akli Kemal 5 (The Kemalist Mentality 5)*, Inkilap Press, 2015.

²⁶⁰ Interview, Murat Karayalçin (June 2014).

²⁶¹ Atatürk's principles have been independently analysed in a separate chapter.

²⁶² The adjustment of Article 35, the National Security Council, OYAK, and other aspects which give the military political and economic autonomous will be discussed in the following chapters in detail. See: Frederic Misrahi, 'The EU and the Civil Democratic Control of Armed Forces: An Analysis of Recent Developments in Turkey', *Perspectives: Review of International Affairs*, No.22, 2004: 27. (In the article, it is argued that the military's main power comes from public support, not from the legal procedures; therefore, he argues that the military will remain more powerful than the civilians as a result of this unconditioned public support.) For the privileges that benefit the military from the

the other hand, are to be found in Article 35, the National Security Council, OYAK, YAS (High Military Council), and financial privileges.²⁶³ In particular, the creation of OYAK (Turkish Armed Forces Assistance and Pension Fund) is important for understanding military autonomy and the military's assumed role as the "nation-builder". The foundation of OYAK as a military-industrial complex increased the military's influence in politics by turning it into a major capital power.²⁶⁴

By the 1960 intervention, the revolutionist tendency of the military gave way to a relatively more conservative attitude; but formally they continued to define their ideology as Kemalism.²⁶⁵ Normally, guardianship can be seen as the continuation of revolutionism. Having been the motor force of the Turkish revolutionism, the military officers have always been very sensitive for the continuity of the regime they have created (at least rhetorically).²⁶⁶ During the rules of Atatürk and İnönü the military had appeared apolitical, but the revolutionists had not yet faced a serious opposition. However, after witnessing several "counter-revolutionary" implementations during the rule of Democrat Party, the military authorities began to involve itself in politics.

OYAK see: Gerassimos Karabelias, 'Dictating the Upper Tide: Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Özal Decade, 1993-2003', *Turkish Studies*, 9, No.3, 2008: 466; Demirel, 'Soldiers and Civilians', 130; Gerassimos Karabelias, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey, 1980-95', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 35, No.4, 1999: 140, 142; İlhan Uzgel, 'Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy', *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 34, 2003: 183-184.

²⁶³ Principally, there are three articles which give the military privilege and political autonomy. These are:

1) Article 35 of the military's internal service act: 'The military is responsible for defending both the Turkish fatherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitution'. (That article has been changed under AKP rule, limiting the military's role as 'defending the nation from external threats').

2) Article 85 of the Internal Service Regulations of the Turkish Armed Forces: 'Turkish Armed Forces shall defend the country against the internal as well as the external threats, if necessary by force.'

3) Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution: The MGK (National Security Council) 'shall submit to the Council of Ministers its recommendations against the internal and external security of the country' (and it became obligatory for the government to give priority to the military's recommendations in the MGK; however, under AKP rule, the contexts of these articles changed in favour of the civilians). For the institutional privileges of the Turkish military see: Kuru (2012): 43-44.

²⁶⁴ For a detailed analysis see: p, 243-44.

²⁶⁵ For instance see: Demirel, 'Soldiers and Civilians', 129.

²⁶⁶ Interview with Aydın Kalpakci, June 2014.

Political involvement from the military moderately continued until the second term of the AKP government, at which point they slowly began to become depoliticised. The beginning of depoliticisation can be shown in the military's statement of 27 April 2007. Following that declaration, the political influence of the military rapidly decreased.²⁶⁷ Since 2011, particularly during Necdet Ozel's tenure as Chief of the General Staff, the military's depoliticised status became more evident. They have not given any political statements or made comment, apart from in relation to minor events. They have usually worked in harmony with the government in domestic and foreign issues. The best indicator of that case was the military's silence during the big Istanbul Gezi (Parki) protests against the government, and the corruption allegations toward Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in 2013. On the other hand, given the reasons that have been discussed in Chapter 1, associating this recent process with professionalism can be misleading. Hence, I defined the third and last stage of military culture as 'depoliticisation'.

In general, this section has discussed Atatürk's basic ideas about the art of soldiery, military culture, and civil-military relations. Atatürk's ideas about military culture show some similarities with Prussian military culture as regards discipline and professionalism. This is important in order to understand the parallelism between Atatürk's and Huntington's ideas, because in the *The Soldier and the State* Huntington gives the Prussian military ethic as a worthwhile example of professionalism. Accordingly, Atatürk was raised under the same discipline, because the Ottoman military academies had taken the Prussian model as an example. Atatürk argues that the officer should have a good level of education, and should be aware of

²⁶⁷ There are several reasons for this political isolation; one of them is the alleged coup plots aimed to overthrow the government that led the arresting of top military commanders. That process is discussed in Chapter 7: The AKP Era.

the latest developments in science and technology. He should act rationally and positively without considering his emotional concerns, and should make the most logical decisions during warfare.

Lastly, Atatürk's ideas and practices show his commitment to civilian supremacy. Hence, Huntington's and Atatürk's ideas about that issue have many similarities. Atatürk explicitly mentioned in his famous 'Speech to the Youth' that guardianship of revolutions should be the civilians' duty. Therefore, the military's later politicisation cannot be based on Atatürk's personality.

3.4 MILITARY AND SOCIETY: THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY-NATION

3.4.1 Introduction

Military-nation is a term often used by the civil and military authorities to refer to the assumed cultural linkage between society and military.²⁶⁸ It can be seen as a formula that describes the unwritten roots of military legitimacy. The concept has often been applied by both civil and military authorities to motivate people to join the military during times of warfare. Hence, particularly anti-militarist and liberal intellectuals tend to use "military-nation" in a negative sense. For instance, Ayse Gul Altinay (1971) defines military-nation as a "myth" for giving society a militarist character. Additionally, that concept is used by the authorities to show an emotional contact between the Turkish society and military. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the term while analysing the acts of the Turkish military.²⁶⁹

In any case, the military-nation idea puts the military in a separate place from the people. Hence, the military has always been "the most trusted organisation" in the

²⁶⁸ Yusuf Oguzoglu, 'The formation of modernism in the Turkish military culture by the cooperation of military and nation' in: *Turkish Army from the Foundation, Declarations from the 12th Military History Symposium-I*, Ankara: The Presidency of General Staff, 2009: 56-57.

²⁶⁹ Demirel, 'Soldiers and Civilians', 139.

eyes of the people. Arguably, one reason behind this love and trust is the importance that is given to militarist values by the nation. Additionally, the military's role in history increases its importance for the people, because it played a key role in preserving the Turkish culture and language from outside threats, by using "original Turkish" as the only spoken language inside the military.²⁷⁰ Lastly, given the birthright principle of Koonings and Kruijt (2002), the military's role in the Liberation War and Atatürk's heritage further strengthened the ties between society and the military.²⁷¹ Therefore, this thesis argues that the real political legitimacy of the Turkish military comes from the so-called roles and meanings that Turkish society has imposed on the military centuries ago. Due to the aforementioned historical reasons, the officers have, perhaps, had more confidence on state matters than the civilians. Indeed, perhaps this case has made the absorption of democratic culture harder for the people, due to their assumed dependency of military leadership. Relatedly, the military has continued to preserve its place as "the last and the ultimate resolution of the problems". The former Chief of the General Staff Ilker Basbug mentions this case with these words:

*The Turkish military is not getting its power from its weapons but from the Turkish society's love and trust in its armed forces.*²⁷²

This speech, and others by the generals, claims a strong cultural link between the military and the society. That is why the officers assert unwritten legitimacies behind the interventions. Accordingly, when one investigates the military interventions in Turkey, it can easily be observed that the military's main concern was always the people's reaction, because the military mostly restricted itself from political

²⁷⁰ Ilber Ortaylı, *Europe and Us*, Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010: 165.

²⁷¹ For Atatürk's connective symbolism between the military and society see: Finer (2002): 194.

²⁷² "Org. İlker Basbug'un Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Devir-Teslim Töreni Konuşması" ["Gen Basbug's Speech at the General Staff Handover Ceremony"], <http://www.tsk.mil.tr> (accessed: August 28, 2008).

involvements that did enjoy a remarkable public support. To maintain that public support, the military authorities make every effort to keep the military-nation idea alive.²⁷³ Yet, it may be beneficial to notice that, there is currently a serious decline in public support for junta rule.

The examples of militarism can be observed in every section of the society. There are famous public sayings, such as “Every Turk born as soldier”, which can be heard in the military trainings.²⁷⁴ Another ancient idiom describes “horse, women (wife) and weapon” as the most important things for a Turkish man. Even when the Turkish military showed direct or indirect praetorian behaviours, Turkish society still continued to praise the military, and this was considered as a “public confirmation” by the military authorities.²⁷⁵ Hence, it is possible to notice that military culture and national culture have been in strong interaction since the time of the early Turks. Indeed, it may be hard to analyse them independently from each other. Some scholars go so far as to argue that military culture shaped Turkish culture and created its most important tenets.²⁷⁶ The ex-Chief of the General Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu notes:

*The Turks who are known as a “military-nation” won many victories through history and founded many states...*²⁷⁷

²⁷³ Demirel, ‘The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene’, 269-71.

²⁷⁴ Ayse Gul Altinay, “‘Askerlik Yapmayana Adam Denmez’”: Zorunlu Askerlik, Erkeklik ve Vatandaslik (“One cannot be a real man before completing military service”: Compulsory Military Service, Manhood and Citizenship)’, in: *Men’s Nation, Soldier’s Nation*, Istanbul: Iletisim Press, 2013, p.205. Also for the importance of being an officer during the later years of the Ottoman Empire and the mass mobilisation for total war during the Liberation War, see: Nuran Yildiz, *Tanks and Words*, Alfa Press, 2nd ed., 2010, p.17-18; Demirel, ‘Soldiers and Civilians’, 140.

²⁷⁵ Ilhan Uzgel, *Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy*, p: 183.

²⁷⁶ Abidin Unal, *Turkish Army from the Foundation, Declarations from the 12th Military History Symposium-I*, Ankara: The Presidency of General Staff, 2009, pp.2-3.

²⁷⁷ Quoted in: Ayse Gul Altinay, *ibid.*: 326.

In conclusion, there may be significant criteria which affect people's general opinion toward militaries such as: "social characteristics, education, ideological beliefs, national and individual identities".²⁷⁸ Although social and economic status is important to a certain extent, different factors can also be effective. In some cases, warrior traditions in societies and the meanings that they give to military objects may cause these societies to deeply associate themselves with their militaries, which can rarely be seen in the Western societies today. Conversely, in the anti-militarist societies, there are strong criticisms against warlike symbols, which create a distance between the militaries and the societies.²⁷⁹ Perhaps, the close ties between Turkish society and military culture can be explained with these sociological realities.

3.4.2 Historical Background and Atatürk's Contributions

The first use of the term military-nation in history was in a book published in England in 1803, where it is used with a negative sense.²⁸⁰ The term was first used in the Ottoman Empire in the 1860s. A newspaper known as *Tasvir-i Efkar* described the Ottoman nation as a "combatant nation". After a while, the term was used to show that the military was the nature of the Turkish nation, and, therefore, each Turk at the same time had to have the basic characteristics of the military.²⁸¹

After the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the military-nation concept gained a new and stronger meaning, because the Turkish Liberation War was a public mobilisation.²⁸² Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and with his

²⁷⁸ Salih Akyurek et al. (2014): 210.

²⁷⁹ Venesson Pascal, 'Civil Military Relations in France: Is There a Gap?', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.26, No.2, June 2003: 20-42.

²⁸⁰ The book was titled *The French Considered as a Military Nation Since the Commencement of Their Revolution*. It discusses the formation of conscript army in France and its possible consequences on Britain (See: Altınay, 1971: 14).

²⁸¹ In *Nutuk*, Atatürk defines military as the 'source' national institution.

²⁸² See: Ahmet Emin Yaman, 'Kuvayimilliyeden Düzenli Orduya Geçiş ve Ordu-Millet Dayanışması' (Transition to Formal Army from Guerrilla and the Cooperation of Military and Nation) in: *Turkish*

imposition of Tekalifi Milliye (the national taxes), a great majority of both male and female citizens supported the military in the war, either by actively joining or by giving background support. The designers of the military-nation concept gave the military a special position, given its role as nation builder.²⁸³ Accordingly, retired general Omer Bayrakli noted:

*The close connections with the military and the citizens stem from the total warfare of the nation under Atatürk's leadership. The Tekalifi Milliye orders enabled the people to join the war. By this way, the civilians were partnered to the Republic, war and security. Almost all of the logistical supports behind the front-lines during the war were made by the civilians. Turks are the nation that best makes these kinds of battles and that is the thing that created the military culture.*²⁸⁴

After the foundation of the Republic, Atatürk made several references to the military-nation idea, in both *Nutuk* and *Vatandas için Medeni Bilgiler* (Civilised Knowledge for Citizens) as well as in the *Turkish History Thesis*. For instance, the extracts from speeches below clearly show Atatürk's depictions of Turkey as a military-nation:

*We are a military-nation. From ages seven to seventy, women and men alike, we have been created soldiers ...*²⁸⁵

Army from the Foundation, Declarations from the 12th Military History Symposium-I, Ankara: The Presidency of General Staff, 2009.

²⁸³ Ahmet T. Kuru, 'The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdism, and Communism', *Insight Turkey*, Vol.14, No.2, 2012: 37-57, p.41.

²⁸⁴ Interview, Omer Bayrakli, 09. 07. 2014.

²⁸⁵ Altınay (1971): 14.

*Our nation is a country of two things: soldiers and farmers. We are
a nation which is capable of raising excellent soldiers and
farmers...*²⁸⁶

Hence, Atatürk argued that military culture and national culture should go hand in hand and should not be separated from each other.²⁸⁷ Furthermore, Atatürk generalises that argument by considering that the military cultures and civil cultures of nations are strictly tied with each other:

*War is not just a battle between two militaries but a battle between
their nations. War is an exam for the societies with their all
members and their practices in the field of science and
technology.*²⁸⁸

To that extent, several scholars – including Altınay, Ozkan, Morin, and Lee – consider that Atatürk constructed the necessary “myths” for creating a nation state during the 1930s. The most important of these myths was, they argue, the concept of “military-nation”. The concept was created to demonstrate a close connection between the military, national feelings, and revolutions. Articles and history books were reshaped for the education programme with the motifs of the concept of military-nation, the heroism of Turks, and their warrior characteristics. These motifs were designed with religious attributions and the importance of being martyrs.²⁸⁹ The history books described the Turks brought up as “soldiers” and “heroes” by giving

²⁸⁶ Atatürk, *The Speeches and Statements of Atatürk: Vol.2*, Ankara: Atatürk Research Centre, 1997, p.135.

²⁸⁷ Nurseli Yesim Sunbuloglu, ‘Giris: Turkiye’de Militarizm, Milliyetcilik ve Erkek(lik)lere Dair Bir Cerceve’ (Introduction: A Frame of Militarism, Nationalism and Manhood in Turkey) in: *Men’s Nation, Soldier’s Nation*, p.12.

²⁸⁸ The Presidency of Turkish General Staff, *Atatürkism: Book 1*, Ankara, 1982, p.78.

²⁸⁹ Among the religious motifs, the most remarkable ones are those describing the military as ‘the house of the prophet’ and naming the soldiers as ‘mehmetcik’, which has a meaning as ‘the soldier of the prophet Muhammed’. For being a martyr, see: A. Kadir Varoglu and Adnan Bicaksiz, ‘Volunteering for Risk: The Culture of the Turkish Armed Forces’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 31, No.4, July 2005: 594.

references to the ancient Turks in Central Asia. Warrior culture was defined as a characteristic that can only be seen in the Turkish societies, not in the other nomadic ones.²⁹⁰ Faik Turkmen, a lecturer in the military schools during those years, defines this case with these words:

We are a nationalist and soldier state before everything else.

Nationalism and soldiery are the real basics of the Turkish soul.

*Turks admire ... war scenes, heroic music, horses and the sounds of swords.*²⁹¹

Some authors argue that Atatürk applied the military-nation concept in *Nutuk* (1927) during his “construction of Turkish nationality” with arguments such as: “Turks have always been free and independent and they prefer death to subjugation”.²⁹² Accordingly, Morin and Lee (2013) argue that *Nutuk* is a typical example of the nation state construction, because it creates all the required narratives for that kind of construction, such as the “myth” of a military-nation: “Your first duty is to forever protect and defend Turkish independence”. Atatürk defines Turks as “historically military people” who are “born soldiers” and “ready to make ultimate sacrifice”. Atatürk mentions that the Turkish people should live in “honour and dignity”, and that this can be achieved only by “complete independence”. “A nation deprived of its independence cannot go further than being a slave in the eyes of the civilised world,

²⁹⁰ Guven Gurkan Ozkan, *Türkiye’de Milli Kimlik İnşası Üzerine Surecinde Militarist Eğilimler ve Tesirleri* (Militarist Inclinations and their Results during the National Identity Construction in Turkey) in: *Men’s Nation, Soldier’s Nation*, p. 85-87; Senem Kaptan, ‘Çatlakların Gölgesinde Militarizm: Türkiye’de Askerlik, Aneelik ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet’ (Militarism Under the Shadows of Crackles: Soldiery, Motherhood and Social Gender in Turkey), in: *Men’s Nation, Soldier’s Nation*, İstanbul: İletişim Press, 2013, p.338.

²⁹¹ Faik Turkmen, *National and Military Moral*, İstanbul: The Press of Military High Schools, 1943, p.7.

²⁹² Atatürk, *Nutuk* quoted in: Aysel Morin and Ronald Lee, *Constitutive Discourse of Turkish Nationalism: Atatürk’s Nutuk and the Rhetorical Construction of the ‘Turkish People’*, Routledge, 2013, p.492-493.

Turks have never been in such a humiliating state in history and it is better for such a nation to be perished than to be a slave, if so Independence or Death!”²⁹³

3.4.2.1 Atatürk’s ‘Speech to the Youth’

As has been mentioned in the previous section, the ‘Speech to the Youth’ included clear evidence that, according to Atatürk, the “protection of the Republic” should belong to civilians. The ‘Speech to the Youth’ is a quite well-known speech in Turkey. It is normally the final part of *Nutuk*. Most citizens learn and memorise the speech during the earlier years of school life. Indeed, it is possible to encounter that speech in every corner of Turkey including schools, colleges, universities, state institutions, private properties, and businesses, as well as the military establishments, barracks, and ordinary citizens’ homes.

In the last pages of *Nutuk*, after explaining the reasons for and the story of the Turkish Liberation War, Atatürk draws a conclusion that the new Turkish Republic cannot be left to the hands of “the Sheikhs, dervishes, murids (different ranks within religious brotherhoods), fortune-tellers, wizards, tomb guardians”. He maintains that “a nation which leaves its destiny to the hands of superstitions” cannot reach to “the level of contemporary civilisations”, and remains as “primitive”. *Nutuk* continues with the words “I present this Republic as a ‘gift’ to the younger generations”. Then he finishes *Nutuk* with the ‘Speech to the Youth’.²⁹⁴ In that final part, he suggests that the same conditions during the Independence War can emerge again in the future. If that happens, he warns the new generations to defend the Republic by implying that the Turkish young have a “noble blood”. Usage of unifying and motivating rhetorics, or applying to mythical expressions such as “noble blood”, is a common case during

²⁹³ Atatürk, *Nutuk*, p.9-10; quoted in: Morin and Lee, *ibid.*: 493.

²⁹⁴ Atatürk, ‘Turk gencligine biraktigimiz kutsal armagan’ (The sacred gift that we left to the Turkish youth’, in: *Nutuk*, 1927.

the construction of nationalism within modern terms. Hence, I specifically discussed the scholarly debate related to the usage of myths and symbols to construct the perception of “self” and “others” in Chapter 4. On the other hand, for the purpose of this chapter, this speech shows us Atatürk’s personal desire for making civilians the primary and ultimate protectors of the regime. Also, the speech explicitly suggests that the “true owners of the Republic” should be “civilians”, not the “military”. His words “(Even when) all of the (nation’s) armies were dispersed ... O! (Turkish Youth) ... your duty is saving the Turkish Republic and independence” are especially remarkable for the purpose of this thesis:

*If some day again you are compelled to defend the Republic and independence, you shall not waste time assessing the possibilities and circumstances of the situation ... (Because) the enemies ... may have an unprecedented victory... All the castles of the holy nation may be captured, all the shipyards occupied, all its armies dispersed and every part of the country invaded ... O, Turkish youth! Even under these circumstances your duty is saving the Turkish independence and Republic. The strength you need is already embedded in your noble blood.*²⁹⁵

3.4.3 The Impacts of Compulsory Military Service

Throughout the foundation of the Republic, the concept of military-nation has been dominated by several assumptions, such as “prioritising the nation over everything; even than parents and family” and “sacrifice oneself if necessary for the benefits of the country”.²⁹⁶ To indicate how military service is important for the people, it can be

²⁹⁵ Atatürk, *Nutuk*, p.740-741. The translation was quoted from: Morin and Lee (2013), p.498.

²⁹⁶ Yasar Tolga Cora, ‘Asker-Vatandaşlar ve Kahraman Erkekler: Balkan Savaşları ve Birinci Dünya Savası Donemlerinde Beden Terbiyesi Aracılığıyla İdeal Erkekliğin Kurgulanması’ (Soldier-Citizens

worthwhile to mention the citizens' perspective on military service. Predominantly, a number of citizens who come from rural areas consider military service as the most important aspect of their lives.²⁹⁷ They believe that a man must complete his duty of military service to become "a real man". It is very common to observe people who send their son, friend, or relative to the military with traditional celebrations. The people cover their vehicles with the Turkish flags and chant "Our soldier is the greatest soldier".²⁹⁸ Some of them may even fire guns into the air. Compulsory military service enables the military to bring together all types of citizens, of different status, ideologies, and regions, equally, under one flag. Accordingly, the removal of class differences, ideological conflicts, and status within military barracks builds the core of the military-nation idea.²⁹⁹

It is a fact that military service can be a school for the people who live in rural areas: they socialise, learn how to read and write, how to eat in public, and how to live under discipline.³⁰⁰ Therefore, when they come back to their family, they are regarded as "a real man" who is ready to marry and to be "the leader of the family".³⁰¹ There is a famous idiom that goes "nobody gives his daughter to a man who has not completed the military service for marrying".³⁰² In addition to this, it is

and Hero Men: Creating the Ideal Men by Gym during the Balkan Wars and the First World War) in: *Men's Nation, Soldier's Nation*, p.53; Guven Gurkan Ozkan 'Militarist Inclinations during the Construction of National Identity in Turkey', p.75, in: *Men's Nation Soldier's Nation*, Istanbul: Iletisim Press, 2013.

²⁹⁷ Ozkan, *ibid.*: 88.

²⁹⁸ The Chief of the Turkish Republic General Staff, *Atatürk and the Republic in the Turkish history*, Ankara: General Staff's Press of Military History and the Presidency of Strategic Research, 2009, 2nd ed., p.11; Akyurek et al., *ibid.*: 261; Varoglu and Bicaksiz, 'Volunteering for Risk,' 584-585.

²⁹⁹ Malcolm Cooper, 'The Legacy of Atatürk: Turkish Political Structures and Policy-Making', *International Affairs*, 78, 1, 2002: 115-128, p.119; Salih Akyurek et al., *ibid.*: 215.

³⁰⁰ Altinay, *ibid.*: 223-227.

³⁰¹ Ozkan, *ibid.*: 82, 94.

³⁰² Altinay, *ibid.*: 216.

quite usual that a mother and a father say “Long live the homeland” after they have lost their son in a war when he was in the military service.³⁰³

As a summary, some states tend to implement civilian control over their militaries without much effort. Nevertheless, some nations, like Turkey, can inject special roles to their military beyond security, such as “modernism” and “development”, as a result of their inherited characteristics. In these types of states, military culture becomes more autonomous and interventionist in political affairs. In Turkey, most cases such as secularism, foreign policy, education, and social problems are considered within the circle of security; therefore, drawing the roles of civilians and the military can cause confusion.³⁰⁴ As has been mentioned, the traditions and cultural values of Turkey have enabled the military to have a big influence on political matters. Thus, the military became the primary actor of modernisation, from the middle of the nineteenth century, during the Ottoman Empire, and this role strengthened during the Republic. Due to this basic role, society has always had a deep respect toward the military, regarding it as the most trustable institution within the state.³⁰⁵

3.4.4 Public Support

According to the public surveys, people’s trust in the military has always remained higher in Turkey than it has for all other institutions. After the latest events, such as the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, there has been remarkable decline in the level of trust, but still the military retains its position as the most trustable organisation within Turkey. Eurobarometer surveys demonstrate that the public trust for the military was

³⁰³ Safak Aykac, ‘Şehitlik ve Türkiye’de Militarizmin Yeniden Üretimi: 1990-1999’ (Reproduction of militarism in Turkey and Martyrness: 1990 – 1999), in: *Men’s Nation Soldier’s Nation*, Istanbul: İletisim Press, 2013, p.172.

³⁰⁴ Akyurek et al., *ibid.*: p.3.

³⁰⁵ Ergun Özbudun, *Study on Democratic Control of Armed Forces Civilian Control of the Military: Why and What?*, European Council Vienna Commission Press, Study No.389, 2007, Strasbourg, 26 September 2007, p.4.

89 per cent in 2004, although it declined to 70 per cent in 2010.³⁰⁶ Additionally, Bilgesam's survey in 2013 suggests that the public trust for the military was approximately 64 per cent. That shows that, despite a considerable decrease in the findings compared to previous years, the military is still the most trusted organisation in Turkey, by a large margin. Yet, Ahmet T. Kutu (2012) claims that one reason for the high level of trust can be the military's lack of accountability, which made the generals more trustable compared to the politicians. He argues that the decline in the level of trust after the Ergenekon and Balyoz prosecutions proves that idea.³⁰⁷ However, even if one believes that Kuru is right, one should recognise that public support is still strong for the military, despite all the coup prosecutions, detentions, and arrests.³⁰⁸

3.5 CONCLUSION

As was briefly referenced in the introductory section, this chapter has made three main contributions to the thesis. Firstly, it has outlined the main ethoi of Turkish military culture. Turkish military culture can be summarised as the combination of several factors, including: the idea of military-nation; the revolutionist legacy of the Young Turks; Atatürk's legacy; the Islamic legacy; and other collective military ethoi, namely ideas, rituals, symbols, and beliefs, which are common across all militaries, such as self-sacrificing, altruism, being sceptical to politicians, and routine

³⁰⁶ Yaprak Gursoy, 'Turkish Public Attitudes Toward the Military and Ergenekon: Consequences for the Democratic Consolidation', Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University, European Institute, Working Paper No.5, 2012, p.11.

³⁰⁷ Kuru, *ibid.*: 42-43; Also Demirel (2005) argues that the military rules have never been considered as harmful by the Turkish people, as opposed to the Argentinian and Greek examples; therefore, the Turkish military has always felt comfortable when interfering in politics (Demirel, 2005: 245-46, 252-53, 258, 260-264).

³⁰⁸ Salih Akyurek and Mehmet Ali Yilmaz, *A Sociological View on the Turkish Armed Forces*, Ankara: Bilge Adamlar Strategic Research Center (Bilgesam), Report No.56, April 2013, p.248. For a very detailed analysis of public trust in the military see: Zeki Sarigil, 'Deconstructing the Turkish Military's Popularity', *Armed Forces & Society*, 35, No.4, July 2009: 709-27. (The author cites Huntington's argument that public trust/support for the military increases their political legitimacy, *ibid.*:2.)

practices. Especially, the Turkish military's sceptical legacy toward politicians has made it politically keen and active until recent years, in that the officers still were not inclined to trust the politicians' sincerity in commitment to national interests and Atatürkist ideals. Additionally, members of the military have tended to be suspicious about civilians' capability to rule, due to the lack of discipline in civil life. That line of consideration became an important point that prevented the military from stepping back from politics.

The second contribution of the chapter is related to Atatürk's ideas about the relevant issues. Atatürk's ideas about officership and military culture have many similarities with Huntington's pragmatic views, in that Atatürk sees officership as a combination of passion for heroism, altruism, rationality, and scientific and technological superiority, as well as strong obedience. Yet, one interesting point that separates Atatürk from Huntington's pragmatism is Atatürk's strong emphasis on ethical and moral considerations. That is to say, Atatürk argues that, apart from being a man of reason and mind, the officer should have a strong level of moral and ethical values in peacetime, and he should consider himself as the defender of national peace and order. Atatürk's ideas about war evidence this fact, in that he ponders that war can only be legitimate if there is a need to defend the nation; otherwise, it becomes murder and slaughter. Lastly, Atatürk's relevant ideas, statements, and practices about civil-military relations indicate that he believed in the necessity of military depoliticisation, and its subordination to civilians for a sustainable parliamentary regime. Indeed, it is possible to find a similarity between Huntington's professional military mind and Atatürk's ideas.

The last contribution of the chapter is related to the military-nation idea – the assumed linkage between the military and society. The dominance of militarist

values in society, due to the reasons that have been mentioned above, gave the military a core position in Turkey's national politics. The roles and meanings that have been imposed on the military centuries ago caused them to remain in a politically active position. Indeed, in most of the previous Turkish states, we may see that the military has been in the founder and the ruler positions. This reality was also mentioned by Atatürk, in that he defined the military as the core and basis of the national institution and the guider of national ideals. Additionally, given the birthright principle of Koonings and Kruijt (2002), the military's role as the nation builder during the Liberation War gave it an unwritten legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

In summary, this chapter has been a foundation for the empirical chapters by exploring the main ethoi that create military culture. In the next chapter, Atatürk's principles will be discussed by taking into account their academic foundations and their relationships with the military discourse. By doing this, the aim is to illustrate the ties between the martial ethoi and Kemalist principles, insofar as they have been used as the main reasons behind military interventions. So, by analysing the Atatürkist principles, we have two goals: firstly, to understand whether or not the military discourse was consistent, while showing Atatürk's principles as a justification for their interventions; secondly, to identify the main theoretical terms that will be employed in the empirical chapters.

CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF ATATÜRK'S PRINCIPLES AND MILITARY'S RHETORIC

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter looked at the dynamics of Turkish military culture as well as the reasons behind the Turkish military's political character. It also argued the importance of Atatürk and Atatürkist ideals, as the symbolic and ideological ethos of military culture. This chapter will continue to define Turkish military culture by offering a conceptual analysis of Atatürk's principles. Indeed, Kemalist principles have not only been a type of "military ideology" in their discourse, but they have also represented the founding philosophy of the Turkish state. It is even possible to consider Atatürk's principles as the formal state ideology. Principally, the formal character of the regime in Turkey has been based on these principles, namely *Republicanism*, *Secularism (Laicism)*, *Nationalism*, *Populism*, *Statism*, and *Revolutionism*.³⁰⁹ Especially, secularism, nationalism, and republicanism are referred to as the "unchangeable principles" of the regime. Indeed, any suggestion to change these principles is defined as a "crime", according to the Turkish constitution.³¹⁰

By referring to Article 35 of their Internal Service Act, the army authorities have often interfered in state affairs, either directly or indirectly.³¹¹ The article gives the military the responsibility of protecting the Turkish constitution (especially the aforementioned principles) from internal and external enemies. Article 35 was prepared by the ruling junta following the 1960 coup d'état. Additionally, by creating

³⁰⁹ Some authors use 'Laicism' instead of 'Secularism', 'Publicism' instead of 'Populism', and 'Reformism' instead of 'Revolutionism'.

³¹⁰ For the English translation of first four articles of the Turkish Constitution see: *The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey*, 'Articles: 1-4', Copyright Legislation Profile Turkey. Available at: <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982Constitution-1995-1.pdf> (accessed 1997).

³¹¹ For the context of Article 35, see Chapter 3.

the National Security Council (NSC), the military authorities had a legal tool for involvement in the execution process. The NSC is a combination of civilian and military authorities to discuss and decide the fundamental domestic and foreign security issues. After each military intervention, the military's powers were increased in the Council. The main domestic security problem has been indicated as the "threats against Atatürk's principles", namely excessive ideologies such as political Islam and the Kurdish separation movement. Yet, the legal powers of the military have been restricted by the AKP government, under the guidance of European Union Progress Reports. Accordingly, the military has lost most of its legal foundations to claim protection of Atatürk's principles.³¹²

After Atatürk's death, the military protected its subordinated position until the 1950s. Although there had been several juntaist attempts up to that point, the civilian regime continued without a break until the 1960 coup d'état. Following the coup, the military intervened in democracy on four occasions (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997). During these interventions, the military prepared radical regulations to establish supervision over the civilians. The major motivation behind the interventions was described as protecting Kemalist principles.³¹³ Relatedly, the military authorities have rebuffed all charges of breaching democracy by referring to their "constitutional responsibility".

³¹² For the relationship between Atatürk's principles and the military see: Narli, 2007: 108; Sadik, 2013: 211; Karabelias, 2009: 57, 59, 64 and 1999: 139; Cooper, 2002: 118-121; Haynes, 2010: 4; Bora, 2003: 437; Morin and Lee, 2010: 495; Dyer, 1973: 121-164; Karabelias, 1999: 130-132; 139; Bardakci, 2008: 23; Tachau and Heper, 1983: 20; Toktas and Kurt, 2008: 1; Davies, 2013: 512; Mellon, 2006: 74; Heper, 2009: 35; Karpas, 1970: 1671; Atasoy, 2011: 90; Kamrava, 2000: 73; Kaya, 2011: 3; Emin, 2007: 33; Momayezi, 1998: 5; 25; Duman and Tsarouhas, 2005: 410; Demirel, 2003: 255; Demirel, 2004: 128-129; Cizre and Walker, 2010: 93; Bilgic, 2009: 812; Momayezi, 1998: 3; 5-6; Harris, 1965: 55; Hale, 2011: 195; Haynes, 2010: 315; Cizre and Cinar, 2003: 312-313; Pion-Berlin, 2011: 295; Satana, 2008: 372.

³¹³ In both the 1960 and 1982 Constitutions, the reference to Atatürkist principles (especially republicanism-secularism-nationalism) can clearly be observed.

This chapter has four targeted contributions. Firstly, it will discuss Atatürk's principles by investigating their conceptual backgrounds. That is to say, the chapter will define relevant principles by taking into account Atatürk's writings, speeches, and practices. The second contribution of the chapter is to explore the similarities and differences between the Atatürkist and foreign interpretations of the relevant terms. The third contribution is to argue whether or not the military was consistent while embedding their interventions into a Kemalist legacy. The final contribution is to make a brief introduction to the empirical process, because starting from the next chapter these terms will occasionally be used while analysing civil-military relations. Additionally, these terms will be the main framework of the analytical tables in empirical chapters.

4.2 FIRST PRINCIPLE: SECULARISM

4.2.1 Conceptual Clarification:

Before analysing the secularism in Turkey and its relationship with democratisation and modernisation, it may be beneficial to observe two different views in the literature, one of which considers a direct relationship between secularism and modernism and the other that objects to this. Actually, as a dictionary term, secularism comes from the Latin word *saeculum*, which means “of the world”, developed as a reaction to “of the church”; in other words, being secular can be defined as “creating distance between the matters of religion and the matters of the world”.³¹⁴ The leading scholar in this field Peter Berger (1967) explained secularisation as “a process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from

³¹⁴ Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, ‘The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations’, *European Journal of International Relations* 10, No.2 (June 2004): 237-238; Andrew Davison, ‘Turkey, ‘A Secular State’? The Challenge of Description’, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol.102, No.2/3, Spring/Summer 2003: 333-350, pp.333-334.

the domination of religious institutions and symbols”.³¹⁵ In this regard, Berger defined this process as a gradual penetration to the society and institutions in which people become more aware of the world and organise their life without expecting any benefit from the promises of religion.³¹⁶ In other words, secularism might be defined as an instrument that puts forward the idea that moral rules can be shaped logically, without regard to religious doctrines.³¹⁷

Related to this, Andrew Davison (2003) argues that secularism is applied by materialists, humanists, atheists, and antitheists to outline a very different worldview, which is sharply different to religious explanations. He argues that the term secular may have a negative relationship with religion and religiosity because it divorces the religious doctrines and the idea of god from human conscience and behaviour, for a realistic outlook on items such as social norms, customs, art, education, ideology, law, and politics.³¹⁸ In accordance with this, there are various definitions of secularism drawing sharp lines between state and religion. For instance: a contemporary scholar Azzam Tamimi (2000) defines secularism as “a certain theory of life and conduct without reference to a deity or a future life”.³¹⁹ John Keane also argues that secularists are the people who believe that “Church and the world are caught up in an historical struggle in which slowly, irreversibly worldliness is getting the upper hand”.³²⁰ By looking at these definitions, it is fair to summarise that secularism aims to liberate worldly matters such as art, science, education, politics, law, and social life from the impact of religion, for the good of both. But, given the

³¹⁵ Quoted in: Peter Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, New York: Anchor Books, 1967.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Kai Nielsen, ‘Morality and the Will of God’, in *Critiques of God: Making the Case against Belief in God*, Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1997: 249.

³¹⁸ Davison, ‘Turkey, a ‘Secular’ State?: The Challenge of Description’, 334.

³¹⁹ John L. Esposito and Azam Tamimi, ‘The Origins of Arab Secularism’, *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, New York: New York University Press, 2000, p.14.

³²⁰ John Keane, in: Hurd ‘The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations’, 236.

existence of more than one religion, there are questions of defining what “religious” means and how far the religion can penetrate into the worldly area. Because of this, as will be discussed presently, the questions of what “secular” means and how far it can limit religion also remain unanswered.

In this regard, Berger offers two models of secularism, one of them more democratic and the other one stricter: *objective* and *subjective*. Berger defines *objective secularism* as an institutional separation in which religion is entirely isolated from state departments. In this model, the state controls the society by employing positive and secular regulations. Therefore, the concept of nation state develops as the main institutional instrument of the state, instead of the supranational religious unity (known as “ummet” in Islam) to keep citizens together.³²¹ On the other hand, *subjective secularism* analyses the case on a more individualistic basis. In this model, the individual understands the world and tries to find solutions to problems in a pragmatic way. Also, in his/her social relations with others, he/she chooses a positivist/scientific approach.

At this point, Berger suggested a secularisation theory by considering a positive relationship between secularisation and modernisation. According to this suggestion, while the people’s interest in worldly matters including science, art, and philosophy was being increased, religion would slowly be disappeared from social and individual spheres. Berger explained this case as “secularisation of consciousness” by which he argues “secularism may be observed in the decline of religious contents in the arts, in philosophy, in literature ... in the rise of science as an autonomous, thoroughly secular perspective on the world ... Moreover, the process of secularisation has a subjective side as well. As there is a secularisation of society and

³²¹ Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, 107-108.

culture, so is there a secularisation of consciousness”.³²² In a similar way, another scholar Jose Casanova (1994), suggested that the decline of religion would occur in three steps: (1) “the increasing structural differentiation of social spaces resulting in the separation of religion from politics, economy, science, and so on”; (2) “the privatisation of religion within its own space”; and (3) “the declining social significance of religious belief, commitment, and institutions”.³²³ This approach contends that if societies become more modern, simultaneously the level of religious beliefs and practices declines, and the impact of religion on social and political life disappears.

On the other hand, there are scholars who have challenged the modernisation theory by arguing that it is not always possible to find a direct relationship between secularism and modernisation. Interestingly, one of these scholars is the principal builder of the secularisation theory, Peter Berger. Berger later changed his idea by declaring that he was wrong, because, although there is improvement in science, philosophy, and the arts, religion still preserves its influence.³²⁴ Actually, there are two criticisms against the secularisation theory that need to be clarified. The first issue is the uncertainty of the concept. In the academic literature, there is not a universally accepted definition of ‘secularism’. Instead, one is quite likely to encounter different definitions. As was argued by Thomas Mitchell (2000), “the meaning of the term secular” is not something self-evident or universal.³²⁵ Hence, Rajeev Bhargava (1998) argues that secularism can be “interpreted differently at

³²² Ibid.: 107-8.

³²³ Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 13-14.

³²⁴ See: Peter L. Berger, *the Desecularisation of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, the Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999.

³²⁵ Thomas Mitchell, *Introduction to Questions of Modernity*, ed. Timothy Mitchell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. xiii.

different times”.³²⁶ Indeed, due to the existence of many different religions and due to the absence of a universal definition of what religion and religious mean, it is perfectly normal that there can be many different definitions of secularism that are not universally accepted. Secondly, due to the non-existence of a universal definition, the term can easily be constructed and interpreted according to the political benefits. Indeed, there is a view that considers secularism as a Western myth for othering the developing states and for indicating the West as a modernised and civilised role model to imitate.³²⁷ According to the critical scholar Scott Thomas (2005), religion and secularism are indeed invented myths of liberalism, which claim a universal validity to guide non-Western developing states for progress, modernisation, and developing.

Indeed, there are strong evidences that oblige us to consider that Thomas is right. In other words, the United States and other Western states claim to be secular but still they apply to religious references when needed for their political interests. The existence of the Christian Democrats can be supportive evidence to this. In addition to this, there are religious references in the legal American regulations that, in fact, should be secular, such as the court cases, state departments, wedding ceremonies, and even the statement ‘in God we trust’ on the dollar. Most importantly, the President of the “secular” United States George W. Bush applied religious terms after the 11 September attacks to legitimise his operation to Iraq as a war against “evil”.³²⁸

³²⁶ Rajeev Bhargava, *Introduction to Secularism and Its Critics*, Oxford, 1998, p. 3.

³²⁷ See: Hurd, ‘The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations’.

³²⁸ See: Scott Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century (Culture and Religion in International Relations)*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

To sum up, the definition of secularism is contested and changes from one case to another. The main purpose of secularism is to separate worldly matters such as education, law, science, social life, and the arts from the impact of religion. However, the boundaries of this limitation are highly blurry and contested. As long as there is not a universal answer of what is religious and what is not, the definition of secularism will continue to experience a similar paradox. Yet, basically, there is a view offering a positive relationship between secularism and modernism and there is another view that opposes this. In the next part, we will discuss which one of these two views better explains the Turkish case by taking into account the importance of secularism for Turkish modernisation and military culture.

4.2.2 Secularism in Turkey

The principle of secularism has always been considered the most vital element of Turkish modernism. Especially, the founding father Atatürk prepared all the revolutions according to this principle. Indeed, the nationalism principle, at one point, served as a tool for achieving secularism by breaking ties with the Islamic world and the concept of ummet.³²⁹ Furthermore, Atatürk and the later junta leaders saw the secularism principle as being part and parcel of a democratic regime. At this point, we have already seen that there are two different views, one of which suggests a positive relationship with secularism and modernism and the other that opposes this. To see the role and importance that was given to secularism during the foundation of modern Turkey, it is necessary to observe history.

The first secularisation movements in Turkey date back to the last centuries of the Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire was officially considered an Islamic state. Sharia

³²⁹ Nukhet Sandal, 'Public Theologies of Human Rights and Citizenship: The Case of Turkey's Christians', *Human Rights Quarterly* Vol: 35, No:3, 2013.

law was dominant in political, social, civil, and cultural spheres.³³⁰ Sharia was based on three main resources, namely the Koran, Hadith (The Prophet's sayings) and icma (the interpretations of the religious authorities). Particularly after the seventeenth century, a series of defeats against the Western military powers, territory losses, and economic deadlocks led the Ottoman elites to produce reform plans. In the following process, the impact of religion on state matters began to be lessened; however, that change was not revealed to the people in the very beginning. The first official and strong reaction against the belief that "religion could administer all of the worldly matters" came with the Tanzimat. Tanzimat was a decree by the Sultan in 1839 that was influenced by the Western system, considering that the rapidly changing world conditions could not be handled by the old religious principles. Tanzimat included several reforms that were carried out by following Western laws and institutions.³³¹ Moreover, the first secular public schools and courts began to be established. The judges in these courts were trained in a more secular environment than the previous ones. Especially, in the following decades, the new graduates of the reformed military academies would undertake a major role in the Turkish revolution.³³² Eventually, the new secular Turkish Republic was founded by these officers.³³³

After the foundation of the Republic, a number of secular reforms were implemented by the founding father, Atatürk. The most important of these reforms are: 'the abolition of the Sultanate' (1922); 'the declaration of the Republic as the new regime' (1923); 'the removal of the Caliphate' (1924); 'the adoption of modern

³³⁰ Bulent Daver, *Secularism in Turkey*, University of Ankara, Faculty of Political Science, 1969, p.31.

³³¹ Ibid.: 31.

³³² For a detailed analysis of how revolutionary ideals within the young Ottoman officers led to the foundation of the Turkish Republic in the early twentieth century see: Gwynne Dyer, 'The Origins of the 'Nationalist' Group of Officers in Turkey 1908-18', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 8, No.4, October 1973: 121-64.

³³³ The historical process which led to this modernist transformation within the military is analysed in the following chapter.

clothes' (1926); 'the adoption of the Swiss civil code' (1926); 'the removal of religious brotherhoods (tarikats)' (1926);³³⁴ 'the adoption of the Italian penal code' (1928); 'the adoption of the Latin alphabet' (1928); 'the enfranchisement of women and their right to stand for election', (1934); and 'the replacement of the article emphasising that "the state's religion is Islam" by the principle of secularism' (1937). Religious teaching in public schools was also abolished. The 'Call to Prayer' and the prayer speeches were officially translated into Turkish from the Arabic.³³⁵

The founding fathers of the Republic generally preferred to use the term *laicism* (laiklik) to describe the separation of the state and religion, rather than "secularism".³³⁶ Laicism is a French word that means "of the people" instead of "of the clergy". Some scholars consider that laicism and secularism denote the same situation. However, there are several scholars who argue that they are somewhat different concepts in reality. Talal Asad (2003) defines laicism as the situation in which religious beliefs and practices are "confined to a space where they cannot threaten political stability or the liberties of free-thinking citizens."³³⁷

One claim of laicism, at the same time, is to guarantee an individual's religious freedom in their own private life while excluding religion from public life.³³⁸ Yet, in some cases, the state can cross the objective borders of secularism and penetrate into the subjective line through Laicist practices. For instance, in France, the state has banned the wearing of religious symbols such as headscarves, skull caps, veils, and

³³⁴ Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, Walter de Gruyter, 1988: 122.

³³⁵ Bulent Daver, *ibid.*: 32.

³³⁶ Emelie A. Olson, 'Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: 'The Headscarf Dispute'', *Anthropological Quarterly*, 58, No.4, October 1985: 163.

³³⁷ Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 191.

³³⁸ See: Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century (Culture and Religion in International Relations)*, p.36.

turbans.³³⁹ This example shows us that Laicist implementations sometimes do not only regulate social life according to a secular philosophy but they apply coercive methods with the purpose of breaking an individual's moral and intellectual ties with religion through penetrating into the individual's private area.³⁴⁰ It is fair to say that the Turkish state applied strict methods to stabilise secularism in every aspect of life. At the same time, some right-wing parties followed a completely opposite way by undermining secularism to get votes from pious electors. Therefore, I applied the separation of *strict*, *moderate*, and *democratic* secularism to indicate different implementations of laicism in Turkey that are applicable in the analytical tables at the end of each empirical chapter.

In this context, the aforementioned reforms of Atatürk have received different criticisms with regard to the practising of secularism in Turkey. Some scholars find it strict, some find it moderate, and some perceive it as softer than the other secularist regimes. Although most scholars agree that anti-religious and positivist ideas influenced some of the Kemalist reforms, most of them also argue that Atatürk's reforms did not oppose religion as a concept.³⁴¹ Indeed, some argue that they did not offer an absolute separation of religion and the state. They suggest that the laws and political regulations were built on secular principles, but the state also applied Islam as an instrument for promoting national unity. However, they also maintain that the real aim of the state, while doing this, was keeping the religion under state

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ See: Hurd, *the Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations*, 240.

³⁴¹ For instance see: Nasser Momayezi, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey', *International Journal on World Peace*, 15, No.3, September 1998: 13.

supervision, to make room for modernisation by gradually secularising social and political life.³⁴²

One contested issue in the practice of Turkish laicism is the creation of the Directorate of the Religious Affairs (DIR). The DIR was established after the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 by the Turkish Assembly. The aim in creating that organisation was to put all the religious activities and services under the official supervision of a formal state institution. In this way, the state had an official mechanism to supervise possible anti-secular propaganda. According to the current regulation of the DRA, their main duty is: “By committing to the principle of secularism ... to execute the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics of Islam, enlighten the public about their religion, and administer the sacred worshiping places.”³⁴³ This institution has been one of those within the state to have had the largest allocation from the state budget. In addition to this, the Ministry of Education was authorised by the state to found a Faculty of Divinity, which would be responsible for training religious officials. The Faculty of Divinity was transformed into the “Institute of Islamic Research”. Moreover, the DIR opened Quran courses in 1934.

As a result, it is possible to separate the views related to Turkish secularism and Islam into two categories. The first view does not consider Islam as a serious obstacle against modernisation and they tend to refuse the subjective side of Atatürk’s secularism. This group, particularly, puts forward the aforementioned creation of DIR and Islamic institutions. Through the DIR and other Islamic

³⁴² Murat Somer, ‘Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.28, No.7, 2007: 1271-1289, p.1276.

³⁴³ *Republic of Turkey Presidency of Religious Affairs*, ‘Regulations’. Available at: <http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr/anasayfa.aspxerrorpath=/english/tanitim.asp> (accessed 2013); Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 122.

institutions, the founding fathers would aim for two purposes: firstly, they aimed to employ Islam as a tool of revolution to prevent religious resistance and to impose the revolutionist principles by reinterpreting Islam according to these principles.³⁴⁴ Secondly, they aimed to nationalise Islam by making it part of the new Turkish secular identity.³⁴⁵ This is because absorbing Islam as part of Turkish culture within a modern format was seen as a more pragmatic way, given the deep influence of Islam in Turkish society. Moreover, during those days, a direct opposition to religion would create a very strong counter-revolutionary resistance. Hence, instead of completely removing their ties with Islam, the founding fathers aimed to suppress traditionalism with its own tool by closing unofficial Islamic establishments (religious brotherhoods) and by controlling all the Islamic activities through the DIR. As was suggested by Toprak Binnaz (1995), by this institution, the religious leaders such as the Imams and Muezzins became paid “employees of the state”.³⁴⁶

On the other hand, the second group tends to see Kemalist secularism as a conflict between Islam and modernisation.³⁴⁷ Thus, secularism became a key for Kemalists to solve this problem in favour of modernisation. This group emphasised two things: the subjectivity of Kemalist secularism and the intention of removing Islam from the new Turkish identity. Firstly, they found Kemalist secularism subjective because, as suggested by Berger, it was also intended to control the private life of individuals,

³⁴⁴ See: Toprak Binnaz, ‘Islam and the Secular State in Turkey’, in *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s*, ed. Cigdem Balim, et al., Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995, 35; Davison, ‘Turkey, a ‘Secular’ State?: The Challenge of Description’, 338; Murat Somer, ‘Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.28, No.7, 2007: 1271-1289, p.1276..

³⁴⁵ See: Sandal, ‘Public Theologies of Human Rights and Citizenship: The Case of Turkey’s Christians’; Serif Mardin, ‘Religion in Modern Turkey’, *International Social Journal*, 29, 1997, p.287; and ‘Turkey, Islam and Westernization’, in *Religion and Societies: Asia and the Middle-East*, ed. C. Caldarola, Berlin: Mouton, 1982, p.179; Bulent Daver, ‘Secularism in Turkey’, *Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi*, 1969, p.30.

³⁴⁶ Binnaz, ‘Islam and the Secular State in Turkey’, in *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s*, 35.

³⁴⁷ Nicole and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled*, London: John Murray, 1997, pp.316-317.

and moved beyond its normal aim.³⁴⁸ They argue that these reforms were imposed with force, without giving the citizens enough time to absorb them. The reforms intended to outlaw the existence of religious rules in the public sphere and aimed to eradicate those rules from both the private and cultural life preferences of citizens, and also to remove its role in Turkish identity construction. To achieve this, the critics maintain, a set of regulations had been created, from education to dress, as mentioned above.³⁴⁹ Thus, secularism took a subjective form, which does not only indicate “the official disestablishment of religion” but also enables “the constitutional control of religious affairs”.³⁵⁰ Due to these reasons, the critics argue that Kemalist secularism has a different and broader meaning than secularism in most of the Western states. It did not only intend to separate religion and politics, but also aimed to liberate society from the hold of religion by creating free individuals who are “nationalist, positivist, scientific-minded, anti-traditionalist and anti-clerical”.³⁵¹

In addition to this, the scholars who see an opposite relationship between Kemalism and Islam also object that Atatürk saw Islam as part of the Turkish identity. According to Bernard Lewis (2001), although the Republican elite has never resorted to an anti-Islamic rhetoric, the real aim of the Atatürk reforms – to break the power of organised Islam and its influence on the minds and hearts of the Turkish people – was clear.³⁵² Kemal H. Karpat (2001) suggests that Atatürk aimed to create a new type of nationalism, which rejected the Ottoman and Islamic heritages, by giving

³⁴⁸ E. Fuat Keyman, ‘Modernity, Secularism and Islam the Case of Turkey’, *Theory, Culture and Society*, 24, No.2, March 2007: 222.

³⁴⁹ Keyman, ‘Modernity, Secularism and Islam the Case of Turkey’ 222.

³⁵⁰ Ibid. (It is observable that Keyman defines laicism as a slightly different concept than secularism, which is stricter, and includes the features of both objective and subjective secularism.)

³⁵¹ Daver, ‘Secularism in Turkey’, 36.

³⁵² Bernard Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, Schocken Books Incorporated, 2001, 136.

reference to the pre-Islamic past of the Turks. He argues that the Republican history books were reshaped to indicate that the pre-Islamic Turks had democratic and modernist tendencies, but that their connection with the Western civilisations was prevented by force after they converted to Islam, and they lost touch with the West.³⁵³ Some Kemalists considered the traditional clothes, such as hijab, veil, and fez, as backward dress, adopted from the Persian, Arabic and Byzantine cultures, and violating the “true” pre-Islamic Turkish culture. They argued that the early Turks in Central Asia had never covered their women’s heads.³⁵⁴ Justin McCarty (2001) also notices that Turkey rejected the Ottoman past to become a part of the West.³⁵⁵ According to Bernard Lewis (2001):

*[T]he political and intellectual leadership of Turkey made a conscious choice for the West and for a Western identity ... the Middle East had become associated in their minds with decline, defeat and betrayal. The West ... seemed to offer the means of economic development and of social and political liberation.*³⁵⁶

Similarly, William Hale (2000) notes:

With the establishment of an officially secular republic, any idea that Turkey should act ... as a Muslim state was definitively abandoned ... Atatürk’s clear aim was to establish Turkey as a

³⁵³ Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.353.

³⁵⁴ Emilie A. Olson, ‘Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: The Headscarf Dispute’, *Anthropological Quarterly*, Vol. 58. No. 4, *Self & Society in the Middle-East*, 1985, 164.

³⁵⁵ Justin McCarty, *The Ottoman Peoples and the End of the Empire*, London: Arnold, 2001, p.216.

³⁵⁶ Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, 136.

respected nation state, on the Western model, with sufficient economic and military strength to sustain that role.³⁵⁷

As a result, as was argued in the previous section, there is a view considering that secularism is an invented modernisation myth to establish and maintain hegemony over the developing states. The concept of secularism goes hand-in-hand with the modernisation theory and shows the modern Western world as a role model to imitate. Through that, secularism becomes a tool for big powers to lead the developing states according to their own interests. In this way, Western hegemony and its neoliberal ideals are maintained. The supporters of this view consider that there is not a certain academic definition of secularism and it is open to different interpretations. Especially, the religious motifs that are used by the allegedly secular states to legitimise their domestic and foreign policies evidence this fact. By considering this argument, we may argue that it is academically contested whether there is a relationship between secularism, democratisation, and modernisation. At this point, for the Turkish case, there are two views, one of which explains Turkish secularism as a battle against Islam for achieving modernisation and democracy. The second view opposes this by arguing that a modernised interpretation of Islam was institutionalised by the state through the DIR and was used for injecting revolutions to the society and for preventing Islamic-based criticisms.

Indeed, none of these views are either completely true or wrong. Perhaps, not Islam by itself, but its anti-modernist interpretations and its institutional-legal rules (sharia) by the religious Ulama class were frequently used to suppress modernist acts in the Ottoman Empire. Mostly, this religious propaganda against modernism was made to maintain the privileged position of the religious class and the Janissaries.

³⁵⁷ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000, p.332.

Furthermore, the Young Turks Revolution faced a serious resistance from the religious groups and monarchist officers who were organised under the Freedom and Accord Party. As a result, a negative relationship occurred between modernisation and Islam, both in Turkish society and military culture. Again, the reason for that perhaps was not Islam as a belief but its interpretations by the Ulama. Additionally, as can easily be seen in the Quran and Islamic texts, Islam is a religion that includes regulations for social life, administration, and law. Given that these rules were based on the social life in the Arabian Peninsula 1,400 years ago (during the sixth century AC), they were far from meeting the demands of modern life. Hence, starting from the Young Turks era, the revolutionist officers began to see the worldly rules of Islam (sharia) as an obstacle against reforming the society regarding education, law, and social life.

Nevertheless, none of these previous reform attempts became successful to secularise society and liberate it from the attachment of Islamic law. Only the victory in the Independence War and the dissolving of the positions of Caliphate and monarch opened the path for doing this. As the saviour of state and religion with a religious Ghazi title, Atatürk's credit became limitless in the eyes of people, even to the degree of overthrowing the monarch and establishing a republic. Following the foundation of the Republic, most of Atatürk's revolutions were directly related to the purpose of secularising the nation. The secular reforms were implemented in a radical manner by intervening in the private area. Hence, the Turkish version of secularism is closer to the subjective model. Nevertheless, Atatürk's secularism, which was dictated by force, has some differences with Berger's suggestion because Berger suggested that secularism will occur automatically during the modernisation process without needing to use force.

On the other hand, due to the strong influence of Islam in the society, Atatürk aimed to institutionalise Islam by putting it into state control. By creating the DIR, Faculty of Divinity, and translating the Quran into modern Turkish, the founding fathers intended to meet Kemalist revolutions with a modern interpretation of Islam. By this way, Atatürk also aimed to break the conflict between Islam and modernism without removing it from Turkish cultural identity.

I argue that, given the deep influence of Islam in the society, a true democracy is only possible with the absorbance of the secularism principle. For instance, giving equal rights to women, such as giving the same share from inheritance, preventing the assassination of women for adultery, increasing people's education level in the urban regions, liberating villagers from the hegemony of landlords, even protecting the non-Muslim citizens' rights are only possible with the true intertwining of secularism with democratisation. As we will see in the Democrat Party and AKP eras (Chapters 6 and 7), when secularism was weakened, religion could easily become a manipulative force in the hands of politicians to increase and maintain their political power.

Related to this fact, starting from the Young Turks era, the revolutionist ideals of military culture were shaped according to the secular worldviews. After Atatürk, the military continued to see secularism as part and parcel of democracy. Yet, following NATO membership and the change in military culture from revolutionism to guardianship, the military's sensitivity in terms of secularism softened. Especially, after capitalism and anti-Communism became embedded in military culture instead of Kemalist statism and populism, the military began to use secularism as an excuse to legitimise its interventions and to protect its privileged economic position.

Overall, it is fair to consider the revolutionary stage of military culture (1908-1945) as a sincere but impatient effort to create a stable democratic regime. Secularism became the main tool of this effort. However, starting from the guardianship era (1945-1999), the military's approach to secularism changed, and this time it became a tool for legitimising its interventions and for preserving Turkey's good relations with the Western bloc. Eventually, the military's alleged efforts to intertwine democracy with secularism would not prove successful. Following the military's recent depoliticisation, the AKP government began to increase the Islamic tone in its politics and, perhaps for the first time since the 1908 Revolution, Islam became too influential in Turkish politics. The historical details of these developments will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. In the next section, finally, as has been mentioned at the beginning of this section, considering the Turkish case and the results that have emerged this section, the analytical tables in the empirical chapters will analyse secularism under three different titles: *moderate secularism*, *strict secularism*, and *democratic secularism*.

4.3 PRINCIPLE: NATIONALISM

4.3.1 Conceptual Clarification

Around the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and particularly after the French Revolution, nation states began to replace the multinational empires. In these processes, the concept of nationalism undertook a constructivist duty and grew up as a new kind of “passionate” thought.³⁵⁸ Especially, in the Ottoman Empire, the growing nationalist trend led various ethnic groups to demand their independence

³⁵⁸ Esat Oz, ‘21. Yüzyılda Milli Devlet, Kuresellesme ve Turk Milliyetçiligi’, in: *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce: Milliyetçilik (Political Thought in Modernizing Turkey: Inside Nationalism)*, İstanbul: İletisim, 2008, p.751.

back.³⁵⁹ Eventually, most of these groups regained their independence during the process of dissolution. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire also led to “redrawing the map of the Middle East”.³⁶⁰ Firstly, most of these regions were controlled by the Great Powers and later, when they retreated, the territory was consumed by power strife and regional conflicts among the new nation states. Nasser’s attempts to create an Arab Nation, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, and Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait are some remarkable examples of these strifes during the twentieth century.³⁶¹

Unlike the nationalist attempts in the Middle East and the Muslim world, Atatürk avoided the new Turkish state searching for a religious unity or a leadership of the Muslim world.³⁶² Rather, his efforts were to create a nation state under the Turkish identity. In this way, the impact of religion in society and politics would also be broken, because the identity of Turk had been suppressed under the Muslim identity (Ummecilik-Umma) during the Ottoman era. Due to the religious character of the Empire, its people tended to be classified as “Muslims” and “non-Muslims”. Atatürk’s definition of nationalism aimed to unite all the ethnic groups in Turkey under the Turkish identity.³⁶³

Aysel Morin and Ronald Lee (2010) argue that Atatürk’s so-called “anti-religious” reforms deeply influenced the perception of Turkish nationalism. They maintain that Atatürk’s nationalism had ethnicity statements, which is similar to romantic nationalism such as the German and Italian versions. However, unlike them, his ideas were not transformed into “extremist ideologies”. Atatürk adopted ideas from the

³⁵⁹ Ayla Gol, ‘Imagining the Turkish nation through ‘othering’ Armenians’, *Nations and Nationalism*, 11 (1), 2005:121-139, p.124-128.

³⁶⁰ Mehran Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War*, University of California Press, 2011, p.65.

³⁶¹ Aysel Morin and Ronald Lee, ‘Constitutive Discourse of Turkish Nationalism: Atatürk’s *Nutuk* and the Rhetorical Construction of the ‘Turkish People’, *Communication Studies*, 61, No.5, 2010: 488.

³⁶² Ibid.

³⁶³ Ibid.

French Revolution such as “sovereignty”, “secularism”, and “equality”. But, unlike in France, the authors assume, the principle of nationalism emerged as a “top-down military movement”. Additionally, Atatürk’s formulation was different to the Third World nationalisms, which developed against European colonisation without any pushing factor from above.³⁶⁴

In the literature, there are two dominant definitions of nationalism, namely the *primordialist* and *modernist* approaches. Scholars in the primordialist group contend that nationalism is embedded in ethnicity, and takes the roots of nations from the very beginnings of history. Therefore, this approach considers that ethnic ties are natural, fixed, and given. E. Shills (1957) defines ethnicity as a “blood tie” and considers it “primordial”.³⁶⁵ Clifford Geertz (1973) offers the “given-ness” of ethnicity and claims that ethnic ties cannot be completely understood by referring only to social relations.³⁶⁶ Van Den Berghe (1981) asserts that sociological formations among humans are, in fact, based on biological ties.³⁶⁷ Finally, Reynolds V. (1983) argues the impact of ethnicity in shaping in-social groups, such as “in” and “out”.³⁶⁸

On the other hand, modernisation theorists define “nation” as a modern formation. They consider the emergence of nationalism as the natural result of transition from “agrarian to industrial society”.³⁶⁹ Ernest Gellner contends that the increase in industrialisation triggered the need for centralised education. Centralised education increased the level of education and led to the homogenisation of cultures.³⁷⁰ Gellner

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ Shills E., ‘Primordial, personal, sacred and civil ties’, *British Journal of Psychology*, 7, 1957: 13-45.

³⁶⁶ Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, Basic Books, 1973, p.488.

³⁶⁷ Pierre L. Van den Berghe, *The Ethnic Phenomenon*, ABC-CLIO, 1987.

³⁶⁸ Reynolds, V., *The Sociology of Ethnocentrism*. London: Croom Helm, 1983.

³⁶⁹ Morin and Lee, *ibid.*: 488.

³⁷⁰ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Cornell University Press, 2008.

(1964) argues that “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness” but is nevertheless “the invention of nationalist discourse”.³⁷¹ He claims that the nationalist discourses created nations that had not previously existed.³⁷² Benedict Anderson uses the description “imagined communities” for explaining these nations.³⁷³ Eric Hobsbawm considers nations as the creation of “social engineering”. He argues that collective identities are constructed through “invented traditions”, which aim to create a link between the past and present for their societies.³⁷⁴ Modernists assert that ethnicity is a concept that is used by the elites to gain popular support in their struggle for power.³⁷⁵

Maurica Charland (1987) contends that social engineers choose specific narratives and interpret them in a text to categorise “people” as subjects, in order to create a collective identity.³⁷⁶ M.C. McGee (1975) puts forward that “the people” emerge only as rhetorical objects in that type of texts. Accordingly, he argues that “the people” in those texts are, in fact, the socio-political myths that they depict.³⁷⁷ Kenneth Burke (1989) states that myths as the stories which produce the “essence” of the cultures in narrative ways.³⁷⁸ He notes that: “To derive a culture from certain mythic ancestry, or ideal mythic type, is a way of stating that culture’s essence in narrative terms”.³⁷⁹ Therefore, the political rhetoric often applies to this “essence” to construct “the people”. Also, he defines ideologies and myths as two related concepts: “ideology is

³⁷¹ Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1964), 169.

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ Benedict Anderson *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, 2006.

³⁷⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, ‘The Nation as Invented Tradition’, *Nationalism Studies*, Oxford University Press, 1994.

³⁷⁵ Umut Ozkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, p.109.

³⁷⁶ Maurice Charland, ‘Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Québécois’, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 73, No.2, 1987: 140.

³⁷⁷ Micheal C. McGee, ‘In Search of ‘the People’: A Rhetorical Alternative, *the Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 61, No. 3, Taylor&Francis online, 1975, 235-249.

³⁷⁸ K. Burke, *On Symbols and Society*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1989.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.: 309.

to myth as rhetoric is to poetry”.³⁸⁰ H. Tudor (1972) considers myths are used to demand concepts such as hegemony, authority, territory, independence, and social solidarity.³⁸¹ B.S. Osborne (2001) notes that the myths organise “the past in patterns that resonate with a culture’s deepest values and aspirations”.³⁸² C.G. Flood (1996) argues that the myths poke “the feelings of solidarity and alienation which underpin and undermine communities and their boundaries”.³⁸³

M.P. Moore (1991) contends that political myths are the growing results of fragmented narratives.³⁸⁴ According to Charland (1987), the “constitutive rhetorics” combine together and reshape these narratives and use them for creating new political coalitions and identities.³⁸⁵ Morin and Lee (2010) argue that these narratives define various past events as the causes that led to the current circumstances, and they promise a future that will be real when “the constituted subjects begin inhabiting and performing their identities”.³⁸⁶ Burke (1973) contends that Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* is an example of creating an “enemy”.³⁸⁷ He (Hitler) accuses the Jewish people of the economic crisis in Germany and blurring the Aryan blood.³⁸⁸ He uses myths such as claiming the “inferiority” of the Jews and “superiority” of the Aryans.³⁸⁹ He also

³⁸⁰ Ibid.: 303.

³⁸¹ Henry Tudor, *Political Myth*, Praeger, 1972. For the importance of ‘myths’ in constructing national identities including Turkey, also see: Gol, Ibid.

³⁸² Brian S. Osborne, ‘Landscapes, Memory, Monuments, and Commemoration: Putting Identity in Its Place’, *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 33, No. 3 (2001): 43.

³⁸³ Christopher Flood, *Political Myth*, Routledge, 2013 (Copy Right: 1996, First Publish: 2002).

³⁸⁴ M.P. Moore, ‘A Rhetorical Criticism of Political Myth: From Goldwater legend to Reagan mystique’, *Communication Studies*, 42, 1991: 295-308.

³⁸⁵ See: Maurice Charland, ‘Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the *Peuple Quebecois*’, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol: 73 Issue:2, Taylor and Francis 1987, p. 133-150.

³⁸⁶ Morin and Lee, *ibid.*: 490.

³⁸⁷ Kenneth Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action*, University of California Press, 1974, p.194.

³⁸⁸ Ibid.: 204.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.: 202.

applies to the religious terms to show his war as a struggle between the “good” and the “evil”, and his task as removing “the evil” from the surface of the earth.³⁹⁰

4.3.2 Nationalism in Turkey

Atatürk’s definition is a mixture of primordial and modernist interpretations of nationalism (*milliyetçilik* in Turkish). Article 88 of the 1924 constitution defined “Turk” as: “Among the people of Turkey, without the distinction of race or religion, Turk shall be the term of citizenship”.³⁹¹ Atatürk answers the question of “who is Turk?” with these words: “Turks are the people of Turkey who founded the Turkish Republic”.³⁹² Considering these definitions, one may argue that “Turkish identity” in its current form was designed by Atatürk. This new perception of Turkish identity did not only create a nation state but also created essential circumstances for secular revolutions. As was argued by Malcolm Cooper (2002), the abolition of sharia and the alphabet revolution prepared the suitable conditions for constructing the new “Turkishness”.³⁹³

Atatürk’s nationalism is theoretically formulated with his famous words: *Ne Mutlu Turkum Diyene!* (How fortunate he who calls himself a Turk!). That is to say, an individual’s “Turkishness” is not based on his race but on his accepting himself as Turkish. Therefore, everybody who was involved in the Liberation War was taken as a “Turkish citizen” without looking at their ethnicity. The accepting of oneself as “Turk” includes the adoption of Turkish culture, including language, traditions, and

³⁹⁰ Ibid.: 201.

³⁹¹ *TBMM*, ‘1924 Anayasası’ (Constitution of 1924), 10 January 1945. Available at: <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa24.htm> (accessed 10 January 1945).

³⁹² Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Yurttaş İçin Medenî Bilgiler*, 1930 (the book was directly dictated to Afet Inan by Atatürk himself). Also see: Serif Mardin, ‘Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?’, *Daedalus*, 102, No.1, January 1973: 177.

³⁹³ Cooper, ‘The Legacy of Atatürk’, 116.

customs.³⁹⁴ The Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren, during the 1980-83 junta, explains Atatürk's nationalism with these words:

What lies at the basis of the Turkish Republic ... is the sublime Atatürk's philosophy that says: "How fortunate he who calls himself a Turk!" This philosophy includes every citizen who considers himself a Turk, regardless of creed, race, religion ... Atatürk's concept of nationalism is basically this ... this philosophy establishes a perfect harmony with the democratic regime, and contributes to the formation of a healthy national body. For there exists no discrimination among the individual citizens. All the citizens are equal. Those who govern the country in the name of the people are allowed no discrimination, have no right to divide the nation and enmity among the citizens. In this context the democratic regime ... is not a separatist, but a unifying factor ... Turkish nation based upon the principles of Atatürk, will survive by ... the motto "a single state, a single nation" ... No power will be able to divide it."³⁹⁵

In this long speech by Kenan Evren, there are several references to Atatürk's principles, to state unity, and nationalism. Atatürk's nationalism is defined as a combining element among different ethnic communities in the state by the condition of regarding themselves as "Turk". This speech was made during the 1980 coup, just after the rise of the Kurdish separation movement. Therefore, one purpose of Evren's while making this statement can be seen as preventing separation attempts.

³⁹⁴ Emrullah Uslu, 'Ulusalçılık: The Neo-nationalist Resurgence in Turkey', *Turkish Studies*, Vol.9, No.1, March 2008: 73-79, p.73.

³⁹⁵ Translation available in: Frank Tachau and Metin Heper (1983): 27.

Although there is one formal definition in the constitution, Atatürk's nationalism has been understood differently by different ideologies. At this point, Tanil Bora's (2003) categorisation can be helpful in order to see different interpretations of nationalism in Turkey. He separates nationalism into four groups: *Official*, *Kemalist*, *Liberal*, and *Radical* nationalism. The first is the "Official Nationalism: Atatürk's Nationalism", which is a combination of modernist and primordialist nationalism, based on the idea of nation-state, and renders the military as "the founder and guardian of the nation state".³⁹⁶ This formula does not take into account any other Turkish communities that live outside of the mainland, "Anatolia", in nationalist terms, and it does not include the previous Ottoman territories such as the Balkans, Arabia, and North Africa. Therefore, it can also be regarded as the "Anatolian Turkism", which took its origins from the "Misak-i Milli" (the National Pact) during the Turkish Liberation War, which included Anatolia and western Thrace. After the Liberation War, these territories were mostly gained back, except for Mosul, Hatay, and some lands in western Thrace and the Aegean islands. Hatay became part of Turkey in 1939.³⁹⁷

On the other hand, the status and identity of the non-Muslims (Armenians, Rums, Jews, and so on) and the Kurdish people have always been an argumentative issue while defining Anatolian nationalism. Principally, the south-eastern parts of the National Pact borders had mostly been held by the Kurdish people. After gaining independence in 1923, the Lausanne treaty did not specifically refer to the Kurds as a minority group.³⁹⁸ Although the founding fathers avoided defining Turkish

³⁹⁶ Although Bora's definition is reasonable, his consideration of the military as 'the guardian' is debatable in the absence of clear evidence.

³⁹⁷ Nicholas Danforth, 'Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP', *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 7, No.3, 2008: 86-87.

³⁹⁸ See: Sandal, 'Public Theologies of Human Rights and Citizenship: The Case of Turkey's Christians'. Also see: Baskin Oran, *Kurtler ve Aleviler Azinlik midir?* (Are the Alevis and the Kurds

citizenship with ethnical elements, in the following decades, the Kurds have occasionally stated their discontent with state politics because of the restrictions over the Kurdish identity. The earliest Kurdish rebels started in the earlier years of the Republic. In the event known as the Dersim Rebellions (1937-38), thousands of Kurdish citizens died. After that, Kurdish separatism weakened.³⁹⁹ Yet, during the 1970s, especially after the foundation of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), Kurdish separatism became one of the most challenging problems of Turkish politics.⁴⁰⁰ The PKK was founded in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan as a socialist and nationalist Kurdish resistance organisation. The PKK has become a serious threat to state security given its periodic attacks on the south-eastern borders. The conflict between the PKK and Turkish military has continued up to the present by causing thousands of deaths. The major issues that cause dissatisfaction among the Kurdish citizens can be summarised as restrictions over the Kurdish language in education and the media, denial of the Kurdish identity, poor economic conditions, as well as discriminations and oppression over the Kurds.⁴⁰¹ Most of these complaints by the Kurdish citizens particularly strengthened after the junta rule spanning 1980-83. Indeed, the restrictions on the Kurds and denial of the Kurdish identity went so far as considering the Kurdish people as one 'Turkish tribe'. Additionally, the junta rule promoted Islam as an antidote against Kurdish nationalism.⁴⁰²

The second one is "Kemalist Nationalism: Ulusculuk", which is a left-wing interpretation that appeared during the 1990s, particularly as a reaction to the anti-

considered as minority?). Available at: [www.baskinoran.com/gazete/212\)Kurtler\(09-07-2004\).rtf](http://www.baskinoran.com/gazete/212)Kurtler(09-07-2004).rtf) (accessed 09 July 2004).

³⁹⁹ Baskin Oran, *Türk Dis Politikası Cilt 2: 1980-2001* (Turkish Foreign Policy Book 2: 1980-2001), İletişim Press, 2001, p.23-24.

⁴⁰⁰ Kerim Yıldız, *Irak Kurtleri, Dun, Bugun ve Yarın* (Iraq Kurds: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow), Belge Press, 2005, p. 158. Also see: Oran, *ibid*.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid*.

⁴⁰² *Ibid*.

secularist movements. That movement promotes secularism against the danger of “sharia” and is more likely to see the military as “the guardian of secularism and the national unity”.⁴⁰³ In this model, the “humanistic” and the “universalistic” façade of Kemalist nationalism is stressed. During the 1960s and 1970s, this movement associated Kemalism with “anti-imperialism” and “full sovereignty”. In the 1990s and 2000s, new rhetoric was added to this movement, such as “anti-Islamism” and “anti-sharia”, which are decorated by “anti-Westernist motifs”, and discourses about “national pride”.⁴⁰⁴

The third one is “Liberal Neo-Nationalism”, which emphasises the importance of modernisation by using economic terms. Bora explains that the emergence of this model dates back to the last years of the 1980s, as a result of capitalisation in Turkey. The Liberal approach associates nationalism with the passion of attaining the level of the wealthy/developed states. In other words, “national pride” should have been promoted by competing against the big economies. They predominantly put forward Atatürk’s goal of reaching the level of contemporary civilisations by associating Turkey with having a strong economy, market, and the power of export. That movement, which stresses the importance of economics and creating a national market, is highly supported by particular media figures and big businessmen. Thus, the AKP’s discourse, which had supported the EU membership, in particular in the party’s early years, was welcomed by the liberal nationalists and brought them significant power.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰³ Again, this argument is open to criticism, because there is not any clear academic evidence to show that most Kemalist Nationalists support military interventions against political Islam.

⁴⁰⁴ Tanil Bora, ‘Nationalist Discourses in Turkey’, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 102, No.2/3, Spring/Summer 2003: 433-451, pp.438-440.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 440-442.

The fourth one is “Turkist Radical Nationalism”. Tanil Bora describes this type of nationalism as a “fascist” ideology which understands Atatürk’s nationalism with extreme terms. That movement takes its origins from the pan-Turanist movements in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, which aimed to combine all the Turkish inhabited territories around the world – particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia – under one Turkish state. The early representative of this ideology was Nihal Atsız. Then, in the 1960s, that ideology found a place of expression in the Assembly through the establishment of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Alparslan Türkeş, as a nationalist, conservative, and anti-Communist figure, became the leader of this movement. However, the racist emphasis lost momentum after the 1970s and was replaced by a new discourse based on a “cultural-historical essentialism”. The new understanding of radical nationalism also put forward Islam as the main element of Turkish nationalism. After the 1980 coup, the Islamic elements gained a significant importance and the pan-Turkist elements weakened. The movement showed strict opposition to Kurdish nationalism, defining it as “secessionism” during the 1980s and 1990s. The PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party) attacks during these years had strengthened public support for the MHP. The young idealist supporters of MHP (Ulkuculer, or the Grey Wolves) created new myths, which made reference to Turkish mythology, and pre-Islamic and Islamic Turks. After the rise of the Islamic movement, as a response, the MHP left the Islamic elements to a secondary position and put forward Turkish nationalism again, and remained in a more secular position. The Radical Nationalists depict an Atatürk figure who is “a passionate Turkish nationalist”, and who does not make any “concession” from the “nationalistic” ideals.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., 445-447.

Indeed, Bora's categorisation is also remarkable for its indication of Turkey's ideological map. The four different interpretations of nationalism – Official, Nationalist, Liberal, and Radical – also represent the general rhetoric of four major political movements in Turkey: Moderate Kemalism, Radical (Nationalist) Kemalism, Ultra-Nationalism, and Liberalism. These four movements have been represented by different parties within different periods. One could add a fifth model of nationalism to Bora's categorisation, namely National Outlook (Milli Gorus), which refers to the nationalist discourse of political Islam. National Outlook tends to glorify the Ottoman Empire's successful centuries. Yet, it is slightly different to the MHP's radical nationalism, in that National Outlook has strong references to the Muslim identity of Turks. Hence, they argue that Turkey should break its connections with the West and be the leader of the Islamic World, as it had been during the Ottoman era. The National Outlook can also be beneficial to understand the AKP's increasing success. Unlike the previous Islamic parties, the AKP softened the Islamic emphasis of National Outlook and gained support from more secular voters, including businessmen and intellectuals, and from the media. That is to say, the AKP's position can be defined as a combination of liberal and Islamist versions of the nationalist discourses, because, unlike its predecessors, the AKP adopted a strong liberal discourse apart from its Islamic background. Indeed, the AKP have an image that is closer to secular right-wing parties, such as the Motherland (ANAP) and True Path (Dogru Yol) parties.⁴⁰⁷ The National Outlook version of nationalism, indeed, is important in order to understand the rhetoric during the military interventions. The anti-secular references in that version of nationalism and its stress on Islam as one vital part of Turkish identity were explicitly against Atatürk's

⁴⁰⁷ For the relationship between the AKP and National Outlook ideology also see chapter 7.

definition of nationalism and secularism. Hence, one may see a negative relationship with the National Outlook and military rhetoric. Especially, the models that we have defined as *positive-undemocratic* and its opposite *negative-democratic* in Turkey have a direct relationship with the rhetoric of Islamic parties and the military's sensitivity in terms of secularism. In other words, whenever the military increased its voice in politics, the Islamist emphasis by political parties softened; and whenever the military stepped back, the Islamic discourse began to increase.

Morin and Lee (2010) argue that Turkish nationalism has characteristics of both modernist and primordialist nationalism, but neither enables a full description. As modernists argued, Turkish nationalism emerged in the modern era but it did not experience any industrial development until the opening of a sugar factory in 1933.⁴⁰⁸ The primordialist explanation also cannot explain the case, because, they argue, Turkish nationalism was “discursively constructed” by the constitution, and with Atatürk's own words. Altınay notices that the Turkish History Association (1931) and the Turkish Language Association (1932) – under the supervision of Atatürk – played the central role in constructing the tenets of the modern Turkish nationalism.⁴⁰⁹ That association tried to research the ethnic roots of the Ancient Turks by making several observations and creating historical theses. The most famous of them was “the Sun Language Theory”, which argued that there were links between the Ancient Turks and the Sumerians and the Mayans. The theory also suggested that Turkish was one of the oldest languages, and the ancestor of many modern ones.⁴¹⁰ One main purpose of these works was to remove “ummetcilik” and

⁴⁰⁸ Morin and Lee, ‘Constitutive Discourse of Turkish Nationalism’, 489.

⁴⁰⁹ A. Altınay, *The Myth of the Military Nation*, New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, p.22-24.

⁴¹⁰ Ilker Ayturk, ‘Turkish Linguists against the West: The Origins of Linguistic Nationalism in Atatürk's Turkey’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 2010: 8-19; Ilker Ayturk, ‘The Racist Critics of Atatürk and Kemalism, from the 1930s to the 1960s’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 46, 2011: 300-333,

inject “nationalism” into people’s minds by giving priority to pre-Islamic Turkish researches, instead of Islamic ones.⁴¹¹

Indeed, Turkish nationalism can be seen as the result of an “identity search” that started during the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire applied the “millet” (nation) system to identify its people. The millet system was created by considering religious identities, in which the people were categorised as the Muslim, Jewish, and Christian Ottoman millets. The millet system lost its effect after the rise of nationalism among different communities. With the impact of the French Revolution, the multi-cultural structure of the state caused divisions among the different nationalities. The ideas of “Pan-Turkism”, “Turkism”, “Ottomanism”, and “Pan-Islamism” aimed to produce alternative solutions to keep specific ethnic communities together. Pan-Islamism promoted the “ummetscılık”, which aimed to combine all the Muslim communities under the “Muslim” identity, and Pan-Turkism promoted the Turkish identity as Turks together under one single state. Ottomanism aimed to connect all the millets under the identity of “Ottoman”. All these ideals failed except Turkism. Turkism was similar to Atatürk’s “Anatolian Turkism”, which sought to create a nation state within the borders of modern Turkey. Eventually, the Turkism ideal became a reality after the foundation of Turkey as a successor to the Empire.⁴¹²

As has also been argued in the previous chapter, Morin and Lee suggest that Atatürk’s famous *Nutuk* (The Speech) is a typical example of using myths for

pp.308, 309, 313; Andrew Mango, ‘Atatürk and the Kurds’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, December 2006, p.21.

⁴¹¹ Mogens Pelt, *Military Intervention and a Crisis Democracy in Turkey: The Menderes Era and its Demise*, I.B. Tauris, 2014, p.21.

⁴¹² Morin and Lee, *Ibid.*: 491.

shaping collective national identities.⁴¹³ *Nutuk*, at the same time, became a response to the criticisms of the opposition, who began to title him a “dictator”. Atatürk’s *Nutuk* was described as a “self-narrative” by Hulya Adak (2003), in which Atatürk wrote history by “his own hands” and “his own personal memories of the Liberation War”. *Nutuk* constructed the necessary myths to create the nation state, such as “the First Duty”, “the Encirclement”, “the Internal Enemy”, “the Ancestor”, and “the Modernity”, and became the benchmark of republican Turkish nationalism.⁴¹⁴ *Nutuk* became the most influential discourse in shaping “Turkish politics, culture and education”.⁴¹⁵

As a result, Atatürk’s nationalism is a *mixed model* – a combination of primordial and modernist models. Indeed, Atatürk’s approach is scientifically reasonable because the Ottoman Empire’s domination over three different continents caused its citizens to mix with each other. Therefore, it is highly contested whether the people who live in modern Turkey are originally as Turkish as their ancestors in Central Asia, or whether they mixed with other nationalities under the long-term Ottoman rule. As a result, modern Turkish nationalism can be seen as a concept that has predominantly been constructed and defined by Atatürk. According to his definition, the Turkish people are the citizens who live within the borders of the current Turkey, who fought together in the Liberation War and founded the state. Even by his words, Atatürk defines Turkish citizenship as accepting oneself as a Turk.⁴¹⁶ The military has also tended to follow the same path as Atatürk. Rhetorically, the military authorities defined the Turkish nationalism without ethnical terms – merely

⁴¹³ Ibid.: 490.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.: 492.

⁴¹⁵ Hulya Adak, ‘National Myths and Self-Narrations: Mustafa Kemal’s *Nutuk* and Halide Edib’s Memoirs and the Turkish Ordeal’, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102, No.2, 2003: 509-27.

⁴¹⁶ *Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism*, ‘Atatürk İlkeleri: Milliyetçilik’ (Atatürk’s principles: nationalism). Available at: <http://www.kultur.gov.tr/TR,96303/ataturk-ilkeleri.html> (accessed 2016).

accepting oneself as Turk. Yet still, particularly during the periods of junta rule, the military faced serious criticisms with its alleged discriminative behaviour toward minorities. These criticisms came from both domestic and foreign authorities. However, there is not any explicit evidence to argue that the military has ever acted contrary to Atatürk's definition of nationalism. Therefore, in line with the results that have emerged from this section, the analytical tables in the empirical chapters will identify the Turkish model of nationalism as a *mixed model*, in parallel with Atatürk's ideas.⁴¹⁷

4.4 OTHER PRINCIPLES: (-Republicanism, Statism, Populism, Reformism-)

4.4.1 Republicanism

As a political terminology, republicanism (*cumhuriyetçilik* in Turkish) refers to the governance type that takes its legitimacy directly from the people. Therefore, the governance does not belong to a particular person, class, or group but directly to the all parts of the citizenship. As defined in *The Social Contract* by Jan Jacques Rousseau, the citizens use (or give) their right to govern through the elected people (governments) by the elections.⁴¹⁸ Article 1 of the Turkish Constitution stipulates: “The State of Turkey is a Republic”; Article 2 states: “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by rule of law, within the notions of

⁴¹⁷ The only exception here can be given as the Union and Progress era –especially the process after 1913-, in which the pan-Turkist ideal of leading officers had made remarkable primordial impacts to the nationalist policies. See: Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp.89-90.

⁴¹⁸ For the definition see: *Tarih. Tumdurs. Com*, ‘Cumhuriyetçilik İlkesi’ (principle of republicanism), Available at: <http://tarih.tumdurs.com/cumhuriyetcilik-ilkesi.html> (accessed 31 Jan 2014) and for the Social Contract: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Trans. M. Cranston, Harmonds, 1762.

public peace, national solidarity and justice, respecting human rights, loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk...”⁴¹⁹

Atatürk considered that the best way of governance is the republic. He explained this situation with his famous words: “Sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation”.⁴²⁰ In *Nutuk*, Atatürk stresses that “the Ottomans (the sons of the Ottoman Sultans) acquired the power to rule over the Turkish nation and maintained it by violence and repression for more than six centuries and now the Turkish people took the sovereignty by rebelling against these usurpers”.⁴²¹ During the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan was, at the same time, the Caliph. Traditionally, people tended to believe that the monarch had a divine right given by God, and anybody who refused to obey him was indeed revolting against God himself. This gave the Sultans an absolute sovereignty, which could not be challenged by anybody.

Atatürk defines this case in *Nutuk*:

The Nation and the Army had no suspicion at all of the Padişah-Caliph's treachery. On the contrary, on account of religious and traditional ties handed down for centuries, they remained loyal to the throne and its occupant. Seeking for means of salvation under the influence of this tradition, the security of the Caliphate and the Sultanate concerned them far more than their own safety. That the country could possibly be saved without a Caliph and without a Padişah (Sultan) was an idea too impossible for them to comprehend. And woe to those who ventured to think otherwise!

⁴¹⁹ For the translation of the 1982 Turkish constitution see: TBMM, *Constitution of the Republic of Turkey*. Available at: http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf (accessed 2016).

⁴²⁰ Quoted in: *Hurriyet Daily News*, ‘Sovereignty Belongs to Nation’. Available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/sovereignty-belongs-to-nation.aspx?pageID=438&n=sovereignty-belongs-to-nation-2006-04-26> (accessed 26 April 2006).

⁴²¹ Atatürk (1927).

*They would immediately have been looked down upon as men without faith and without patriotism and as such would have been scorned.*⁴²²

As a result, the principle of republicanism aimed to break the perception that “citizens” (known as the “tebaa” in the Ottoman Empire) had to be ruled by “a sacred person”, and to give the confidence that each individual is equal with another and has an equal right to have a say in social matters. The military’s close relationship with the republicanism principle is explicit enough. Most of the direct military interventions have been made by the statement of being carried out through the “duty of protecting the Republic and republican principles”. Yet, one may argue that the military occasionally breached the republican principles during its political involvements, either willingly or reluctantly. Given the evolution of the Turkish regime from one party to a multi-party system, and given the periodic military interventions, the analytical tables in the empirical chapters will classify the versions of republican regime in Turkey into two groups, namely *authoritarian* and *democratic* republics.

4.4.2 Statism

Atatürk states that real and absolute independence is only possible with economic independence, and that is the true way of modernisation. The principle of statism (*devletcilik* in Turkish) declares that the state should supervise all the economic activities within the state, and should involve itself in the areas where private enterprise is not willing to go, or where private enterprise is incapable. According to the principle of statism, the state is not just the main source of economic activities,

⁴²² Ibid.

but it is also the owner of the major industries within the state.⁴²³ Artun Unsal argues that, in the first years of the Republic, the country was extremely undeveloped and had a poor capital. About 80 per cent of the capital belonged to foreigners and ethnic minorities, such as the Armenians, Jews, and Greeks. He refers to Taner Timur's words in his work: "In the country, an industrial bourgeoisie was almost non-existent, and was also not national".⁴²⁴ Ayfer Dagdelen notes that the principle of statism aimed to create a national economy, independent from foreign interventions.⁴²⁵ Unsal argues that a new law was enacted in 1927 to promote industrialisation, while also giving incentives to the private sector. Atatürk considered that a bourgeoisie would emerge in the long run, but the global economic crisis made it necessary for state-owned enterprises to control the key sectors. Meanwhile, the mixed economy was a reasonable solution, where the private sector had not enough capital.⁴²⁶

Malcolm Cooper explains Atatürk's economic policy as a state-sponsored experience rather than a private one. He maintains that the Ottoman economy was feudal and based on agriculture. The new Republic aimed to create industrial bases under state sponsorship during the 1920s. The founding fathers of Turkey were under the influence of harsh economic conditions during the war years, which made it hard for private entrepreneurs to have enough capital for establishing businesses. The economic policy in the Atatürk era was highly influenced by the Soviet system, even to the extent of using their five-year term template for industrial development in 1933. Thus, Turkish enterprise became a combination of tariff protections and a

⁴²³ Portland State University, 'Atatürk's Principles: Statism', *Hatfield School of Government Center for Turkish Studies*. Available at: http://www.pdx.edu/turkish_studies_center/atat-rk-ilkeleri-Atatürks-principles (accessed 2016).

⁴²⁴ Artun Unsal, 'Atatürk's Reforms: Realization of An Utopia By a Realist', *The Turkish Yearbook Vol.XIX*, pp.39-45.

⁴²⁵ Dagdelen, *ibid.*: 27.

⁴²⁶ Unsal, *ibid.*: 53-54.

weak domestic competition policy. At the practical level, many elements of state ownership were put under the protection of the law. Cooper argues that some parts of the judiciary became more passionate even than the military, in terms of protecting the Atatürk model of statism.⁴²⁷ Ayfer Dagdelen contends that Atatürk saw the principle of Statism as a socio-economic requirement for catching up with the Western civilisations, due to the poor economic conditions of the state and lack of capital. She notes that a strong economy is the first condition for creating an independent nation state. Thus, Atatürk's nationalism considered statism as the true way of providing this goal.⁴²⁸

In conclusion, the military rhetoric tends to promote Atatürk's statism against a liberal economy, in general. Yet, especially after the NATO membership, one can observe a growing interest in a liberal economy by the military authorities, arguably due to preserving close relations with the Western bloc. The changing characteristic of military culture from revolutionism to guardianship enabled capitalism and anti-Communism to embed in military culture and turned the military into a military-industrial complex. Following the 1960 coup d'état, the military changed its members' social status by creating economic privileges such as the foundation of OYAK. In addition to this, the 1980-83 period of junta rule played an important role in embedding liberal policies in the national economy. By assigning liberal economist Turgut Ozal to the highest position in economic matters, the military opened the paths toward liberalisation. Following the junta rule, Turgut Ozal became the first civil prime minister and replaced most of the statist policies with liberal practices. Hence, one cannot argue that the military has remained loyal to Statism in

⁴²⁷ Malcolm Cooper, 'The Legacy of Atatürk: Turkish Political Structures and Policy-Making', *International Affairs*, 78, 1, 2002: 115-128, pp.117, 122-23; Artun Unsal, *ibid.*: 53; Additionally see: Emrullah Uslu, *ibid.*: 74.

⁴²⁸ Dagdelen, *ibid.*: 26-27.

every period of history. In the analytical tables, the statism principle will be analysed under the “economic policies” headline, which separates economic policies into two groups, namely *statism* and *liberal economy*.

4.4.3 Populism

The principle of populism basically states that there are no class privileges and distinctions in the Turkish Republic, and no individual, family, class, or organisation can be superior to the others.⁴²⁹ According to the principle of populism (*halkcilik* in Turkish), each citizen should be equal in the eyes of the law without considering any ethnic, religious, language, or sect differences. As has also been argued in the previous chapter, Artun Unsal notes that, when he was in the military academy, Atatürk read a lot of books about the French Revolution and had ideas about the concepts of “freedom, equality, and brotherhood”.⁴³⁰ He accepts the existence of classes, but there cannot be any discrimination. They can only survive with cooperation, without considering any difference:

*Our people are not constituted of classes with diverging interests but classes whose existence and work require each other. Who can deny the fact that the farmer needs the craftsman, the craftsman the farmer, and the farmer the merchant, and that each of them needs all others and the worker.*⁴³¹

The principle of populism offers that the politicians elected by the citizens should follow policies which favour the interests of different groups within the nation, without considering any differences. The aim of populism is to educate people to

⁴²⁹ Portland State University, ‘Atatürk’s Principles: Populism’, *Hatfield School of Government Center for Turkish Studies*. Available at: http://www.pdx.edu/turkish_studies_center/atat-rk-ilkeleri-Atatürks-principles (accessed 2016).

⁴³⁰ Unsal, *ibid.*: 46.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*: 48.

govern themselves; therefore, the principle of populism is the natural result of the principle of republicanism. Because republicanism means people elect the rulers from inside, and thus the republican regime becomes a public regime. Therefore, since the opening of the Turkish National Assembly, Atatürk often stressed that the new republican regime would be a public regime.⁴³²

Indeed, the populism principle, and Atatürk's emphasis on public education by associating it with this principle, is an important point regarding democratisation, political culture, and their relations with military interventions. As was argued by Samuel Finer in his classic *Man on Horseback* (1962), the countries with *minimal* and *low* political cultures are more vulnerable to military interference than the countries with *developed* and *mature* political cultures.⁴³³ Atatürk's efforts for increasing people's level of education with reforms, such as adopting the Latin alphabet, opening public schools, public houses, village institutes, schools for women in villages, and land reform, can also be seen as attempts at increasing political and democratic culture. Again, considering Finer's argument, Atatürk's education reforms can also be seen as the most stable solution to future military interventions. Lastly, the military has ostensibly remained loyal to the populism principle. Yet, the military's alleged discriminative, oppressive, and authoritarian behaviours during the periods of junta rule in the guardianship era do not meet with Atatürk's populism principle in reality.⁴³⁴

⁴³² *Turkish Ministry of Education*, 'the Principle of Populism'. Available at: <http://www.meb.gov.tr/belirligunler/10kasim/ilkeleri/halk.htm> (accessed 2016).

⁴³³ Samuel Finer, *Man on Horseback*, Transaction Publishers, (2002 edition), p: xvii.

⁴³⁴ For the relationship between the military and the Populism principle see: Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution', *The American Historical Review*, Vol.75, No.6, October 1970: 1654-1683, p.1671.

4.4.4 Revolutionism

The principle of revolutionism (reformism) suggests that Turkey should make reforms and should replace traditional institutions with modern ones.⁴³⁵ Revolutionism (*inkilapcilik* in Turkish) is a meticulous policy of transformation that assumes that the policy makers within a state should always be the leaders of reformism and progressive movements to struggle against the newly arising problems of the age in the society. Atatürk considers science as the “true and only guide” for reformism. He expresses the main aim of reformism with his famous words: “We will attain the level of contemporary civilisations”.⁴³⁶ Stephen Kinzer argues that in a rapidly changing world, Atatürk’s belief was that Turkey could be modern only by adopting modern values.⁴³⁷ Atatürk stated that his ideas should be open to interrogation and change, if necessary. They should not be taken as unchanging dogmas. Once he said: “In a rapidly changing world, introducing unchanging ideas becomes illogical. I do not leave you any verses, dogmas or unchanging-fixed rules as a spiritual legacy. My spiritual legacy is science and reason.”⁴³⁸ The military’s relationship with the revolutionism principle has indeed coming from the Young Turks era. Even, Atatürk himself was raised during this era as being one of the revolutionist officers of the age. More or less, the military’s revolutionist character has continued to exist up to the present day, since the military modernisation in the Ottoman Era.

⁴³⁵ Portland State University, ‘Atatürk’s Principles: Revolutionism’, *Hatfield School of Government Center for Turkish Studies*. Available at: http://www.pdx.edu/turkish_studies_center/atat-rk-ilkeleri-Atatürks-principles (accessed 2016).

⁴³⁶ Unsal, *ibid.*: 36.

⁴³⁷ Stephan Kinzer, *Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011, p. 50-51.

⁴³⁸ Quoted in: Oktay Gunensin, ‘Her Yere Asılsın’ (It should be hanged everywhere), *Vatan*. Available at: <http://haber.gazetevatan.com/0/76304/4/yazarlar> (accessed 21 April 2006).

4.5 CONCLUSION

The theoretical part of this thesis has been completed with this chapter. In the first four chapters, military culture, the martial ethos, elements of Turkish military culture, and finally Atatürk's principles have been defined. That is to say, the thesis has presented the essential conceptual clarifications for starting the empirical process. Following this, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will analyse the character of the relationship between military culture and politics regarding the five analytical models that have been mentioned above.

Additionally, this chapter has made four specific contributions. Firstly, it has discussed the theoretical definitions of Atatürk's principles by considering the relevant literature. The second contribution of the chapter has been to discuss differences and similarities between Atatürkist and alternative interpretations and practices of these principles. Especially, the secularism principle has some relative differences to other versions, in that the Atatürkist version, which is known as laicism, has not only aimed at liberating social life from the impact of religion, but has also aimed at liberating minds and souls from the impact of religion in private life. Hence, Atatürk's version is closer to the subjective secularism definition of Berger. Yet, Atatürk's laicism is still different to Berger's, because it aimed to dictate this separation by laws and regulations. On the other hand, Berger said that this liberation would be coming naturally while people are modernising, not by force. Therefore, the analytical chart in the empirical chapters will separate secularism into three different titles regarding their practice in Turkey: strict, moderate, and democratic secularism. Also, Atatürk's nationalism definition is a mixture of primordial and modern models, because Turkish citizenship, legally, has not been based on ethnicity but on accepting Turkish nationality. On the other hand, there

were still strong primordial references to the origins of the Turks in Atatürk's time, which were embedded in the national education system. Yet, the analytical chart will indicate the Turkish nationalism as a mixed model in the empirical chapters.

The third contribution of the chapter was to evaluate military interventions under the guidance of Atatürkist principles. Normally, the military has stated that it was a constitutional duty for the military to protect Atatürk's principles from external and internal threats, by referring to the relevant regulations. On the other hand, it is not easy to maintain that the military has always remained loyal to Atatürkist ideals. Especially, the Turkish-Islam synthesis, which was promoted by the military, was explicitly against the major purpose of the secularism principle. The main reason for this shift from the Atatürkist line was indeed change from revolutionism to guardianship, which put military culture into a capitalist and anti-Communist route after the NATO membership. Eventually, after being a military-industrial complex, secularism became an excuse for the military to maintain its new social status and economic privilege as well as enabling the military to preserve Turkey's alliance with the Western bloc against the Soviet Union. Additionally, the liberal transformation of the national economy during the 1980s was indeed started by the military's promotion, in that the military assigned liberal-orientated Turgut Ozal to the position responsible for economic policies. Ozal became the first prime minister after the junta rule, and comprehensively replaced Atatürk's Statism with a completely liberal economic policy. As a result, one can come to the conclusion that the military's staunchly Kemalist discourse has sometimes not gone further than being an excuse to legitimise military interventions.

The last contribution of the chapter was to make a brief introduction to the analytical process. Most of the terms that have been discussed in this chapter will also be

applied in the empirical chapters. The terms will also be shown in several analytical tables in the final parts of each case study, which will be coded by taking into account relevant scholarly debate and Turkish experiences. In other words, secularism will be identified from moderate to strict, namely: moderate, democratic, and strict secularism. Nationalism will be shown as mixed nationalism; regime type will be identified as strict or democratic republic. Finally, the economic policy will be categorised as statism or liberal economy.

CHAPTER 5: Case Study I: Major Cultural Transformation in the Turkish Military “From Traditionalism to Revolutionism” (1908-1945)

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The first four chapters have prepared the necessary background to answer the main research questions. The important points that have been derived from the previous chapters can be summarised thus: The main purpose of civil-military literature is to prevent militaries from breaking democracy. At that point, the suggestion of this thesis is looking at the main ethoi that create military cultures. As has been elaborated in the second chapter, military ethoi have crucial impacts in shaping militaries' political positions. Hence, if these sets of ethoi are shaped according to democratic and liberal principles, namely political neutrality and civilian supremacy (the professional ethos), with a proper education programme, the militaries may stay in their own autonomous area by professionalising, and may accept subordination to civilians. Indeed, that is the case that was referred to as objective control by Samuel Huntington. At that point, the Turkish military's evolution from a highly political culture to current depolitical status becomes a rich case for analysing the relationship between military ethos and politics. Given the nation-builder status of the Turkish military (the birthright principle), the changes in military culture have tended to bring fundamental changes in Turkish politics. Hence, starting from this chapter, the thesis will focus on the answer to the key research question, namely the type of relationship between the Turkish military and politics as regards the five analytical models: *positive-democratic*, *negative-democratic*, *positive-undemocratic*, *negative-undemocratic* and *variable*.

The analysis will be done within three steps. Firstly, in each empirical chapter, the historical narrative will be explained by taking into account the changes in military culture and national politics. Each change will also be analysed with regard to the relevant analytical model. Secondly, in the summary part of each chapter, a final evaluation will be made. Lastly, an analytical table will be included in final part to give the reader a schematic summary of the process. The analytical tables will be prepared according to the results that emerge from the empirical chapters. Additionally, a final and comprehensive evaluation of the three case studies will be made in Chapter 7 and in the Conclusion. To implement this purpose, the empirical part of the thesis will be divided into three chapters. Chapter 5 analyses the *revolutionist* transformation between 1908 and 1945; Chapter 6 analyses the *guardianship* process between 1945 and 1999; Chapter 7 analyses *depoliticisation* between 1999 and 2013.

At this point, this chapter has four targeted contributions. The first contribution is to explore the dynamics that have created a close linkage between the military and society. Hence, the chapter will analyse the military institution from the earliest Turkish states in Central Asia. In this way, the chapter will not only show the foundations of the military-nation assumption, but will also indicate why the military has always had a central position as being the founder and ruler in the Turkish states. The second contribution is to show how praetorian tradition was embedded in the Ottoman army during the declining period. To achieve this goal, the chapter will begin its analysis from the foundation years of the Ottoman Empire by indicating the status of the military within the state. Then, the chapter will analyse the declining years of the Empire, wherein the state authority was weakened and the military often intervened in state affairs. The Janissaries interventions have also marked the

beginning of a long-term praetorian tradition in the Turkish military, which has continued after the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic. Given the main purpose of the thesis, the main focus will be given to the history of modern Turkey. Therefore, the pre-Islamic Turkic history and the classical Ottoman era will be summarised briefly, and then the main focus will be given to the revolutionary era of military culture, which starts with the Young Turks Revolution in 1908 and continues until the end of the early republican era in 1945. The third contribution of the chapter is to explore how revolutionism became embedded in military culture, and how it led to the foundation of the secular Turkish Republic. The last contribution is to indicate the ideological divisions within the military, and the variable nature of military culture. For the third and fourth contributions, the chapter will analyse a number of important incidents, namely: the earliest military reforms in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the Tanzimat reforms; the First and Second Constitutional eras; the Young Turk revolution; the Union and Progress Era; and, finally, the Liberation War and Atatürk's reforms.

5.2 THE FOUNDATION AND RISING YEARS OF OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1299-1699)

5.2.1 Early Turkish States and the Origins of Military Nation Idea

The latest scientific findings demonstrate that the history of the Turks began around BC 5000; however, the written history starts approximately 3000 years ago. According to the Orkhon Inscriptions, one of the first basic characteristics of the Turkish societies was soldiery.⁴³⁹ The Great Hun Empire (BC 220-BC 46) is mostly accepted as the first Turkic state. The Turkish military takes its formal date of foundation as BC 209, which is the date that Mete Khan had created the first

⁴³⁹ Pekin and Yavuz, (2014): 37. (The Orkhon Inscriptions are one of the oldest written resources about the early Turkish societies.)

organised land forces.⁴⁴⁰ Historians note three features which separated the ancient Turkish military from the others: it was non-paid, it was permanent, and it was composed of horsemen.⁴⁴¹ Because of the nomadic life and hard living conditions of the weather, everybody within the state was a soldier and was ready to fight. Military discipline penetrated into every part of social life and fixed militarist values as a lifestyle into the Turkish societies.⁴⁴² Children were brought up as warriors; the women rode horses and used weapons. There were traditional sports such as *cevgen*, *cirit*, archery, and wrestling, which involved riding horses, using weapons, and struggling. The hunting sessions were like military exercises.⁴⁴³ Therefore, military was not a profession but an obligation, which collects all the settlers together during wartime. The collective mobilisation or “total war” during the Turkish Liberation War can be considered as a reflection of this structure, inherited from the previous Turkish states.⁴⁴⁴ Historians argue that there are two characteristics that have been inherited from the Central Asian Turkish states and transferred to the later ones: these are military culture, which has been deeply associated with the Turkish societies, and the tradition of strong central state authority.⁴⁴⁵ In the language used by the early Turks, the dominance of militarist expressions indicates the position of soldiery in the Turkish national culture.⁴⁴⁶ Additionally, even in the first Turkish states, the military was effective in politics. The warriors and veterans had some

⁴⁴⁰ Unal, *ibid.*: 7. (Mete Khan, also known as Modu Chanyu, was the first Emperor of the Huns.)

⁴⁴¹ Ibrahim Kafesoglu, *Türk Milli Kültürü (Turkish National Culture)*, Istanbul: Bogazici Press, 1991, p.269.

⁴⁴² The Presidency of the General Staff, *Atatürk and the Republic in Turkish History*, Ankara: General Staff's Press of Military History and the Presidency of Strategic Research, 2nd ed., 2009, p.11.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁴ Unal, *ibid.*: 8.

⁴⁴⁵ Mevlut Ozdemir *Türk Ordusunun Tarihsel Dayanaklari* (The Historical Origins of the Turkish Army), Ankara: University of Ankara Political Science Press, 1972, p.10. (The central state means establishing states with strong central authority, which is a tradition that transferred to the later Turkish states from the ancient ones.); A. Kadir Varoglu and Adnan Bicaksiz, ‘Volunteering for Risk: The Culture of the Turkish Armed Forces’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 31, No.4, July 2005: 583.

⁴⁴⁶ Mevlut Ozdemir, *ibid.*: 16.

influence over the Khakan (Empire) through the decision-making body (Kurultay). This structure was transferred to the following Turkish states, including the Seljuks and the Ottomans.⁴⁴⁷

5.2.2 The Ottoman Empire: Early Years (1299-1699)

The Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) was founded in 1299 by a group of warriors under the leadership of Osman Ghazi (1299-1326). Osman Ghazi became the first Sultan of the new state. The years between 1299 (the foundation of the state) and 1699 (the Karlowitz treaty) have generally been referred to as “the rising years” of the Empire, in that the state controlled the Balkans, Ukraine, Caucasia, Western Iran, Iraq, Syria, the Arabian peninsula, North Africa, and most of the islands in the middle and eastern Mediterranean Sea. Among the reasons behind this early success, one may mention effective usage of physical force, applying religion as a connective tool for keeping the people together, and legitimising conquests by using the jihad card.⁴⁴⁸ The Ottomans were founded nearby the border of the Byzantine Empire as a small emirate.⁴⁴⁹ The Ottoman Emirate expanded its borders by the Gaza doctrine and rapidly turned into an Empire. The Gaza policy, as a “Sunni Muslim doctrine”, generated the main pushing force of the Ottoman expansion.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁷ Varoglu and Bicaksiz, ‘Volunteering for Risk’, 583.

⁴⁴⁸ Halil Inalcik, ‘The question the emergence of the Ottoman State’, *International Journal of the Turkish Studies*, 2:2 1981-1982, p.71-79. (The concept of jihad (or Gaza) is an argumentative issue in Islamic literature. Modern Islamic philosophers contend that the jihad means defending yourself from foreign attacks, but does not mean attacking somebody’s country just for invasion or economic benefits. However, when one observes the history, most of the Muslim states tended to use the term to legitimise their attacks and invasions under the excuse of ‘religious war’. Therefore, I have also applied the term while explaining the Ottoman campaigns.)

⁴⁴⁹ Yusuf Halacoglu, ‘The Ottoman State Organization in the Classical Age’, *Turks: Book 9*, pp.795-838.

⁴⁵⁰ M. Naim Turfan, *The Rise of the Young Turk: Politics the Military and Ottoman Collapse*, Alfa Press, 2000, p.37.

The Ottoman Emirate's gaza policy focused on conquering and settling as well as expanding the borders.⁴⁵¹ The conquering policy required a strong army, which is stable and powerful.⁴⁵² The strong army would invade the new lands and would find new income sources.⁴⁵³ The Sultan was accepted as "zillullah", which means "the shadow of Allah", and his decisions were considered as the God's decisions. Obedience was inevitable.⁴⁵⁴ The military campaigns and invasions formed the main financial income of the soldiers; consequently, the Empire needed more lands to meet its increasing soldier requirement. For instance, the state was giving a piece of land to the Sipahis, as had the Seljuks. Therefore, the Empire needed more lands as the number of Sipahis had increased.⁴⁵⁵

The major impact of the military over the state has continued through the entire history of the Ottoman Empire, and that tradition also remained during the Republic.⁴⁵⁶ As Albert Howe Lybyer stated, the Ottomans were *an army before it was anything else*.⁴⁵⁷ The Sultan was the Commander in Chief, and the Vezirs were the generals. The Sultans were being trained according to military discipline from their childhood, and learned the combat techniques. In the classical period, the core of the Ottoman military power were the Janissaries army which were directly

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.: 40; Lord Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire*, 1977: 152; Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922*, 1999, p.18. (Kinross's true name is indeed 'Patrick Kinross'; but he is mostly known and referred as 'Lord Kinross'. Therefore, in the footnotes, we used the name in the title of relevant resource; but in the bibliography, we only used the true name 'Patrick Kinross'.

⁴⁵² Turfan (2000): 31.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.: 70.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.: 43.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.: 54, 56; For how the Sipahis organised themselves (the system known as 'timar' (feudal tenure)) see: Lord Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire*, 1977: 152; Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922*, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.29; Michael Cook, *A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730*, Cambridge University Press, 1976: 104-106, 140; Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age 1300-1600*, 1973: 108.

⁴⁵⁶ Krs. B. Svci, 'A view on the military existence and impact in the Turkish State', *Ankara University Political Science Department Magazine*, xv: 3, 1961, p.39-45.

⁴⁵⁷ Albert Howe Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent*, Nabu Press, 2012, p.90.

dependent to the Sultan. The Janissaries were one of the most disciplined and the stable militaries of Europe (perhaps the best).⁴⁵⁸ These Janissaries were taking the orders from Istanbul, not from the local governors. In this way, the central authority was preserved.⁴⁵⁹ The absolute obedience of the Janissaries is defined as *machine-like fidelity* by Serif Mardin.⁴⁶⁰ In the time of Suleiman and afterwards, the Empire had the strongest and most disciplined army of its time.⁴⁶¹

5.3 THE DECLINE OF OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1699-1908)

Although the main problem behind the Empire's decline has been defined as the military's deformation by Ottoman ruler elites, the major reason was modernisation in Europe after the Renaissance Era. During the time of Suleiman I, the Ottomans reached their maximum success, which made the Empire "self-satisfied and inward looking", closing its doors to outside developments.⁴⁶² The Ottomans had achieved some progress in technology but they applied to these innovations just for the military institution. They could not "break their ties with the Near Eastern culture" and remained under "the impact of traditionalism". They could not manage to observe the "changing mentality" in Europe, and this caused the Empire to overlook military developments in the Western world.⁴⁶³

⁴⁵⁸ Halil İnalcık, 'Osmanlılarda Saltanat Veraseti Usulü ve Türk Hakimiyet Telakkisiyle İlgisi' (The Way of Dynasty in the Ottomans and its Relation with the Perception of Sovereignty), *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 14, no. 1 (1959): 57.; Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age History of Civilisation*, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1973, p.11.

⁴⁵⁹ İsmail Hakkı Uzuncarsili and Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi: cilt. 2. Kısım. Uzunçarşılı, İ.H. XVIII. Yüzyıl*, (History of the Ottoman Empire: Book 2) Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1959: 264-265, 546.

⁴⁶⁰ Quoted in: Bener Karakartal, Turkey: 'the Army as Guardian of the Political Order', in: Christopher Clapham and George Philip, *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data, 1985.

⁴⁶¹ İlber Ortaylı, *Tarihimiz ve Biz*, İstanbul: Times Press, 2008, p.44-46.

⁴⁶² See: Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age 1300-1600*, 1973: 52.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

Between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the military entered into “a process of instability, lack of function and technological backwardness”.⁴⁶⁴ The breaking point that stopped the Empire’s growth was the Second Siege of Vienna in 1683. The defeat in the siege indicated that the European militaries were technologically improved, and the Ottomans were weakened. By the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, the expansion process of the Empire ended and the state began to decline.⁴⁶⁵ The Empire began to lose lands and weaken gradually. The state authorities became convinced that unless the military was reformed, the collapse of the state was inevitable.⁴⁶⁶ During the declining era, the military rebellions created serious threats against weak state authority. Nevertheless, the Janissaries’ riots were generally implemented with a goal of maintaining the existing power of the Janissaries within the state, and therefore they should be analysed as distinct from the later revolutionary attempts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.⁴⁶⁷ Indeed, the Janissary riots were conveying strong anti-Western motifs. Accordingly, the religious feelings of the people were severely manipulated to legitimise these rebellions.⁴⁶⁸

In the declining era, the Janissaries gradually increased their political power as an interest group, to the degree that it challenged the Sultan’s authority. It may even be correct to define the Janissaries army as a “state within the state” within those years.

⁴⁶⁴ Turfan, *ibid.*: 84.

⁴⁶⁵ Gábor Ágoston, ‘Treaty of Karlowitz’, *Encyclopaedia of the Ottoman Empire*, InfoBase Publishing, 2010, pp.309–10; Andrew Wheatcroft, *The Ottomans: Dissolving Images*, Penguin, 1993, p.64.

⁴⁶⁶ Unal, *ibid.*: 14.

⁴⁶⁷ Huseyin Cevizoglu, ‘Osmanlida Cagi Yakalama Cabalari ve Buna Karsi Direnislere’ (The Attempts to Catch the Civilization and Resistances in the Ottomans), in: *The Declarations of the 7th Military History Seminar II: The Ottoman Empire between the years of 1763-1938 and the society and the army in the Turkish Republic*, Ankara: The Turkish Chief of the General Staff, p.90; Halil Inalcik and David Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp.415, 418-419.

⁴⁶⁸ See: Orhan Pamuk, *Istanbul Memoires and the City*, Faber and Faber, 2005: 219; and Osman Unal, *ibid.*: 142.

Many times, the Sheikh ul-Islam and the Ulama made compromises with the Janissaries to overthrow the Viziers and the Sultans.⁴⁶⁹

Additionally, with the new regulations, the Janissaries were allowed to marry and sell merchandise. The freedom of merchandising pushed the Janissaries toward financial interests. After each new rebellion, they began to demand land and privileges from the Sultan. Indeed, they became an important ally of the civilian groups who were demanding higher positions within the state. The central authority continued to decline and the military's political influence continued to grow.⁴⁷⁰

Accordingly, in the following centuries, the defeats against the European powers continued to grow. Now the state rulers realised that the expected reforms should cover a large area, namely discipline, weapons, technical effectiveness, education, and even military uniforms.⁴⁷¹ As one can predict from this example, the Ottoman army should have been professionalised with technical terms. The first serious modernisation attempts started with the naval forces. The Muhendishaneyi Bahri Humayun (the Empire Naval Engineership) was opened in 1773 to raise new naval

⁴⁶⁹ Inalcik, *ibid.*: 63; Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922*, 1999: 4. The Sheikh ul-Islam was considered to be the greatest religious authority within the state. The Sultans were asking him for the 'fatwa' (religious consent) before giving their 'ferman' (decree) to learn whether it was against the religion or not. They had a very respectable position; indeed, the Sultans were giving importance to earn their support because of the tebaa's (public's) deep religious concerns. The Ulama class was the subsequent religious authority, which was subordinated to the Sheikh ul-Islam. The Ulama was combined with a group of religious experts (see: Wheatcroft, 1993: 126) which included the Kadis (the Judges) and the Muftis (the local religious authorities), who were giving their religious and judicial decisions according to sharia law (Islamic law), which was based on the Quran, Sunnah (Hadiths), and Icmaa (the agreement between the religious authorities). (See: Cook, 1976: 47; Inalcik, 1973: 166-178; and Lewis, 1961: 265.) As was illustrated in the previous chapter, during the declining years, the Ulama increased its impact on state matters intensively by urging people's religious feelings. For how the Ulama became an obstacle against the reforms, see: Kinross, *Ottoman Centuries* (1977): 364; Jason Goodwin (1998): 182; Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution', *American Historical Review*, 75, No.6 (October 1970): 1657; Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, p.121.

⁴⁷⁰ Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922*, 1999: 45; I.H. Uzuncarsili, *Ottoman History III/1*, pp.245-350. Also see: Inalcik and Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, p.664.

⁴⁷¹ Gerassimos Karabelias, 'Military Class and Perpetual State Control in Turkey', Working Paper, (2008), 2.

engineers with the new techniques of “geometry and geography”.⁴⁷² In the meantime, a French specialist, Baron de Tott, was assigned by the Ottomans as an advisor. Tott’s suggestions led to the foundation of a new howitzer school.⁴⁷³ Additionally, again through his suggestions, the School of Riyaziye was opened to give mathematics lessons to the officers.⁴⁷⁴ As a result, the following centuries would witness a sudden mental change within the Turkish military, from a traditionalist and conservative worldview to a revolutionary and progressive tendency.⁴⁷⁵

5.3.1 The Legacy of the Nineteenth Century Reform Attempts (1789-1876)

5.3.1.1 The Era of Selim III (1789-1807)

The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed important reform attempts by the Sultan Selim III (1789-1807). Indeed, there are some authors who suggest that he was the first Ottoman Sultan who seriously realised that the Ottomans needed to adopt Western technology and science to recover the state.⁴⁷⁶ He decided to remove the Janissaries institution, because that organisation was the greatest block to reform efforts. But the Janissaries and the Ulama were resisting any attempts at change, while labelling them as “the infidel inventions (Gavur Icadi)”.⁴⁷⁷

Nonetheless, Selim III bravely established a new military organisation, named as “Nizami Cedit” (the New Order) in 1793.⁴⁷⁸ The Nizami Cedit was trained by the

⁴⁷² Yusuf Oguzoglu, ‘The Emergence of Turkish Modernization Culture in the Context of Military-Nation’, in: Ibid.: 58-59 Ankara: The Turkish Chief of the General Staff; Huseyin Cevizoglu, ‘The Attempts to Catch the Civilization and Resistances in the Ottomans’, in: Ibid.: p.89; For more information see: Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 48-49, 83; For a summary of the reformation process, which goes up to the abolishment of the Janissaries, also see: Goodwin, *Lords of the Horizons*, 1998: 289-300.

⁴⁷³ Lewis, *ibid.*: 48.

⁴⁷⁴ Necdet Hayta and Ugur Unal, *The Reformation Movements in the Ottoman State*, 3rd ed., Ankara, 2008, pp.59-60.

⁴⁷⁵ For a schematic analysis of the process see: Analytical Table 1 (p. 223-225).

⁴⁷⁶ Cevizoglu, *ibid.*: 94.

⁴⁷⁷ Unal, *ibid.*: 145.

⁴⁷⁸ Wheatcroft, *ibid.*: 103; Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, ‘The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey’, *Comparative Politics*, 16, No.1, October 1983: 19. The author argues that the Nizami Cedit

European officers and experts; their training system was designed according to the European militaries. Eventually, the anti-reformist units of the state organised a big resistance against the Nizami Cedit.⁴⁷⁹ In the mosques, the preachers criticised the new military institution by stating that “the infidel Nizami Cedit were dressed alike the French militaries and the Sultan would be punished by Allah because of allowing that”.⁴⁸⁰ Eventually, they organised a rebellion to remove the Nizami Cedit in 1807 with the Janissaries (the Kabakci Mustafa event). The leader of the rebellion, Kabakci Mustafa, demanded a religious fatwa from the Sheikh ul-Islam, and obtained it. In summary, the fatwa declared:

*The poor Sultan increased his blindness ... and forgot that he was the head of Muslims, he did not trust Allah but copied the infidels ... now I only care about the religious interests and the future of the Ottoman state.*⁴⁸¹

Selim III was obliged to issue a law to remove the Nizami Cedit. However, the rebellions did not satisfy the Janissaries: they massacred many members of the Nizami Cedit, dethroned the Sultan and then executed him as well.⁴⁸² Eventually, they removed all the remaining Nizami Cedit.⁴⁸³ Overall, the reign of Selim III is particularly important in showing the increasing power strife within the military. Additionally, the event marked the beginning of a secularisation process by modernising military units. The foundation of Nizami Cedit, as a Western-orientated modern army, received strong reactions from the traditionalist wing of the military.

army was indeed the beginning of a modernisation process within military culture, and was also the beginning of political modernisation within the state, which took its ultimate shape through Atatürk.

⁴⁷⁹ Unal, *ibid.*: 148-149.

⁴⁸⁰ Yucel Ozkaya, ‘3. Selim Doneminde Kara Ordusunda Yapilan Yenilikler’ (The Reformatations in the Selim the Third Era), in: *The Declarations of the 7th Military History Seminar II*, p. 8.

⁴⁸¹ Cevizoglu, *ibid.*: 95.

⁴⁸² Wheatcroft, *ibid.*: 1993: 114-15.

⁴⁸³ Unal, *ibid.*: 150-151; For a detailed analysis of the Nizami Cedit and the Era of Selim III see: Cevizoglu, *ibid.*: 89-97.

Despite the Nizami Cedit being closed down, this division within military units would continue under different names. The later conflicts within the military, such as Mekteplis versus Alaylis, Unionists versus Saviours would occur because of the different worldviews of the officers.

5.3.1.2 The Era of Mahmud II (1808-1839)

During the reign of Mahmud the II (1808-1839) the reformist Grand Vizier Alemdar Mustafa Pasha attempted to reinstitute the Nizami Cedit under a different name “Sekbani Cedit” (the New Army) in 1808. The Janissaries revolted again and the Sekbani Cedit was abolished in 1808.⁴⁸⁴ But Mahmud II was very determined to remove the Janissaries to strengthen the central authority.⁴⁸⁵ Therefore, unlike his predecessors, Mahmud II followed a more cautious strategy by convincing the Ulama of the necessity of a new military organisation. He had a fatwa from the Sheikh ul-Islam and declared that “there was no religious obstacle against forming a new educated military organisation”. Eventually, a mutiny made by the Janissaries against modern military training methods gave Mahmud II the suitable conditions for disbanding the Janissaries. The forces of Sultan surrounded the Janissaries’ barracks and opened fire. Eventually, the Sultan managed to break the rebellion. The Janissaries were abolished in 1826 and that event is recorded in history as the Vakayi Hayriye (the Auspicious Incident).⁴⁸⁶ That event broke the main obstacle against military modernisation.⁴⁸⁷ Additionally, the abolition of the Janissaries became an important turning point for the Ottoman economic policies. Not only did this event re-strengthen the central authority but it also opened the path for transiting from an

⁴⁸⁴ Unal, *ibid.*: 152-153.

⁴⁸⁵ Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire*, 1999: 49; Turfan, *ibid.*: 132.

⁴⁸⁶ Lewis, *ibid.*: 79; Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922*, 1999: 63-64; For a summary of reformation process that goes up to the abolition of the Janissaries, also see: Goodwin, *Lords of the Horizons*, 1998: 289-300; Andrew Wheatcroft, *ibid.*: 84-137.

⁴⁸⁷ Unal, *ibid.*: 154; Cevizoglu, *ibid.*: 99.

urban to a liberal economy.⁴⁸⁸ Following this event, the first commercial bourgeoisie class began to emerge among the non-Muslim minorities. For the first time in Ottoman history, a privileged class appeared who made independent commercial activities. These important changes affected the military, the Ottoman intellectuals, and the non-Muslim minorities. Given the emergence of the printing press (print capitalism), non-Muslim Ottoman minorities began to construct their own national identity by using a common discourse and language through the newspapers, books, reading clubs, conferences, meetings, and commerce.⁴⁸⁹

More specifically, an Ottoman bureaucratic elite would emerge in the following decades apart from the commercial bourgeoisie. The emergence of a Westernist education system in the new military schools created a kind of “cultural capital”, which collected the positivist, secular and liberal worldviews of its time. This new trend would prevail to the civilian intellectuals from the military elite and would create a feeling of unity and a common ideal among the new Ottoman bureaucratic elite to liberate the state from ignorance and would simultaneously create the foundations of revolutionism within military culture.⁴⁹⁰

In this regard, the following process would trigger the notion of nationalism by encouraging minorities for independence and would push the Ottoman intellectuals and military elite to seek solutions for preventing the Empire from dissolving. The events in the following process, such as the enlightenment and politicisation of the

⁴⁸⁸ For re-establishment of central authority and transition to liberal economy, see: Inalcik and Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, pp.6-7, 764-768, 825 and 854-858.

⁴⁸⁹ For a detailed analysis relevant to the emergence of print capitalism and first commercial bourgeoisie class among the non-Muslim minorities, see: Fatma Muge Gocsek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernisation and Social Change*, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.117-118. For related arguments, also see: Ayla Gol, *Imagining the Turkish Nation through 'othering' Armenians*, p.128.

⁴⁹⁰ For the emergence of a bureaucratic elite, see: Gocsek, *ibid.*: 80-81 (the author describes it as a “bureaucratic bourgeoisie”, which is distinct from the commercial bourgeoisie. The author argues that, while the commercial bourgeoisie collected material resources, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie collected knowledge and culture.)

military elite, the Tanzimat Era, the emergence of the Young Ottomanist movement, and the declaration of First Constitutional Monarchy are related to this solution search.

Immediately after the abolition of the Janissaries, a new military institution, “Asakiri Mansureyi Muhammediye” (the Victorious Soldiers of Mohammad), was founded.⁴⁹¹ Mahmud II intentionally chose the “name of Prophet Mohammad” for the new military institution, to give an Islamic impression. All of the Janissaries’ barracks were destroyed, and roughly 6,000 Janissaries were massacred (according to many historians). Twenty thousand of them were sent to prison.⁴⁹² In the following process, important developments were seen. The first medical schools, “Tiphaneyi Amire” (1827) and “Cerrahhane” (1832), were opened. In 1834, the Military School “Mektebi Umumi Harbiye” and “Mizikayi Humayun” (the Harmonica School) were opened. These establishments sent several students to Europe for education. Additionally, a number of teachers were demanded from Europe to teach in these schools.⁴⁹³

At this point the aforementioned reforms came, namely the establishment of modern military schools, sending officers to Europe, and bringing European teachers. It started a new cultural trend within the military, which prepared the essential conditions for the future transformation that has been titled *revolutionism* in this thesis. The progressive ideas began to occur among the officers while they were learning the positive sciences in the modern schools: philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, and contemporary political thoughts, as well as the latest scientific and technological innovations. Accordingly, most Turkish officers learned French to

⁴⁹¹ Lewis, *ibid.*: 79.

⁴⁹² *Ibid.*: 154; Lewis, *ibid.*: 79.

⁴⁹³ Cevizoglu, *ibid.*: 99; Lewis, *ibid.*: p.84

learn the ideals of the French Revolution.⁴⁹⁴ The first remarkable coup attempt became the Kuleli Incident (Kuleli Vakasi) in 1859, an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Sultan.⁴⁹⁵ Yet, that praetorian trend would continue to develop in the following process and would reach its climax during the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. The words of historian Naim Turfan (2000) summarises that transition:

*The officers in the modern military were trained with the contemporary political ideas of that era in the military schools. That caused a feeling of self-awareness among the officers in which they believed that they can be a pushing force from the top. Therefore, that process – unlike the intentions of Mahmud II – increased the military's impact on the state and made it the most effective institution ... Soldiers began to consider themselves as the most capable group to solve the state's problems.*⁴⁹⁶

Most of the aforementioned ideas derived from the French Revolution, such as nationalism, republicanism, liberalism, equality...⁴⁹⁷ Hereafter, the whole military education and equipment were brought completely in line with the Prussian and French models.⁴⁹⁸ Niyazi Berkes explains these renewals toward the European military system with these words:

⁴⁹⁴ Mustafa Ozbey, 'İkinci Mesrutiyet Surecinde Askeri Orta Ogretim Kurumlarında Eğitim ve Öğretim' (The Education in the Military Schools During the Second Constitutional Monarchy), in: *The Declarations of the 7th Military History Seminar II*, p.341; Tanel Demirel, 'Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40, No.1 (2004): 69; Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, 'Transformation of Turkey's Civil-Military Relations Culture and International Environment', *Turkish Studies*, 12, No.2, 2011: 258-60. For the establishment of first modern Military Academies see: Mesut Uyar and A. Kadir Varoğlu, 'In Search of Modernity and Rationality: The Evolution of Turkish Military Academy Curricula in a Historical Perspective', *Armed Forces & Society*, April, 2008.

⁴⁹⁵ Gocek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernisation and Social Change*, 78.

⁴⁹⁶ Turfan, (2000): 137-138.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.: 165.

⁴⁹⁸ Lewis, *ibid.*: 111-112.

*The most important but less known educational reform within the 19th century Ottoman state was the creation of the modern military.*⁴⁹⁹

Lastly, another important change within this era was the beginning of compulsory military service, following a regulation of 1843. Soldiers were chosen by lottery, the service was five years and limited to the Muslim citizens.⁵⁰⁰

5.3.1.3 The Tanzimat Era (1839-1876)

Tanzimat is the reform process that starts with the declaration of the Imperial Act of Gulhane (Gulhane Hatti Humayunu) in 1839 and ends with the declaration of the First Constitutional Monarchy (Birinci Mesrutiyet) in 1876. The primary purpose was giving non-Muslims rights equal to those of the Muslim citizens. Since the French Revolution had spread nationalist ideals to every part of Europe, some ethnic groups within the Ottoman Empire began to demand autonomy. As a reaction, the Sultan and his advisors considered that if they give equality to non-Muslims, they could create a new Ottoman identity (*Ottomanism*) without regard to any religious or ethnic difference, and in this way they prevent the Empire dissolving. The Tanzimat Reforms were proclaimed legal with the declaration of “Gulhane Hatti Humayunu” (the Imperial Act of Gulhane) in 1839.⁵⁰¹ Although the movement could not find enough support from both the Muslims and Christians, it led to some important reforms, such as starting the secular changes in the education system and the law.⁵⁰²

⁴⁹⁹ Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Routledge, 2013: 101-102. For a detailed analysis of reform movements during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries in the Ottoman Empire see: Aziz Rifki Ateser, *ibid.*: 351-370. For the importance of new military schools on military modernisation also see: Gocek (1996): 45, 74-75.

⁵⁰⁰ Taner, *Tanzimat'tan Kurtuluş'a Osmanlı Ordusu*, 18-19.

⁵⁰¹ Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922*, 66; Andrew Wheatcroft, *The Ottomans: Dissolving Images*, 1993: 167; 183; Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 28; Bulent Daver, ‘Secularism in Turkey’, *Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi*, 1969, 30-32.

⁵⁰² Joan Haslip, *The Sultan*, Cassell & Company, 1958: 12; Cevizoglu, *ibid.*: 100.

5.3.1.4 The First Constitutional Monarchy (1. Mesrutiyet) Era (1876-1878)

In 1856, another reform package, the Decree of Reform (Islahat Fermani), was issued to continue the Tanzimat reforms. The decree offered more rights to non-Muslims. Firstly, military service became obligatory for non-Muslims. Secondly, non-Muslims had the right of promotion to “colonel” rank within the Ottoman army.⁵⁰³ Apart from the military reforms, some renewals were made in the civil education system. Following this process, a new movement, the *Young Ottomans* (Genc Osmanlilar), began to grow up among the educated class. The Young Ottomans comprised a group of civilian intellectuals who aimed to combine all the different ethnic groups under the Ottoman identity.⁵⁰⁴ This new movement was promoted to the public through newspapers, theatre, games, poets, and books. The most influential member of the Young Ottomans was Namik Kemal (1840-1888).⁵⁰⁵ The Young Ottomans played leading role in the declaration of the First Constitutional Monarchy.⁵⁰⁶ During the declaration of the constitutional monarchy, the progressive wing of military played an important role by giving their support to the Young Ottomans. In 1876, the first Ottoman constitution (Kanuni Esasi) and the first parliament (Meclisi Mebusan)

⁵⁰³ Ibid.: 148; For a detailed analysis for conscription in the Ottoman military see: Osman Koksall, ‘Osmanli Devletinde Askerligin Vatandaslik Mukellefiyetine Donusumunun Evrimi’ (Emergence of Conscription in the Ottoman State) in: *The Turkish Military since the Foundation to Today: the Declarations from the 12th Military History Symposium, 20-22 May 2009*, Ankara: The Turkish Chief of the General Staff, pp.259-271; Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, 1977: 501, 580.

⁵⁰⁴ Mogens Pelt, *Military Intervention and a Crisis Democracy in Turkey: The Menderes Era and Its Demise*, I.B. Tauris, 2014, 23. In this work, the author notes that ‘modernisation’ and ‘civilisation’ appeared as the new ideology among the Ottoman elites. Turfan, *ibid.*: 151; Wheatcroft, *ibid.*: 189

⁵⁰⁵ Karpas, ‘The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64’, 1658; Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, pp.23, 31-33. (There is a discussion over the founding fathers of the Young Ottomans’ Namik Kemal and Ali Suavi’s opinions.)

⁵⁰⁶ Turfan, *ibid.*: 152; Because of the mentioned reasons, some consider the First Constitutional Monarchy as the ‘Magna Carta of Turkey’, in which the Sultan voluntarily (or reluctantly, by outside pressures) abandoned some of his authority. Additionally, the first parliament and constitution were established. For the process between the opening and dissolving of the first parliament see: Kinross, *ibid.*: 573-577; Jason Goodwin, *Lords of the Horizons: A History of the Ottoman Empire*, 1998: 312; Gerassimos Karabelias, ‘The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey, 1980-95’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 35, No.4, 1999: 131; M. Sukru Hanioglu, ‘Civil-Military Relations in the Second Constitutional Period, 1908-1918’, *Turkish Studies*, 12, No.2, 2011: 179; Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 26; 161 (The author notes that the army played a crucial role in implementing the First Constitutional Monarchy.); Also see the letter of Sultan Abdulaziz in: Serif Mardin, ‘The New Ottomans, young Turks and the Armed Forces’, *Forum XVI*: 176, August, p.6-7.

were officially approved by the Sultan. The First Constitutional Monarchy lasted for two years. The authoritarian Sultan Abdulhamit II decided to dissolve parliament in 1878, and the Empire returned to being an absolute monarchy.⁵⁰⁷

In the final analysis, the process from the first military reform attempts to the end of First Constitutional Monarchy can be considered as a transition period for military culture from traditionalism to revolutionism. However, despite there having been a remarkable modernist trend within the military regarding the absorbance of the ideals of the French Revolution, namely liberty, equality and fraternity, it can be too early to consider military culture as revolutionist at this level. Furthermore, the First Constitutional Monarchy was not a strong liberal regime because the Sultan was still in a supervisor position and had the right to dissolve parliament. Related to this, it is not possible to associate the military with a Huntington type of professional military ethic, given its increasing relationship with politics.

5.4 FROM TRADITIONALISM TO REVOLUTIONISM: THE TURKISH REVOLUTION AND THE MILITARY CULTURE (1908 – 1945)

5.4.1. The Young Turks Revolution and the Second Constitutional Monarchy (1908)

After restarting absolute monarchy, Abdulhamid II increased his authoritarian behaviour. Additionally, he became one of the early representatives of *Islamist* ideology. Islamism was one of the main ideologies during that era, aiming to combine all Muslims under the identity of “Islam”.⁵⁰⁸ To achieve that, Abdulhamid

⁵⁰⁷ Turfan, *ibid.*: 157-158. For a schematic analysis of the process until the end of First Constitutional Monarchy see: Analytical Table 1 in the end of chapter, (p. 213-215).

⁵⁰⁸ For the ideologies of ‘Islamism’, ‘Turanism’, ‘Ottomanism’, ‘Pan-Turkism’ etc. see: Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, London: Hurst & Company, 1995; and for the relations between Abdulhamit II and Islamism see: *ibid.*: 46. Also see: Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, 1977: 586; Serif Mardin, ‘Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?’, *Daedalus*, 102, No.1, January 1973: 176.

was considering strengthening the position of the Caliphate.⁵⁰⁹ Historians note that the first known praetorian revolutionary organisation appeared during Abdulhamid's reign. The officers organised a coup d'état in the Imperial Military Medical School (1896). However, this attempt became unsuccessful, and its members were tried and exiled.⁵¹⁰ Despite the failure of this earliest coup attempt, the revolutionist officers began to increase their impact in politics by organising the *Young Turks* (Jon Turks) movement.⁵¹¹ The Young Turks movement combined the revolutionist officers and civil Ottoman intellectuals against the authoritarian rule of Abdulhamid II.⁵¹² Eventually, the Young Turks movement would lead to the establishment of modern Turkey. The officers who were educated during this era later became the leaders of the Turkish revolution.⁵¹³

Indeed, the foundation of the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihad ve Terakki – CUP) is the most important development that made the Young Turks Revolution successful by enabling them to be organised effectively. The Committee was founded by the medical military students in 1889 as a secret organisation (the earliest name was the Ottoman Union), which penetrated into the Military (Harbiye) and Medical (Tibbiye) academies as well as the School for Civil Servants (Mulkiye).⁵¹⁴ Thus, the composition of the organisation became a mixture of revolutionist officers and civil intellectuals. The Committee's discourse tended to be secular and liberal.⁵¹⁵

⁵⁰⁹ Turfan, *ibid.*: 160-161.

⁵¹⁰ Patrick Kinross, *Atatürk*, Hachette UK, 2012, p.18; Lewis (1961): 198. Normally, the first recorded coup attempt by the modern military units is viewed as the aforementioned unsuccessful Kuleli Incident in 1859. But the coup attempt at the Imperial Military Medical School in 1859 is notable in being the first direct intervention attempt by the revolutionist officers.

⁵¹¹ For an analysis on the Young Turks see: M. Sukru Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, Princeton University Press, 2011: 48-67.

⁵¹² Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism*, 1995: 45-51.

⁵¹³ Turfan, *ibid.*

⁵¹⁴ Gocek (1996): 79.

⁵¹⁵ For the CUP's liberal ideas during its foundation see: Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*. In the later process (after 1913), pan-Turkism entered into the party discourse as a strong ideal by the impact of revolutionist officers.

In following years, the organisation rapidly increased its impact in Turkish politics by acting together with the Young Turks.⁵¹⁶ Together with the CUP, the Young Turks increased their protests against the oppressive rule of Abdulhamit through the circulation of bulletins and issuing of secret newspapers.⁵¹⁷ Indeed, the CUP party became a tool for the Young Turks to increase their effect in politics.⁵¹⁸

Related to this, a number of events in the meantime triggered nationalist feelings and accelerated military politicisation. These events were important land losses, such as Tunisia to France (1881), Egypt to Britain (1882), and the turmoil in Greece (1896-1897).⁵¹⁹ The German Field Marshall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, within this period, was a general inspector in the Ottoman military school. After his observations, he prepared a report and submitted it to Kaiser Wilhelm II (1888-1918). The report mentioned the growing politicisation among the Turkish officers due to strong nationalist feelings. He implied that, accordingly, the Turkish officers could be demanding radical political changes in the near future.⁵²⁰ The following decade evidenced that Goltz was right. The strong opposition from the Young Turks obliged Sultan Abdulhamit II to declare the Second Constitutional Monarchy in 1908 (the Young Turk Revolution).⁵²¹

On the other hand, one important event during the revolutionary era, “the Mektepli/Alayli dichotomy”, is particularly important to understand why I chose the title ‘Crossing Identities’ to describe Turkish military culture. The early days of the

⁵¹⁶ Hanioglu, ‘Civil-Military Relations in the Second Constitutional Period, 1908-1918’, *Turkish Studies*, 12, No.12, 2011, p. 182; Ozkan Duman and Dimitris Tsarouhas, ‘“Civilianization” in Greece versus ‘Demilitarisation’ in Turkey: A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Relations and the Impact of the European Union’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 32, No.3 (April 2006): 410.

⁵¹⁷ Inalcik and Quataert (1995): 766-772.

⁵¹⁸ Pekin and Yavuz, *ibid.*: 49.

⁵¹⁹ Lewis, *ibid.*: 195.

⁵²⁰ Turfan, *ibid.*: 169-170.

⁵²¹ Cevizoglu, *ibid.*: 101; and Haslip, *The Sultan*, 259-268; Wheatcroft, *The Ottomans: Dissolving Images*, 203, 206.

Second Constitutional Monarchy saw a rivalry and division among the officers, between the higher educated and lower educated ones. Basically, two rival groups appeared within the military: the first group was “Mekteplis”, graduates from the military academy; the second group was “Alaylis”, those from the ordinary schools. Accordingly, the first group regularly displayed contempt for the latter, because of their ignorance, and the second group did likewise, because of the Mekteplis’ inexperience. While the Mekteplis were Western-orientated, modernist, and nationalist, the Alaylis were mostly conservative, traditionalist, and coming from pious families.⁵²² The Alaylis were loyal to the Sultan and supported the absolute monarchy. They were anxious that the growing power of the Mekteplis would push them to the subordinated position.⁵²³ Indeed, the Alaylis lost their power after the 1908 Revolution, but they continued to organise counter revolutions such as the unsuccessful 1909 coup attempt (the 31 March Incident) and the successful 1912 coup d’état (under the name of “Saviour officers”). Yet, the 1913 coup d’état by the Mekteplis (under the name of “Unionist officers”) led the revolutionist officers to hold full control over the state and the army. The domination of Mekteplis in the military continued to remain throughout the Kemalist revolution. After Atatürk, similar divisions to the Mektepli/Alayli dichotomy continued to occur under different names and ideologies. In addition to this, the stronger side would use every opportunity to eliminate the weaker side from the military.⁵²⁴

⁵²² Kemal H. Karpat, Karpat, Kemal H., *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Asker ve Siyaset*, (Soldier and Politics since the Ottoman times), Timaş Press, 2015, p.10. Salih Akyurek, *ibid.*: 251; Turfan, *ibid.*: 233; Linda Michaud-Emin, ‘The Restructuring of the Military High Command in the Seventh Harmonization Package and its Ramifications for Civil–Military Relations in Turkey’, *Turkish Studies*, 8, No.1, 2007: 32.

⁵²³ Turfan, *ibid.*: 234-235.

⁵²⁴ There are several examples of these eliminations. For instance, events such as the Fourteens, 9 March Event, Lieutenants of 78, and Ergenekon-Balyoz can be seen as attempts at removing the opponents.

As aforementioned, the 1908 Revolution and the declaration of the Second Constitutional Monarchy marked the beginning of revolutionism within the military culture. The modernisation attempts started in the previous century not only created a secular and revolutionist military elite but, at the same time, led to the secularisation and liberalisation of the political system. Indeed, the events before the 1908 revolution and the impact that the revolution made on the Turkish political system have not been sufficiently analysed yet by Turkish scholars. One comprehensive study, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, by the Turkish historian Aykut Kansu brings forward radical arguments for the process. In contrast to the traditional argument, Kansu imposes a civilian character to the Union and Progress party and he defines the 1908 Revolution as “a civilian-led move”. Furthermore, Kansu argues that the 1908 Revolution is the main breaking point in Turkish politics, which embedded a strong parliamentary tradition to the Turkish political culture and in this way opened the path to the Republican regime.⁵²⁵

Indeed, as was argued by Kansu, the events before the revolution – such as the public protests against Sultan Abdulhamit II’s oppressive regime and his policy of high taxes, which started in Erzurum and prevailed to other cities in 1906 – indicate that the revolution obtained a considerable level of public support, which is mostly overlooked by the Turkish historians.⁵²⁶ Nevertheless, Kansu’s work severely overlooks the military’s role during the revolution and aims to give the revolution an almost completely civilian character. Although the movement has benefitted from a significant civilian power, the coercive image of the revolutionist officers was obligatory to deter the Sultan and his followers. In addition to this, after the 31 March 1909 mutiny, the parliamentary regime had frequently been interrupted by the

⁵²⁵ Kansu, *the 1908 Revolution in Turkey*, 373-74.

⁵²⁶ Kansu, *Ibid.*: 35-93. Also see: David and Quataert, *ibid.*: 881.

military coups and was eventually replaced by a military dictatorship. Especially after the 1913 coup d'état, the Union and Progress party became a tool for the revolutionist officers to maintain their dictatorship.

One crucial fact increases the importance of 1908: the Second Constitutional Monarchy regime was much more liberal than the previous one in 1876, because now the Sultan was almost a symbolic figure and had neither the right to interfere in parliament nor to dissolve it arbitrarily.⁵²⁷ As mentioned above, the Union and Progress Party – as the motor force of revolution – gained remarkable public support from the Turks, Armenians, and Jews. Although the regime did not receive effective support from some ethnic groups especially the Arabs and Rums, and although there was not true equality, given the absence of women voters, for the first time in history the Ottoman state benefited from a strengthened liberal political atmosphere with the representation of different parties and ethnic groups.⁵²⁸

5.4.2 The 31 March 1909 Event

The first serious challenge to the recently created parliamentary regime came on 31 March 1909. The supporters of monarch and the radical religious groups launched a rebellion in Istanbul. The mutiny generated a risky situation shortly afterwards, prevailing around the streets of Istanbul. The rioters were chanting slogans such as “we want sharia back”. Combining their powers with the monarchist officers (mostly Alaylis), they began to attack the sympathisers of the Unionists and the 1908 Revolution. The revolutionist wing of the military were alarmed and they began to prepare units to stop the revolt. The forces that are known as the “Movement Army – Hareket Ordusu” came to Istanbul from Salonika and quelled the uprising. Martial

⁵²⁷ Kansu, Ibid.: 371.

⁵²⁸ Kansu, Ibid.: 366-67

law was proclaimed.⁵²⁹ The Movement Army dethroned Sultan Abdulhamit II and replaced him with the Sultan Mehmed V Resad (1909-1918).⁵³⁰ This coup d'état – known as the 31 March Event – was especially important for the military's future political role. Now, the military had become completely entrenched in politics. Afterwards, the revolutionist officers would be the “guardians” of the new parliamentary regime that had been created in 1908.

After the dethronement of the Sultan, the military backed the Committee of Union and Progress, which increased its dominance in the Assembly (Meclisi Mebusan – The Assembly of Representatives).⁵³¹ Particularly, Mahmud Sevket Pasha, who during the 31 March Events was the commander of the Movement Army, obtained a respected and influential position within the state, as the new head of government. Accordingly, the new Sultan V Resad's authority was symbolic and weak.⁵³² Concurrently, the strongly nationalist *Turanism* ideology (combining all the Turks under one single state) began to increase its popularity among the officers and Unionists.⁵³³ The announcement of martial law after the 31 March Incident gave the military extraordinary powers, and turned Mahmud Sevket Pasha's government into a “dictatorship”.⁵³⁴

The general policy of the military during the period of martial law was protecting the Constitutional Monarchy and sustaining the status quo in the conservative cities. Therefore, they cracked down on all those who tried to challenge the power of the

⁵²⁹ Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) also served in the Movement Army as ‘the Head of the Officer Staff’.

⁵³⁰ Cevizoglu, *ibid.*: 101-102; Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, 1977: 576-577.

⁵³¹ Turfan, *ibid.*: 221.

⁵³² *Ibid.*: 252-254.

⁵³³ *Ibid.*, 264; Enver Pasha, his comrades and a remarkable part of the Union and Progress Committee were the supporters of Turanism; this ideology was later supported by the radical wing of the National Action Party (MHP). Also see: Inalcik and Quataert, *ibid.*: 766-772.

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*, 270-71.; Kinross, *Atatürk*, 35-39.

military.⁵³⁵ In 1911, an opponent party, the Hurriyet ve Itilaf Firkasi (the Freedom and Accord Party), was established. Immediately, the party received increasing support from the public. As a reaction, the Union and Progress party approached the military for help to stop the rise of the Freedom and Accord Party. Together with the revolutionist officers, the CUP applied brutal methods to suppress the opposition.⁵³⁶ Eventually, they (CUP) became successful in the 1912 elections by applying “fraud and violence”.⁵³⁷ Now, the cooperation between the military and the Unionists were clearly observed by everyone. The officers considered that they were the most legitimate institution within the state who could decide the destiny of the nation.⁵³⁸ Thus, now, they were expecting legitimacy as being the “guardians of the regime”. Mahmud Sevket Pasha explained this situation with these words:

The military had a major role during the declaration of the constitutional regime ... because the Union and Progress could not achieve that task alone ... that was obligatory that they needed a great support ... Normally, that is not a right thing for a military to leave its main task and to involve in politics. An army should not do this malignity ... however if the case was to save a nation which is declining, it is not a malignity but it is an honourable thing.⁵³⁹

During these years, a new opponent movement inside the military was organised as a reaction to the fraudulent 1912 elections. The defeat in the Trablusgarp (Libya War) against Italy (1911) and the Albanian Revolt (1912) weakened the authority of the

⁵³⁵ Ibid., 272.

⁵³⁶ Karabelias, ‘Military Class and Perpetual State Control in Turkey’, 4.

⁵³⁷ Turfan, *ibid.*: 288. The election in 1912 is known as the ‘election with sticks’, because the military-backed Union and Progress suppressed the opposition by applying violence and fraud during the elections.

⁵³⁸ Ibid., 289.

⁵³⁹ Ibid.

Union and Progress party. The name of the new opponent movement begun by counter-revolutionary officers was *the Saviour Officers* (the Halaskar Zabitan), and it forced Mahmut Sevket Pasha to resign. Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha formed a new government by mixing the anti-Unionists and opponent military officers.⁵⁴⁰ As a result, the opponent officers became successful and pushed the Union and Progress party out of government.

5.4.3 The 1913 Ottoman Coup d'État (Raid on the Sublime Porte – Babiali Baskini)

Almost immediately after the Gazi Ahmed Pasha government came to power in July 1912, the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) began, in October 1912, turning into a major defeat for the Ottoman state. The government of Ahmed Pasha retired. The Bulgarian forces besieged Edirne and came very close to Istanbul. The state was under a major threat. The anger against the government was strengthened among the nationalists.⁵⁴¹ The 1913 coup was implemented within this tough atmosphere by the unionist officers. Lieutenant Colonel Enver Pasha was the leader of the movement. The organisers initiated propaganda by stating that the government would be leaving Edirne to the enemy very soon.⁵⁴² On 23 January 1913, everything was ready for the coup; the propaganda urged the public against the government. They encircled the Sublime Porte (the government building) and shouted slogans. The raiders killed the Minister of War, Nazim Pasha, and his assistant Nafiz Bey.⁵⁴³ Enver Pasha declared: “We will establish a government which has the ability to defend the nation’s

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.: 300-306.

⁵⁴¹ For the Balkan Wars see: Andrew Mango, *Atatürk*, Hachette UK, 2011: 112-116, 121-123.

⁵⁴² Sevket Sureyya Aydemir, *ibid.* and Enver Pasa, *Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Pasa: 1908-1914 - Book 2* (Enver Pasha, From Macedonia to Central Asia), Remzi Kitabevi, 1976: 383.

⁵⁴³ Turfan, *ibid.*: 360.

rights”.⁵⁴⁴ Enver Pasha forced the Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha to retire by the threat of a gun.⁵⁴⁵

The Sultan did not show any resistance and signed the government’s resignation. The Sultan’s sanctity legitimised the coup. The government was replaced under the leadership of Mahmut Sevket Pasha. Talat Pasha was chosen as the Minister of Domestic Affairs and Ahmed Izzet Pasha as the representative of the Commander in Chief.⁵⁴⁶ The new cabinet started a “new era for the Young Turk movement”.⁵⁴⁷ The 1913 coup also redefined the status of the military from “praetorian” to a “ruler” army. Following the intervention, the military officers became “active rulers” within the government and cooperated with the civilian politicians (Unionists) to rule the state together.⁵⁴⁸ Therefore, the following process, starting from the Sublime Court until the end of the First World War, can be defined as a half-junta regime.⁵⁴⁹

The Union and Progress Committee decided to continue to the war against the Balkan forces. However, they could not manage to defend Edirne, and the Bulgarians entered the city on 30 May 1913. The loss of Edirne caused a deep sadness among the citizens, because it was the previous capital of the Ottoman Empire and, thus, had a symbolic importance for the nation.⁵⁵⁰ The defeat in the Balkan wars and the loss of territories – particularly Edirne – strengthened militarism within the society, which assumed that the Empire was dissolving.⁵⁵¹ In the literature and political

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid., 362.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid., 362.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid., 362-363.

⁵⁴⁷ See: Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, 1977: 590-591; Turfan, *ibid.*: 364.

⁵⁴⁸ Turfan *ibid.*: 368-369.

⁵⁴⁹ Mango, *Atatürk*, 117-120; Metin Heper, ‘The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy’, *South European Society and Politics* 10, No.1, 2005: 34.

⁵⁵⁰ Selek Sabahattin, *İsmet İnönü, hatıralarım: genc subaylık yılları (1884-1918)* (İsmet İnönü, Memories: The Years as a Young Officer), Bureaucak Yayınları, 1969, 117.

⁵⁵¹ Pekin and Yavuz, *ibid.*: 53.

discourse, the militarist rhetoric began to be applied more frequently, to stimulate nationalist feelings in the citizens.⁵⁵²

Another important development in those years was the strengthening of relations between the Ottoman and the German militaries. Ilber Ortaylı explains the situation:

*One of the important results of the 1912 Balkan defeat was the Ottomans' demand for a new reformist committee from the German military...*⁵⁵³

Indeed, Mahmud Sevket Pasha was not happy with the growing political interests among the officers. The ideological conflicts inside the military were reducing its effectiveness. He was thinking about prohibiting military members from participation in political parties and voting. As a result, he intended to invite a German military expert for reconstructing the military. In this way, he thought, the military could adopt the professional mentality of the Prussian military.⁵⁵⁴ Mahmut Sevket Pasha avoided revealing his reformist ideas and his intention of depoliticising the military.⁵⁵⁵ Yet, on June 1913, Mahmut Sevket Pasha was assassinated in his

⁵⁵² Turfan, *ibid.*: 425-431.

⁵⁵³ Quoted in Pekin and Yavuz, *ibid.*: 43.

⁵⁵⁴ Hayati Aktas, 'Birinci Dunya Savasi'nda Turkiye'de Gorev Yapan Alman Subaylarinin Faaliyetlerinin Bir Degerlendirmesi ve Turk Askerinin Konumu' (An Assessment about the German officers' practices who were in duty during the First World War in Turkey and the Position of the Turkish Soldier), in: *The Declarations of the 7th Military History Seminar II The Ottoman Empire between the years of 1763-1938 and the society and the army in the Turkish Republic*, Ankara: The Turkish Chief of the General Staff, 2001: 413. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Prussian army became an example for the revolutionist nations who aimed to professionalise their armies. A similar case to the Ottoman reformation is also seen in the Chilean army: in 1885, the government invited the Prussian Colonel Emil Korner along with the 20 Prussian officers to train the Chilean army in a professional way. As in the Ottoman case, the Chilean officers travelled to Germany for training. (See: Koonings and Kruijt, (2002): 112-113). Additionally, during the American Revolutionary War, the Prussian general Friedrich Wilhelm Von Steuben played a fundamental role by teaching the units of the continental army the essentials of professional military discipline, war strategy, and training. See: Michael Lee Lanning, *The American Revolution 100: The Battles, People, and Events of the American War for Independence, Ranked by Their Significance*, Sourcebooks, 2008: 223.

⁵⁵⁵ Turfan *ibid.*: 479.

car.⁵⁵⁶ His death concurrently removed the only obstacle against the Union and Progress hegemony.⁵⁵⁷ Because of these reasons, it is possible to consider that Mahmut Sevket Pasha was the first key historical figure in the Turkish military to support political neutrality or, in its modern name, normative professionalism in the Turkish military.⁵⁵⁸

According to Naim Turfan, the Union and Progress party was not very strong when it was alone. But their power was sharply increasing through the military support, because the real dominant power within the state was the young officers. Indeed, Turfan argues that the civil political parties in the state could not go further than being the “puppets” of the military. Therefore, the Unionists had always been in close relations with the officers, to preserve their good positions. The young officers were a “rising class” and they were not affected by the political changes.⁵⁵⁹ Furthermore, the death of Mahmud Sevket Pasha, ironically, cleansed the way for the revolutionary officers. Afterwards, Evren Pasha emerged as the most influential figure among the young officers.⁵⁶⁰

In June 1913, the Second Balkan Wars started. This time, the Ottoman forces gained back some of the lands that they had lost in the First Balkan War, including Edirne. The success was met with a great joy among the citizens and increased trust toward

⁵⁵⁶ Zekeriya Turkmen, ‘Birinci Dunya Savasi Oncesinde Ittihat ve Terakki Hukümetinin Dogu Anadolu Islahat Projesi ve Uygulamalari’ (The Reform Project and Practices of the Union and Progress Government before the First World War), in: *The Declarations of the 7th Military History Seminar II...*, p.252; Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, 1977: 595; Hanioglu, ‘Civil-Military Relations in the Second Constitutional Period, 1908-1918’, 187. It is not exactly clear who assassinated Mahmut Sevket Pasha. Indeed, some claim that the monarchist Saviour officers were responsible for this assassination. See: Soner Yalcin, ‘AKP Artik Ezberini Bozmali’ (AKP Should Change its Mind by Now), *Sozcu*. Available at: <http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/yazarlar/soner-yalcin/akp-artik-ezberini-bozmali-1329575/> (accessed: 26 July 2016).

⁵⁵⁷ Turkmen, *ibid.*, 252.

⁵⁵⁸ Although Mustafa Kemal was also known for his commitment to political neutrality and professional military behaviour, he was not yet in a key commanding position during Mahmut Sevket Pasha’s time.

⁵⁵⁹ Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, 477-478.

⁵⁶⁰ Turfan, *ibid.*: 442-452.

the young officers.⁵⁶¹ The public support for the military after the Edirne success is also important in yet again exemplifying a tradition: whenever there was a failure, the public blamed the politicians, not the military; but when there was a success, the people thought of it as the military's achievement.⁵⁶² That situation can be seen as the reflection of the militarist elements within Turkish society and the assumed military-nation idea. The Turkish people have always wanted to see the military as a trustworthy organisation, and they always tended to remain suspicious against the civil politicians. This perception has not changed much during the Republic. Public support, the people's trust for the military and their suspicion of politicians, has always made it easier for military officials to interfere in politics. Actually, the high level of public trust in the military is an aspect that is common to all militarist nations. Conversely, in the liberal and anti-militarist states, the trust level for the military can be much lower. Therefore, insofar as strong militarist values continue to protect their dominance within the society, it is presumable that the high public trust and sympathy for the military will remain in higher proportions in Turkey.

After regaining Edirne, Enver Pasha became a national "hero" and was assigned the position of Minister of Defence.⁵⁶³ Enver Pasha's main goals were to complete the Westernist reforms and to insert the "Unionist ideology" into all sections of the state and military.⁵⁶⁴ The pan-Turkist ideology was promoted and a more nationalist

⁵⁶¹ Ibid., 509-510. (Similar events can be seen in the Republican Era: After the Cyprus Intervention, citizens' support for the military increased.)

⁵⁶² Turfan, *ibid.*: 505.

⁵⁶³ Y.H. Bayur, *Turkish History of Revolution, Book: 2/4*, Ankara: Turkish Historical Association, 1943-47: 319; Sevkett Sureyya Aydemir, *ibid.*: 403.

⁵⁶⁴ Turfan, *ibid.*: 533. The Unionist ideology can be evaluated as the combination of nationalism (particularly the Turanist version), secularism, and positivism – ideas that are formalised under the heading 'Westernism'. The pan-Turkist wing of the Unionists further increased their impact after the 1913 coup d'état. See: Karpas, *Soldier and Politics since the Ottomans*, p.10. Also, Inalcik and Quataert (1994) define the Young Turk ideology as the combination of Westernism, secularism, nationalism, and centralisation. See: Inalcik and Quataert, *ibid.*: 766. In contrast, according to Aykut Kansu (2001), the Unionist ideology was strongly liberal and tolerable to minority rights in the very beginning and this tolerance enabled them to have a high public support during the 1908 Revolution.

economic policy was adopted.⁵⁶⁵ Yet, commerce continued to remain under the control of non-Muslim minorities.⁵⁶⁶ On the other hand, the liberal views of the CUP and its tolerance for minorities were notably weakened by the impact of the military and the absorbance of pan-Turkism. In addition to these developments, Evren Pasha forced some officers to resign and replaced them with the younger and “modernist” ones, and in doing so obtained an absolute control over the military.⁵⁶⁷ Turfan describes this scheme as “the civilians were under the control of the military and the military was under the control of Enver Pasha”.⁵⁶⁸

On 14 December 1913, a committee of German officers under the leadership of Liman Von Sanders came to the Ottoman state.⁵⁶⁹ Enver Pasha arranged the reforms by considering the advices of Liman Von Sanders and his committee.⁵⁷⁰ In these years, Enver Pasha’s great influence over the state caused the Germans to define Turkey as “Enverland”.⁵⁷¹ In a short period of time, sizeable progress was achieved in the education of the land forces. The German officers were assigned to important positions inside the Ministry of War and under the Chief of the General Staff. Furthermore, the Minister of Navy, Cemal Pasha, started a reformation programme for the Navy by taking the advice of English advisors Admiral Arthur Limpus,

See: Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*. On the other hand, according to my observations, the Unionists were more liberal during the revolution and they were supported by the non-Muslims and minorities. However, after the military’s penetration into politics, the CUP’s tolerance of minorities weakened. Especially, after the 1913 coup d’état, through the impact of the military, pan-Turkism became the dominant ideology of the CUP.

⁵⁶⁵ Inalcik and Quataert, *ibid.*: 763, 766-772.

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.*: 811.

⁵⁶⁷ Celalettin Yavuz, ‘Ahmet Cemal Pasanın Bahriye Nazirligi Doneminde Osmanli Turk Bahriyesinde Reform Arayislari’ (The Search for the Reforms in the Ottoman Navy During the Ahmed Cemal Pasha’s Ministry of Navy), in: *The Declarations of the 7th Military History Seminar II The Ottoman Empire between the years of 1763-1938 and the society and the army in the Turkish Republic*, Ankara: The Turkish Chief of the General Staff, 2001, p.69.

⁵⁶⁸ Turfan, *ibid.*: 535-544.

⁵⁶⁹ Otto Viktor Karl Liman von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey*, Naval & Military Press, 2005: 3; Hayati Aktas, *ibid.*: 414; For Von Sander’s coming to Turkey and reform movements during that era see: Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, 1977: 598-599.

⁵⁷⁰ Yavuz, *ibid.*: 69.

⁵⁷¹ Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, 1956: 53.

Admiral Douglas Gamble, and Admiral Hugh Pigot Williams.⁵⁷² He forced the older and more conservative generals to retire.⁵⁷³ A number of warships were ordered from the United Kingdom and France, including submarines and explorers.⁵⁷⁴

5.3.4 The First World War and the War of Liberation

The close links between the Turkish people and military date back to the beginnings of written Turkish history. Undeniably, the close links, as well as the roles and meanings that Turkish society imposed on the military, have played a crucial role in the military's politically keen and active nature. Yet, as has been defined in the birthright principle of Koonings and Kruijt (2002), and through the events in the Liberation War, the military's role in organising the national resistance and founding the Republic has increased its political legitimacy in national politics and in the eyes of people. In the following process, the events which led to the foundation of the Turkish Republic will be elaborated. In other words, the following process is particularly important for observing the future political legitimacy of military, the main ethoi that created the foundations of military culture as well as the close linkage between the military, society, and politics.

When the First World War (1914-1918) began, the situation of the Ottoman military was relatively better than it had been in the previous years. The reforms made by Evren Pasha, by following the German system, showed their results. According to Liman Von Sanders, the Turkish military was now in better conditions, and it was even ready to challenge Russia's military power.⁵⁷⁵ Related to this, in August 1914, Germany and the Ottoman Empire signed a secret alliance to induct the Ottoman

⁵⁷² Alan Palmer, *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire*, Faber & Faber, 2011: 1918.

⁵⁷³ Yavuz, *ibid.*: 75.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*: 77.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*: 77.

Empire into the war.⁵⁷⁶ As a result, the Ottoman Empire entered the war by opening several fronts, including Gallipoli, the Eastern Front, and the Suez Canal. In some of its fronts, the military showed successful defensive manoeuvrings. In the Battle of Gallipoli (1915), the Ottoman military purged back the Allies' campaign of conquering Istanbul after a series of battles.⁵⁷⁷ Mustafa Kemal's reputation suddenly increased after his successful commandership and key role in the victory at Gallipoli.⁵⁷⁸ However, in most of the fronts, the Empire suffered severe defeats. Among the military failures, the most famous was the Battle of Sarikamis (1914-1915). Enver Pasha launched a campaign against Russia in Eastern Turkey. The campaign turned into a severe defeat, with thousands of deaths.⁵⁷⁹

A number of losses were taken on other fronts as well. Finally, in 1918, the Empire took its place among the losers. The Armistice of Mudros was signed between the Ottomans and the Allies.⁵⁸⁰ Among the most important points of the agreement, the control of Istanbul and the Dardanelles were given to the control of the Allies. Most parts of the Ottoman military were dissolved. According to one regulation, the Allies had the right to invade any place in the Ottoman lands if they observed a security threat. Additionally, the supervision of communication tools, including the telegraph

⁵⁷⁶ For details see: Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, 1977: 603-606.

⁵⁷⁷ See: Anil Nanda, 'Gallipoli: Intercontinental Leadership through the Prism of Atatürk, Churchill, and Gandhi', *World Neurosurgery*, 79, No.1, January 2013: 35-39.

⁵⁷⁸ Ergun Ozbudun and Ali Kazancigil, *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, Hurst & Co., 1997: 60; For Atatürk's services in WWI see: Hanioglu, *Atatürk*, 75-85.

⁵⁷⁹ Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001: 59-60. For an evaluation about Ottoman causality in the First World War see: Cihat Goktepe, 'Birinci Dunya Harbi'nde Sehit Olan Askerler Hakkinda Bazi Degerlendirmeler' (Several Analyses about the Martyrs in the First World War), in: *The Declarations of the 7th Military History Seminar II The Ottoman Empire between the years of 1763-1938 and the society and the army in the Turkish Republic*, Ankara: The Turkish Chief of the General Staff, 2001:131; Hanioglu, *Atatürk*, 73.

⁵⁸⁰ Cevat Bakkal, 'Mutareke Donemi Basininda Teceddut Firkasi ve Istanbul Hukümetleri' (The Governments of Istanbul and the Teceddut Parties), in: *The Declarations of the 7th Military History Seminar II The Ottoman Empire between the years of 1763-1938 and the society and the army in the Turkish Republic*, Ankara: The Turkish Chief of the General Staff, 2001, 116; For Ottoman militaries' general performance during the First World War see: Andrew Wheatcroft, *The Ottomans: Dissolving Images*, 1993: 206-207.

and radio, and all the ports and shipyards were taken by the Allies. The Armistice of Mudros marked the “unofficial” end of the Empire,⁵⁸¹ because the Sultan and his government had already accepted the rule of the Allies and had begun propaganda against any possible nationalist resistance.⁵⁸² Three days after the agreement, Enver Pasha and the leaders of the Union and Progress party, as the major figures responsible for the defeat, left the country.⁵⁸³ The Union and Progress party dissolved itself after its leaders left the state.⁵⁸⁴

On 15 May 1919, Greek forces invaded Izmir (Smyrna), located in a very strategic position for potential military campaigns.⁵⁸⁵ Italian units invaded Antalya (a strategic port city in southern Turkey) and French troops advanced to southern Turkey from Syria.⁵⁸⁶ The Turkish people were worried but could not manage to organise any serious resistance at this level. As a result of the Armistice, most of the military were dissolved except for some minor forces in Ankara and Erzurum.⁵⁸⁷ There were still national guerrillas throughout the state, but they were local and were not be able to act effectively. Concurrently, Mustafa Kemal pasha (Atatürk) was sent to Samsun (north-east Turkey) on 19 May 1919 as the inspector of the 9th Army by the Ottoman government.⁵⁸⁸ At that point, his intentions of organising a resistance movement in Anatolia were not known by the Sultan and his government.⁵⁸⁹

⁵⁸¹ For detailed information of the partition of the state by the Armistice of Mudros, see: Mango, *ibid.*: 197.

⁵⁸² Atatürk, *Nutuk*, 1927.

⁵⁸³ Özbudun and Kazancigil, *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, 62.

⁵⁸⁴ Mango, *ibid.*: 199, 222.

⁵⁸⁵ Özbudun and Kazancigil, *ibid.*: 65.; Mango, *ibid.*: 217-18; Hanioglu, *Atatürk*, 96.

⁵⁸⁶ Özbudun and Kazancigil, *ibid.*: 57.

⁵⁸⁷ Pekin and Yavuz, *ibid.*: 58; For a detailed analysis of the military’s final situation after the Mudros Armistice see: Kinross, *Atatürk*, 194-195; Also: Atatürk, *Nutuk*, ‘Ordu’nun Durumu’ (the situation of the army).

⁵⁸⁸ Özbudun and Kazancigil, *ibid.*: 65.

⁵⁸⁹ For a detailed analysis of Atatürk’s plans for organising a national resistance secretly before moving to Samsun see: Alev Coskun, *Samsun’dan Once Bilinmeyen 6 Ay* (Six Months which are Unknown before Samsun), Cumhuriyet Press, 2008.

Mustafa Kemal's attempts for organising national resistance started with a number of meetings in Amasya, Erzurum, and Sivas (June-September 1919). In these meetings, the level of threat and possible salvation scenarios were discussed. The meetings caused Istanbul's government to suspect possible resistance in Anatolia under Mustafa Kemal's leadership, without having the Sultan's confirmation. The Sultan summoned Mustafa Kemal back to Istanbul by taking his duty of inspecting away. Mustafa Kemal immediately responded to Istanbul that he had retired from his military position. (In the Appendices C, there are some documents that clearly show that the Istanbul government gave orders to the local administrators in Anatolia to arrest military officers who showed an interest in politics. However, explicitly, the main purpose of the Istanbul government was to deter Mustafa Kemal and his friends from starting a national liberation without the permission of the Sultan).⁵⁹⁰

Despite these developments, the meetings of nationalists had already created suitable conditions for establishing a democratic assembly that would combine representatives from the different cities of Turkey. These representatives were named as "Heyeti Temsiliye" (Committee of Representatives).⁵⁹¹ The Committee chose Mustafa Kemal as the president of the establishment. The decisions that were taken during the national congresses are important in understanding the purpose and strategy of the Liberation War. Briefly, these decisions can be summarised as follows:

- The unity and independence of the nation are under risk.

⁵⁹⁰ Atatürk, *Nutuk*, 1927. (As mentioned in the main text above, during my investigations in the military's archive room, I found some formal telegraphs that were written by the government of Istanbul to stop the Kemalist resistance. The documents accuse Mustafa Kemal and his friends of showing interest in politics, which was not acceptable for officers. Copies of the documents can be seen in the Appendices: Part C).

⁵⁹¹ Ibid., Chapter: 'Milli Kongreler ve Gelisen Olaylar' (The National Congresses and the Following Incidents). Until the Sivas Congress, the Committee of Representatives were only representing the cities of Eastern Anatolia, but by the Sivas Congress, its status was changed to 'the Committee of Representatives representing the whole Turkish nation'.

- The Istanbul government cannot implement the responsibility that it undertaken.
- The passion and determinacy of the people alone can save the state.
- The lands of the nation within the national borders are whole and cannot be divided.
- (If it was necessary), the whole nation together will resist and defend itself (against all types of invasions).
- If the Istanbul government cannot protect the independence and security of the state, a temporary government shall be founded for this purpose. Its members will be chosen by the national congress (or otherwise by the Committee of Representatives).
- Any kind of political supremacy and privilege cannot be given to the non-Muslim minorities.
- Demanding any “mandate” and “protection” from other states cannot be accepted.⁵⁹²

During the national congresses, Atatürk behaved cautiously to avoid directly attacking the Sultan and the Caliphate. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, he mostly directed his criticisms at the government, not at the Sultan. Moreover, he successfully managed to convince the people that the national assembly would be created temporarily, until releasing the Sultan from the “enemy invasion”.

Following the meetings, the last Ottoman Assembly (Meclisi Mebusan) was opened in Istanbul. Atatürk was indeed against the establishment of an assembly in Istanbul

⁵⁹² For the Amasya Congress, see: Kinross, *Atatürk*, 2001: 171-173; For the Erzurum Congress see: Kinross, *Atatürk*, 2001: 174-183; For the Sivas Congress see: Kinross, *Atatürk*, 1964: 184-190; For the Havza, Amasya, Sivas, Erzurum meetings see also: Mango, *Atatürk*: 224-245 and Atatürk, *Nutuk*: ‘Milli Kongreler ve Gelisen Olaylar’; and Lewis, *ibid.*: 247-49.

because of the existing British supervision.⁵⁹³ The most important development after the creation of the Assembly became the declaration of the “National Pact” (Misak-i Milli). The National Pact was a declaration by the Kemalist nationalists that promised to continue to fight until saving the current Turkish lands.⁵⁹⁴ The first draft of the National Pact, indeed, was prepared during the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, but was formally revealed on 12 February 1920 in the Ottoman Assembly.⁵⁹⁵ The Assembly in Istanbul was closed down by the Allies on April 1920.⁵⁹⁶ Immediately after this, the nationalists gathered in Ankara and opened the current Turkish Grand National Assembly (23 April 1920).⁵⁹⁷ The Assembly intentionally started work after the Friday Prayer. During the inaugural ceremony, an impressive religious ritual was implemented to convince the people that the nationalist resistance was not a rebellion against religion and the Caliphate.⁵⁹⁸ Nevertheless, these developments in the meantime had seriously worried the Sultan. The following days saw “a war of fatwas” between the Monarchist and Kemalist religious authorities. Firstly, the Sheikh ul-Islam issued a fatwa by declaring that the Kemalists were directly resisting against the Sultan. They had to be executed if they were captured, for the good of religion. As a response, Mufti Rifat Borekci, who was the major religious authority in Ankara, issued a counter-fatwa by declaring that, given the conditions of those

⁵⁹³ See: Atatürk, *Nutuk*.

⁵⁹⁴ The territories which were mentioned in the Misak-i Milli, or the National Pact, were gained back except for some parts of northern Iraq, including Kirkuk and Mosul, eastern Greece, and the ‘Twelve Islands’ in the Aegean Sea. The National Pact is still referred to whenever Turkey has a problem with its neighbours.

⁵⁹⁵ For the National Pact, see: Mango, *ibid.*: 269; and Atatürk, *Nutuk*: ‘Misak-i Milli Hazirlaniyor’ (The National Pact is being prepared); Lewis, *ibid.*: 248.

⁵⁹⁶ See: Atatürk, *Nutuk*: ‘Ali Riza Pasa Kabinesi, Istanbul’un Isgali ve Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi’nin Toplanmasi’ (The Step Back of the Ali Riza Pasha Cabinet, the Conquest of Istanbul and the assembling of the Turkish Grand National Assembly)

⁵⁹⁷ Ozbudun and Kazancigil, *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, 60.

⁵⁹⁸ Atatürk, *Nutuk*: ‘Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi Toplaniyor’ (The Turkish Grand National Assembly is assembling). Also see: Hanioglu, *Atatürk*, 102-103.

days, national resistance was not a mutiny but was a religious obligation in which each Muslim should participate.⁵⁹⁹

In August 1920, the Ottoman government made an agreement with the Allies; the “Sevres Agreement” divided the remaining Ottoman lands to be shared between the Allies. The Sevres Agreement was refused by the Kemalists immediately.⁶⁰⁰ However, the impact of this treaty has continued until today. The case was later recalled as the “Sevres Syndrome”. The Sevres Syndrome is based on the idea that the Western states still preserve their plans for dividing Turkey today, and arrange their foreign policy to achieve this goal.⁶⁰¹

In the meantime, Mustafa Kemal managed to unify most of the active and retired professional soldiers as well as local guerrilla forces (Efeler) under a stable, disciplined army. In reaction, Sultan Vahideddin organised his own army by taking the support of the Allies, creating what is known as the “Caliphate’s Army” (Kuvayi Inzibatiyye). The Caliphate’s Army organised systematic riots against Mustafa Kemal and the nationalists by dispersing religious propaganda. Yet, the Kemalist forces quelled all the riots and established a certain authority in central and eastern Anatolia.⁶⁰² Additionally, the Ankara government built close relations with the Soviets. This friendship generated an important international support for the

⁵⁹⁹ Mango, *ibid.*: 275.

⁶⁰⁰ Kinross, *Atatürk*, 230.

⁶⁰¹ For the Sevres Syndrome see: Baskin Oran, *Türk Dis Politikasi 3* (Turkish Foreign Policy 3), Iletisim Press, 2013: 74;

Michaud-Emin, ‘The Restructuring of the Military High Command in the Seventh Harmonization Package and Its Ramifications for Civil–Military Relations in Turkey’, 33; Gulnur Aybet, ‘Turkey and the EU After the First Year of Negotiations: Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges’, *Security Dialogue*, 37, No.4, December 2006: 547.

⁶⁰² Ozbudun and Kazancigil, *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, 67. For detailed information on the Caliphate’s Army also see: Atatürk, *Nutuk*: ‘Halife’nin Ordusu’ (Caliphate’s Army). And for the suppression of riots: Atatürk, *Nutuk*: ‘İc Ayaklanmalar’ (Domestic Mutinies).

Kemalists. Turkey and the Soviets signed a friendship agreement in Moscow on 16 March 1921.⁶⁰³

On the Eastern front, a serious battle took place between the Turkish and Armenian forces. The Turkish units managed to defeat the Armenian forces. The Treaty of Alexandropol (Gumru) was signed. Armenia became the first country to formally recognise the Ankara government (on 22 October 1920).⁶⁰⁴ After series of local conflicts in some cities between the French and the Turkish units, France signed a peace agreement (the Ankara Agreement) with the Ankara Assembly on 9 June 1921.⁶⁰⁵ The French forces left the current south-eastern Turkey except Hatay.⁶⁰⁶ Italy also left south-western Turkey without doing battle.⁶⁰⁷

The longest and the strictest battles happened in the Western Front against the Greek Forces. During the Sakarya and Dumlupinar battles, Mustafa Kemal's simultaneous implementing of two different roles, as the "Chief of the Assembly" and the "Commander in Chief", was a remarkable event for civil-military relations. When the Grand Assembly was founded, Mustafa Kemal was chosen as the Chief of the Assembly. His military duty had formally ended. He was being placed in a civilian position in the Assembly. Yet, the military influence on the Assembly was significantly visible. For example, the two major commanders of the Liberation War, Ismet Pasha (Inonu) and the Fevzi Pasha (Cakmak), were also implementing civilian duties in the Assembly.⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰³ Ozbudun and Kazancigil, *ibid.*: 67; Kinross, *Atatürk*, 245; Hanioglu, *Atatürk*, 119.

⁶⁰⁴ For the Gumru (Alexandropol treaty) see: Baskin Oran, *Türk Dis Politikasi Vol. 1* (Turkish Foreign Policy 1), Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2001: 170-171; Hanioglu, *ibid.*: 121-122.

⁶⁰⁵ Ozbudun and Kazancigil, *ibid.*: 68; Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1*, 149-151.

⁶⁰⁶ In 1939 Hatay became part of Turkey.

⁶⁰⁷ For relations with Italy see: Oran, *ibid.*: 151-153.

⁶⁰⁸ Pekin and Yavuz, *ibid.*: 184.

The Turkish troops stopped Greek progress twice, in the first and second battles of Inonu (January 1921 and 31 March 1921, respectively), under Ismet Pasha's (Inonu) commandship.⁶⁰⁹ But, in the following months, the Greek forces advanced with a more successful campaign. After defeating the Turkish forces in the Eskisehir and Kutahya battles (10-14 July 1921) the Greek army approached Ankara. The Assembly offered Mustafa Kemal the position of "Commander in Chief", due to the "extraordinary reasons". The position of Commander in Chief normally belonged to the Sultan. Holding this position would be an open challenge to the Sultan's authority. However, Mustafa Kemal realised the opposition's intention. The opponents were thinking to send Mustafa Kemal away from Ankara, because the military had already been in very risky situation. If the military lost under the command of Mustafa Kemal, his reputation would fade away. After evaluating this possibility, Mustafa Kemal offered a counterproposal, "using the Assembly's relevant powers about the military issues". He limited his proposal to three months. Some deputies found that offer too much, as they were frightened to lose their influence to a large extent. Also, the aforementioned deputies blamed Mustafa Kemal of demanding a "dictatorship".⁶¹⁰ On 5 August, the proposal was accepted by a great majority of votes. (In the Appendices B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4, there are some formal documents related to this event. In the documents it is clearly observed that Atatürk's double duties as the Commander in Chief and the head of parliament were given to him by the Grand National Assembly and were accepted by the majority of votes due

⁶⁰⁹ Mango, *Atatürk*, 2011: 307-311.

⁶¹⁰ Mango, *ibid.*: 317.

to the “extraordinary circumstances”. The regulation of Commander in Chief was limited to three months, given Atatürk’s wishes.)⁶¹¹

After being assigned Commander in Chief, Mustafa Kemal prepared a proclamation, known as the “Tekalifi Milliye” (National Obligations). The national obligations played an important role in changing the war’s destiny. This event was later referred to as a typical example of the “military-nation assumption”, in that the whole nation participated in the war, directly or indirectly. This proclamation gave ten orders including: every household shall provide one set of underclothes and boots for the military; 40 per cent of all stocks of cloth, leather, flour, soap, and candles shall be delivered; all civilian transport vehicles shall serve for the military free of charge; all weapons shall be surrendered to the military; one fifth of all horses, carts, and carriages shall be given to the military for use of the military...⁶¹² (There are formal documents related to the collection process of National Taxes available in Appendices D.1 and D.2).

Eventually, the Turkish military, under Mustafa Kemal’s commandership, defeated the Greek forces and pushed them back to the western side of the Sakarya River in the Battle of Sakarya (21 September 1921). With the victory of Sakarya, the Turkish military gained an advantage over the Greek forces. The national trust and support for Mustafa Kemal irreversibly increased. After the battle, the legislation for the Commander in Chief was extended three times in a row.⁶¹³ Mustafa Kemal gained the “Marshall” rank and religiously sacred Ghazi title, which is given to those who

⁶¹¹ Pekin and Yavuz, *ibid.*: 185-86; Mango, *ibid.*: 317. Kinross, *Atatürk*, 271-272. Also for detailed information see: Atatürk, *Nutuk*: ‘Sakarya Zaferi’ (The Victory of Sakarya); George S. Harris, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics’, *Middle East Journal*, 19, No.1, January 1965: 177 (see the second deep note on the page); Hanioglu, *Atatürk*, 126-127. As aforementioned, the copies of formal writings that were written during the negotiations about the legislation for the Commander in Chief are available in: Appendices B.1, B.2, B3, and B4.

⁶¹² Mango, *ibid.*: 318.

⁶¹³ For detailed information about the Battle of Sakarya see: Atatürk, *Nutuk*.

were wounded during the Jihad (19 September 1921).⁶¹⁴ Most likely, these two titles further increased Atatürk's legitimacy in the eyes of the military and the people as the defender of the nation and Islam. Between 26 and 30 August 1922, the Turkish forces defeated the Greek units completely in the "Turkish Grand Attack" under Mustafa Kemal's commandership. On 9 September 1922, the Turkish forces regained Izmir.⁶¹⁵ The Greek forces left Turkey. On 11 September 1922, the Armistice of Mudanya was signed between the Allies and Turkey. The Allies agreed to leave Istanbul and the Dardanelles.⁶¹⁶ The borders of current Turkey were finally controlled by the Turkish army (the only exception was Hatay). On 23 July 1923, the Lausanne Treaty was signed between the Ankara government and the Allies. The new Turkish state and the Grand National Assembly in Ankara were formally recognised by the other states.⁶¹⁷ The lands that had been decided in the "National Pact" were mostly regained, apart from some regions including Kirkuk, Hatay, Mosul, eastern Greece and the Twelve Islands.⁶¹⁸

Overall, the process from the 1908 Revolution to the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 can be seen as a feasible example of the model that has been titled the *positive-undemocratic relationship*, in that the theocratic Ottoman monarchy was replaced initially by a constitutional-parliamentary regime and latterly by a secular

⁶¹⁴ Kinross, *ibid.*: 335.

⁶¹⁵ For details of the Grand Attack and the Battle of Dumlupınar see: Atatürk, *Nutuk*: 'Buyuk Taaruza Hazirlik, Baskumandan Meydan Muharebesi, Saltanatın Kaldırılması ve Gelisen Olaylar' (The Preparation for the Grand Attack, the Abolishment of the Dynasty and the following events).

⁶¹⁶ Pekin and Yavuz, *ibid.*: 186.

⁶¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶¹⁸ For detailed analysis of the Lausanne Treaty see: Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy I*, 222-228; Mango, *Atatürk*, 2011: 356, 366-67, 373, 375, 380, 386-87; Kinross, *Atatürk*, 354-374; Andrew Mango, *From the Sultan to Atatürk: Turkey*, Haus Publishing, 2009: 172-182; Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey*, Overlook Press, 2011, 58; William M. Hale, *Aspects of Modern Turkey*, Bowker [for] the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies of the University of Durham, 1976, 2; For an analysis of the exceptions from the National Pact including Hatay (Alexandretta) see: Pelt, *Military Intervention and a Crisis Democracy in Turkey*, 35-40.

republic with the support of a military elite.⁶¹⁹ In conjunction with this, the next process will explain how Turkey became a modern secular state through the reforms of Atatürk.⁶²⁰ On the other hand, as one may consider from the examples hitherto, it is hardly possible to talk about a Huntington type of normative professionalism at this level. Perhaps, the close relations with the Prussian army could make some contribution to professionalism regarding technical terms, but arguably not to a sufficient level.

5.3.5 Early Republican Era (1922-1945)

During the War of Independence, the lines between the civilians and the military were not sharply drawn. Although Atatürk was supporting a total separation of the military from politics, he did not put forward that idea explicitly during the war. In parliament, there were approximately 14 military commanders.⁶²¹ Furthermore, the ideological differences among the deputies and the officers did not create big problems, because everybody was focused on winning the war.⁶²² However, just after the victory, the differences of thought among the commanders became apparent. Some authors consider the strife as “a conflict for power” between Atatürk and the several military commanders (Kazim Karabekir, Rauf Orbay, Refet Bele, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy).⁶²³ It is largely assumed that most of the commanders were still committed to the Sultan and the Caliphate, and could not imagine a regime without them. Nevertheless, Atatürk’s strategic political manoeuvrings enabled the abolition of both positions. On 1 September 1922, the monarchy was abolished. Then, on 29

⁶¹⁹ For a schematic analysis of the process see: Analytical Table 2 (p.196).

⁶²⁰ See: Analytical Table 1, (p.223-225).

⁶²¹ Pekin and Yavuz *ibid.*, 186; William Hale, *Türkiye’de Ordu ve Siyaset, 1789’dan Günümüze* (the Politics and Military in Turkey, from 1789 to Today), Istanbul: Hil Press, 1996: 70-72.

⁶²² Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 140.

⁶²³ See: Umit Ozdag, *Atatürk ve İnönü Dönemlerinde Ordu-Siyaset İlişkisi* (Civil-Military Relations during Atatürk and İnönü Eras) (PHD Thesis), Ankara: The Gazi University Institute of Social Sciences, September 2006, p.39; Harris, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics’, 56-59.

October 1923, the status of the regime was stated as “republic”. That was followed by the abolition of the Caliphate on 3 March 1924.⁶²⁴

Following the abolishment of the Caliphate, Atatürk continued to implement the reforms that changed Turkey’s image from a theocratic ummet (umma) state to a secular national Republic.⁶²⁵ At this point, it is likely to state that some of Atatürk’s reforms had already been started after the 1908 Revolution but could not have been completed because of the strong religious opposition and involvement in the First World War. Atatürk’s reforms aimed to create a distance being created between Turkey and Ottoman past. Turkey approached Western culture by refusing its connection with the traditional Islamic legacy. The most notable of these reforms can be said to be the secularisation and nationalisation of education system, the replacement of sharia law with the Italian penal code and the Swiss civil law (equality of men and women before the law, prohibition of marrying more than one spouse, equality in shares of heritage), the adoption of modern clothes (jacket, hat, trousers, tie or bow tie for men instead of fez and turban; hat, jacket, and skirt for women instead of hijab and headscarf), voting and elective rights for women, the closing of the tarikats and tekkes (houses of Islamic brotherhoods),⁶²⁶ declaring Saturdays and Sundays as formal holidays, adopting Western weights and measures,

⁶²⁴ Ozbudun and Kazancigil, *ibid.*: 68. For a detailed analysis of Atatürk’s strategic moves for implementing these revolutions, see: Atatürk, *Nutuk*: ‘Ankara’nın Baskent Olması, Barış Donemi Meclisi, Cumhuriyetin İlânı ve Gelisen Olaylar’ (The proclamation of Ankara as the capital city, the Assembly of the peace-term and the following events) and ‘Hilafetin Kaldırılması, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nde Meydana Gelen Gelişmeler, Memlekette Huzur ve Güveni Sağlamak için Alınan Tedbirler, Gençliğe Hitabe’ (The Abolition of the Caliphate, the Developments which emerged in the Grand Assembly, the Measures for Sustaining Peace and Safety, the Speech to Youth).

⁶²⁵ Ozbudun and Kazancigil, *ibid.*: 71.

⁶²⁶ Tarikats and Tekkes are the meeting places of the people who have committed themselves to a specific religious community which is known as Sufi brotherhood; See: Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 120.

adopting the Latin alphabet instead of Arabic... Moreover, the statement that “the state religion is Islam” was replaced by the principle of secularism in 1928.⁶²⁷

In the early years of the Republic, the military remained obedient to civilian rule.⁶²⁸

However, it is not possible to associate these years with normative professionalism.

The military’s commitment to the three main commanders of liberation war, namely Atatürk, İnönü, and Fevzi Çakmak was the main reason behind military subordination.⁶²⁹ Accordingly, Umit Özdağ describes this model as “militarism without the military”. Normally, the military was appearing to be out of politics, but, in reality, it was entirely political: it was representing Atatürk’s main power. The military was ready to suppress any possible opposition of Atatürk orders.⁶³⁰ Actually, Özdağ argues that both the Kemalists and conservatives had struggled to pull the military onto their own side. In the end, Atatürk, with his logical tactical manoeuvres, managed to gain full control over the military in 1927.⁶³¹ Between the years 1927-1928, the military became the active protector of the regime.⁶³² Additionally, it is predictable that Atatürkist principles became deeply embedded in

⁶²⁷ Lewis, *ibid.*: 404; Dietrich Orlow, ‘Political Violence in Pre-coup Turkey’, *Terrorism*, 6, No.1-2, 1982: 55-56; Ben Lombardi, ‘The Return of the Reluctant Generals’, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.112, No.2, Summer 1997: 191-215. (In these works, the author argues that Atatürk’s revolutions could not become very successful in penetrating into the lower social classes, rural places, and villages. Therefore, when Atatürk died, there was still a great level of commitment to the old traditions within the state. Even in many villages, teachers and Westernisation are perceived as symbols of ‘infidelity’.); Howard A. Reed, ‘Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey’, *Middle East Journal*, 8, No.3, July 1954: 269; For a detailed analysis of Atatürk’s reforms also see: Birol Baskan, ‘What Made Atatürk’s Reforms Possible?’, *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 21, No.2, April 2010: 143-56; For an argument over the revolution of dress and the headscarf issue, see: Emelie A. Olson, ‘Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: ‘The Headscarf Dispute’’, *Anthropological Quarterly*, 58, No.4, October 1985: 161-71; Daver, ‘Secularism in Turkey’, 32; Pelt, *Military Intervention and a Crisis Democracy in Turkey*, 19-20.

⁶²⁸ Nil S. Satana, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Europe, the Middle East and Turkey’, *Turkish Studies*, 12, No.2, 2011: 286.

⁶²⁹ Harris, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics’, 58; Giray Sadik, ‘Comparative Analysis of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and South Korea till the Early 2000s’, *Gazi Akademik Bakı\cs*, No.12, 2013: 211.

⁶³⁰ Demirel, ‘Soldiers and Civilians’, 129; Harris, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics’, 56.

⁶³¹ Karabelias, ‘Military Class and Perpetual State Control in Turkey’, 6.

⁶³² Özdağ, *ibid.*: p.43

military culture within these years, arguably due to the education that was given in the military academies, colleges, and barracks.

To understand better how Atatürk used the military's power and how the military was naturally at the centre of politics, his speech in 1922 to some of the deputies can be used as strong evidence. This famous event was mentioned in detail in *Nutuk* by Atatürk. Shortly before the abolishment of the Sultanate, the supporters of the monarchy were arguing in favour of the Sultan. Atatürk argues that the deputies who committed to the Sultan were arguing that “no ... the Sultanate cannot be abolished ... it is not possible both religiously and scientifically”. Atatürk explains the rest of the process with these words:

*Gentlemen, I said sovereignty and Sultanate are taken by strength, by power and by force. It was by force ... (the Ottoman Sultans) seized the sovereignty and Sultanate of the Turkish nation ... Now the Turkish nation has rebelled and has effectively taken sovereignty ... into its own hands ... (Therefore), the question under discussion is not whether or not we should leave the Sultanate and sovereignty to the nation. That is already an accomplished fact – the question is merely how to give expression to it. This will happen in any case. If ... the Assembly ... could look at this question in a natural way, I think they would agree. Even if they do not, the truth will still find expression, but some heads may roll in the process.*⁶³³

In this speech, Atatürk states that the abolition of the Sultanate will be carried out, if necessary, by force. The deputies who would object to its abolition are threatened

⁶³³ Lewis, *ibid.*: 258.; Interview, General Aydın Kalpaklı, June 2014; Atatürk, *Nutuk*.

with execution. Doubtless, this threat of Atatürk could not be achieved without the existence of military support. During the speech, Atatürk had the full authority over the military as the Commander in Chief. As a result, the example supports the view that the military was political, as the guardian of revolutions.⁶³⁴

There are several developments that enabled Atatürk to gain full control over the military. Firstly, he asked the commanders to choose between military and civilian careers. Then, he worked for eliminating the opponent commanders from effective positions within the military and replaced them with commanders who were loyal to him. Marshall Fevzi Cakmak, known for his loyalty to Atatürk, became the Chief of the General Staff.⁶³⁵ Additionally, the public support for him as the “saviour of the nation” significantly strengthened Atatürk’s position against the opponents. Indeed, the public support for Atatürk remained at very high levels until his death. The paradox between the people’s religious concerns and Atatürk’s secular reforms, interestingly, could not undermine the public’s love for Atatürk. To see the positive impact that Atatürk has had on the people, it is enough to observe current Turkey, because, in every place, even in the most conservative parts of the state, one can easily encounter his busts, posters, sayings, and commemorations. Such a level of

⁶³⁴ For a detailed analysis of how the military played the major role in suppressing the anti-revolutionary moves see: Gavin D. Brockett, ‘Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Toward a Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923-38’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34, No.4 (1998): 44-66. Two of the most important of these counter-revolutionist riots are known as the Menemen and Sheikh Sait riots. Especially, the Menemen event, which happened in 1930, has left deep impacts as the symbol of religious fanaticism against Atatürk’s revolutions. The rebellions started with demonstrations declaring a demand for sharia law; eventually they beheaded Lieutenant Kubilay, who was unarmed. Immediately, martial law was declared in the city and the rioters were caught. Some of them were sentenced to death (L.C. Armstrong, *Grey Wolf*, London, 1932: 324, 327). In addition to these two events, some counter-revolutionist events happened in Kayseri, Erzurum, and Maras (22-26 November 1925). In Maras, some pious people protested the ‘revolution of dress’ by shouting ‘we don’t want hats’. As a response, the local soldiers intervened and arrested 39 protestors. In Erzurum, a group of 3,000 people – men and women – protested the introduction of Western dress by wearing fezes and turbans. The gendarmerie forces opened fire upon the crowd and killed some of the demonstrators (Brockett, 1998: 49-50). Thus, the military’s ‘indirect’ political support of Atatürk and his revolutions were an undeniable fact during the early Republican Era.

⁶³⁵ For the power struggles between Atatürk and his opponents to take the full control of the military see: Ozdag, *ibid.*

trust and commitment enabled Atatürk to attempt even the most radical reforms during his lifetime.

Thirdly, Atatürk used several opportunities to eliminate conservatives from the Assembly. The first one was the establishment of the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) in 1924. The opponents, Kazım Karabekir, Adnan Adıvar, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet Bele, and Rauf Orbay, established an opposition party. Their party stated that they were committed to the Republic and to liberal values, but also that they were respectable to the “religious values”.⁶³⁶ Following the establishment of the party, two incidents that were allegedly related to the party members and policies happened: the rebellion of Sheikh Said; and the attempted assassination of Atatürk. After these events, the Kemalists accused the Progressive Republican Party of manipulating the people’s “innocent” religious feelings. Some members of the party were also accused of involvement in the attempted assassination of Atatürk; one of these members was Kazım Karabekir, the “heroic” figure of the Liberation War, who was the General Commander of the Eastern Front. After these events, some people were sentenced to death and the Progressive Republican Party was disbanded.⁶³⁷ As a result, after these successful political manoeuvres, Atatürk managed to hold full authority over the military.

⁶³⁶ This party can be seen as the ancestor of the right-wing conservative parties in Turkey. It was followed by the Free Republican Party, Democrat Party, Justice Party, the Motherland Party, the National Action Party, the National Order Party, the Welfare Party, the True Path Party, the AKP and others; For the establishment of the Progressive Republican Party, the following process, and its closure see: Kinross, *Atatürk*, 394-403; Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, Taylor & Francis, 2002: 57-58; Mango, *Atatürk*, 2011: 418-19, 425-426, 429, 446, 450; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 59. For the Sheikh Said Rebellion see: Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy I*, 248; Harris, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics’, 56; Baskan, ‘What Made Atatürk’s Reforms Possible?’, 148.

⁶³⁷ Harris, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics,’ 59; William Hale, ‘The Turkish Republic and its Army, 1923-1960’, *Turkish Studies*, 12, No.2, 2011: 194.

Under the military's "deterrent" image, Atatürk implemented his ideals by creating a secular-modern Turkey, until his death in 1938.⁶³⁸

After Atatürk's death, his "companion in arms" İsmet İnönü was chosen as the second president of Turkey. İsmet İnönü had a good reputation through his successful commandship during the Liberation War. Additionally, he also had a good political career, having been the chief representative of Turkey in the Armistice of Mudanya (1922) and at the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Both in the Liberation War and the Republican era, he undertook several political roles in the Assembly, including the prime ministry. İnönü was chosen as the new president after Atatürk's death. His presidency came in the eve of the Second World War. Therefore, he spent most of his time preparing Turkey for a possible war. It is often mentioned that the military during WWII was technologically outdated, and the officers lacked knowledge of new weapons, military vehicles, and other devices. Hence, technological backwardness of the military can be accepted as a motivating factor for entering NATO in the 1950s. Other than this development, the military's subordination to civilians continued until the end of İnönü's presidency. Undeniably, his military background and his role in the Liberation War had a big role in keeping the military in its barracks, just as happened during Atatürk's term. Although there were some claims that the military began to be politicised during his presidency, there was not any noticeable movement against civilian authority. Indeed, the

⁶³⁸ For detailed analysis of the assassination attempt to Atatürk see: Uğur Mumcu, *Gazi Pasaya Suikast* (Assassination Attempt to Gazi Pasha), Ankara: Uğur Mumcu Research Press, 1998; For the opponents' criticisms and Atatürk's answers to them during this era see: Atatürk, *Nutuk*: 'Ankara'nın Baskent Olması, Barış Donemi Meclisi, Cumhuriyetin İlânı ve Gelisen Olaylar' (The proclamation of Ankara as the capital city, the assembly of the peace-term and the following events) and 'Hilafetin Kaldırılması, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nde Meydana Gelen Gelismeler, Memlekette Huzur ve Güveni Sağlamak için Alınan Tedbirler, Gençliğe Hitabe' (The Abolishment of the Caliphate, the Developments which emerged in the Grand Assembly, the Measures for Sustaining Peace and Safety, the Speech to the Youth); For the removal of the Progressive Republican Party see: Serif Mardin, 'Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?', *Daedalus*, 102, No.1, January 1973: 182.

connection of the Chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence in 1949 had been a giant step toward achieving professional CIV-MIL relations. However, that regulation was abolished after the 1960 coup d'état. The military was directly connected to the prime minister, and this has remained a big problem to the present day.⁶³⁹

By and large, The liberal atmosphere of the 1908 Revolution (the declaration of the Second Constitutional Monarchy) gradually turned into a dictatorship after the 31 March 1909 event. The revolutionist officers quelled the mutiny and declared martial law. They replaced Sultan Abdulhamid II with Sultan V. Resad. Following this event, the military became the guardian of the constitutional regime. Accordingly, the parliamentary regime was occasionally breached by coups d'état and military involvements. Indeed, the process saw an ideological strife within the military. As a continuation of the Mekteplis/Alaylis tradition, this time the strife existed between the Unionist and Saviour officers. After the 1913 coup d'état, the revolutionist officers (Unionists) gained full control over the military and ruled the state as a military dictatorship. The hegemony of revolutionist officers lasted until the end of WWI (1918). The remaining lands of the Ottoman Empire including the current Turkish soils were conquered by the victory states. Yet, through the Turkish Liberation War (1919-1923), under the leadership of a revolutionist military elite commanded by Kemal Atatürk, the Turks regained their independence. After the victory in the Liberation War, a new Turkish state – the Republic of Turkey – was founded over the remaining lands of the Ottoman Empire and its regime was announced as a republic (1923). The monarchy and Caliphate were abolished. After a series of Western-orientated secular reforms, the Turkish revolution was completed.

⁶³⁹ See: Analytical Table 1, (p. 223-225) .

To sum up, I view the beginning of the revolutionist period within the military culture as the 1908 Revolution and extend it until 1945. In general, the years between 1908 and 1945 can be associated with the *positive-undemocratic relationship*, in which a revolutionist military elite became the founders, rulers, and guardians of a parliamentary regime. During the process, the revolutionary ideals of the Young Turks, including secularism, liberalism, nationalism, and democratisation, dominated military culture and were finally formalised as Kemalism after the foundation of Turkey. On the other hand, Atatürk's and Inonu's presidencies perhaps became the only period within which the military presented a completely *depolitical* image. Additionally, the years between 1923 and 1945 became the only stable and problem-free periods of Turkish civil-military relations. Yet, it is not possible to associate this process with a Huntington type of *normative professionalism*. Rather, the terms of Atatürk and Inonu should be explained with the *subjective control model* of Huntington, wherein Atatürk's revolutions and the Republican Party's basic principles were indoctrinated to the military and, in this way, the military became the "mirror" of the state. In addition to this, the officers who were against Atatürk's revolutions were eliminated from the military or from influential military positions.

Analytical Table 1:

PERIODS	MILITARY CULTURE	TYPE OF REGIME	TYPE OF ECONOMIC POLICY	TYPE OF SECULARISM	TYPE OF NATIONALISM	ANALYSIS
13 th - 17 th centuries	<i>Traditional (Jihadist doctrine and absolute obedience to the Sultan</i>	<i>Absolute Monarchy</i>	<i>Monarchist (The commodity belongs to the God and Muslims and is owned by the Sultan as being the shadow of God on Earth. The conquered lands shared between the Muslims (Fayel Muslimin) There is a military-political regime and strong statism)</i>	<i>Islamic Theocracy (The state is officially considered an Islamic State)</i>	<i>Ummet (Islamic Unity) (Citizens (Tebaa) are identified as "Muslims" and "non-Muslims". Islamic identity was accepted as the main title of the state)</i>	<i>There is not any democratic element</i>
17 th - 19 th centuries	<i>Traditional (Jihadist, occasionally praetorian and anti-modernist)</i>	<i>Absolute Monarchy</i>	<i>Monarchist</i>	<i>Islamic Theocracy</i>	<i>Ummet (Islamic Unity)</i>	<i>There is not any democratic element</i>
1773-1876 (Adopting European military system)	<i>Variable (Earliest indications of revolutionist change)</i>	<i>Absolute Monarchy</i>	<i>Monarchist (Following the abolishment of Janissaries, the efforts for liberalising the economy gained momentum)</i>	<i>Islamic Theocracy</i>	<i>Ummet (Islamic Unity) (Given the first liberal economic attempts, the earliest examples of print capitalism emerged. Nationalism was prevailed among different ethnic groups)</i>	<i>There is not any democratic element</i>

1876-1878 (Declaration of the First Constitutional Monarchy in 1876)	Variable (Military culture continues to complete its revolutionist evolution under a strife between the monarchist and parliamentary officers)	Constitutional Monarchy (For the first time in Turkish history, a constitution and a parliament are created; it lasts for only two years)	Monarchist	Islamic Theocracy (Religion is still influential in national politics and there is not a serious challenge at this point)	Ottomanism (Ottomanism was promoted as a new identity to combine different ethnic groups without considering religion)	Positive-Undemocratic Relationship (Collaboration of revolutionary officers and civil Ottoman intellectuals forced the Sultan to limit some of his powers)
1878-1908	Revolutionist (Combining their powers with the liberal Union and Progress Committee, and the anti-monarchist people, the Revolutionist officers increase their pressures on the monarchy under the movement known as the Young Turks)	Absolute Monarchy (Although the Sultan dissolved the parliament in 1878, pressure from the public and the revolutionist officers obliged him to recall constitutional monarchy in the 1908 Revolution)	Monarchist (The earliest attempts for creating a bourgeoisie class. The first commercial bourgeoisie was mostly created by non-Muslim minorities)	Islamic Theocracy (The absolute reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II saw a rapid increase in Islamic policies while urging Ottoman intellectuals and revolutionist officers to organise new resistant moves)	Ummet (Islamic Unity) (The Ottomanist policies of the Ottoman intellectuals during the first parliamentary era were weakened by Pan - Islamist promotion of Sultan Abdulhamid II)	Positive-Undemocratic Relationship (Starting from the 20 th century, rapid politicisation of the revolutionist officers (Young Turks) eventually obliged the Sultan to reopen the parliament in the 1908 Revolution)
1908-1909 (Declaration of the Second Constitutional Monarchy-The 1908 Revolution)	Revolutionist	Constitutional Monarchy (Pressures from the public, Unionists and revolutionary officers known as the Young Turks obliged to Sultan to declare a Second Constitutional Monarchy in the event titled as the 1908 Revolution)	Monarchist (Still symbolically, the Sultan was the owner of property, but in reality the reopening of parliament severely weakened his influence in economic policies. The earliest examples of liberal capitalist policies by the Unionists began to occur)	Islamic Theocracy (Islamic rule was under great challenge after the declaration of Constitutional Monarchy. Secular ideals of Unionist move and Young Turks started to show their impacts in national politics)	Ummet (Islamic Unity) (Just as the Islamic rule, the ummet concept was also under a great challenge. The liberal and egalitarian rhetoric of the Unionists caused different ethnic groups to give full support to the 1908 Revolution and the Committee of Union and Progress)	Positive-Undemocratic Relationship (Theoretically, the revolutionist officers' firm support to the 1908 Revolution and Unionist movement can arguably be considered as undemocratic, but if one observes its positive results for democratisation, the period until this date should be seen as a positive-undemocratic relationship)

<p>1909-1918 (Three coups d'état, in 1909, 1911 and 1913. The First two were carried out by the supporters of monarch. These coups enabled state rule to be changed frequently. Finally, after coup d'état in 1913 (Sublime Court), the revolt. officers obtained full control over the military and the regime became a military Dictatorship)</p>	<p>Revolutionist (This process saw a struggle and mutual coup d'états between revolutionist and traditionalist (monarchist) officers; but after a final coup d'état in 1913 (Sublime Court) the revolutionist officers managed to suppress the traditionalist officers and the Union and Progress party gained full control over the rule of state, the revolutionist officers became the main power of Unionists)</p>	<p>Constitutional Monarchy (In 1909, the monarchist officers and opponents of parliamentary regime organised a mutiny. The military suppressed the riot and replaced the Sultan with a new figurehead successor)</p>	<p>Statism (After deactivating the Sultan's powers and transforming him into a symbolic figure, the military-backed Union and Progress Party made several efforts to liberalise the economy and to create a bourgeoisie. However, the dictatorship of revolutionist officers after the 1913 coup d'état replaced this trend with a more statist approach)</p>	<p>Moderate Secularism (The Union and Progress Party began to implement the first secular practices in history. But still, Islamic references were strong)</p>	<p>Primordial Nationalism (After the liberal and egalitarian rhetorics of the Unionists during the 1908 Revolution, a new ideological trend, known as Turancılık, began to be effective among the revolutionist officers. Turancılık is mostly based on ethnic (primordial) aspects and aims to connect Turkish states in Central Asia, Caucasasia and Anatolia under one single state. Especially, after the 1913 coup d'état, Turancılık increased its impact by the military figures Enver Pasha and his friends who gained the rule of state)</p>	<p>Positive-Undemocratic Relationship (Although, the military-backed Union and Progress Party occasionally applied authoritarian methods to suppress opposition, this authoritarian manner prevented the Sultan (monarchy) from regaining his influence and powers over state matters. Additionally, the emergence of the first secular practices in national politics paved the way for the Turkish revolution under Atatürk's leadership)</p>
<p>1918-1950 (The Ottoman Empire was replaced by the Republic of Turkey. After series of secular and liberal reforms, Turkey took its place among the modern states of the age with its state institutions and law)</p>	<p>Revolutionist (Under the leadership of a revolutionist military elite, Turkey became a secular republic. After the Turkish Independence (Liberation; War, the military silently remained as the main protector of the Kemalist revolutions)</p>	<p>Authoritarian Republic (Under one party rule, some practices of the new republic remained severely authoritarian. The attempts for creating a second party were failed twice until the foundation of Democrat Party in 1945)</p>	<p>Statism (Several development plans were prepared to nationalise the economy and to create a Turkish bourgeoisie. Although the founding fathers aimed to create a mixed economic model, state has been the supervisor of all economic activities)</p>	<p>Strict Secularism (Turkey experienced a rapid secularisation from sharia. Most of these practices were executed in a radical manner and occasionally saw strong public resistance)</p>	<p>Mixed Nationalism (Turkish nationalism was defined as a mixture of primordial and modern nationalism. The 1924 constitution defined Turkish citizenship as accepting oneself as Turk without considering ethnicity. On the other hand, some implementations such as the Sun Language Theory in the early republican era stressed the primordial side of Turkish nationalism)</p>	<p>Positive-Undemocratic Relationship (The revolutionist trend in military culture finally led to the foundation of secular Turkish republic)</p>

5.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has been the first step of the empirical process. After making a brief introduction to pre-Islamic Turkish history and the early Ottoman period, the chapter

explained the main reasons behind praetorianist evolution and the foundations of revolutionary transformation within military culture. Lastly, the chapter explained the foundation of Turkey as a secular republic. In other words, the first case study has seen a regime change from a monarchy to a republic, under the leadership of a revolutionist military elite. Indeed, this is a clear example of the model that has been defined as *positive-undemocratic* from the beginning of this thesis.

Ultimately, this chapter has brought four main contributions for the purpose of thesis. The first contribution has been indicating the dynamics that created the military-nation perception. The strong warrior tradition in the early Turkish states has generated a close linkage between the military and society, which has continued up to the present day. The main implication of this fact, for the purpose of the thesis, is that the military has always been the principal organisation in the Turkish states, either by being the founder or administrator. This fact also caused the military to be politically active and ideologically divided.

The second contribution has been explaining the factors that pushed the military into being a praetorian institution. As has also been elaborated in the previous chapters, the Turkish military was always politically keen and active, but, given the strong central authority in the early Ottoman Era, they were not able to affect state politics. Although they tried to rebel several times, they were easily suppressed. Yet, it is largely known that, even in the rising years of the state, the Janissaries were politically active by favouring candidates for the throne. Accordingly, the decline of the state brought a weakening to both state authority and military discipline. The centuries between the seventeenth and nineteenth witnessed periodic Janissaries' rebellions, which caused the replacement and execution of several Sultans. As a result, the Janissaries were replaced by the modern military institutions. Yet, this

process started a praetorian tradition in military culture that would continue for centuries.

The third contribution has been to explain how revolutionist tradition became embedded in military culture. The secularised system within the military academies led officers to experience a major mental transformation toward revolutionism. The officers increased their involvements in politics with the aim of saving the state from decline. Eventually, the revolutionary officers founded the current Turkey under Kemal Atatürk's leadership. The revolutionary ideals of the military, namely secularism, nationalism, republicanism, and statism have also become the founding dynamics of the new state, while being officialised under Atatürk's principles. Accordingly, these principles would strongly embed in military culture during the foundation years, while causing it to preserve its praetorian tradition.

The fourth contribution has been to indicate the foundations of the three different identities – revolutionist, guardian, and depolitical – that are the focus of this thesis. Even during the declining years of the Ottoman Empire, it is possible to observe these divisions. The Janissaries represent the guardian side of military culture, which is traditionalist, conservative, and likely to maintain the status quo. Following the disbandment of Janissaries, the same tradition was represented by the monarchist officers, later would be known as the Alaylis. The Young Turks, on the other hand, represent the revolutionist wing, which is modernist, secular, liberal, and supportive of the parliamentary regime. Lastly, the Atatürkist tradition represents the depoliticised legacy of military culture, which aims to make a clear separation between politics and the military and makes an effort to achieve the normative and technical professionalisms, which is relatively similar to Huntington's separation of powers.

These three different identities would continue to exist under different names and groups in the different periods in history, for instance: the Janissaries versus Nizami Cedit; the Mekteplis versus Alaylis; the Unionists versus Saviours; the Monarchists versus Republicans; the Juntaists versus Moderates; and so on. Yet, in this case study, we saw the increasing authority of revolutionist officers within the military, which allowed them to gain full control in the end. Following the 1908 Revolution, the revolutionist officers became deeply involved in politics as the guardians of the constitutional regime. Eventually, under Atatürk's leadership, they organised the national resistance and founded the secular Turkish Republic. At this point, it may be necessary to maintain that Atatürk benefited from the military's deterrent image while implementing his secular reforms. Nevertheless, his major intention was to depoliticise the military.

By and large, the first case study has been a clear example of the *positive-undemocratic model*, in which a military-dominated elite undemocratically involved itself in politics but, in the end, replaced an absolute monarchy with a parliamentary system.⁶⁴⁰ Hence, the process cannot be associated with Huntington's normative professionalism and objective civilian control. Also, the process can neither be associated with the subjective civilian control, because, during the Young Turks era, the party did not civilianise the military. Conversely, the military under Enver Pasha's leadership gained full control over the party. Nevertheless, after the foundation of Turkey in 1923, the military gave a distinct image. Under the supervision of three heroic commanders of the Liberation War – Atatürk, İnönü, and Çakmak – the military was subordinated to civilian rule. Yet, the process between 1923 and 1950 is closer to the *subjective control* than the objective one, in that the

⁶⁴⁰ See: Analytical Table 1, (p. 223-225).

military was indoctrinated with the Kemalist ideology and became the mirror of the Republican Party. The military's close relations with Inonu and the Republican Party in the following decades evidence this.

CHAPTER 6: Case Study II: Turkish Officers as the Guardians of Regime “Radicals, Moderates and Professionals” (1945-1999)

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The empirical process will continue with this case study, which comprises the years between 1945 and 1999. This case study is particularly remarkable for a high level of politicisation in the military and different factions. During the Atatürk and İnönü rules, the main reason behind the military subordination tended to be the charismatic personalities of two retired commanders of the Liberation War. Accordingly, the military was ideologically closer to the Republican Party, due to the strong Kemalist tendencies of both institutions (the military and the party). Yet, the military gradually returned back to its political activism just after the establishment of a stable parliamentary regime. In 1950, the Democrat Party won the elections and remained in power for 10 years. The Democrat Party's founding fathers were past members of Republican Party and were coming from civilian origins. The party was known for its liberal-orientated economic policies and relatively weakened secular discourse. Especially, in the rural places and villages, the party gained increasing support. The party's various statements and practices against the Kemalist revolutions, and its increasing oppression over opponents, caused the military to take over in the 1960 coup d'état. In the following process, the military ruled the country through the National Union Committee. They closed down the Democrat Party, executed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and his two leading ministers, arrested the party's members, and created a new constitution. In the new constitution, the military created the National Security Council to supervise politics. The importance of this case study for the military culture and the notion of crossing identities is the

military's evolution from revolutionism to guardianship. By 'guardianship', my purpose is to formalise the new transformation within which military culture shifted from its revolutionist line. During the process, capitalism and anti-Communism became embedded in military culture. Additionally, through the creation of OYAK and the rise in officers' social status, the military became a military-industrial complex. Hence, Atatürkist principles – especially secularism – did not go further than being an excuse to legitimise military interventions in the eyes of the people. Through the measures that were implemented during the juntas, the military became the guardian of American-orientated national policies and a newly created capitalist regime.

At this point, this chapter aims to make two important contributions for the purpose of the thesis. The first contribution is to explore why the military re-involved itself in politics after a process of depoliticisation. The second contribution – which is particularly important in answering the main research question – is analysing the aforementioned transition from revolutionism to guardianship. That is to say, the chapter will explain how the military occasionally witnessed internal strife between the different factions (crossing identities), how this strife affected military culture, and how it affected national politics. In the end, the reader will have a clearer idea about the relationship between military culture and Turkish politics, as this process will present empirical examples of the five different models.

6.2 THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1945-1960 AND THE 1960 COUP D'ÉTAT (27 MAY)

The second president, Ismet Inonu – as Atatürk's successor – faced a big challenge at the very beginning of his term. The Second World War had just started in 1939. Turkey was not ready for a big war given the military's technological backwardness

and financial difficulties.⁶⁴¹ Yet, Inonu tackled this issue successfully by keeping Turkey impartial during the Second World War. Nevertheless, the Second World War caused important changes in Turkish foreign policy. It was the end of the long-term Turkey-Soviet friendship built up during Atatürk's term, and saw Turkey converging with the Western bloc.

After the war, the Soviets came up with several demands, such as claiming lands in eastern Turkey and creating a mutual commission between Turkey and the Soviets for governing the Bosphorus.⁶⁴² As a result, the Soviet risk compelled Turkey to approach the Western front to establish closer relations with the United States.⁶⁴³ In addition to technological backwardness and the Soviet threat, particularly, the young officers were not happy with the drop in their social status and financial difficulties. They began to lose their trust in the Chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Cakmak, and in President Ismet Inonu. Indeed, the first secret organisations had already appeared just after the end of the Second World War.⁶⁴⁴ The young officers considered that the military profession should regain its former respect within the society. Additionally, military technology had to be improved by new weapons, because they were in a severely weak position against possible foreign threats.⁶⁴⁵ Hence, the foundation purpose of the first secret juntas was indeed completely different from that of the later ones. They were founded to overthrow Inonu and the committee of higher commanders within the military. Conversely, the later juntas were established to

⁶⁴¹ William Hale, 'The Turkish Republic and Its Army, 1923–1960', *Turkish Studies*, 12, No.2, 2011: 196. (The author notes that the Turkish army technologically was unprepared for a modern war.); Also see: Pekin and Yavuz, *Soldier and Politics*, 2014, 75.

⁶⁴² *Ibid.*: 77.

⁶⁴³ Umit Ozdag, *Civil-Military Relations during Atatürk and Inonu Eras*, (2006): 123.

⁶⁴⁴ *Ibid.*: 124.

⁶⁴⁵ *Ibid.*: 134, 138.

overthrow Inonu's rivals.⁶⁴⁶ This can give the reader a clear clue about how the military was highly political even during those early days of the Republic, and how the young officers were likely to be affected by different political trends.

However, at that time, there were several factors that were making a military intervention hard to achieve: the organisations were not strong enough, and Inonu, as a retired commander, was very experienced compared to the young officers and knew military psychology very well. It was unlikely for the young officers to challenge him. Thus, the foundation of the Democrat Party would become a new hope for the young officers.⁶⁴⁷ Additionally, we defined the process between 1950 and 1957 as a *variable relationship*, in that there were different factions within the military, namely the Republicans and Democrats, and the military's impact in politics was not sufficiently visible yet.⁶⁴⁸ But, in a short period of time, with the foundation of the first junta establishments, the overwhelming majority of officers began to position themselves against the Democrat Party.⁶⁴⁹

The beginning of the Cold War brought several important developments in Turkish CIV-MIL relations. The most important development happened in 1949: the Chief of the General Staff was subordinated to the Ministry of National Security. That was indeed symbolically very important for achieving civilian supremacy.⁶⁵⁰ However, that regulation of the Republican Party lasted only for 11 years. After the 1960 Coup,

⁶⁴⁶ For the secret coup organisations within the military during the Second World War see: Ozdag (2006): 138-141 and Dogan Akyaz, *Askeri Mudahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*, (The Impacts of the Military Interventions to the Hierarchical Order of the Armed Forces), Iletisim Press, 2002, p. 42.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid.: 159.

⁶⁴⁸ Akyaz, *The Impacts of the Military Interventions to the Hierarchical Order of the Armed Forces*, 58-60.

⁶⁴⁹ For a schematic analysis of the process see: Analytical Table 2 in the end of chapter, (p.261-264).

⁶⁵⁰ Interview, Murat Karayalcin. (After the 1960 intervention, the Chief of the General Staff was tied directly to the prime minister, which became one of the main problems critiqued by the European Union in its negotiations.); Aylin Guney and Petek Karatekelioğlu, 'Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects', *Armed Forces & Society*, 31, No.3, April 2005: 444; George S. Harris, 'The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics', *Middle East Journal*, 19, No.1, January 1965: 63.

the military was irreversibly subordinated to the president. On the other hand, the Cold War started a long-term partnership between Turkey and the United States. Through the Truman Doctrine (1947) and Marshall Aids, Turkey began to receive economic support from the United States.⁶⁵¹ Especially, after the NATO membership in 1952, the close relations between the two countries made important contributions to the military regarding technological modernisation and technical professionalism.⁶⁵² In addition to these two developments, the 1950 elections became a milestone for Turkish democracy. The Democrat Party won the elections against Atatürk's Republican Party and established the first civilian-dominated government. Yet, after the elections, four generals visited Inonu and asked him whether he wanted any move from the military to stop the Democrat Party (DP); Inonu refused this. Furthermore, this visitation was learned by the DP; hence, the Chief of the General Staff Abdurrahman Nafiz Gurman pledged that the military was respectful to the results.⁶⁵³ Theoretically, in this 'historically well-known' event, the ideological divisions within the military can be seen. Four commanders who have sympathy to Ismet Pasha (Inonu) ask him whether or not he wants a military intervention. Just after this event, the Commander in Chief gives a guarantee that the Turkish military is respectful to democracy and public choice. As a result, the two contradictory events give us a clear clue about the military's high political interests – even in Inonu's time – and the existence of different parties within.

In foreign policy, the relations between Turkey and the United States also continued to develop during the Democrat Party rule. Turkey became involved in the Korean

⁶⁵¹ Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution', *The American Historical Review*, 75, No.6, October 1970: 1662. Pekin and Yavuz, *ibid.*: 78.

⁶⁵² *Ibid.*: 145.

⁶⁵³ Pekin and Yavuz, *ibid.*: 78-79; Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution', *The American Historical Review*, 75, No.6, October 1970: 1661; Harris, 'The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics', 66.

War (1950) to help the coalition forces. In the end, Turkey became a NATO member in 1952.⁶⁵⁴ The dated Turkish weapons were replaced by modern ones. A number of American experts came to Turkey to train the Turkish officers.⁶⁵⁵ Those years were very similar to the military modernisation of the last Ottoman centuries. This time the American military system replaced the previous Prussian system. Additionally, the close relations with the United States enabled capitalism and anti-Communism to embed in military culture and distanced the military from the revolutionary ideals of Kemalism. In the following decades, the military interventions would design and protect domestic policies according to NATO interests.

Accordingly, a professional improvement (technically) became observable among the younger officers after learning modern techniques from the NATO armies. In a short time, a mental difference had emerged separating the younger and older officers.⁶⁵⁶ Nevertheless, this development did not bring any remarkable change for CIV-MIL relations. The relative harmony between the military and DP government could only continue until 1954.⁶⁵⁷ Because, after the DP's second election victory in 1954 (by 58 per cent of the votes), the government began to be less tolerant, undemocratic, and more repressive against its opponents.⁶⁵⁸ Additionally, they intended to pull the military onto their side. Arguably, these first authoritarian tendencies of the DP triggered the establishment of first secret juntaist organisations

⁶⁵⁴ Tim Jacoby, 'For the People, Of the People and By the Military: The Regime Structure of Modern Turkey', *Political Studies*, 51, No.4, December 2003: 673.

⁶⁵⁵ For relations with the United States and the NATO during the 1950s, see: Baskin Oran, *ibid.*: 522-576; Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, Walter de Gruyter, 1988: 139.

⁶⁵⁶ Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, 'The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey', *Journal of International Affairs – Columbia University*, 54, No.1, 2000: 209.

⁶⁵⁷ Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 141; Akyaz, *The Impacts of the Military Interventions to the Hierarchical Order of the Armed Forces*, 77.

⁶⁵⁸ See: Mehmet Ali Birand, *Demirkirat* (the Iron Carat), Istanbul: Dogan Press, 2005.

inside the military.⁶⁵⁹ As a result, the NATO membership perhaps improved military professionalism regarding technical terms, but in terms of normative professionalism, the military could not show any remarkable progress.

There are significant reasons that increased the tensions between the Menderes government and the military. The primary reason was that the DP was not as sensitive as the RP as regards Atatürk's reforms. Menderes, normally, was not against Kemalism and Atatürk's reforms;⁶⁶⁰ indeed, in the earlier periods of the DP's rule, they created some regulations to show their commitment to Atatürk and secularism.⁶⁶¹ However, a number of practices to impress religious voters alarmed the military, such as transforming the Call to Prayer from Turkish to Arabic, opening religious tombs, putting religious lessons onto the education curricula, and establishing closer relations with the religious brotherhoods.⁶⁶² Additionally, the aforementioned oppression over the opponents targeted the institutions that had close relations with the military. Among the oppressed bodies was the Republican Party,

⁶⁵⁹ Umit Ozdag, *Menderes döneminde ordu-siyaset ilişkileri ve 27 Mayıs ihtilali* (Civil-Military Relations during the Term of Menderes and the 27 May Intervention), Boyut Kitaplari, 1997, 52.

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid.: 56; Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 140.

⁶⁶¹ For instance, closing down the Nation Party because of it 'using religion for political purposes' and implementing a law for 'preserving Atatürk's memory' from outside attacks. See: Mogens Pelt, *Military Intervention and a Crisis Democracy in Turkey: The Menderes Era and Its Demise*, I.B.Tauris, 2014, 49-50.

⁶⁶² Nasser Momayezi, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey', *International Journal on World Peace*, 15, No.3 (September 1998): 14; Metin Heper and Aylin Guney, 'The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience', *Armed Forces & Society*, 26, No.4, July 2000: 638; Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 123; Birol Baskan, 'What Made Atatürk's Reforms Possible?', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 21, No.2, April 2010: 148; Bülent Daver, 'Secularism in Turkey', *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1969, 33-34; For more information see: Mogens Pelt, *Military Intervention and a Crisis Democracy in Turkey: The Menderes Era and Its Demise*, I.B.Tauris, 2014: Chapter 4 'Menderes and Counter-Kemalist Currents'; one important point is the closing of the village institutions and the cancellation of the land reform; both of these regulations were cancelled by the Republican Party because of strong opposition from the Democrat Party members before they took over the government. See: Cetin Yetkin, *Karsi Devrim (Counter-Revolution) 1945-1950*, Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Mudafa-i Hukuk Press, 7th ed., 2009; Nicole and Hugh Pope *Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and After*, London, 1997: 92-93; Begum Burak, 'The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: To Guard Whom and From What?', *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies*, 4, No.1, 2011: 149.

the media, the university staff and students, as well as the bureaucracy.⁶⁶³ Additionally, the early economic success that came after the American Marshall Aids started to weaken and put the level of public support down.⁶⁶⁴

In addition to the illegal juntaist mobilisations, a strong civilian protest increased the pressure over the Menderes government. However, the DP maintained its authoritarian manner. One event in particular furthered tensions; in 1955, history recorded this speech of Menderes: “You are so powerful that you can bring back the Caliphate if you wish.”⁶⁶⁵ In addition to this, Menderes survived a plane crash near to London’s Gatwick Airport in 1959. Ironically, the conservative side, including some media organs, promoted the event as a sign of Menderes’ “sacredness” as “a chosen person” by God.⁶⁶⁶ Furthermore, after the “anti-secular” regulations, such as putting religious teaching into schools, opening the path for the Imam-Hatip schools, building too many mosques, and similar developments, this led some opponents to consider the Democrat Party policies as “nothing less than a declaration of Islam as state religion” and a cancellation of the “secularism” principle in the constitution.⁶⁶⁷

The first coup attempt by the juntaists, in 1957, is known as the Nine Officers Incident. The attempt was made by a secret organisation that was established by

⁶⁶³ For details see: Frank Tachau, *Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy, and Development*, New York: Praeger, 1984: 45; Nicole and Hugh Pope *Turkey Unveiled, Atatürk and After*, London, 1997: 92-93; Ozan O. Varol, *The Turkish ‘Model’ of Civil-Military Relations*, SSRN Scholarly Paper, Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2013; Karpas, ‘The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64’, 1673; For an evaluation of the reasons for the 1960 coup see: Harris, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics’, 198; Ersel Aydinli, ‘A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey’, *The Middle East Journal*, 63, No.4, 2009: 585.

⁶⁶⁴ Especially, after the Marshall Aids, the rapid rise in the number of tractors made a positive impact on the villagers – Turkey climbed to fourth place in wheat production. See: Mehmet Ali Birand, *Demirkirat*.

⁶⁶⁵ Pelt, *Military Intervention and a Crisis Democracy in Turkey*, 67. For the increasing authoritarianism of the DP government also see: Nil Satana, ‘Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 34, 2007: 365.

⁶⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 56-60.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 69.

some active officers – mostly lower ranks.⁶⁶⁸ That first effort was unsuccessful and one of the members was arrested.⁶⁶⁹ Yet, the protest continued to grow. On 28 April 1960, students arranged demonstrations against the DP in the Istanbul University's Faculty of Law. In a short period of time the protest prevailed around the streets of Istanbul. During these events, the military gave support to the demonstrators by stopping the police.⁶⁷⁰ Immediately after, martial law was proclaimed.⁶⁷¹ Yet, in the following process, the demonstrations continued to grow. After some meetings, on 27 May 1960 the military revealed that they had taken over the rule of the state and overthrown the government. This was the first coup d'état after the foundation of the state. The military made this statement:

*Turkish military usurped the rule of the nation to prevent brother fighting and the current crisis. The armed forces intend to leave the governance to the civilians as soon as possible after doing impartial and just elections under the supervision of a committee ... we retain our loyalty to our alliances and commitments including NATO and CENTO.*⁶⁷²

In general, the main reason behind the intervention is considered as stopping the Democrat Party from undermining democracy and secularism. Hence, the military's

⁶⁶⁸ Burak, 'The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics', 150; Hale, 'The Turkish Republic and its Army, 1923–1960', 198.

⁶⁶⁹ Ozdag (1997): 109.

⁶⁷⁰ Varol, *The Turkish 'Model' of Civil-Military Relations*, 5.

⁶⁷¹ Ozdag, *ibid.*: 153-55.

⁶⁷² *Ibid.*: 201-202; Karpas, 'The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64', 1664. (In this work, the author argues that the weakening prestige of the military and declining social status was indeed one of the fundamental reasons behind the coup.); Pinar Bilgin, 'Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey's Geography' 1: The Uses of 'Geopolitical Truths' in Turkey', *Political Geography*, 26, No.7, September 2007: 744 (The author discusses that after NATO membership, the Turkish military went into a modernisation process and it is likely that the increasing self-confidence of the military in this process motivated them to enhance their status within the state; so, the author implies, unlike what Huntington said, increasing professionalism had a 'negative impact' on democratisation in the Turkish example. Bilgin's argument, therefore, supports our suggestion that, it is more likely to associate the process with technical professionalism rather than a normative one).

first aim was shown as creating a new constitution that would strictly protect secularism and prevent possible religious propaganda in the future. Yet, once the military took over the rule, the crossing identities within military became observable from outside. The radical group (“the Fourteens”), under the leadership of Alparslan Turkes, offered a military government that would remain in power for a longer time to complete what Atatürk had started, by projecting his principles to the public.⁶⁷³ The second group (Inonu supporters) offered to assign rule to the RP as soon as possible. Lastly, another group (moderates) suggested that they should leave the rule to the civilians after implementing the necessary reforms and staging an election.⁶⁷⁴ The last group’s idea was accepted and implemented.⁶⁷⁵ The leader of the movement, Cemal Gursel, was also supporting the last idea. Gursel immediately stated that he was against “dictatorship”:

[The] purpose and the aim of the coup is to bring the country with all speed to a fair, clean and solid democracy ... I want to transfer

⁶⁷³ Burak, ‘The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics’, 150; Tim Jacoby, ‘For the People, Of the People and By the Military: The Regime Structure of Modern Turkey’, *Political Studies*, 51, No.4, December 2003: 674.

⁶⁷⁴ Pekin and Yavuz, *ibid.*:87; Roger P. Nye, ‘Civil-Military Confrontation in Turkey: The 1973 Presidential Election’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 8, No.02, April 1977: 212.

⁶⁷⁵ Momayezi, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, 6-7; Tanel Demirel, ‘Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 31, No.2 (January 2005): 249; Akyaz, *The Impacts of the Military Interventions to the Hierarchical Order of the Armed Forces*, p. 146. (Political divisions within the Turkish military have continued to this day. But, by employing relevant disciplinary mechanisms, the military authorities tried to eliminate different ideologies and aimed to preserve the military’s main Kemalist ideals, namely secularism and nationalism. Additionally, it is likely to encounter similar examples in the other armies who have an interventionist legacy. For instance, the Brazilian military, especially before the 1964 intervention, showed major similarities to the Turkish army. Firstly, before the 1964-1985 junta rule, the Brazilian military was always turning rule back to the civilians after making intended reforms. However, the long-term junta rule after 1964 broke this tradition. Secondly, just like the Turkish junta after 1960, the Brazilian military junta also witnessed an internal conflict between *radicals (hard-liners)* and *moderates (soft-liners)*. But, as opposed to the Turkish case, the radical wing became the dominant side and maintained the junta rule for 21 years until 1985. For the Brazilian army and military junta between 1964 and 1985, see: Koonings and Kruijt, 2002: 90-95.)

power and the administration of the nation to the free choice of the people.⁶⁷⁶

This discourse indeed shows the main idea that most Turkish officers have adopted since the foundation of the Republic. The majority of the military authorities have always been against long-term junta rule, and have tended to give power to the civilians as soon as possible. In this regard, the rhetorical commitment of the military to democratic ideals can also be seen in the speeches below. Alparslan Türkeş explains the reasons for the coup with this statement:

*For several years, we have seen that the constitution was breached, our democracy was under risk. The parliament did not do anything to prevent it. The nation doubted that the government was going to a dictatorship ... the Turkish Armed Forces – who have the responsibility of protecting the state from domestic and foreign threats – considered that this internal strife endangered the security of the nation ... Turkish Armed Forces decided to solve the problem.*⁶⁷⁷

Colonel Osman Köksal, a member of the movement, argued that:

*The Democratic Party rule removed social justice by implementing the inflationist policies, caused the majority of citizens to suffer from poverty, made concessions from Atatürk's principles and moved to the dictatorship and thus, under these circumstances, the intervention of the military was an obligation.*⁶⁷⁸

⁶⁷⁶ Ben Lombardi, 'Turkey-The Return of the Reluctant Generals?', *Political Science Quarterly*, 112, No. 2, July 1997: 205.

⁶⁷⁷ Özdağ, *ibid.*: 242-43.

⁶⁷⁸ *Ibid.*: 124.

Turkes' idea was that civil rule could not control the tension which could develop after the coup, and could not make the necessary reforms for the state. After a long speech, he stated that Turkey needed to be developed rapidly; but this was not possible inside a democratic regime. Returning to democracy could only be possible after Turkey handled its problems. However, his radical opinions brought negative reactions, even from the leaders of the movement.⁶⁷⁹

After the intervention, the coup leaders founded the National Unity Committee.⁶⁸⁰ The committee started a "cleaning" operation, targeting the military, parliament, and universities. The officers who were under suspicion for various reasons were forced to retire in August 1960. Accordingly, Turkes' radical group "the Fourteens" was forced to disband, and its members were sent abroad. Additionally, 147 members of the academic staff of different universities were fired.⁶⁸¹ In the meantime, the Committee created a commission, bringing together several famous academics, to prepare the new constitution.⁶⁸² The new constitution was accepted on 9 July 1961 with a majority of public votes. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and the Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan were sentenced to death and were executed.⁶⁸³

Some authorities consider the 1961 constitution as the most liberal and progressive constitution in the history of Turkey.⁶⁸⁴ The new constitution brought extended liberal rights and freedoms such as "the right to strike", "the right to establish civil associations", and also broadened rights for forming parties and religious

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid.: 134-35.

⁶⁸⁰ Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 163; Daver, 'Secularism in Turkey', 34.

⁶⁸¹ Pekin and Yavuz, *ibid.*: 87-88.

⁶⁸² Ozdag, *ibid.*: 250; Varol, *The Turkish 'Model' of Civil-Military Relations*, 5.

⁶⁸³ Pekin and Yavuz, *ibid.*: 88; Bener Karakartal, 'Turkey: The Army as Guardian of the Political Order', *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, 1985, 49.

⁶⁸⁴ Interview with Aydin Kalpakci; Varol, *ibid.*; Burak, 'The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics', 150.

freedoms.⁶⁸⁵ The press became more liberal, new regulations were made for establishing labour unions, the judiciary became fully independent,⁶⁸⁶ and necessary steps were taken to prevent future one-party dictatorships.⁶⁸⁷ Additionally, the new constitution created new institutional bodies to increase the military's political legitimacy and to increase check and balances.⁶⁸⁸ Firstly, by the foundation of the *National Security Council* (NSC), the military actively involved itself in the execution process. The NSC was founded as a consultative body to the government; it was designed as a mixture of civilian and military authorities. According to the first NSC regulations, the military was responsible for giving information to the government on the issues based on national security. However, after each intervention, the military increased its legal powers in its favour.⁶⁸⁹ The second new body was the *Senate*, which had been created to be the second legislative chamber, "to counterbalance" the Assembly.⁶⁹⁰ Finally, the *Constitutional Court* was created and was dominated with the right of deciding whether or not the party policies within the parliament conformed to the constitution. In the following decades, the Constitutional Court closed down a number of parties that had strong popular support.

⁶⁸⁵ TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly), *Secim, Secim Sistemleri ve Turkiye'deki Uygulamalar* (Election, Election Systems and Practices In Turkey), Ankara: TBMM Press, 1982: 99; Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 142.

⁶⁸⁶ Mumtaz Soysal, *Dinamik Anayasa Anlayisi: Anayasa Diyalektigi Uzerine Bir Deneme* (The Understanding of Dynamic Constitution: An essay over Constitutional Dialectic), Ankara University Press, 1969: 87-106; Ergun Ozbudun, *Turk Anayasa Hukuku* (Turkish Constitutional Law), Ankara: Yetkin Press, 1986: 143-148.

⁶⁸⁷ Ahmet Yildiz, *Ihtilalin Icinden: Anilar, Degerlendirmeler* (Inside the coup, memories and assessments), Istanbul, 2001: 177; Nicole and Hugh Pope, 96; Feroz Ahmed, 11; Daver, 'Secularism in Turkey', 35.

⁶⁸⁸ Varol, *The Turkish 'Model' of Civil-Military Relations*, 2.

⁶⁸⁹ Rona Aybay, 'Milli Guvenlik Kavrami ve Guvenlik Kurumu' (National Security and Security Institution), *Ankara University Political Science Faculty Magazine*, Vol.XXXIII, Nos.1-2, March-June 1978: 77-78.

⁶⁹⁰ Pelt, *Military Intervention and a Crisis Democracy in Turkey*, 189.

In addition to the creation of NSC, the military made a new regulation in its Internal Service Law by adding Article 35:

*The duty of the military is to safeguard the territorial integrity and the nature of the Republic which is defined by the Constitution.*⁶⁹¹

After its creation, Article 35 has been the main legal tool of military authorities whenever they intended to intervene in governmental affairs.⁶⁹² Apart from these regulations, some other regulations were also implemented to strengthen the economic power of the armed forces.⁶⁹³ Retired officers were settled into the top positions in the bureaucracy, or they moved into private and state-run enterprises. The generals were appointed to ambassadorial positions. In 1961, the OYAK (Turkish Armed Forces Assistance and Pension Fund) was founded, to give the military personnel some priorities in the Turkish social insurance system, to provide social security to the military personnel, and to enable the military to become involved in the business and the industry sectors.⁶⁹⁴ The OYAK became one of the largest conglomerates in the country by providing high shares to the military investors. The generals became a privileged, elite group in Turkish society. Their destiny was no longer connected to the party leaders, but to the regime itself.⁶⁹⁵ By 1975, the organisation subsidised over 19,000 homes, advanced 35,000 loans, and

⁶⁹¹ The nature of the Republic was explained as a secular, social Republic which was built on the rule of law and human rights.

⁶⁹² Sarigil, 'The Turkish Military', 8-9.

⁶⁹³ Ahmad, *ibid.*: 12; Ersin Kalaycioglu, *ibid.*:88.

⁶⁹⁴ F. Michael Wuthrich, *Commercial Media, the Military, and Society in Turkey during Failed and Successful Interventions*, Ankara: Bilkent University, 2010: 219; Karabelias, *Military Class and Perpetual State Control in Turkey*, 8; Jacoby, 'For the People, Of the People and By the Military,' 676-677 (In the article, the author argues that the military searched for opportunities to cooperate with the industrial elite by creating the OYAK); Michaud-Emin, 'The Restructuring of the Military High Command in the Seventh Harmonization Package and Its Ramifications for Civil–Military Relations in Turkey', 34.

⁶⁹⁵ Ahmad, *ibid.*: 12.

collected tax-exempt assets equal to two billion Turkish Lira.⁶⁹⁶ It integrated itself into large economic sectors including the automotive industry (Renault and Goodyear), stock speculation (AXA), and aircraft construction and weapons manufacture (Lockheed). The success of OYAK improved the living standards of the military elite and secured their position.⁶⁹⁷ Eventually, the aforementioned status of OYAK as a military-industrial complex gave the military a fundamental role in the creation of a modern capitalist state. As a result, the military's autonomous status was further increased given these financial privileges.⁶⁹⁸

Overall, the 1960 coup d'état and the following regulations of the NSC can be seen as an example of the *positive-undemocratic relationship*, in that the military intervention overthrew a growing authoritarian and anti-democratic government. Additionally, the military created a new constitution with more extended democratic rights and liberties.⁶⁹⁹ On the other hand, the process cannot be explained in any of Huntington's theories, because the military was involved in politics, overthrew the government, dissolved the parliament, and created a new constitution. Additionally, given the NATO membership, there has been a remarkable increase in the level of *technical* professionalism. Especially, the younger officers learned the most recent combat technology and usage of modern weapons, but this technical professionalism was not supported by a *normative* professionalism and, therefore, the military's political activism could not be stopped. Lastly, through NATO membership and the creation of OYAK, capitalism embedded in military culture and distanced itself from Kemalist statism. In the following process, the military would begin to grow as a military-industrial complex, and it would change national politics according to

⁶⁹⁶ Jacoby, 'For the People, Of the People and By the Military: The Regime Structure of Modern Turkey', 677.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁹ See: Analytical Table 2 in the end of chapter (p. 275-78).

capitalist and anti-Communist principles. On the other hand, the liberal 1961 constitution perhaps became the last revolutionist act from the officers in broadening civil rights and democratic principles. However, shortly afterwards, the military authorities began to consider this new constitution as a huge mistake and became convinced to replace it with a more conservative one.

6.3 THE PERIOD OF 1960-1971 AND THE 1971 INTERVENTION (12 MARCH)

The 1971 coup has some differences from the previous one. Unlike the 1960 intervention, the military did not directly take over the rule, but rather forced the government to resign. After the 1960 coup, the domestic and foreign developments, as well as the relatively liberal domain that was created by the new constitution, led to a politicisation of the masses. Especially, the university students and labour unions were affected by the global political atmosphere. The mass demonstrations and conflicts between the left and right wing students, as well as police interventions, led the nation into a chaotic environment.⁷⁰⁰ These new events pushed the civilian governments into a weaker position. They became unable to prevent the anarchical situation that threatened public security. The military authorities tended to believe that the problem was the extended liberal regulations of the new constitution. The liberal regulations were too much for Turkey and caused polarisations between the people. A reformation was necessary to restrict some of its regulations.

On the other hand, two important events – the Cyprus question and the Johnson letter – domestically increased the level of anti-Americanism. The existing conflict between the Greeks and Turks on Cyprus had been increasing every day, and collapsing relations between the two NATO members. The worsening relations

⁷⁰⁰ Momayezi, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey', 7-9.

caused Turkey to consider its options for a military operation in Cyprus. But the American President Johnson sent a letter to the Turkish prime minister, Ismet Inonu, and warned him that if the Turkish military conducted an operation to Cyprus, it could create a conflict between the two NATO countries Turkey and Greece. Therefore, the United States would not allow Turkey to use the weapons given by the United States. The strict style of the letter created a shock effect throughout the country and triggered anti-Americanism, especially among the student groups: the Islamists and the left-wing nationalists harshly protested. The anger was transformed into slogans in the mass demonstrations such as “non-aligned Turkey” or “fully independent Turkey”. Given the political atmosphere, the Turkish War of Liberation was often recalled as a victory against “the imperialist West”, especially by the left-wing groups.⁷⁰¹ These years also saw a significant change in the Republican Party’s ideological stance. Under Bulent Ecevit’s leadership, the party adopted a more leftist rhetoric and became a “full” social democratic party. As a result, relations between the military and the Republican Party declined, because the military had to position itself against socialism due to its NATO alliance. Indeed, the military began to gain more support from right-wing people and conservatives in the following period.⁷⁰²

By and large, the military’s influence over politics began to weaken after two unsuccessful coup attempts, in 1962 and 1963, by Talat Aydemir. In these coup attempts, the majority of the military did not give support to Aydemir and showed its willingness to maintain civilian supremacy.⁷⁰³ Accordingly, it is possible to observe a

⁷⁰¹ Faruk Sonmezoglu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası (1964-1980)* (USA’s Turkish Policy), Der Yayınları, 1995; Feroz Ahmed, *ibid.*: 140-141; Clapham and Philip (1985).

⁷⁰² Ahmet T. Kuru, ‘The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdism, and Communism’, *Insight Turkey*, 14, No.2, 2012: 47; Tachau and Heper, ‘The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey’, 31.

⁷⁰³ Talat Aydemir attempted to carry out two coups d’état, in 1962 and 1963. Aydemir came from the radical wing of the military and he intended to establish a long-term junta rule for imposing “Atatürk’s principles” to the public from above. However, in both attempts, the overwhelming

short-term military subordination between the years 1965 and 1970, in which civilian rule continued without any remarkable obstacle. The military began to re-involve itself in politics only after the student demonstrations of the late 1960s. As a result, it may be feasible to define the period between 1965 and 1970 as a *positive-democratic* model, in which the military did not involve itself in politics and civilian rule worked democratically.⁷⁰⁴

At the domestic level, the student movements continued to grow. Some universities became a type of “liberated zone”. Under the leadership of some influential revolutionary figures, such as Deniz Gezmiş and Mahir Cayan, the leftist students created very effective political organisations. On the other hand, the far right nationalist Grey Wolves (Ulkuculer) organised strong opposition groups against leftists. The Grey Wolves attended summer camps to learn the art of the guerrilla warfare. The leftist students also received training from the Palestinian camps. The Islamists, on the other hand, created different groups to provoke jihad against the “imperialist West”. The situation in the campuses gradually worsened when the students started to access weapons and apply violence against each other and the police.⁷⁰⁵ Especially, a number of events including kidnaps, robberies, and bombings put the Turkish government into serious trouble by creating tensions between the military and the civil authority. The labour unions were also becoming more militant and political, demanding higher wages and better working conditions, particularly

majority of officers showed their commitment to the moderate wing of the military and did not support the juntaists. In addition to this, the retired Commander and Prime Minister İnönü’s decisive manner to maintain civilian supremacy enabled the majority of the military to show commitment to civilian rule. On the other hand, Aydemir’s junta (mostly known as “the February twenty two – 22 Subatcılar”) was supported by the two other juntas: “the Fourteens – Ondörtlüler” and the air junta “the Elevens – Onbirler.” For a detailed analysis about the Aydemir event, see: Akyaz, *The Impacts of the Military Interventions to the Hierarchical Order of the Armed Forces*, pp.214-234.

⁷⁰⁴ For a schematic analysis of the process, see: Analytical Table 2 (pp.261-264). According to CIV-MIL scholar Dogan Akyaz, the re-emergence of juntaist establishments started after 1967. Nevertheless, until 1970, the civilian supremacy continued to exist. See: Akyaz, *ibid.*: 235.

⁷⁰⁵ Nicole and Hugh Pope, *ibid.*: 104; Eric J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001: 276.

through the propaganda of the Worker's Party and the two big trade unions, the Turk-Is (Turkish Labour) and the DISK (Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions).⁷⁰⁶

In the meantime, the military began to consider circumstances for a military intervention. The generals seemed to be convinced that Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel and his government did not have enough capacity to prevent the crisis. Nevertheless, due to the negative experiences that they had witnessed during and after the 1960 coup d'état, they were less willing to take over the rule directly. Rather, they intended to create a government that would rule according to the military's demands, and that would make necessary reforms.

On the other hand, one notable event again is important for indicating the crossing identities within the military. The process before implementing the 1971 intervention was, indeed, a typical re-emergence of the Mektepli/Alayli dichotomy. The division (this time) was between the left- and right-orientated officers. According to this new categorisation, while the leftists were favouring a Marxist-orientated regime, the rightists were supporting more capitalist-orientated policies.⁷⁰⁷ According to Muhsin Batur, the officers were divided into four, in those days, as "the commanding elite, leftists, status quoists and the neutrals".⁷⁰⁸ Related to this, the Chief of the General Staff, Memduh Tagmac, once stated that the military was divided into distinct groups as being the "progressives-conservatives" and "revolutionists-guardians".⁷⁰⁹ Accordingly, the first coup d'état attempt came from the left-orientated revolutionist wing. On 9 March 1971, the revolutionist generals, such as retired general Cemal

⁷⁰⁶ Ahmad, *ibid.*: 143-146; Nicole and Hugh Pope, *ibid.*: 105; Ersin Kalaycioglu, *ibid.*: 104.

⁷⁰⁷ For the separation between the revolutionist and guardian officers as well as their Marxist and capitalist orientations, see: Akyaz, *ibid.*: 287- 301. Also see: Karpas, *Soldier and Politics since the Ottomans*, 244.

⁷⁰⁸ *Ibid.*: 302.

⁷⁰⁹ *Ibid.*: 328.

Madanaoglu –who was one of the primary leaders of the 1960 junta rule – and the Chief Commander of Air Forces Muhsin Batur intended to execute a left-orientated coup d'état; but they were unsuccessful. In the following process, some higher rank commanders would be fended off because of their leftist orientations.⁷¹⁰ Hence, this unsuccessful event is also important for maintaining the guardian tradition within military culture.

Three days after the unsuccessful coup attempt by the revolutionist wing, on 12 March 1971, the Chief of the General Staff Memduh Tagmac and the Chief Commanders of the land, sea and air forces issued a communique to the president demanding his government resign.⁷¹¹ If he refused, the military would resort to non-democratic measures, leaving Demirel with no other choice but to retire. Nihat Erim became the new prime minister and established a cabinet of technocrats, starting a new period of semi-military government by imposing martial law. The youth organisations were banned; the meetings, the seminars of the associations, the unions and the strikes were prohibited; the newspapers were suspended; the bookshops were prohibited to sell books that were not approved by the authorities; the intellectuals and the journalists were arrested; hundreds of people were detained.⁷¹²

In the early days of military rule, chaos proliferated. On 17 May, the Israeli consul Ephraim Elrom was abducted and the credit for this event was taken by the extreme

⁷¹⁰ *Halk TV*, Interview with Erol Mutercimler, 'Simdiki Zaman' (Today), (accessed: 05.06.2016); Also see: Kurtulus Kayali, *Ordu ve Siyaset 27 Mayıs-12 Mart (Military and Politics 27 May-12 March)*, İletişim Press, 1994; Akyaz, *The Impacts of the Military Interventions to the the Hierarchical Order of the Armed Forces*, 58; and Mehmet Ali Birand, *12 Mart: İhtilalin Pencesinde Demokrasi* (12 March: Democracy under the Paw of Coup d'état), Imge Kitabevi Press, 2007.

⁷¹¹ Harris, 'Military Coups and Turkish Democracy, 1960-1980', 206. Varol, *The Turkish 'Model' of Civil-Military Relations*, 8. Karakartal, *Turkey*, 49. Burak, 'The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics', 151; Jacoby, 'For the People, Of the People and By the Military', 675 (In the text, the author discusses the possibility of CIA support for the intervention.); Demirel, 'Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy', 250.

⁷¹² Celil Gurkan, *12 Mart'a 5 kala* (5 minutes to 12 March), Istanbul: Tekin Press, 1986: 15-39; Nicole and Hugh Pope, *ibid.*: 106; Demirel, 'Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy', 251.

leftist Turkish People's Liberation Army. After the abduction, the military further increased its repression, increased the arrests, and applied torture to the prisoners.⁷¹³ However, the military could not save Elrom; he was found dead. Additionally, two British and one Canadian radar engineers were taken hostage in the Black Sea. The army conducted an operation to save them but did not manage to do so. Immediately after, the military strengthened its operations, especially over left-wing activists. Most of them were captured, were wounded, or died during these operations. Accordingly, Deniz Gezmiş, the symbolic leader of the left-wing students, was arrested and executed with two activist friends on 6 May 1972.⁷¹⁴

During the 1971 intervention, martial law was renewed by the Assembly every two months, in order to implement the constitutional requirements for each institution of the state, such as the unions, the press, radio and television, the universities, and state departments, as well as the courts. Indeed, the military authorities were convinced that the extended liberal rights in the 1961 constitution became too much for Turkey, insofar as the immature political culture in the society caused people to abuse these rights and apply violence.⁷¹⁵ Additionally, the military's supervision over the civilians was strengthened by increasing the status of national security. As has always been the case during the military interventions, the majority of people supported the military. The political parties also gave support to the process by remaining silent. The right-wing parties welcomed the new amendments while the left-wing parties showed no visible objection.⁷¹⁶

⁷¹³ Margaret Krahenbuhl, et al., *Political Kidnappings in Turkey, 1971-1972: A Report*, Rand, 1977: 48-70.

⁷¹⁴ Ahmad, *ibid.*: 151; Nicole and Hugh Pope, *ibid.*: 106-107.

⁷¹⁵ That case supports Samuel Finer's argument that the 'low political culture is equal to low civilian supremacy'.

⁷¹⁶ Ahmad, *ibid.*: 154.

The most important result of this intervention for the purpose of this thesis is the military's increasing conservatism. In other words, the military began to lose its Kemalist revolutionist character and adopted a status quo-ist and more authoritarian identity which is defined as 'guardianship' throughout this thesis.⁷¹⁷ Given the NATO alliance, anti-Communism continued to increase its influence.⁷¹⁸ Additionally, the aforementioned influence of OYAK as a military-industrial complex, imposed military an important role as regards creating a capitalist modern state.⁷¹⁹ Hence, the 1971 military intervention can be defined with the *negative-undemocratic relationship*, in which the military became more political; but, unlike its previous interventions, it brought serious harm to democracy.⁷²⁰ Lastly, it is still unlikely to associate the military culture with an Huntington type of professional ethos. Even, it is contestable, whether or not the military adopted a sufficient level of professionalism regarding technical terms.

6.4 THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1971-1982 AND THE 1980 COUP D'ÉTAT

This coup d'état has a different character to the 1971 intervention because, the military again took over the rule directly and dissolved the government. In addition to this, many scholars consider the 1960 coup as more "progressive", because of the extended liberal regulations in the 1961 constitution; the same scholars tend to see the 1980 coup d'état as "counter-revolutionist". The 1982 constitution limited most of the individual rights that had been given to the people by the previous constitution and increased the authoritarian character of the state. Furthermore, many scholars

⁷¹⁷ Akyaz, *ibid.*: 234

⁷¹⁸ *Ibid.*: 238.

⁷¹⁹ For a detailed analysis of the ideological divisions among the officers and the military's efforts to promote a more capitalist economy during the 1971 and 1980 interventions, see: Tim Jacoby, 'For the People, Of the People and By the Military: The Regime Structure of Modern Turkey', *Political Studies*, Vol.51, 2003: 669-685.

⁷²⁰ See: Analytical Table 2 (p. 275-78).

consider the 1980 intervention as the main reason behind the rise of the Islamist movement, because of the aforementioned *Turkish-Islam synthesis* that was created by military to stop leftist mobilisation. Additionally, the new constitution increased the military's political legitimacy. The president's rights were largely broadened. This development was strategically important for the military, because, until that time, the presidents – with the exception of Celal Bayar – were always being chosen from the military commanders.⁷²¹ Hence, the seat of the presidency was already held by the military. Therefore, a strong president means strong military supervision. Additionally, the military's power in the National Security Council was further strengthened. According to Article 118 of the new 1982 Constitution, *the government had to give priority consideration to the decisions and recommendations* (of the NSC). The NSC, according to the new regulations, would now be composed of five military members – including the Chief of the General Staff and the Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and also the Gendarmerie – vis-à-vis four members of the government, namely the prime minister, and the ministers of the Interior, Defence, and Foreign Affairs.⁷²²

The pre-coup process witnessed some key events regarding civil-military relations and national politics. The first important incident is the crisis of the presidential election in 1973. As has been noted, the position of the presidency was important for the military authorities. Hence, in 1973, the military decided to make General Faruk Gurler (Commander of Land Forces) the next president via an election. But both the leader of Republican Party, Bulent Ecevit, and the leader of liberal Justice Party, Suleyman Demirel, acted together to prevent Gurler's presidency. As a result, Gurler could not get enough votes to be elected. The event was considered a victory against

⁷²¹ Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 195.

⁷²² Sarigil, 'The Turkish Military', 9. Burak, 'The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics', 151.

the military. The military remained highly disappointed by the decision, but they could not afford to make another intervention and stepped back. The Assembly chose retired general Fahri Koruturk, who was known for a more democratic personality.⁷²³

The following years evidenced that the 1971 intervention could not bring a long-term solution to the political divisions. Polarisation and conflicts started to appear through the middle of 1970s.⁷²⁴ The Grey Wolves (Ulkuculer) – who were supporters of the National Action Party (MHP) – began to create disorder in the streets. Similarly, the left-wing students and the Islamists organised their own resistance groups, such as the Revolutionary Left (Dev-Sol) or the Revolutionary Way (Dev-Yol). The ideological separation also penetrated into the police forces: 17,000 right-wing police officers were detected against 2,000 leftist ones.⁷²⁵ The events went so far as to disrupt the Republican Party leader Bulent Ecevit's meetings. Sharpening political terror caused a very tragic event on 1 May 1977: Labour Day. DISK (the largest labour union in Turkey) organised a crowded demonstration in Istanbul's Taksim Square. In the middle of the meeting some unknown people shot into the crowd from nearby buildings; people ran in panic and caused 36 deaths and injuries to hundreds.⁷²⁶ Terror continued to escalate daily, causing assassinations, including famous writers, politicians, and academics such as Professor Bedreddin Comert and

⁷²³ Ahmad, *ibid.*: 155-156; For a detailed analysis of 1973 presidential election see: Nye, 'Civil-Military Confrontation in Turkey'. (In this work, the author arguably suggests that this was the first time the civilian compromise suppressed the military authorities, which showed that if civilians come together, they can subordinate the military. The foreign media entitled this event a 'democracy exam'.)

⁷²⁴ Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 148.

⁷²⁵ Kenan Evren, *op. cit.* Information given by Inferior Minister Golcugil to Martial Law Coordination Meeting, 17 March 1979.

⁷²⁶ Ahmet Samim, 'The Tragedy of the Turkish Left', *New Left Review*, No.126, March-April 1981, p.60; Ahmad, *ibid.*: 163,166, 169.

the newspaper editor Abdi İpekci.⁷²⁷ The death toll climbed to thousands until the military coup.

In addition, other conflicts occurred between the Alevis and Sunnis, and between the Turks and Kurds. The Alevis are known as a different sect of Islam, and are traditionally known for their support of the secularism principle and the Atatürk reforms. The Alevis tend to be closer the left-wing parties, while the most Sunnis are traditionally closer to the right-wing.⁷²⁸ The first conflicts between the Sunnis and Alevis took place in Malatya, Sivas, and Bingöl causing civilian losses and damage to buildings.⁷²⁹ However, the most tragic event happened in Kahramanmaraş. *The Kahramanmaraş Incident*, known as the Kahramanmaraş Massacre, began when Sunni radicals raked and bombed a coffee house owned by the Alevis.⁷³⁰ Shortly afterwards, a big collision between the Alevis and Sunnis engulfed the whole city. More than one hundred died and many were wounded. Instantly, the military declared martial law in 13 provinces. Prime Minister Ecevit reluctantly accepted martial law, even though he was known as a democratic person who was against military interventions. The minister of the Interior took responsibility for the events and resigned from his position.⁷³¹

The chaotic situation led the military authorities discussing the case; the majority of commanders was of the opinion that a solution was possible, but again only by the armed forces' own methods. In other words, it was too late for seeking democratic

⁷²⁷ Ahmad, *ibid.*: 171-172.

⁷²⁸ For the Alevis' support of the secularism principle and Atatürk principles see: Cem Vakfı, 'Alevilerin Atatürk Sevgisi', (The Alevis' deep sympathy for Atatürk), Available at: <http://www.cemvakfi.org.tr/cemal-canpolat/alevilerin-ataturk-sevgisi/> (accessed: not available).

⁷²⁹ Nicole and Hugh Pope, *ibid.*: 134.

⁷³⁰ Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 193.

⁷³¹ Çağlar Keyler, 'The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy', *New Left Review*, No.115, May-June 1979, pp.6, 12; Mehmet Ali Birand, *The Generals Coup in Turkey*, Brassy's Defense Publishers, 1987: 59-60; For a detailed analysis of the Kahramanmaraş Incidents and the Martial Law declarations related to them also see: M. Zafer Uksul, *Bildirileriyle 1974-1980 Donemi Sikiyonetimleri (The Martial Law Rules in the Term 1974-1980 with its Declarations)*, Tarih Vakfı, 2016, p. 53-100.

options. Additionally, there were rumours that political polarisation began to affect the officers.⁷³² However, Prime Minister Ecevit was still resistant and determined to maintain civil control, mentioning “martial law with a human face”. However, the opponents blamed Ecevit for not giving sufficient room for the military to move. Ecevit resigned on 16 October and Suleyman Demirel formed the new government on 12 November.⁷³³ During those days, the generals were meeting in Istanbul to discuss the right time for a possible intervention.⁷³⁴

The chaos in Turkey also became more important for Europe and the United States because of the Iranian Revolution. The Islamic mobilisation following the Humeyni regime increased Turkey’s strategic importance for the West. *The Guardian’s* Brussels correspondent declared:

*Not surprisingly Turkey ... is now seen as a zone of crucial strategic significance not only for the Southern Flank (of NATO) but for the West as a whole.*⁷³⁵

That case created another disagreement between the civil and military sides when Matthew Nimetz of the US State Department arrived in Turkey to negotiate the new US-Turkey Defence and Cooperation Agreement. Demirel did not allow the use of bases in Turkey by the Rapid Deployment Force and also he did not want to facilitate Greece’s return to NATO until Turkey’s demands in the Aegean region were recognised. Nimetz evaluated the case that Turkey was incapable of playing the role that Washington demanded from it with the existing government.⁷³⁶ Accordingly,

⁷³² Birand, *ibid.*: 61.

⁷³³ Ahmad, *ibid.*: 174.

⁷³⁴ Birand, *ibid.*: 93-94.

⁷³⁵ *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 15 April 1980, p.5.

⁷³⁶ Birand, *ibid.*, p. 122.

there are strong assertions that the United States supported the military intervention in 1980 by preserving its good relations with the Turkish military.⁷³⁷

The generals made a defence agreement with the United States without informing the government and accepted giving Greece some concessions to meet Washington's demands. They restored the Air Space Agreement, which had been made after the Cyprus war in 1974. On 29 March 1980, the government – with no other choice under the military pressure – signed the Turkish-American Defence Agreement.⁷³⁸ By this agreement, the military changed the direction of Turkish foreign policy. *The Economist* magazine evaluated the situation as the ending of Turkey's rapprochement with Russia and the non-aligned countries under Ecevit, moving its direction to the West again.⁷³⁹

After some preparation, on 12 September 1980, the military finally stated that they were taking power. The military did not face strong resistance and took control instantly.⁷⁴⁰ The Chief of the General Staff, Kenan Evren, made a statement to radio and television:

*The Turkish Armed Forces had no choice but usurping the rule by the purpose of maintaining the state unity ... the rights and freedoms of the people ... the security ... the happiness and prosperity of the people.*⁷⁴¹

As had been the case with the 1960 coup d'état, the military again stressed Atatürk's principles in explaining the reasons for the coup d'état. They stated that the

⁷³⁷ For instance see: Tanel Demirel, 'The Turkish Military's Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980', *Armed Forces & Society*, 29, No.2, January 2003: 257-272.

⁷³⁸ Ahmad, *ibid.*: 175.

⁷³⁹ 'Reoccidentation', *The Economist*, 5 April 1980.

⁷⁴⁰ Ersin Kalaycioglu, 'The Turkish Political System in Transition: Multi-Party Politics in the 1980s', *Current Turkish Thought*, Vol.56, Fall, 1985: 16; Nicole and Hugh Pope, *ibid.*: 141.

⁷⁴¹ Ankara Radio, 12 September 1980.

military's purpose was to protect and rebuild the democratic regime, not to break it. On 16 September 1980, Kenan Evren declared that the military was decisive to remove all the obstacles against true democracy in a way that would make no further military interventions necessary in the future. He maintained that the education system would be renewed to create democratic and nationalist generations loyal to Atatürk's principles.⁷⁴²

Accordingly, the military dissolved parliament, announced the fall of the government, and arrested the party leaders. All political parties were also abolished by law.⁷⁴³ Travelling abroad was banned, and martial law was declared in all regions. The new cabinet was established under the leadership of Bulent Ulusu, together with the chosen technocrats, the retired bureaucrats, and the generals. On 21 November 1980, the martial law authorities announced that there had been 1,245 arrests and 8,000 detentions since the intervention. The use of excessive force and torture became widespread and systematic in jails, causing the death of a number of prisoners under suspicious circumstances. Kenan Evren did not deny the existence of torture in prisons. However, he expressed that the torture was not an order that came from the high command, but was the fault of some guardians in the jails who were "mentally ill".⁷⁴⁴ The junta rule received various reactions from abroad. While Europe was extensively critical of the authoritarian nature of the regime, the US continued to maintain its moral support either by material help or verbal support to the junta.⁷⁴⁵

⁷⁴² Ahmad, *ibid.*: 183; Gerassimos Karabelias, 'The Military Institution, Atatürk's Principles, and Turkey's Sisyphean Quest for Democracy,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45, No.1, 2009: 60.

⁷⁴³ Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 63; Gerassimos Karabelias, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey, 1980-95', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 35, No.4, 1999: 134-135.

⁷⁴⁴ Mehmet Ali Birand, *12 Eylül Belgeseli* (documentary of 12 September), 1998

⁷⁴⁵ Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun, *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries*, Durham, N. Carolina, 1987, pp.328-65.

During the junta rule, the ideological divisions reappeared. There were two different groups in the military: moderates and extremists. Both sides claimed Kemalism as their main ideology. The moderates preferred a soft regime and wanted to give authority to civilian rule as soon as possible. The extremists were radical, wanting to restrict the system and to eliminate the old politicians. Furthermore, they were passionate to create a new party of their own. Kenan Evren acted as a mediator between the two camps.⁷⁴⁶ Related to this, thousands of officers -titled as the “Yetmissekizli Tegmenler (Lieutenants of Seventy Eight)” who were known as left orientated were expelled from the military.⁷⁴⁷ In the end, the junta rule became a mixture of extreme and moderate views. The junta regulations and the new constitution completely changed the direction of Turkish politics once again, as had happened after the 1960 coup; but this time toward a more authoritarian route.

The first important political change was the new economic politics. The junta leaders intended to implement a more liberal model instead of maintaining a closed economy. Therefore, Turgut Ozal was chosen as the new deputy prime minister and was made responsible for the economy. Indeed, Ozal was an old member of the Islamic National Salvation Party. Suleyman Demirel had made him responsible for economic policies during his government before the coup d'état. Ozal prepared a programme known as the 24 January Decisions, which was a package for liberalising the national economy. Ozal was known for his good relations with the IMF and the World Bank. Hence, after the 1980 coup d'état, the junta leaders assigned him

⁷⁴⁶ I. Schick and E.A. Tonak (eds.), *Turkey in Transition*, New York, 1987: 236-65.

⁷⁴⁷ Halk TV, Interview with Erol Mutercimler, ‘Today’, (accessed: 5 June 2016).

responsibility for the national economy and encouraged him to complete the 24 January Decisions to liberalise the economy.⁷⁴⁸

The second important change is the *Turkish-Islam synthesis*. The Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren considered that the nation needed new regulations to reduce the ideological polarisations. He considered that further divisions should be prevented by combining the new generations under Atatürkist ideology. He promoted a new interpretation of Kemalism: nationalist and “arguably” more tolerant to Islam.⁷⁴⁹ Evren created a new education system under the project, known as the “Turkish-Islam synthesis”, a mixture of nationalism, Kemalism and traditional Islam. He argued that Islam, Atatürkism and nationalism were the values that keep society together and prevented it from political polarisations.⁷⁵⁰ To achieve this goal, compulsory religious lessons and moral education were added to the education curriculum. Accordingly, Evren considered that if students learn Islam from its original resources, they would not get involved in violent movements.⁷⁵¹ The school texts were reconsidered with regard to the Turkish-Islam synthesis (particularly the history books) in a way that promoted Turkish nationalism, unity, and religiousness, in order to prevent ethnic divisions and Communism. The history books, this time, gave priority to Muslim-Turkish history instead of the pre-Islamic history that had been preferred in the Atatürk era.⁷⁵² Relatedly, Kenan Evren presented a religious image by quoting passages from the Koran during his speeches. The Turkish-Islam project was indeed implemented to stop leftist mobilisation and to break political

⁷⁴⁸ *The Times*, 16 September 1980; Also see: Pinar Kaya Ozcelik, ‘12 Eylülü Anlamak’ (Understanding the 12th September), *Ankara Üniversitesi Dergiler Veritabanı*, pp.77-78.

⁷⁴⁹ Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 153.

⁷⁵⁰ Nicole and Pope, *ibid.*, p.146.

⁷⁵¹ Varol, ‘The Turkish Model of Civil-Military Relations’, 740; Momayezi, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, 15-16; Cooper, *The Legacy of Atatürk: Turkish Political Structures and Policy-Making*, 121; Davison, ‘Turkey, a ‘Secular’ State?’, 338; Daver, ‘Secularism in Turkey’, 38.

⁷⁵² *Ibid.*: 32.

divisions. The military authorities saw Islam and nationalism as an “antidote” against Communism, but, in the following decades, it made an unexpected effect by strengthening political Islam.⁷⁵³ The 1980-83 period of junta rule blurred the clear borders between state and religion, leading to the rise of political Islam. Following the junta, female religious students with headscarves began to appear in the universities, which gained a symbolic value for the Islamist movement in a short time and led to major tensions between the secularists and the Islamists.⁷⁵⁴ As we will see in the following sections, political Islam would become a serious threat to democracy, which eventually led the 1997 “post-modern coup” without directly taking over the rule.

The third and perhaps the most important change within this period of junta rule was the new constitution. The new constitution did not only bring fundamental changes for the future of Turkish politics; but it also put civilians under a stricter military control with a number of changes in the execution, legislation and judge. These changes can be summarised as increasing the president’s power, restriction of democratic representation and political activism, supervision over media and education as well as increasing the military’s influence in the NSC. As has been mentioned before, the military authorities began to consider the extended liberal rights of the 1961 constitution too much for Turkey, in that the society was not ready to absorb such civil rights and freedoms. Hence, the military authorities limited some of these liberties during the 1971 intervention. Yet, this constitution, according to the leaders of 1980 coup d’état, should have been completely replaced with a more restrictive one. Hence, one year after the coup d’état, in October 1981, the National

⁷⁵³ Tanel Demirel, ‘Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40, No.1, 2004: 136; ‘Politics and the Turkish Military,’ *Strategic Comments*, 3, No.5, 1997: 1; Karabelias, 2008: 9-10.

⁷⁵⁴ Mellon, ‘Islamism, Kemalism and the Future of Turkey’, 77. For a detailed analysis of the beginning of ‘the headscarf issue’ in Turkey during the 1980s see: Olson (1985).

Security Council appointed a consultative assembly to form a new constitution.⁷⁵⁵ The new constitution was accepted by a great majority of votes on 18 October 1982. The new constitution has occasionally been defined as having a “Gaullist character”, since it has strengthened the authority of the president by conferring upon him important powers such as dissolving parliament and the right to call a general election.⁷⁵⁶ Kenan Evren largely benefited from these regulations by becoming the new president of Turkey in 1982. He remained in the position until 1989.⁷⁵⁷ Additionally, the military’s supervision over the media and universities was tightened by the establishment of the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTUK) and the Council of Higher Education (YOK).⁷⁵⁸ All political parties were abolished and the new political organisations and parties were put under strict control. The leaders of the previous parties were banned from involvement in active politics for 10 years. The election threshold for entering parliament was lifted to 10 per cent of the votes, to prevent the involvement of excessively ideological parties. They were not allowed to establish supplementary branches such as women’s or youth organisations. Article 69 prohibited trade unions from pursuing political activities or getting support from political parties.⁷⁵⁹ More importantly, as aforementioned in the beginning of this section, the National Security Council

⁷⁵⁵ Momayezi, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, 11-12. (For a detailed analysis of the 12 September reforms, constitution, and NSC’s powers see: Sakallioglu, ‘The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy’; Tachau and Heper, ‘The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey’, 28-29.

⁷⁵⁶ Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, 37, 45; Heper and Evin, *ibid.*: 170.

⁷⁵⁷ Ahmad, *ibid.*, p.186.

⁷⁵⁸ F. Michael Wuthrich, ‘Commercial Media, the Military, and Society in Turkey during Failed and Successful Interventions’, *Turkish Studies*, 11, No.2, 2010: 222.

⁷⁵⁹ Ersin Kalaycioglu, *1960 Sonrasi Siyasal Hayatina Bir Bakis: Demokrasi, Neo-Patrimonyalizm ve Istikrar* (A view to the Turkish political life after 1960: Neo-Patrimonialism and Stability), Universite Ogretim Uyeleri Dernegi (The Association of University education members); *Tarih ve Demokrasi: Tarik Zafer Tuna’ya Armagan* (History and Democracy, a gift to Tarik Zafer Tuna), p.22; Heper and Evin, *ibid.*: 126-127. Heper and Evin, *ibid.*: 63; Gerassimos Karabelias, ‘The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey, 1980-95’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 35, No.4, 1999: 134-135.

became a military dominated body with new changes. Now, the NSC would be composed of five military members and four civilians. Additionally, with the article 118 of the new 1982 Constitution, the government would give priority to the NSC decisions.⁷⁶⁰

To stabilise the new regulations, the military remained in power for three years and completed the intended changes in politics. As a result, the 1971 and 1980 interventions brought fundamental changes both for military culture and state politics. The military distinctly moved away from its Kemalist legacy by encouraging a more liberal economy than statism, and implementing extended restrictions on civilian rights and liberties. Over this process, the Turkish military gave a relatively more conservative, status quo-ist, authoritarian image in contrast to its revolutionist past. Despite the stated commitment to democracy and civilian rule, most of the practices during the junta rule, and the new legal regulations that they made, were explicitly anti-democratic, oppressive, and authoritarian.

Indeed, the military discourse was still dominated by strong Kemalist and secular references throughout this process. Yet, in reality, some of the practices of the 1971 and 1980 juntas have clear contradictions with Atatürk's principles. As has also been mentioned, the Turkish-Islam synthesis and the encouragements for a more liberal economy are explicitly contrary to Atatürk's statism and secularism principles. But the most important conclusion of this process, for the purpose of this thesis, is the increasing religious populism. As aforementioned, starting from the Turgut Ozal era in 1983, Islam would be a more promising tool for the party leaders to secure votes from the conservative electors. The military, ironically, became responsible for this development by opening the paths with its Turkish-Islam synthesis. That

⁷⁶⁰ Sarigil, 'The Turkish Military', 9. Burak, 'The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics', 151.

development is particularly important, because the military's alleged commitment to secular and democratic norms, at this stage, did not go further than legitimising their interventions in the eyes of the people and politicians. After having been an industrial-military complex through the creation of OYAK, and after capitalism and anti-Communism had become embedded in military culture, the military's revolutionary attempts for intertwining secularism with democratisation weakened and secularist discourse became a tool for maintaining the military's current status and the regime's capitalist character. In the following decades, the Islamic Welfare Party would increase its votes and become one of the leading parties in Turkish politics. This result was perhaps unpredicted by the military authorities in the beginning, but, throughout the process, the Kemalist revolutionism would re-increase its impact in military culture, while strengthening the level of anti-Americanism and anti-Islamism.

By and large, I associated the period between 1971 and 1973 with the *negative-undemocratic relationship* in that the memorandum in 1971 had broken the natural progress of democracy and had caused severe human rights breaches. On the other hand, after the presidential election in 1973, we may observe a notable decrease in military interventions, with civilian rule continuing until the 1980 coup d'état without any break. Therefore, the process between 1973 and 1980 can be associated with the *positive-democratic relationship*.⁷⁶¹ Nevertheless, it is not likely to associate this temporary depoliticisation with a Huntington type of professional military ethic. Indeed, it is more meaningful to see this process as a short-term retreat to see whether or not the civilians had the ability to handle the problems. The military's gradual involvement in politics, as a result of the increasing national disorder,

⁷⁶¹ See: the Analytical Table 2 (275-278).

evidences this. Additionally, with the new constitution in 1982, the military further increased its political legitimacy to supervise politics after stepping back. Accordingly, the junta rule between 1980 and 1983 again can be considered as a *negative-undemocratic relationship* because it inflicted serious harm to democracy by dissolving the parliament, censoring the media, and closing the political parties and organisations. Additionally, the 1982 constitution, made under the supervision of the junta leaders, noticeably limited the democratic rights and liberties that had been gained previously, in the 1961 constitution. Overall, the process cannot be explained by the objective and subjective models of Huntington. As a result, the military culture was still distant from absorbing a professional ethos regarding normative and technical terms.

6.5 THE OZAL ERA

The first general elections since the coup d'état were in 1983; the Motherland Party (MP) (Anavatan Partisi) won the elections with 45 per cent of the votes. Turgut Ozal became the new prime minister. Ozal's term is known for several successful attempts to keep the military under civilian control. Indeed, the election victory in 1983 was against the military's favoured candidate.⁷⁶² Relatedly, Ozal's term saw a silent battle between the military and civilians for dominance. Hence, Sarigil defines this strife for getting the upper hand as a *tug-of-war*.⁷⁶³ After coming to power, the Ozal government considered that some of the junta regulations were too excessive and

⁷⁶² Nilufer Narli, 'Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-Military Relations, 1980–2002', *Turkish Studies*, 12, No.2, 2011: 215-25; Guney and Karatekelioglu, 'Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations', 444-445; Nicholas Danforth, 'Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP', *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 7, No.3, 2008: 88; Karabelias, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey, 1980-95', 137; Harris, 'Military Coups and Turkish Democracy, 1960–1980', 211.

⁷⁶³ Sarigil, 'The Turkish Military'.

anti-democratic. Thus, Ozal argued that some regulations should be reconsidered for restoring civilian authority and demilitarising the decision-making.⁷⁶⁴

Apart from the developments in CIV-MIL relations, the Ozal Era saw important social and political transformations. Ozal passed several laws to strengthen the liberal economy, such as encouraging small and medium business entrepreneurs in Anatolia. Additionally, Ozal made important attempts to strengthen civilian associations. That is to say, Ozal created powerful civilian bodies to challenge the military's influence over domestic politics. The liberalised atmosphere following his economic reforms arguably led both civilian and military authorities to re-question the authoritarian and repressive methods of past junta rules. Hence, one can suggest that the liberalisation during Ozal's government made the military more tolerant toward civilians and made them reconsider their main responsibilities. As a result, the 1980 junta became successful in one respect, because it created a politically more homogenous, liberal, and less politically inclined society. Yet, this time, the negative result came from an unpredicted source: political Islam.⁷⁶⁵ The rise of the above mentioned political Islam was tolerated by Ozal arguably because of voting concerns.⁷⁶⁶ Indeed, Ozal himself was a former member of the Islamist National Salvation Party, and he had refused a very detailed package which was prepared and suggested by the military to protect secularism.⁷⁶⁷

Additionally, Ozal's attempts for curbing the military's influence also targeted the military's rooted taboos in foreign policy. He offered alternative solutions to the Kurdish problem and the conflicts with Greece. He declined the military's offer to

⁷⁶⁴ Gerassimos Karabelias, 'Dictating the Upper Tide: Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Ozal Decade, 1993-2003', *Turkish Studies*, 9, No.3, 2008; Guney and Karatekelioglu, 'Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations', 444-445.

⁷⁶⁵ Narli, 'Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-Military Relations, 1980-2002', 219.

⁷⁶⁶ Gareth Jenkins, 'The Turkish Military's Impact on Policy', *The Adelphi Papers*, 2 May 2008, p.60; Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military*, 131-135.

⁷⁶⁷ Jenkins, 'The Turkish Military's Impact on Policy': 60.

appoint General Necdet Ozturun to the position of Chief of the General Staff in August 1987 and instead appointed his own candidate, General Necip Torumtay. However, during the Gulf War, Ozal had a disagreement with the new Chief of the General Staff Torumtay, and this strife resulted in Torumtay's resignation.⁷⁶⁸ Additionally, Ozal made an agreement with the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou for halting Air Force exercises over the Aegean Sea without asking the military authorities.⁷⁶⁹ His other great challenge to the military supremacy was to be elected as Turkey's eighth president in 1993, and taking this position away from the military. After Ozal, the presidents have always been chosen from the civilian population. There are also ideas that Ozal's one major purpose was subordinating the military to the Ministry of Defence rather than to the prime minister. However, he passed away in 1993, while he was still president, without achieving that.⁷⁷⁰

In general, the military's opinions about Ozal's policies tended to be negative. The sudden rise of political Islam and the Kurdish separation movement as well as the disagreements during the Gulf War caused serious tensions between Turgut Ozal and the military authorities. Accordingly, these developments made some changes to the political position of the military. The rise of political Islam and the Kurdish separation movement – particularly after the end of Cold War – arguably caused a remarkable increase in the number of Kemalist revolutionist officers. The rise of political Islam not only affected the state departments but it conceivably caused a significant penetration into the military by the Fethullah Gulen brotherhood. Indeed, the assumed Islamic penetration into the state departments and the military would

⁷⁶⁸ Karaosmanoglu, 'The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey', 211; Gerassimos Karabelias, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey, 1980-95', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 35, No.4, 1999: 137-138.

⁷⁶⁹ Narli, 'Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-Military Relations, 1980-2002', 219.

⁷⁷⁰ Hasan Celal Guzel, 'What Ozal Would Have Done If He Was Still Alive?' *Radikal*, November 12, 2009.

alarm the commanders for taking more radical measures against the rise of political Islam throughout the following process. Also, in the short term, the PKK would much increase its threat in south-eastern Turkey and would gain remarkable power in the region.

In addition to these developments, the Kemalist officers began to be more sceptical against the United States due to its tolerance toward political Islam and the PKK. Specifically, a new group of officers who were later titled “Ulusalcı Subaylar” (Nationalist Officers) increased their impact, especially among the younger officers, who are known as staunchly secular, arguably anti-capitalist, and with some sympathies for the Eurasian bloc.⁷⁷¹ The growing silent tension between the two NATO allies Turkey and the United States finally caused the notorious Hood Event in 2003.⁷⁷²

Lastly, it would be difficult to associate the Ozal era with a Huntington type of professional ethic. The military was still politically active enough to bring Ozal a package deal to stop the rise of political Islam. Yet, it may be worthwhile to mention that Turgut Ozal managed to reduce military influence over politics (at least) to a certain degree. On the other hand, the reducing military influence in politics led to the strengthening of political Islam. As a result, Ozal’s era can be defined as an example of the *negative-democratic relationship*.⁷⁷³

6.6 INTERVENTION OF 1997 (28 FEBRUARY)

The 1997 intervention is indirectly related to the 1980 coup d’état. This intervention is mostly referred to as the *post-modern coup*, in that the military did not directly

⁷⁷¹ The Nationalist Officers will be discussed in the next chapter while analysing European Union membership.

⁷⁷² The details of the Hood Event, the events that led it and its consequences are given in the Chapter 7.

⁷⁷³ See: Analytical Table 2 (275-78).

take over the rule; rather, it obliged the government to retire. Also, the military received large support from civil institutions, media, and TUSIAD (the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association). The post-modern coup is related to the 1980 coup d'état, because the military tried to remove some of its assumed mistakes of the junta rule. The rapid increase in the Islamic movement allowed the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Party) to come first in the 1995 elections.⁷⁷⁴ As has been noted before, some civilian and military authorities saw the junta rule under Kenan Evren's leadership as highly responsible for that development. The encouragements for teaching traditional Islamic thoughts, the emphasis on religion in the national education syllabus, opening of the Imam and Preacher Schools (Imam-Hatips), and the Quran courses naturally accelerated the rise of political Islam.⁷⁷⁵ It is also possible to think that Islam became a new hope for those in poverty, given the suppression of political ideologies during the junta rule. The Welfare Party was indeed the continuation of the disbanded National Salvation Party. The party was known for its anti-secular rhetoric, which promoted the unity of Islam instead of secular Kemalist nationalism. In this way, they also looked to gain support from the Kurdish people and smaller Sunni Muslim communities by excluding the Alevis and non-Muslims. The party was also known for its strong anti-American and anti-Western discourse.⁷⁷⁶

The aforementioned developments during the Ozal term, especially the changing political structure after the end of Cold War, made important changes to the military's ideological position. The emphasis on Atatürk's principles was

⁷⁷⁴ For rise of Islamist movement see: Karabelias, 'The Military Institution, Atatürk's Principles, and Turkey's Sisyphean Quest for Democracy', 60-63.

⁷⁷⁵ 'Politics and the Turkish Military', *Strategic Comments*, 3, No.5, 1997: 1-2.

⁷⁷⁶ The Islamist movement and their 'National Outlook' ideology is discussed in the Chapters 4 and 7; therefore, in this chapter, just a summary is given.

significantly strengthened.⁷⁷⁷ The left-wing intellectuals and the military approached each other just as during the 1960 coup d'état. While the left-wing intellectuals were most often recalling Atatürk's words about "non-alignment" and "anti-imperialism" to question the Western policies, the Nationalist (Ulusalcı) Officers, in the meantime, were increasing their influence within the military. Some of the nationalist officers were explicitly pointing out their disappointment regarding the US's assumed negligence against Kurdish separatism and political Islam in Turkey. Accordingly, throughout the 1990s, the National Security Council increased its efforts to find solutions to the rise of political Islam. Indeed, some of these instructions had already been mentioned in the package refused by Ozal in the late 1980s.

Again, during these years, the people, particularly from urban areas, joined the local religious communities known as the "religious brotherhoods" (Tarikats). Some religious communities grew rapidly; the most famous of them was the *Fethullah Gulen Brotherhood Movement* (also known as the Cemaat or Hizmet), which established strong connections with every institution of the state, including the police, military, Assembly, media, sports, and business. This ideology was a mixture of moderate Islam and nationalism, which is closer to Erbakan's *National Outlook*. The Fethullah followers are known for their alleged intention of establishing an Islamic state based on sharia law.⁷⁷⁸ Fethullah Gulen's private schools raised a new, elite younger generation who are intellectual and Islam-orientated. The Islamic

⁷⁷⁷ Esra Ozyurek, 'Miniaturizing Atatürk Privatization of State Imagery and Ideology in Turkey', *American Ethnologist*, 31, No.3, August 2004: 374-91. (In this article, the author argues that, starting from the late 80s, not just the military but also the secularist people (even right-wing liberals) strengthened their Kemalist emphasis. The author claims that secularists tried to draw a new Atatürk image which was more humanist, moderate, and respectful to Islamic values, and that this new Atatürk model was promoted by the media: TV, biographies, and movies.)

⁷⁷⁸ Nukhet Ahu Sandal, 'The Clash of Public Theologies? Rethinking the Concept of Religion in Global Politics', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol: 37, No:1*, 2012: 66-83, p.75; Roger Coate and Markus Thiel, *Identity Politics in the Age of Globalisation*, First Forum Press, 2010: 131-153; Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, 65-66. (The Fethullah Gulen movement created a big tension and battle between the AKP and Fethullah's followers, between 2013 and 2015. This resulted in a big operation to eliminate the Fetullah communities.)

intellectuals who were educated in the Fethullah schools later became very effective in politics. Simultaneously, the religious brotherhoods provided a big support for the Welfare Party. Indeed, in one of my interviews, the retired general from the Air Force Bulent Tuzcu stated that, following the 1980-83 junta rule, the Fethullah Organisation made a severe effort to penetrate into the military by indoctrinating their ideals to the young officers.⁷⁷⁹

In these days, there were several assassination attempts directed at intellectuals who are considered as staunchly secular, including Ugur Mumcu, Bahriye Ucoklar, and Turan Dursun.⁷⁸⁰ However, the biggest Islamic attack came with the *Madimak Attacks*. In 1993, a group of intellectuals who were considered as staunchly secular, including the very famous left-wing writer and atheist Aziz Nesin, came to Sivas City to celebrate a cultural event known as the “Pir Sultan Abdal Festivals” and stayed in the Hotel Madimak for a couple of days. Islamists gathered and attacked the hotel by burning, leaving more than 30 people to die. These events demonstrated that the Islamic threat was now at a highly dangerous level.

After coming to power by way of a coalition with Tansu Ciller’s True Path Party (TPP), the Welfare Party began to show their opposition to secularism explicitly. They no longer hid their criticism against the republican regime and Atatürk’s principles. A series of domestic and foreign events increased the military’s fear of the sharia threat: in foreign policy, between 2 October and 7 October 1996, the leader of the Welfare Party, Necmettin Erbakan, made visits to several Islamic countries, including Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria. He made an agreement with Iran for a natural

⁷⁷⁹ Interview with Bulent Tuzcu.

⁷⁸⁰ Ugur Mumcu was known for his investigations about illegal organisations, including Islamic ones. Bahriye Ucoklar was an Islamic expert who was known as a firm Muslim believer and, at the same time, a supporter of Atatürk’s revolutions. Finally, Turan Dursun was known for his strict criticisms against Islam and the prophet Mohammad.

gas transfer. In Libya, Kaddafi's speech about Turkey was hardly criticised by the opponent parties and the press. Kaddafi accused Turkey of being a NATO member and repressing the Kurdish minority. He also accused Turkey of being the ally of Israel.⁷⁸¹ In domestic policy also, on 6 October 1996, an extreme religious group made demonstrations in front of a mosque by shouting slogans in favour of a "sharia" regime.⁷⁸² Again, on 10 November 1996, the Chief of Kayseri government, from the Welfare Party, made a formal speech promoting "jihad".⁷⁸³ Finally, on 11 January 1997, Erbakan gave a dinner to the leaders of the religious brotherhoods during Ramadan.⁷⁸⁴

These and some other events led the military commanders to arrange a meeting in Golcuk to discuss the future of the secular regime.⁷⁸⁵ This time the military looked for public and media support by considering the negative consequences of the repressive junta regime in 1980. The military found vast support from the civilians, including the civil society institutions, Kemalists, leftists, academics, some businessmen, the trade union leaders, and the media.⁷⁸⁶ The conditions were closer to the environment just prior to the 1960 coup d'état; the support for the military was even stronger, because the case was in favour of most of the right-wing parties, especially the Motherland Party. Therefore, some secular right-wing parties

⁷⁸¹ Mehmet Ali Birand, *28 Subat Belgeseli* (The Documentary of 28 February), 2012.

⁷⁸² *Aydinlik*, '28 Subata Adim Adim' (Step by step to 28 February), Available at: <http://www.aydinlikgazete.com/yazarlar/cetn-doan/21585-28-subata-adim-adim-.html> (accessed: 13 May 2013).

⁷⁸³ *Hurriyet*, 'RP'li Baskana Hapis' (The governor from the RP is going to jail). Available at: <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/1997/10/10/13261.asp> (accessed: 10 October 1997).

⁷⁸⁴ For a summary of the events that led to the military intervention see: Güney and Karatekelioğlu, 'Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations', 447-448.

⁷⁸⁵ Birand, *The Documentary of 28 February*.

⁷⁸⁶ Güney and Karatekelioğlu, 'Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations', 448-449. (In the text, it was argued that the military considered this intervention as 'democratic' because of the large civilian support; therefore, the 1997 intervention was mostly titled as the 'post-modern coup'.); Heper and Güney, 'The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy', 647; Demirel, 'Soldiers and Civilians', 137-138; Aydınli, 'A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey', 585.

supported the military. In addition, the attacks of the PKK caused the deaths of thousands and left the public angry against the government for becoming ineffective.⁷⁸⁷ On 4 February 1997, the soldiers performed a military march with 20 tanks and 15 military vehicles in *Sincan* to give the message of intervention if the Islamists were to go further. However, some of the religious groups did not step back; indeed, they explicitly declared that they wanted sharia during the demonstrations.⁷⁸⁸

On 28 February 1997, the National Security Council arranged an emergency meeting that lasted over nine hours. After the meeting, the military authorities spoke to the press using a strict tone, saying that secularism was the basic core of democracy and law.⁷⁸⁹ The National Security Council issued a list of the 18 decisions – which is known as *the National Security Council Decisions* – to the government, stressing that the decisions had to be put into practice to protect secularism. The 18 decisions of the NSC made it an obligation that the private schools of the religious communities (especially the cemaat of Fethullah) be supervised; the education system should be reformed according to Atatürk's education reform (Tevhidi Tedrisat); the primary schools should continue for eight years without giving a break, to prevent transitions to the Imam-Hatip schools; the Quran reading courses should be under supervision; the religious brotherhoods should be completely removed; the Islamist media should be under supervision; religious-based clothes (hijab, turban, headscarf) should be banned in official places; the attacks over Atatürk's personality and his revolutions should be blocked...⁷⁹⁰ These decisions were dictated to the government, leaving

⁷⁸⁷ Narli, 'Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-Military Relations, 1980-2002', 221.

⁷⁸⁸ Karaosmanoglu, 'The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey', 641. *Milliyet*, 24 February 1997, p.3 (Turkish newspaper *Milliyet*).

⁷⁸⁹ See: Birand, *ibid*.

⁷⁹⁰ Umit Cizre, 'Demythologizing the National Security Council Concept: The Case of Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.57, No.2, 2003, pp.213-29; Gareth Jenkins, 'Continuity and Change:

them with no option but to sign. Therefore, some defined this intervention as a *post-modern coup* or a *softened coup* as they did not take over the rule directly. In the following period, Necmettin Erbakan agreed to sign the declaration. The Welfare Party was closed down by the Constitutional Court.⁷⁹¹ During the process, the military continued to benefit from a strong civil support, mostly from the Kemalist intellectuals, the media, and some civilian organisations. The support even caused some authorities to put the intervention on a democratic basis. This intervention was indeed theoretically conforming to the revolutionist tradition of the military, because the military prepared a reform package for protecting democracy from excessive ideologies. However, in practice, the intervention has not changed Turkish politics so much – apart from breaking the democratic process – because most of the 28 February decisions were not practised by the following governments. In the end, the *Justice and Development Party* (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or AKP) came to power in 2002 as the successor of the disbanded Welfare Party. Additionally, after the 1997 intervention, public support for military interventions decreased to its lowest point in history.⁷⁹²

Prospects for civil-military relations in Turkey', *International Affairs*, 83, 2, 2007: 345-346; Mehran Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,' *Political Science Quarterly*, 115, No.1, March 2000: 74; Michaud-Emin, 'The Restructuring of the Military High Command in the Seventh Harmonization Package and Its Ramifications for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey', 37-38; Momayezi, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey', 18-21, 118-119; Heper and Guney, 'The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy', 645; David Pion-Berlin, 'Turkish Civil-Military Relations: A Latin American Comparison', *Turkish Studies*, 12, No.2, 2011: 300. (The measures were like an attempt from the military to correct the mistakes they made during the 1980 junta; see: Umit Cizre-Sakallioglu and Menderes Cinar, 'Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process', *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102, No.2, 2003: 312.)

⁷⁹¹ Yaprak Gursoy, 'The Final Curtain for the Turkish Armed Forces? Civil-Military Relations in View of the 2011 General Elections', *Turkish Studies*, Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2012, p. 193; Jenkins (2008): 62-64.

⁷⁹² David Pion-Berlin, 'Turkish Civil-Military Relations: A Latin American Comparison', *Turkish Studies*, 12, No.2, 2011: 300.

In the final analysis, the impacts of the post-modern coup are arguable. At one point, the military, following the intervention, suggested an effective solution to the increasing Islamic threat by the NSC decisions. On the other hand, most of these practices could not be carried out by the subsequent governments. Additionally, the AKP came to power in 2002 by more than 30 per cent of the vote. Relatedly, some politicians who were banned, such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was imprisoned after the intervention, came back to active politics more powerfully than before. As a result, the long-term effects of the military intervention did not bring any contribution to Turkish politics apart from breaking the natural progress of democracy.⁷⁹³ Overall, it is more consistent to associate the 1990s with the *variable relationship*, in which the civil-military relationship did not follow a stable line.⁷⁹⁴ In accordance with this, the civil-military relationship in this process cannot be explained with Huntington's two models of civilian control and the theory of professional ethic. In addition to this, as mentioned by Abidin Onen, a retired colonel from the Air Force, following the end of the Cold War, some Turkish officers were sent to Europe and the United States to acquire education according to NATO standards. Additionally, the military were involved in a number of NATO campaigns and manoeuvres.⁷⁹⁵ Hence, one may suggest that the process saw an increase in the level of *technical professionalism* but it did not bring an increase in the normative understanding of professional ethos.

⁷⁹³ For a brief consideration of the process see: Satana, 2008, p. 367.

⁷⁹⁴ See: Analytical Table 2, p (275-278).

⁷⁹⁵ Interview with Abidin Onen.

Analytical Table 2:

1950-1957 (The military's political activism since the 19 th century finally led Turkey to be a pluralist democratic regime)	Variable (This process saw a division between the different factions within the military, namely radicals and moderates as well as the Democrat party sympathisers and the Republican party sympathisers)	Democratic Republic (Starting from 1950, Turkey began to witness a complete plural democracy experience with proper elections, ruling and opposition parties)	Liberal Economy (The Democrat Party government replaced RP's closed model with more liberal policies)	Moderate Secularism (The Democrat Party implemented several practices which were arguably anti-secular and aimed to gain the support of religious voters)	Mixed Nationalism (Atatürk's mixed (primordial and modern) nationalist model continued to remain as a state policy)	Variable Relationship (While some groups of officers were remaining neutral, some others attempted to create juntaist organisations. Civ-mil relations remained at a volatile level)
1957-1960 (The military's political activism started to grow, a remarkable number of officers tended to see the secular regime as under risk)	Revolutionist (Kemalist revolutionism became the observable discourse against the DP rule)	Authoritarian Republic (The Democrat Party began to increase its oppression to opponents, including the media, education and opposition party)	Liberal Economy (The Democrat Party's liberal policies continued to develop)	Moderate Secularism (The Democrat Party's increasing emphasis on Islam further disturbed the secular wing as well as the military)	Mixed Nationalism	Variable Relationship (The relations between the military and politics continued to remain at a somewhat inexplicable and unpredictable level)
1960-1961 (Coup d'état in 1960) (The increasing political activism of the military led them to overthrow the government. The reason was given as "protecting the secular democracy")	Revolutionist	Authoritarian Republic (The junta rule applied significant authoritarian practices, especially toward the DP wing)	Statism (The junta rule presented a relatively more statist image)	Strict Secularism (The junta rule intensified the secular tone in their discourse, arguably to prevent possible religious abusing by the future governments)	Mixed Nationalism	Positive-Undemocratic Relationship (Although the coup d'état and the following junta rule are explicitly anti-democratic, this intervention blocked the rise of an anti-democratic regime. As a result, this intervention protected the democracy from abuses)

<p>1961-1965 (Post-Junta)</p> <p>(There were conflicting factions within the military, the moderate wing officers became the dominant group who aimed to give rule to the civilians as soon as possible)</p>	<p>Variable</p> <p>(Military culture became an arena of crossing identities between the radical juntaists and moderates. Radicals attempted to make two coups d'états but were unsuccessful, because moderate officers did not give support)</p>	<p>Authoritarian Republic</p> <p>(The military made a new constitution in 1961 with relatively extended individual rights and freedoms. The military left the rule to the civilians, but continued its strict "supervision")</p>	<p>Statism</p> <p>(The Democrat Party's previous liberal attempts were remarkably slowed down by the junta and successor Republican Party).</p>	<p>Strict Secularism</p> <p>(Both the military's and ruling Republican Party's high sensitivities in terms of protecting the secular dynamics of the state continued to exist)</p>	<p>Mixed Nationalism</p>	<p>Variable Relationship</p> <p>(Both military culture and Turkish politics showed a changeable character. Hence, it may be feasible to categorise this process under "variable relationship", in that the military's supervision on politics made either positive and negative impacts on democracy)</p>
<p>1965-1970</p> <p>(The military officially remained as the ultimate guardian but did not involve itself in politics. Given the liberal 1961 constitution, Turkey's political culture showed a relative increase. Universities were rapidly politicised and divided into ideological camps)</p>	<p>Variable</p> <p>(The number of anti-Communist, status quo-ist and arguably less democratic officers tended to increase. A silent strife between a revolutionist and guardian officers became observable)</p>	<p>Democratic Republic</p> <p>(The 1961 constitution brought Turkey a more democratic atmosphere. Political culture was relatively increased. However, it also created a negative result by making Turkey an arena of crashing ideologies)</p>	<p>Liberal Economy</p> <p>(In 1965, the Justice Party, which was the successor of the closed Democrat Party, began to implement more liberal policies)</p>	<p>Democratic Secularism</p> <p>(Arguably, this period can be seen as an example of a more democratic process regarding secularism, in that parties did not apply much religious populism. Indeed, a remarkable number of people in poverty embraced socialism instead of Islam)</p>	<p>Mixed Nationalism</p> <p>(The official nationalist policy of the state remained as a mixture of primordial and modern nationalism. In general, the Kurdish nationalism was still weak. Also, the ultra-nationalist mobilisation (Ulkuçuler) began to be organised under the Nationalist Action Party)</p>	<p>Positive-Democratic Relationship</p> <p>(For a couple of years, democracy functioned properly without high military supervision and without a serious threat to the democratic and secular dynamics of state)</p>

<p>1971-1973</p> <p>(Increasing political activism started a civilian conflict between rival ideologies. The military forced the gov to retire)</p>	<p>Guardian</p> <p>(After an unsuccessful coup attempt by revolutionists the guardian wing took over, removing important revolutionist officers)</p>	<p>Authoritarian Republic</p> <p>(The military ruled the state indirectly by a veto regime. The military practices became highly critical in terms of human rights within these years)</p>	<p>Statism</p> <p>(The technocrat government, which is created and supervised by the military, softened some of the liberal policies of the Justice Party)</p>	<p>Strict Secularism</p> <p>(Secularist emphases were enlarged during martial law. The Islamic-orientated National Order Party was closed down)</p>	<p>Mixed Nationalism</p> <p>(A mixed nationalist model remained as the official state doctrine)</p>	<p>Negative-Undemocratic Relationship</p> <p>(The 71 military memo blocked a democratic regime. The following junta practices harmed the state's democratic character)</p>
<p>1973-1980</p> <p>(The 1971 intervention could not stop the political struggles between civilians. Turkey was gradually drifting into a civil war)</p>	<p>Guardian</p> <p>(After the 1973 presidential elections, the military's impact in politics saw a relative decrease until the eve of the 1980 coup d'état)</p>	<p>Democratic Republic</p> <p>(Increase in political culture and the existence of different parties from different ideologies led Turkey to be more democratic)</p>	<p>Statism</p> <p>(Statism mostly remained as the dominant economic policy)</p>	<p>Democratic Secularism</p> <p>(Political Islam was not very strong yet. Leftist mobilisation became a new hope for some people in poverty)</p>	<p>Mixed Nationalism</p> <p>(There was not any change in the official nationalist policy of state. The Kurdish separatism began to grow)</p>	<p>Positive-Democratic Relationship</p> <p>(Between the years 1973 and 1978, the military did not greatly involve itself in politics. Democratic mechanisms continued to work properly)</p>
<p>1980-1983 (Coup d'état in 1980)</p> <p>(The civil conflict between the right and left began to cause deaths and violence, the military took over the rule and dissolved parliament)</p>	<p>Guardian</p> <p>(The junta rule lasted for three years. A new constitution was made in 1982, limiting some liberal regulations of the 1961 constitution)</p>	<p>Authoritarian Republic</p> <p>(The military rule between 1980 and 1983 has received strict criticisms due to its death penalties, alleged tortures, suppression over media, education and political institutions)</p>	<p>Liberal Economy</p> <p>(The Junta rule promoted a more liberal economy instead of statism)</p>	<p>Strict Secularism</p> <p>(Although the military promoted the Turkish-Islam synthesis, still they preserved their strict intolerance against Islamists)</p>	<p>Mixed Nationalism</p> <p>(Indeed, the Turkish-Islam synthesis brought a new dimension to the identity issue by closing Islam and nationalism to each other)</p>	<p>Negative-Undemocratic Relationship</p> <p>(The intervention affected democracy negatively. The new constitution and regulations put serious restrictions on democratic rights and freedoms)</p>

<p><i>1983-1991</i></p> <p><i>(The limitations in the new constitution caused a relative weakening in political culture. Political activism of the 60s and 70s lost ground. The Turk-Islam synthesis of the junta rule made political Islam more appealing for the people in poverty)</i></p>	<p><i>Guardian</i></p> <p><i>(The military protected its guardian status. On the other hand, the process saw a silent conflict between civilians and military to be the dominant side. Furthermore, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal managed to limit the military's influence in some important matters)</i></p>	<p><i>Democratic Republic</i></p> <p><i>(The military left rule to the civilians. Turgut Ozal became the new civil prime minister by defeating the military's favoured candidate in the elections. Afterwards, democracy started to work properly)</i></p>	<p><i>Liberal Economy</i></p> <p><i>(For the first time in Turkish history, a liberal economy became so effective. During Turgut Ozal's era, a private sector was rapidly developed, bigger companies were founded, the economy was opened to the foreign investors)</i></p>	<p><i>Moderate Secularism</i></p> <p><i>(Due to the military's Turkish-Islam synthesis and Turgut Ozal's tolerance of political Islam, secularism became more vulnerable)</i></p>	<p><i>Mixed Nationalism</i></p> <p><i>(Officially, nationalism continued to be defined within Atatürkist terms. However, the armed Kurdish separation movement continued to grow. Especially, the Kurdish wing found the new regulations of the junta rule as discriminatory against their identity)</i></p>	<p><i>Negative-Democratic Relationship</i></p> <p><i>(The military's loosening supervision against Ozal's charismatic personality caused political Islam to grow. Ironically, the military was itself responsible for this development. The Turk-Islam synt had caused an 'unexpected' result for the military by opening the paths for political Islam)</i></p>
<p><i>1991-1997</i></p> <p><i>(The end of the Cold War pushed the military into an identity search. Starting from 1996, the military recalled its praetorian role against the Islamists)</i></p>	<p><i>Variable</i></p> <p><i>(The post-Cold War process saw an identity search among the officers. But, the rise of political Islam caused a relative shift toward Kemalist-revolutionism in military culture)</i></p>	<p><i>Democratic Republic</i></p> <p><i>(Democracy continued to work properly without any military interference until 1997)</i></p>	<p><i>Liberal Economy</i></p> <p><i>(The liberal economy, which had been rooted by Ozal, continued to be effective in national politics)</i></p>	<p><i>Moderate Secularism</i></p> <p><i>(Due to the rise of political Islam, the secular nature of the regime faced often serious challenges)</i></p>	<p><i>Mixed Nationalism</i></p> <p><i>(The PKK further increased its threat, the south-eastern borders of Turkey became a battleground between the Turkish army and Kurdish separatists)</i></p>	<p><i>Variable Relationship</i></p> <p><i>(After the Cold War, the military was in an identity search between a more professional role and guardianship Hence, relations were unstable and unpredictable)</i></p>

6.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter has explained an important period in the history of Turkey, in which the military played a leading role in shaping Turkish politics. The period starts with the Democrat Party rule and ends with the 1997 post-modern coup. At the same time, this chapter is significant toward answering the main research question, in that there is variability in military culture and in civil-military relations. By and large, there are two main contributions in the chapter. Firstly, the chapter has evaluated the reasons

behind military politicisation shortly after the Democratic Party's rule. Indeed, the military was not depoliticised during Atatürk's and İnönü's presidencies. There were several factors preventing the military from arbitrary moves. Firstly, the military is both ideologically and emotionally loyal to Atatürk's personality. Although Atatürk did not wear military uniforms during his time in civilian office, and presented a complete civilian image, still he had full control over the military. After Atatürk, İnönü also benefitted from his military past as a commander in the Liberation War. Secondly, military ideologically is closer to the Republican Party. Both the military and the party were already intertwined with each other in the days of the Liberation War, as nation builders. Additionally, Atatürk's charismatic personality remained as a connective figure, bringing the military and the party to each other. Thirdly, the Democrat Party, arguably, put a distance between the military and the state administration, because that party was founded by an elite group, which mostly came from civilian backgrounds. Fourthly, the Democrat Party discourse tended to have severe differences to the military's main discourse, inasmuch as the party's various regulations presented an anti-revolutionist image. For instance, the translation of Call to Prayer to Arabic, putting religious lessons into the education curriculum, the increasing religious and authoritarian tone in the party's rhetoric, and the increasing suppression over opponents made the military highly sceptical and triggered the first juntaist establishments.

The second contribution is especially important to answer the main research question. The chapter has presented crucial examples regarding the type of civil-military relationship in Turkey. Principally, the case study witnessed several transitions between guardian and revolutionist identities. The changes in military culture also affected Turkish politics in a variable way. In other words, the

changeable nature of military culture in Turkey also caused variable results in terms of Turkish politics. As has been noticed in the previous chapters, the Turkish military's highly political nature causes its members to factionalise between different ideologies, depending on the political conditions of time. In the foundation years, a number of officers who were critical to Atatürk's revolutions were side-lined or were stripped of their position. Hence, in Atatürk's era, the officers appeared loyal to one single ideology, which was entitled Kemalism. Yet, the first signals of disagreements started just after the Second World War. The officers were divided between the Inonu supporters and the Democrat Party sympathisers. Throughout the 1950s, several juntaist establishments appeared from different backgrounds. Yet, through to the end of 1950s, most of the higher officers seemed unified against the Democrat Party for the reasons mentioned above. Nevertheless, during the junta rule, the officers were divided again between the moderates and radicals. The radical Fourteens group, under Alparslan Türkeş' leadership, was dissolved. Additionally, another radical juntaist Talat Aydemir's two coup attempts failed due to his inability to hold full control over the military. As a result, the dominance of the moderate wing continued. Yet, in the following period, similar power struggles between different factions would continue to exist.

In this regard, following the 1960 coup d'état, an identity change within military culture became observable. The Kemalist-revolutionist tendency of the military began to be replaced by a more conservative and status quo-ist line, which has been titled guardianship throughout this thesis. In contrast to the revolutionist identity, guardianship was more authoritarian, less democratic, anti-Communist-orientated, and likely to preserve the current status of the regime. Additionally, through the OYAK and financial privileges, the military turned into a military industrial

complex. Although the military ostensibly preserved its Atatürkist discourse, in reality, it shifted from the revolutionist line, and began to employ secularisation and democratisation as a rhetorical tool to legitimise its political acts. Indeed, the 1960 coup d'état can be associated with the military's revolutionist legacy, in that the junta leaders created a new constitution with broadened civilian rights and liberties. Hence, the intended target seemed to be creating a better democracy, with relevant changes. However, the extended civil rights, such as freedom of establishing political associations, caused the nation to rapidly politicise and made it an arena of civil conflicts between different ideologies. Both the 1971 and 1980 military interventions came on the eve of civil war. During these interventions, the military's increasing oppression against freedom of speech, torture, and executions caused the military to receive highly negative criticism, from both domestic and foreign sources. In addition to the increasingly authoritarian behaviour of the military, its promotion of a liberal economy and the Turkish-Islam synthesis during the 1980 junta rule were explicitly negligent of Atatürk's secularism and statism principles. The military replaced the 1961 constitution with a new one in 1982 and brought important restrictions to civil liberties. As a result of increasing religious fundamentalism and the Kurdish separation movement, the military turned back to its Kemalist line throughout the 1990s, and made another military intervention in 1997, this time against political Islam.

Consequently, the years between 1950 and 1999 show a *variable relationship* between military culture and civil-military relations. The period witnesses four military interventions, driven by different political reasons and giving different results for Turkish democracy. In general, the impacts of coups d'état seem to be negative in terms of the democratic regime. Hence, the process can be seen as a

transition from a *positive-undemocratic* model to a *negative-undemocratic* model. Particularly, the changing influence between revolutionist, guardian, and depolitical officers caused national politics to witness several changes regarding democratisation. One reason behind this identity change can be given as the NATO membership. The Soviet threat and the alliance with the US perhaps pushed the military authorities to adopt a more anti-Communist and status quo-ist line, instead of the populist and statist domains of Kemalist revolutionism. The increase in the numbers of Kemalist nationalist officers following the end of Cold War can evidence this reality. But, in general, variability in relations seems dominant in this era. Although both the 1961 and 1997 interventions were allegedly made with more democratic purposes, their long-term effects tended to be negative for Turkish democracy.

Lastly, the legacy of Mektepli/Alayli dichotomy continued to remain. This time the strife emerged between the leftist and rightist officers. Although both sides claimed commitment to Atatürk's principles, the leftist officers were traditionally more sensitive in terms of maintaining the secular, statist, and populist characteristics of democracy. However, the US-backed rightist officers managed to suppress the leftist officers and hold control over the military. As a result, capitalism and anti-Communism became embedded in military culture as the new ideologies instead of revolutionist ideals. After having been a military-industrial complex through the OYAK, the military directed the nation for being a modern capitalist state, in a parallel way to the Western states. However, the military's decreasing sensitivity in terms of protecting secular and populist characteristics of democracy would make Turkish democracy vulnerable to political Islam and human rights violations. At this

point, the secular discourse of the military and its alleged commitment to democracy became the tools that legitimised their implementations.

CHAPTER 7: CASE STUDY III: The Military Steps Back: “Moving Toward a Depoliticised Identity?” (1999-2013)

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is the third and last case study of the empirical part of the thesis. We started the process from the 1997 post-modern coup d'état to show the developments that led to the foundation of AKP. Principally, the ongoing AKP rule between the years 2002 and 2013 has been a time of milestones in terms of Turkish politics. Under the single rule of the AKP, Turkey has witnessed fundamental domestic and foreign policy changes. One of the most important developments is, crucially, the depoliticised appearance of the Turkish military. As has been elaborated from the beginning of the thesis, the military has always remained politically active, most of the time shaping the general borders of internal and external policy. Hence, the military's step back became an unexpected development. Some important events accelerated this process, namely the reforms for accessing the European Union, the unsuccessful website declaration in 2007, and the Ergenekon-Balyoz indictments. Yet, despite all these developments, it is presumable to consider some increase in the military's professional understanding (both technical and normative), but it is arguably not strong enough to achieve an objective control. As was argued at the very beginning, the term 'professionalism' refers to rooted political neutrality, passivism, and unconditional commitment to civilian supremacy within military cultures (professional ethos). This definition, indeed, goes hand-in-hand with Samuel Huntington's ideas of the professional military ethic. However, according to Huntington, this professionalism is only possible when there is an objective military control. In other words, if there is civilian penetration into the military to subordinate it, that would not be a democratic method. At this point, although the Turkish army

has given a professional appearance from the outside, it is still perhaps premature to associate this process with objective control and normative professionalism. Indeed, there are several reasons that may cause one to think that there are some attempts by the AKP to control the military by civilianising it (subjective control). Yet this consideration is also argumentative and hard to prove at this level because of the very recent depoliticisation of the military. For these reasons, this chapter defines this current stage of military culture as ‘depoliticisation’.

Accordingly, this chapter aims to make three main contributions. Firstly, it will analyse the main reasons that push the military into political neutrality. In other words, the chapter will discuss whether there is a mentality change toward professionalism or not, by taking into account other possible variables. Secondly, the chapter will analyse the main political changes during AKP rule by taking into account the military’s politicisation. Thirdly, the chapter will give the answer to the key research question by identifying which model best defines Turkey from the five different analytical models. To achieve this goal, the chapter will compare the results that are derived from this chapter with those that have been derived from the previous two, and will make a final analysis.

Unlike the previous chapters, I will organise this chapter with reference to the Chiefs of General Staff under AKP rule. The reason for this different organisation is that this chapter analyses a shorter historical case study (1999-2013) with much more elaborated examples than those of the previous ones. Additionally, after each change in the position of Chief of General Staff within this period, the civil-military relations have witnessed radical changes. As a result, it can be beneficial to observe the AKP era by dividing the chapter into different sections by taking into account the changes in the position of the Chief of General Staff.

7.2 POST-28 FEBRUARY AND HELSINKI PROCESS

Six months after the military ultimatum in 1997, the Necmettin Erbakan-led coalition government (WP-TPP) resigned, on June 1997. The military benefited from a high public support during the intervention, apart from the staunch supporters of the ruling parties. However, other states, especially the Western countries, saw the incident as “damage to democracy”. The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright warned the Turkish military that taking further steps could breach the Turkish constitution. Nonetheless, she did not forget to stress that the US supports “a democratic and secular Turkey”.⁷⁹⁶ Additionally, the end of the Cold War removed the Soviet threat, and it was not conceivable that the United States could be as tolerant to an intervention as it had been in previous decades. Ironically, anti-Americanism was suddenly growing within the military, given its negligence to the Kurdish separatists and radical Islam. In addition to all these developments, the successor of the WP-TPP coalition, the MP-DL (Motherland-Democratic Left), led by Mesut Yilmaz, showed some hesitation in implementing the 18 measures of the 28 February, which caused tensions between the government and the military authorities. The military authorities were still preserving their concerns about political Islam.⁷⁹⁷ As a consequence of this perception, they furthered their pressures on the coalition to force it to put radical decisions into practice as soon as possible. In response, Mesut Yilmaz stated that protecting the fundamental principles of the state should be the responsibility of the government in a democratic regime. He also implied that the military was responsible with defending the state against the Kurdish separationists,

⁷⁹⁶ *New York Times*, ‘Albright Warns Turkey to Guard Its Democracy’, June 14, 1997.

⁷⁹⁷ Aylin Guney and Petek Karatekelioglu, ‘Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 31, No.3, April 2005: 446.

but protecting the secular regime should have been the government's duty.⁷⁹⁸ Furthermore, Yilmaz declared that the military was wishing to continue its privileges and taking its large share from the national treasury by using the Islamic and Kurdish threats as excuses.⁷⁹⁹ This speech by Yilmaz, in March 1998, increased the tensions between the military and the government.⁸⁰⁰ In response, the Chief of the General Staff, İsmail Hakkı Karadayı, made this well-known declaration:

*Islamism and separatism would remain the primary concerns of the military and that the military was determined to use legal tools enshrined in the constitution in order to play its guardian role to protect Turkey.*⁸⁰¹

The coalition government led by Yılmaz fell in November 1998.⁸⁰² The government was replaced by Bülent Ecevit's temporary government. The early days of his government witnessed an improvement in CIV-MIL relations, despite the military retaining its concerns. However, this positive development in relations did not last long. The tension rose after Yılmaz (who was this time the deputy prime minister) repeated, on August 4 2001, that the protection of the state's security should belong to civilians. He maintained that one cannot see any other example than Turkey where security concerns shape the "state politics".⁸⁰³ As a result, this term continued with a CIV-MIL power struggle for the upper hand. The military often complained about

⁷⁹⁸ For the strife between Yılmaz and the military in terms of preserving secularism see: Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, 'The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience', *Armed Forces & Society*, 26, No.4, July 2000: 646.

Aylin Güney and Petek Karatekelioğlu, 'Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects', *Armed Forces & Society*, 31, No.3, April 2005: 446.

⁷⁹⁹ Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Cinar, 'Turkey 2002', 313.

⁸⁰⁰ Narlı, 'Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-Military Relations, 1980-2002', 222.

⁸⁰¹ The Chief of General Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı's response is available at: <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZA/AyinTarihi/oncekiler/mart98/20-31mart98.htm>. (accessed: March 1998).

⁸⁰² Gareth Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics*, Routledge, 2013: 64.

⁸⁰³ Narlı, 'Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-Military Relations, 1980-2002', 222.

the government's slow steps in implementing the 18 measures of the NSC. On 3 September 1999, General Kivrikoglu made another well-known statement by declaring that the military's battle against political Islam will continue for "a hundred or even thousand years" if necessary.⁸⁰⁴

The post-28 February process saw important incidents with regard to radical Islam and the Kurdish separation movement. The police implemented successful operations against the Islamic terrorist organisation Hezbollah.⁸⁰⁵ The leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), Abdullah Ocalan, was captured on February 1999. Additionally, the closure of the Welfare Party and its successor's (the Virtue Party) poor performance in the elections convinced many citizens that both Islamic fundamentalism and the PKK were weakened. Nevertheless, the aforementioned Islamic Fethullah Gulen movement (also is known as "the cemaat") still remained the main threat, according to the military. In 2000, the military demanded a regulation from the government to dismiss civil servants suspected of being involved in anti-secularist activities; however, the decree was vetoed by President Ahmed Necdet Sezer, who is known for his democratic personality, despite being a staunch secularist.⁸⁰⁶

In 2002, Turkey experienced a big economic deadlock after an argument between the prime minister and the president. The crisis put some companies into serious trouble while increasing interest rates and unemployment. Additionally, Bulent Ecevit's worsening health caused a political ambiguity, which led to early elections.⁸⁰⁷ As a result of the elections on 3 November 2002, the Justice and Development Party

⁸⁰⁴ *Yeryuzu Haber*, '28 Subat Kararlari Tamamen Askiya Alindi' (Decisions of 28 February have been cancelled). Available at: <http://www.yeryuzuhaber.com/28-subat-kararlari-tamamen-askiya-alindi-haberi-62889.html> (accessed: 19 August 2013).

⁸⁰⁵ *Milliyet*, 'Nefes Kesen Operasyon' (Breath-taking operation). Available at: <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2000/01/18/haber/hab00.html> (accessed: 18 January 2000).

⁸⁰⁶ Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, 66.

⁸⁰⁷ Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cinar, 'Turkey 2002', 318.

(AKP) won the elections with 34 per cent of the vote, which enabled it to form a government without any coalition partner.⁸⁰⁸

7.3 AKP AND THE CHANGING RHETORIC OF NATIONAL OUTLOOK

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is the last representative of the Islamic *National Outlook* ideology created by Necmettin Erbakan. The first representative of that ideology was the National Order Party (NOP) (1970-1971), which was founded by Erbakan. The NOP was replaced by the National Salvation Party (NSP) (1972-1980), which was itself replaced by the Welfare Party (WP) (1983-1998).⁸⁰⁹ These three parties were all closed down for “violating the constitution”. The Welfare Party was succeeded by the Virtue Party, led by Recai Kutan, in 1998. However, the Virtue Party showed a poor performance in the 1999 elections, with only 15.4 per cent.⁸¹⁰ Nevertheless, the AKP, as the latest successor of National Outlook, gained a huge success by becoming the most successful Islamic party in Turkish history. The AKP was established in 2001 by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and enjoyed an unexpected victory by coming to rule as a “single-party government”, 15 years after Ozal’s Motherland Party. Hence, in the following process, it may be worthwhile to analyse what reasons brought this success to the Islamic wing. In other words, why did the AKP become so successful after the Virtue Party had failed? To give an answer to this question, it is necessary to see the differences in the AKP’s policies when compared with its predecessors.

⁸⁰⁸ Gareth Jenkins, ‘Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, *International Affairs*, 83, No.2, 2007: 347. For a schematic analysis of the process see: Analytical Table 3 (p. 343-345).

⁸⁰⁹ Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, *State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, Walter de Gruyter, 1988: 125, 128-129.

⁸¹⁰ Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, 65.

In fact, most of the founders of the AKP were old members of the Welfare Party. Moreover, some of its founders, including Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had been banned from politics during the 1997 intervention. Principally, the members of the AKP came from the reformist wing of the Welfare Party. Indeed, their first party programme showed similarities with the Motherland Party's programme during Turgut Ozal's era. Rhetorically, the previous National Outlook parties had been known for their strong anti-American and anti-capitalist emphases. Additionally, the traditional National Outlook parties were giving more importance to "nationalism". In other words, their foreign policy was based on establishing closer relations with the Islamic states and creating a bloc against the "Christian-Western Front". Hence, Turkey must be the leader of the Islamic world in this "holy war" against the West, as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, their statements contained strong references to the Ottoman Empire's most successful periods by implying that Turkey must go back to those glorious years.⁸¹¹ They were known for their objection to European Union membership and to other Western organisations. Although they periodically implied their loyalty to the democratic regime, their discourse would include strong anti-secular images. They were also regularly showing their disagreement with Atatürk's revolutions by implying their negative impacts on Turkey's Muslim identity. One may argue that the regime that the National Outlook was offering was some kind of Islamic democracy, but there were also more radical members of the party demanding a sharia regime.⁸¹²

The ideological vision of AKP showed important differences to its predecessors. Thus, analysing their ideological line could be helpful to understand why it became

⁸¹¹ William Hale and Ergun Ozbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP*, Routledge, 2009: 36.

⁸¹² Hale and Ozbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey*, 34-35.

more successful. Additionally, the change in CIV-MIL relations during the AKP era was mostly driven by the change in AKP's policies than those of its predecessors. This was because the AKP came to power in an environment wherein citizens from all ideologies, including secularists, Islamists, and nationalists, shared a certain belief that the military was the main obstacle against the Islamist threat. This belief was perhaps much stronger than it had been during the previous decades. The AKP presented itself as a typical conservative right-wing democratic party – with religious sensitivities, but committed to democracy and the Republic. They mentioned their loyalty to Atatürk and his principles – particularly secularism and nation's unity – from the very beginning. Furthermore, they indicated European Union membership as their first and foremost foreign goal.⁸¹³ The changes in their rhetoric caused the secular liberals to define the AKP as a “moderate Islamic party”, which is democratic, liberal, and secular and promotes the liberal economy, unlike most of the Islamic regimes in the Middle East.⁸¹⁴ The same group also considered that the AKP's moderate Islamic image could enable Turkey to be a “role model” for the other Islamic countries in the region. In other words, Turkey could give a message by showing that democracy and Islam do not conflict with each other. This rhetoric enabled the AKP to gain bigger support than the previous Islamic parties. They had

⁸¹³ Sule Toktas and Umit Kurt, ‘The Turkish Military's Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s: An Assessment of the Turkish Version of Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DECAF)’, *Turkish Studies*, 11, No.3, 2010: 393.

⁸¹⁴ Murat Somer, ‘Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy’, *Third World Quarterly*, 28, No.7, October 2007: 1272; Murat Bardakci, *Civil-Military Relations in Turkey Under the AKP Government*, 2008: 25; Meliha Benli Altunisik, ‘The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East’, *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 27, No.1/2, January 2005: 56 (In this article, it is argued that Turkey became an example of ‘modus vivendi’ by connecting democracy and Islam under AKP rule.); For an analysis of how Turkey can be a democratic role model for the Middle East see: Seymen Atasoy, ‘The Turkish Example: A Model for Change in the Middle East?’, *Middle East Policy*, 18, No.3, 2011: 86-100. Also, for a detailed analysis of how Recep Tayyip Erdogan adopted a moderate discourse by separating religion from politics see: Metin Heper, ‘The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey’, 2005 (In this article, Heper made an interesting analysis by claiming that Recep Tayyip Erdogan comes from the Sufi Islam tradition, which is known as moderate and tolerant.); Jeffrey Haynes, ‘Politics, Identity and Religious Nationalism in Turkey: From Atatürk to the AKP’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 64, No.3, 2010: 312-27.

support not only from the Islamist voters but also from right-wing liberals, including businessmen, journalists, and intellectuals. Accordingly, the AKP's party programmes promoted democratic and universal values such as "human rights, democratic rights, state of law, pluralism, tolerance to different opinions, and freedom of religion".⁸¹⁵ Additionally, the party programme stated their commitment to Atatürk and his reforms:

*Our Party constitutes a ground where the unity and the integrity of the Republic of Turkey, the secular, democratic, social state of law, and the processes of civilianisation, democratisation, freedom of belief and equality of opportunity are considered essential ... Our Party regards Atatürk's principles and reforms as the most important vehicle for raising the Turkish public above the level of contemporary civilisation and sees this as an element of social peace ... Secularism is a principle which allows people of all religions and beliefs to comfortably practice their religions, to be able to express their religious convictions and live accordingly, but which also allows people without beliefs to organise their lives along these lines. From this point of view, secularism is a principle of freedom and social peace ... Universal standards for rights and freedoms of women, children and labour shall be fully implemented in our country...*⁸¹⁶

⁸¹⁵ Hale and Ozbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey*, 57. For an analysis of the AKP's political line see: Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cinar, 'Turkey 2002', 325-328. (In this article, the writers argue that there was a reformist-moderate wing within the National Outlook's Welfare Party that included Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The reformists' main aim was to establish a new party that would avoid making strict Islamic references. Eventually, the reformist group established itself as the AKP.)

⁸¹⁶ See: *The AKP Party Programme*, 'Fundamental Rights and Freedoms'. Available at: <https://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum> (accessed: 2016).

The AKP was formed by a younger and educated group of people, some of whom originally came from Ozal's Motherland Party. Naturally, they gained a lot of experiences from the past and agreed on more realistic political goals. They realised the disadvantages of following anti-secular policies, and perhaps some members of the party believed in the importance of secularism in democratic regimes. What is more, one may argue that the events during the 1997 intervention – closing parties and banning politicians – enabled the Islamists to see the benefits of being closer to the European Union, to defend their political rights and freedom of opinion.⁸¹⁷ The AKP tended to refuse the National Outlook ideology and gave an impression of being “conservative democrat”; furthermore, they rejected using the “Muslim Democrat” identity.⁸¹⁸ The AKP's softened discourse, compared with its predecessors, convinced many citizens that they were very close to the traditional democratic-liberal right-wing parties, such as the Democrat Party, Justice Party, Motherland Party, and the True Path Party.⁸¹⁹

However, an important part of the society, particularly the left-wing Kemalists, the military commanders, and the judiciary, remained strongly susceptible to the AKP's liberal and secular image from the very beginning.⁸²⁰ Particularly, the nationalist and extremely Kemalist wing of the military (Eurasian/Avrasyaci officers) were not only

⁸¹⁷ Hale and Ozbudun, *ibid.*: 42; Atasoy, ‘The Turkish Example’, 92. (In the article, the author argues that the AKP's support for the EU reforms created a picture that had not been observed before; now, the religious conservatives appeared as the progressive side, struggling for the EU and democratisation, while the Kemalists appeared as the side resisting the change, because, after previous experiences, the Islamists saw the EU, human rights, and democratisation as the best solution for defending their rights against the pressures from the military and secularists. He also argues that, ironically, both the military and the EU pushed the AKP through democratisation for its survival, through their ‘carrots and sticks’ approach.)

⁸¹⁸ Jenkins, ‘Continuity and Change’, 348. Meliha Benli Altunisik, ‘The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East’, *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 27, No.1/2, January 2005: 50. (In this article, the AKP's ideological line is associated with the ‘Christian Democrats’ in Europe and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan presents himself as being both ‘Muslim’ and ‘secular’, in his own words.); Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cinar, ‘Turkey 2002’, 327.

⁸¹⁹ Hale and Ozbudun, *ibid.*: 57.

⁸²⁰ Somer, ‘Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey’, 1272; Jenkins, *ibid.*: 348.

against the AKP but were also against any type of coalition with the West, including the EU. NSC Secretary General Tuncer Kilinc's words in March 2002 are worth mentioning:

*The EU will never accept Turkey ... Thus, Turkey needs new allies, and it would be useful if Turkey engages in a search that would include Russia and Iran.*⁸²¹

Indeed, the existence of Euro-Asian officers is important to understand crossing identities tradition that still continues within the military. According to Gerassimos Karabelias, there were two different groups within the military during the foundation years of AKP: 'Kemalist Democrats', who supported the EU membership; and 'Kemalist-Republicans', who were more strictly nationalist and considered that EU membership could be dangerous for the state's unity.⁸²²

On the other hand, the Kemalist wing – such as the Republican Party and the Labour Party – accused the AKP of doing *Takiyye* (acting tactfully). The word *Takiyye* became very famous during those days to define AKP's "insincerity".⁸²³ Indeed, some thought that the AKP borrowed the Kemalists' and military's Westernist ideology by supporting the EU membership to defeat them by their own "tool". This case left the military in a paradox, because if they showed resistance to the AKP reforms they could be stuck in a position that was entirely opposite to their own principles.⁸²⁴ Additionally, Kemalists assumed that, by using the EU card, the AKP

⁸²¹ Murat Gurgen, 'Orgeneral Kilinc: Avrupa Bize Uyuzmaz' (Europe Does Not Conform Us), *Radikal*. Available at: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=31291> (accessed: 8 March 2002). Also see: Gerassimos Karabelias, 'Dictating the Upper Tide: Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Ozal Decade, 1993–2003', *Turkish Studies*, 9, No.3, 2008: 462.

⁸²² Karabelias, *ibid.*

⁸²³ Hale and Ozbudun, *ibid.*: 62; Sami Faltas, *The General, The Prime Minister and The Imam: Civil-Military Relations in Turkey Today*, p.136.

⁸²⁴ Frederic Misrahi, 'The EU and the Civil Democratic Control of Armed Forces: An Analysis of Recent Developments in Turkey', *Perspectives: Review of International Affairs*, No.22 (2004): 24 (The article argues that the AKP borrowed the military's EU discourse and used it 'as being its own

would have an opportunity to restrict military autonomy and break the biggest obstacle against the Islamic regime.⁸²⁵ Most often they referred to Tayyip Erdogan's "alleged" previous speeches in the 1990s, such as: "Islam is my reference"; "Democracy is not the purpose but it is a tool for the main purpose"; "The system that we want to bring cannot be against the system of Allah"; "People cannot be secular"; "I banned alcohol, because I believe that I am the doctor of this society"; "I am against abortion"; "We have always stating that we are not Atatürkist, but we are adopting his principles"; "It is not possible to be both Muslim and secular"; "If citizens do not want a secular regime, you cannot prevent this".⁸²⁶ However, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his cabinet became successful in convincing most of the citizens that their worldview had changed a lot over the passing years.

7.3.1 Civil-Military Relations under AKP Rule

The AKP has been in power for 14 years and Turkey has seen many different domestic and foreign events within this period. During its term, CIV-MIL relations witnessed a major change, which perhaps has not been seen for many decades. It is the first time since the foundation of state that the military has remained in such a subordinated position.⁸²⁷ Indeed, this subordination had already begun during the EU reforms, but complete political passivism came after the 2007 website declaration and the Ergenekon-Balyoz operations. There may be several reasons behind this development, but the one likely reason, which is related to the purpose of this thesis, is the possible increase in the number of officers who have a more depolitical

goal' by recontextualising it.); Additionally: Zeki Sarigil describes this paradoxical position of the military as 'rhetorically entrapped' in which the military cannot show resistance because of its Atatürkist legacy, in: (Sarigil 2012).

⁸²⁵ Mathew Davies, 'The Legacy of Atatürk: The Limits of Conditionality in Turkish European Union Membership Negotiations', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 67, No.4, August 2013: 512.

⁸²⁶ For the 'alleged' speeches of Erdogan see: Hale and Ozbudun, *ibid.*: 40.

⁸²⁷ The aforementioned subordination of military during the Atatürk and Inonu eras were mostly driven from the presidencies of two retired heroic commanders of Liberation War. Because of that, this recent depoliticisation of military can be considered different than the previous depolitical terms.

mentality.⁸²⁸ Additionally, the early years of AKP rule can be given as an example of the *positive-democratic relationship*, in which the democratic regime worked properly and the military's subordination led to several positive developments in national politics, such as the EU candidacy, economic development, and several radical changes in foreign policy.⁸²⁹

Indeed, there have always been some officers who were against military involvement in politics. Traditionally, Atatürk himself was one of the officers who supported civilian supremacy. Given the strong Kemalist tradition, perhaps Atatürk's idea of civil-military separation has somehow affected the Turkish military. That is to say, the Turkish military has never completely broken its ties with democratic and liberal ideals. For instance, most officers have always remained critical of long-term junta rule, and have tended to pass governing to civilians as early as possible. At least one military intervention, in 1960, was made to protect democracy. Also, the military has always remained in close relationships with the professional NATO armies.

More importantly, there is a correlation between Turkey's EU membership and depoliticisation of the military. Indeed, the military has been a firm supporter of EU membership, believing that it was a necessity for a mature political culture in Turkey. As aforementioned, there is a relationship between military interventions and political cultures. Hence, an improved democratic order after adopting the EU system, would make citizens politically conscious enough to guard democratic and secular dynamics of state without needing the military's deterrent image. That also means the military would not need to leave their barracks in the future. In this regard, the AKP's increasing statements and efforts for entering in the EU made the military

⁸²⁸ See: Metin Heper, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model?', *Turkish Studies*, 12, No.2, 2011: 242.

⁸²⁹ For a schematic analysis of the process, see: Analytical Table 3, (p.343-345).

authorities tolerant toward Islamic rhetoric of the government. Additionally, the EU authorities explicitly stated their opposition to the military's supervision over politics. Accordingly, in the earlier terms of AKP, most of the military's legal powers in politics were restricted by the EU reforms. The military did not show a serious resistance because they did not want to block EU membership process.

Additionally, after witnessing the negative results of military interventions and their failure in solving problems, it is reasonable to assume that the number of depolitical officers has much increased in comparison to previous decades. Naturally, the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials accelerated this process by making important changes in the commanding elite. Indeed, the first significant signals of depoliticisation appeared during Hilmi Ozkok's term (2002-2006). But most importantly, the years between 2010 and 2013 have not seen any serious reaction from the military regarding political incidents. Furthermore, the military remained silent during the famous Gezi Parki protests. Accordingly, the military has moved in harmony with the AKP government in both domestic and foreign issues. The military has occasionally stated its politically neutral position on its website, and harshly criticised the so-called attempts at pushing the military inside political strife. Indeed, an outside observer can find similarities between Huntington's professional military ethic and the Turkish military, as well as the objective control model and Turkish civil-military relations. Yet, as aforementioned, it can be premature, at this stage, to define this development as professionalism.

7.3.2 Hilmi Ozkok Term and the EU Reforms

Hilmi Ozkok was Chief of the General Staff of Turkish Armed Forces between the years 2002 and 2006. Ozkok is known as a democratic person who comes from the

moderate wing of the commanding elite.⁸³⁰ Especially, the one party rule and the EU reforms created conditions suitable for military depoliticisation in his term.

Principally, EU membership has been supported by the majority of generals, because they associated this goal with Atatürk's goal of "catching up the contemporary civilisations". They considered that membership might accelerate a liberal transformation within the society and strengthen the democratic political culture. Therefore, the military saw the EU as the ultimate and most effective cure for stopping religious mobilisation and backwardness.⁸³¹ In this way, the modernisation process that had been started by Atatürk would be completed. Furthermore, because of the aforementioned EU membership, the military might not be in the position of "guardian of secularism", because citizens might embrace democratic values better. Ozkok defined Kemalism as a line of thinking which is "open to changes and new interpretations". Referring to Atatürk's *Revolutionism* principle, he maintained that Atatürkism was not a dogmatic system.⁸³² He avoided using military clichés, such as the "guardian of secularism", and maintained that the officers should develop their "visions" according to the new requirements of the current age, and should restrain

⁸³⁰ See: Toktaş and Kurt, 'The Turkish Military's Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s', 393-394; Mehmet Bardakci, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey under the AKP Government', March 2008: 20; Satana, 2008: 388. (Satana defines the 2000s as a 'new force structure policy' of the TAF, which aims to create a more modern and 'professional' armed forces.)

⁸³¹ Bardakci, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey under the AKP Government', 23; see Huseyin Kivrikoglu's statement in: Guney and Karatekelioğlu, 'Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations', 455; Ozkan Duman and Dimitris Tsarouhas, "'Civilianization' in Greece versus 'Demilitarisation' in Turkey: A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Relations and the Impact of the European Union', *Armed Forces & Society*, 32, No.3, April 2006: 417; Heper and Guney, 'The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy', 451-452; Sami Faltas, 'The General, the Prime Minister and the Imam: Civil-Military Relations in Turkey Today', *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 11, No.1, 2012: 136 (The article discusses whether the AKP was sincere in its commitment to the EU membership or not.); Mathew Davies, 'The Legacy of Atatürk: The Limits of Conditionality in Turkish European Union Membership Negotiations', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 67, No.4, August 2013: 520; Harun Arikan, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?* Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006: 79.

⁸³² Bardakci, *ibid.*: 25; For a detailed analysis of the civil-military relations during the Hilmi Ozkok era see: Metin Heper, 'The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey', *Turkish Studies*, 6, No.2, 2005: 215-31;

themselves from being “repetitive”.⁸³³ He also criticised the military’s Kemalist rhetoric as an excuse for legitimising their interventions since 1960.⁸³⁴ In an interview with Fikret Bila (a famous journalist), Hilmi Ozkok argued that there was a specific group of people who defined themselves as Kemalist, but, in reality, they were either not Kemalist or they did not know the meaning of Kemalist:

*There is a group of so-called Kemalists within the military, those people demand ... a commanding elite who permanently disagrees with the government ... which is entirely opposite to actual Kemalism ... Atatürk ... resigned from the military during the Liberation War, unlike other leaders who took advantage from their military positions ... Do you think Atatürk had imagined a Turkey with continuous conflicts among civilians and the military during the 2000s? Atatürk’s principles tell us to solve the problems with logic; but not with quarrel ... These so-called Kemalists give a big damage to Kemalism ... The actual Kemalism means interpreting his principles according to today’s conditions and making what Atatürk could do if he lived today ...*⁸³⁵

Ozkok was thinking to create a new education curriculum for the military academies and schools, toward a new generation of officers who are more ‘professional’ and have more trust and tolerance for the people’s choice.⁸³⁶ Once, Ozkok summarised his opinions about the military interventions with these words:

⁸³³ Heper, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, 242.

⁸³⁴ Ibid.

⁸³⁵ The interview is in: Fikret Bila, *Komutanlar Cephesi*, Detay Yayıncılık, 2007: 188. Also see his speech in Heper, *The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy*, 2009: 41.

⁸³⁶ Heper, *ibid.* As has been mentioned in the previous chapters, Ozkok’s idea of redesigning the education curriculum indeed supports our idea that the best way of embedding a professional ethos

*The military intervened on May 27 (1960), March 12 (1971), and September (1980). Were these interventions successful? No! If they could be successful, the banned politicians ... could not return to politics. The banned politicians ... later became the prime ministers and the president. This shows that the military interventions are not a panacea. From now on we should have greater trust in the people's judgement.*⁸³⁷

Additionally, in the interview below, Hilmi Ozkok's support for European Union membership is explicit:

*Seventy per cent of the population wants the EU membership. Nobody can resist this kind of majority ... we are ready to compromise (with the government) and undertake risks (that limit our powers) to harmonise with the EU values.*⁸³⁸

Following the elections, the AKP gained strong public confidence after handling the economic crisis.⁸³⁹ The AKP government followed an economic programme by taking the support of the International Monetary Fund. In a short time, successful results were seen: the rate of inflation decreased and the level of exports increased.⁸⁴⁰ The early economic success obliged the military to be more careful about avoiding open conflicts with the government. Accordingly, the military mostly remained in a conciliatory position. However, the military was still protecting its classical position

into military cultures is preparing an academic programme according to the idea of civilian supremacy.

⁸³⁷ *Hurriyet*, 'Ozkok Pasa: Mudahale Care Degil' (Ozkok Pasha: Intervention is not a Panacea) <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ozkok-pasa-mudahale-care-degil-167658> (accessed: 26 August 2003).

⁸³⁸ *Internet Haber*, 'Atina'ya Tarihi Mesajlar' (Historical Messages to Athens). Available at: <http://www.internethaber.com/atinaya-tarihi-mesajlar-1041202h.htm> (accessed: 18 October 2003).

⁸³⁹ Bardakci, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey under the AKP Government', 23.

⁸⁴⁰ Gursay, 'The Changing Role of the Military in Turkish Politics', 746; Atasoy, 'The Turkish Example', 91.

in certain issues, namely “guardianship of Atatürk’s revolutions and principles”, particularly “secularism” and “national unity”.

The earliest tensions between the military and the AKP were caused by “the headscarf ban”. Rhetorically, the military always states its respect for religions. Nevertheless, the headscarf has been considered as a “symbolic” icon that shows the power of the “Islamic” movement. The military thought that any concession from the headscarf ban may cause more serious demands from the Islamists, at the expense of secularism. The ban is based on Atatürk’s revolution of dress. According to the dress regulation, religious clothes (turban, takke, and fez) cannot be used in formal places, including state departments, offices, and schools.⁸⁴¹ The military has always been sensitive in this issue by considering it as “vital” for preserving the secular regime. Relatedly, some noticeable events caused tensions between the military and civilians: on 20 November 2002, the AKP spokesperson Bulent Arinc attended a state ceremony with his wife. In reaction, the military commanders remained silent for three minutes because Bulent Arinc’s wife participated in the ceremony with a headscarf.⁸⁴² On 23 April 2003, the generals again boycotted the opening ceremony of the Assembly after they learned that Arinc’s wife had not removed her headscarf.⁸⁴³ Additionally, on 5 May 2003, the military made a statement to the press

⁸⁴¹ The Law of Dress is mentioned in Article 174 of the ‘1982 Constitution’ under the title of ‘The Law of Hat’. Additionally, the issue of whether turban, fez, takke and other religious-based clothes are actually an order of Islam or not is problematic for the religious experts. Some of the modern interpreters of Islam state that these so-called ‘religious clothes’ are not mentioned in the Quran as an ‘obligatory’ rule. Indeed, some religious experts argue that covering the head is not an Islamic obligation for women. For instance, see: Huseyin Atay, *Kuran Uzerine Arastirmalar* (Studies on Quran, Book: 1-7), Atay Press, 2013; Yasar Nuri Ozturk, *Islam Nasil Yozlastirildi?* (How Islam was damaged?), Boyut Yayinlari, 2001.

⁸⁴² Jenkins, ‘Continuity and Change’, 349.

⁸⁴³ Ibid.

defining the military as “the greatest guarantee of the secular ... characteristics of the Turkish Republic”.⁸⁴⁴

An interview with Hilmi Ozkok (after his resignation) in 2007 also shows that he is personally against wearing the turban in the universities. He considers that the military statements about the turban and the Imam-Hatips (Imam and Preacher Schools) cannot be seen as an intervention in politics, because these statements are part of the military’s constitutional obligations.⁸⁴⁵ In the same interview, he also makes a comment about the president’s (Abdullah Gul) wife who wears a headscarf:

*I do not have problem with his (Abdullah Gul) personality ... (However) if a journalist asks me what I think about a president whose wife has a turban, I tell him that it was “disturbing” ... The Turkish military has some unwritten rules, because some rules are not decided by laws and procedures. Both sides can discuss whether those unwritten rules can change or not ... But, if the president’s wife removes her headscarf, there will not be any remarkable problem between the civilians and the military.*⁸⁴⁶

In that statement, Ozkok arguably refers to military culture and the ‘military-nation’ assumption by mentioning some “unwritten rules”. He suggests that the government and the military should come together and discuss whether these unwritten rules can change or not. This point is important for the main argument of the thesis; because, if one considers these unwritten rules as the main ethoi of military culture, Ozkok clearly says that a civilian supremacy is only possible by reinterpretation of the

⁸⁴⁴The Turkish General Staff, ‘Statement’. Available at: <http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkurmay/bashalk/aciklama/2003/ao8.htm> (accessed: 17 February 2007).

⁸⁴⁵Misrahi, ‘The EU and the Civil Democratic Control of Armed Forces’, 28; Bila, *Komutanlar Cephesi*, 186.

⁸⁴⁶Bila, *Komutanlar Cephesi*, 184-185.

military ethoi. Additionally, Ozkok finds a connection between the turban issue and the unwritten rules of the military, which can give us an idea about the military's ideological position.

On the other hand, Hilmi Ozkok's conciliatory behaviour received some criticisms from the radical nationalist (Ulusalci) wing of the military, particularly after the government made some changes in the education system in favour of the Imam-Hatip Schools (Imam and Preacher).⁸⁴⁷ According to the nationalist officers, Hilmi Ozkok had to give a stronger reaction, but he failed. Therefore, some top commanders showed their reaction directly to the press. On 14 October the Deputy Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug stated that the state creates 25,000 graduates from the Imam Hatip Schools per year, which was too excessive, because the state's need for Imams was about 5,500. That sudden reaction from Basbug caused the AKP to postpone the education reforms.⁸⁴⁸ However, the 28 March 2004 elections brought the AKP much greater confidence because they increased their votes from 34 per cent to 41.7 per cent. Following the elections, in May 2004, the AKP came up with a new education reform proposal. As a reaction, on 6 May the military gave a more powerful official statement to air its doubts about the future of the secular regime and democratic principles:

The general manner ... of the TAF about the Republic's basic characteristics as being "democratic, secular and social state"

⁸⁴⁷ Imam Hatips are schools giving religious education and raising Islamic clerics: the Imams, Muezzins, and Hafizs. The new regulations aimed to make it easier for the Imam Hatip graduates to enter into universities, which made the military and secularists anxious about possible Islamic penetration into the state departments and important positions (Jenkins, 2007: 350).

⁸⁴⁸ Jenkins, 'Continuity and Change,' 350.

ruled by law” has always remained as the same ... and will be the same tomorrow.⁸⁴⁹

The mentioned education reforms were implemented by the Grand National Assembly on 13 May 2004; nevertheless, President Ahmed Necdet Sezer vetoed the package because of its inconsistency with the secularism principle of the constitution. Although the constitution enabled the president to veto only once, the government did not submit the offer again. This indicates that the AKP became very patient to make the reforms they had been planning to do. Arguably, they waited until the right time, when the military’s influence on politics would have disappeared, and thus evading direct conflict with the generals. Erdogan’s sentences indicate how they were cautious to avoid a possible military intervention: “As a government, we are not ready to pay the price”. (The price here is explicitly a possible direct or indirect intervention.)⁸⁵⁰

On the other side, the military was cautious because it did not want to be the main institution blocking EU membership in the eyes of the public.⁸⁵¹ On 3 October 2005, Turkey was accepted to start negotiations with the EU. Certainly, one of the main reasons that convinced the EU to take this decision was the reforms restricting military supremacy. Naturally, this success protected the AKP’s remaining support from the citizens and important civil institutions, including businessmen, particularly from the members of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD). The greater part of the Turkish media, the journalists, and the enlightened class also

⁸⁴⁹ *The Turkish General Staff*, ‘TGS Press Statement No. BN-07/04 of 6 May 2004’. Available at: <http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkurmay/bashalk/aciklama/2004/ao7.htm> (accessed: 17 February 2007).

⁸⁵⁰ ‘Erdogan: YOK’u Zorlamayiz’ (We Will Not Make Pressure on the YOK), *Radikal*, 4 July 2004.

⁸⁵¹ See: Bardakci, *ibid.*: 23.

showed their admiration. Hence, the growing support for the AKP from the public made a military intervention far harder to achieve.⁸⁵²

7.3.3 EU Reforms and Restricting the Military's Legal Powers on Civilian Rule

As has been mentioned, the EU reforms indeed had a crucial role in taming the military into a depoliticised position by the AKP government.⁸⁵³ Although, the military occasionally indicated its discontent with the AKP's attempts for allowing headscarf and opening Imam-Hatip schools, the military did not go further than performing silent protests and giving formal statements. In the same extent, the military preserved its deliberation in the Cyprus issue and Kurdish rights. But still, they did not show a coercive resistance to the government during the negotiations of Annan plan and extension of Kurdish minority rights. The reforms restricting military supremacy have been made by following the EU reports (Acquis Communautaire). The reforms created an important change in the CIV-MIL relations as regards the legal procedures. The primary reforms can be summarised as follows:

- The State Security Courts were abolished.⁸⁵⁴
- The number of civilians within the National Security Council was increased from five to nine; the military remained at nine and the organisation became a civil dominated place.⁸⁵⁵

⁸⁵² See: Duman and Tsarouhas, "‘Civilianization’ in Greece versus ‘Demilitarisation’ in Turkey: A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Relations and the Impact of the European Union", 414-415. (In this article the author quotes Cizre's words: 'The EU pressure seemed the only visible factor that might lead to a smaller role for the military in the Turkish politics', *ibid.*: 418.)

⁸⁵³ As will be discussed in the following sections, the military's depoliticised image continued during the key events such as the Gezi Protests (June-July 2013).

⁸⁵⁴ Gursöy, 'The Impact of EU-Driven Reforms on the Political Autonomy of the Turkish Military', 296.

⁸⁵⁵ Metin Heper, 'The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy', *South European Society and Politics*, 10, No.1, 2005: 37-38; Ariana Keyman, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey', AIRA, 2012.

- The NSC became no more an institution whose recommendations would be prioritised by the civilian government. With an amendment to Article 118, the new status of the body is “assessed by the views conveyed to it”. The new regulation reduced its role to an “advisory/consultative body”.⁸⁵⁶
- The Secretariat of the NSC’s executive powers were restrained; among these powers were: requesting reports from the government, making inspections, and supervising the implementation of NSC decisions. Other duties of the Secretariat were automatically terminated by the abolishing of several departments in the Secretariat, such as the Community Relations Presidency.⁸⁵⁷
- The requirement that the Secretary General of the NSC be a military member was abolished and the first civilian Secretary was appointed in October 2004.⁸⁵⁸
- The overall number of the NSC personnel was reduced by 25 per cent, and the periodic meetings of the NSC were reduced from once a month to once every two months.⁸⁵⁹
- The civilian supervision over defence expenditure was expanded by increasing the rights of the Court of Auditors to check the budget.⁸⁶⁰
- The seat of the NSC on the Board of Inspection of Cinema, Video and Musical Works was abolished.⁸⁶¹
- The representation of the military in the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) was abolished.⁸⁶²

⁸⁵⁶ Toktas and Kurt, ‘The Turkish Military’s Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s’, 391; Heper, ‘The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy’, 37-38.

⁸⁵⁷ Gursoy, ‘The Impact of EU-Driven Reforms on the Political Autonomy of the Turkish Military’, 295.

⁸⁵⁸ Jenkins, ‘Continuity and Change’, 346; Guney and Karatekelioglu, ‘Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations’, 456.

⁸⁵⁹ Jenkins, *ibid.*: 347.

⁸⁶⁰ Gursoy, *ibid.*: 296.

⁸⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶² *Ibid.*

- The representation of the military in the Council of Higher Education and the Supreme Communication Board was abolished.⁸⁶³
- The jurisdiction powers of the military courts were restricted, and eventually their rights to judge civilians during peacetime were abolished.⁸⁶⁴

7.3.4 Foreign Policy Events and the Military (2002-2006)

AKP's foreign policy is defined as "Neo-Ottomanism" by some scholars. The reason is that the foreign policy plan is largely based on (former minister of foreign affairs and current prime minister) Professor Ahmed Davutoglu's thesis of "Strategic Depth". His views were published in a book, of that name, which sold a large number of copies. In this book, he puts forward a formula known as "zero problem with neighbours". Davutoglu assumes that Atatürk's foreign policy of "peace at home and peace abroad" was adopted by all of the previous governments, including the AKP, since Atatürk's time. However, as a result of the changing international conjuncture, Turkish foreign policy needs to be reconsidered in several cases. For instance, Turkish foreign policy had remained too "introvert", without making much effort to intervene in foreign policy events with its closer neighbours. Therefore, Ahmet Davutoglu suggests that Turkey – as the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire – should play a more effective role in the ex-Ottoman lands, including the Middle East, North Africa, Caucasia, and the Balkans. That means that Turkey should both work for the EU membership but should also be in good relations with the Islam

⁸⁶³ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁴ Ibid. For a detailed analysis of the EU reforms – particularly supervision on the budget expenditures for defence – see: Ayse Nilufer Narli, *Aligning Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Transparency Building in Defense Sector and the EU Reforms*, Istanbul: Kadir Has University, 2005; and Tuba Unlu Bilgic, 'The Military and Europeanization Reforms in Turkey', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45, No.5, 2009: 803-24 (In this article, the author argues that, although the military showed its support for the EU membership, it also stated that it will not make concessions with Atatürk's principles.); Faltas, 'The General, the Prime Minister and the Imam', 137-138; Jeffrey Haynes, 'Politics, Identity and Religious Nationalism in Turkey: From Atatürk to the AKP', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 64, No.3, 2010: 312-27; Sule Toktas and Umit Kurt, 'The Impact of EU Reform Process on Civil-Military Relations in Turkey', *SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, Policy Brief*, No.26, 2008: 3.

Conference, Russia, Central Asia, and China. That can be defined as a “leadership” role within the post-Ottoman territories.⁸⁶⁵

In addition to the European Union membership, there are other important foreign policy issues that influence the Turkish CIV-MIL relations.⁸⁶⁶ The most important of them are the Cyprus case and the Kurdish problem. After the US intervention, northern Iraq became an area of conflict between the Kurds, Shias, and Arabs. Naturally, Turkey remains in a risky position because of its conflict with the PKK. Thus, any destabilisation in the area worsens the situation at the expense of Turkey. On 1 March 2003, the Assembly refused to send Turkish troops to northern Iraq in support of the US forces. It is largely considered that most of the commanders and Recep Tayyip Erdogan were willing to accept; however, the majority thought the opposite.⁸⁶⁷ The 1 March proposal worsened relations between the United States and Turkey. This event was followed by “the hood event” on 4 July 2003: some Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq were captured by US troops and their heads were covered by hoods. Hilmi Ozkok describes the hood event as a “humiliating event” for the

⁸⁶⁵ For detailed information see: Ahmet Davutoglu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, (Strategic Depth), 2001; Baskin Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy Vol.3*, Iletisim Press 2013; Pinar Bilgin, “‘Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey’s Geography’1: The Uses of ‘Geopolitical Truths’ in Turkey”, *Political Geography*, 26, No.7, September 2007: 749 (In this article, Bilgin argues Turkey’s risky strategic position enabled the military to play an effective role in foreign policy issues over the civilians); Karen Kaya, ‘Changing Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, April 2011, pp.8-12; Nicholas Danforth, ‘Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP’, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 7, No.3, 2008: 90-94. Indeed, Turkey’s potential leadership role as being a model of a democratic Muslim state (moderate Islam), which also correlates with the AKP’s foreign goals, had been mentioned by George Bush, see: *BBC News*, ‘Bush Backs Turkey’s EU Efforts’. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2564339.stm> (accessed: 11 December 2002); Also, for a detailed analysis of Turkey’s and the AKP’s potentiality as being a democratic role model within the region and the United States’ foreign policy interests on the relevant issues, see: Graham Fuller, *Turkey and Arab Spring: Leadership in the Middle-East*, Bozorg Press, 2012.

⁸⁶⁶ For the Turkish military’s impact on foreign policy and the legal mechanisms that enable the military’s effect on foreign policy issues, see: Ilhan Uzgel, ‘Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy’, *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* 34, 2003: 177-212.

⁸⁶⁷ Oran, *The Turkish Foreign Policy* 3, 274. Nevertheless, there are some scholars who argue that the military did not put pressure on the government for the Iraq decision, because they desired to undermine the government by leaving this ‘painful’ decision to the AKP, see: Misrashi, 2004: 24.

Turkish military.⁸⁶⁸ The event triggered strong reaction from the Turkish media and citizens while increasing anti-Americanism.⁸⁶⁹ On 25 January 2005, Ilker Basbug declared that the military would not remain non-active if the Iraqi Kurds attempted to control Kirkuk and threatened the Turkmen in the area.

The second important case is the Cyprus issue, which became vitally important for Turkey's EU membership. Although Turkey has still a long way to go to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, the Cyprus issue is the most important obstacle against Turkey's EU membership. There has been a deadlock since the Turkish military's operation in Northern Cyprus. Since that date, the Turkish army has remained there and the *de facto* Northern Cyprus state continues to exist, despite not being recognised by the United Nations. That situation causes international problems such as: trade with other states, opening of harbours and airports, and the commodities of the Greek citizens. The problem became more serious when EU membership for Cyprus came onto the agenda. The United Nations' Secretary General Kofi Annan offered a solution, known as the Annan Plan, to make the island a unique state by uniting the two sides. The plan was accepted by the Northern Cyprus citizens, but refused by the Southern side. Eventually, Cyprus became an EU member and the Northern side remained in an isolated position as a result of its non-recognised status. Although Cyprus became a member of the EU as a whole, the citizens on the Northern side could not benefit from the advantages of the EU membership because of the existence of the Turkish army. That case finally blocked Turkey's EU negotiations, because some packages cannot be open to negotiation unless the

⁸⁶⁸ Bila, *Komutanlar Cephesi*, 178; Ismail H. Pekin and Ahmet Yavuz, *Soldier and Politics*, Kaynak Press, pp.213-14.

⁸⁶⁹ Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy* 3: 147.

Northern Cyprus harbours and airports are open to the Southern Cyprus citizens.⁸⁷⁰

The surveys show that the Cyprus question and the EU's approach to the Kurdish and the Armenian issues raised the level of Euro-scepticism among the citizens, while decreasing the support level for the EU.⁸⁷¹

Cyprus and northern Iraq are the issues that the military has considered very important for the state's unity and strategic position. Firstly, the Cyprus issue is important because of its strategic position. Given the fact that Greece controls the Aegean Islands, Turkey will be surrounded by the Greeks from both sides if it leaves Cyprus. Therefore, the military's silence during the Annan Plan and the referendum became the first serious examples that the military were giving concessions in its Cyprus policy in favour of civilians.⁸⁷² Secondly, the northern Iraq issue is sensitive because of state unity. The military commanders considered that if the Kurds have a strong position in the area, such as controlling Kirkuk – or further, founding an independent state – the Kurdish separation movement will have a stable support base. Additionally, there are other issues toward which the military showed sensitivity during the EU negotiations, such as liberating Kurdish education in schools and establishing a Kurdish television channel. The military was concerned that these kind

⁸⁷⁰ See: *The Turkish Ministry of Defence*, 'Kibris' (Cyprus). Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/kibris.tr.mfa> (accessed: 2011); Kivanc Ulusoy, 'Turkey and the EU: Democratization, Civil-Military Relations and the Cyprus Issue', *Insight Turkey*, 10, No.4, 2008: 51-76.

⁸⁷¹ Bardakci, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey under the AKP Government', 23. (The Armenian issue is an important foreign policy deadlock for the Turkish state. According to the historical archives, during the First World War, in 1915, the Armenian settlers in eastern Turkey were forced to migrate toward the southern borders to protect the Ottoman military from Armenian attacks. During this migration, a large number of Armenian citizens died. As a result, Armenia keeps its efforts to sanctify the event as 'genocide' at an international level. However, the Turkish state – even though the event happened at the time of the Ottomans – continues to refuse these allegations of genocide and claims that the event was an 'accident', because they suggest that there was not indeed any systematic plan to eliminate the Armenian citizens.)

⁸⁷² Misrahi, 'The EU and the Civil Democratic Control of Armed Forces', 28.

of privileges for the Kurdish people may threaten state unity.⁸⁷³ During the Ozkok era, the military showed its limits in these issues with these declarations: on 25 January 2005, Ilker Basbug declared that the military would not remain non-active if the Iraqi Kurds attempted to control Kirkuk and threaten the Turkmen in the area.⁸⁷⁴ For the Cyprus case, on the same day, he also declared that none of the Turkish troops on Northern Cyprus would be withdrawn unless both sides agreed on an ultimate solution. Huseyin Kivrikoglu's (a retired Chief of the General Staff) statement below indicates the military's general stance in those days:

*The EU always mentions "Kurd", "Kurdish" ... "Education in Kurdish"... If the Kurdish become free in media and education, who will protect the national integrity ... there is no end of these demands. When one step was taken, another demand will come ... (such as) autonomy, federal system and so on ... Then Turkey will fall apart.*⁸⁷⁵

Hilmi Ozkok's comments on the 1 March proposal, the hood event, and the Kurdish issue are also important to see the military's general considerations over these matters in those days. Hilmi Ozkok accepts that the Kurdish issue is a reality, but it needs to be investigated under three different categories:

Some part of our citizens consider themselves as "Kurdish" and this is a reality ... Since the time of the Ottomans, our people did

⁸⁷³ See: Ersel Aydinli, 'A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey', *The Middle East Journal*, 63, No.4, 2009: 581-96, p.589; Bardakci, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey under the AKP Government', 24.

⁸⁷⁴ Jenkins, 'Continuity and Change', 351. For a general outlook on the foreign policy events and their reflection on the EU negotiations during the AKP era, see: Gulnur Aybet, 'Turkey and the EU after the First Year of Negotiations: Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges', *Security Dialogue* 37, No.4, December 2006: 529-49.

⁸⁷⁵ Fikret Bila, 'Sorun TSK degil AB'nin cifte Tutumu' (*The Problem is Not the Turkish Armed Forces but the EU's Double-Sided Attitude*), *Milliyet*, December 31, 2005.

not make any discrimination toward our Kurdish citizens and accepted them as their own part ... Thus, the Republican laws did not take the Kurdish citizens as “minority” and considered them as the part of Turkish society.

There is a Kurdish ideology. Most of our society do not take into account their ethnic origins when they are making their political choices. But still, there are serious efforts which aim to promote the Kurdish ideology.

(Finally), there is the armed Kurdish movement, the PKK; this is indeed the armed version of the Kurdish ideology.⁸⁷⁶

Ozkok's categorisation actually reflects the military's general consideration of the Kurdish issue. The military authorities argue that they are not against the rights of the Kurdish citizens and there is no way for assimilating them by dictating to them that they are in fact “Turkish”. It is their natural right to reveal their ethnic identity. Nevertheless, the military commanders state that their tolerance for Kurdish nationalism ends if it turns into a political ideology. Hilmi Ozkok considers that Kurdish education is not possible in the schools; however, the Kurdish citizens can learn their language in private courses. He assumes that Turkey should be strict in some certain cases, such as Kurdish education, because if they allow the Kurdish education, then they can claim other demands.⁸⁷⁷ Therefore, the generals consider that Atatürk's *nationalism* is the key principle that keeps the nation together. Hilmi Ozkok's speech below indicates that issue:

⁸⁷⁶ Bila, *Komutanlar Cephesi*, 156-157.

⁸⁷⁷ Bila, *ibid.*: 175.

*Atatürk once stated that the “Turkish nation” are the Turkish people who founded the Turkish Republic. Thus, Atatürk’s definition of Turkish comprises every citizen who participated to the Turkish Liberation War. The Armenians are also within this definition. Atatürk created this comprehensive formula to preserve the state’s unity ... There was not any alternative solution other than the nationalism principle. The unity cannot be preserved by using religion... Islam cannot be a unitary tool; the case of Pakistan is the most visible example of this.*⁸⁷⁸

Hilmi Ozkok’s ideas about the nationalism principle, above, is not much different than the position of the other commanders. In addition to this, Hilmi Ozkok believes that the AKP missed an important opportunity by rejecting the 1 March proposal. He assumes that Turkey could have gained a better strategic position in northern Iraq if it had moved along with the United States. Additionally, his statement proves that the military obeyed the Assembly’s decision, although it did not agree with the decision:

*Is it possible to disobey the parliamentary decision? If I had revealed my opinion in front of the public, they could have said that he put pressure on the civilians ... What happens if the Assembly said “no” to the military’s offer, can you imagine the military’s image ... Do you think that I put the military into such kind of situation?*⁸⁷⁹

This speech proves Hilmi Ozkok’s determinacy in avoiding the military coming into direct conflict with the civilians. He considers that open pressure on parliament is too

⁸⁷⁸ Ibid.: 164-165.

⁸⁷⁹ Ibid.: 168-169.

risky for the military's image, because if parliament refuses the military's suggestion, that could place the military in a weak position in the eyes of the public. Nevertheless, Hilmi Ozkok considers that the 1 March proposal and then the hood event became the turning points in Turkish-US relations. He assumes that the long-term partnership of the two NATO allies in the region has declined after the event, because the military's main purpose was to control the Kurdish mobilisation and the PKK by preventing Kurdish penetration into southern Turkey. However, after the parliamentary refusal, the Kurdish forces found an opportunity to establish closer relations with the US army, and have gained strategic advantage in northern Iraq:

*If the Assembly could accept the proposal, the Turkish military would not be staying there for longer ... our intention was preventing possible migrations and conflicts among the groups ... the US troops would not be staying in Turkey, they would be crossing the border and passing to the northern Iraq ... We (the military) gave support to the proposal. Our aim was to control the mobilisations in northern Iraq ... the only way of achieving this was acting together with the US forces ... (However), the Kurds made this cooperation with the US troops and supported them...*⁸⁸⁰

As noted, Hilmi Ozkok's reaction to the government's policies in domestic and foreign affairs received strong criticisms from the nationalist generals. They accused Ozkok of not being decisive enough against the Islamic threat. Additionally, some went so far as to state that Hilmi Ozkok was a pious man in his private life, and this was causing him to act emotionally, being too soft in preserving secularism.⁸⁸¹

⁸⁸⁰ Ibid., 172-174.

⁸⁸¹ See: Aydinli, 'A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey', 590.

Therefore, some generals considered that he should be replaced by a more “decisive” figure in protecting the republican principles. As a reaction, Ozkok defended himself by claiming that he warned Erdogan periodically about the future of secularism, but still most commanders did not seem convinced. In any case, through to the end of Ozkok’s term, the generals were worrying about the future of political Islam. In addition to this, the secular President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s term was also coming to an end. As a result of these developments, the majority of the top commanders approached Yasar Buyukanit to take the position of Chief of the General Staff. Until that day, Buyukanit had been known for his commitment to secularism and his resistant personality.⁸⁸²

Overall, this earliest term of the AKP can be defined with the *positive-democratic relationship* in that, except for several issues such as the headscarf and Imam-Hatip schools, the military generally appeared in harmony with the government. Indeed, the military subordination in key foreign issues such as EU membership, the Kurdish issue, the Iraq War, and the Cyprus policy evidence this. Similarly, the military subordination enabled the AKP to carry out important reforms for strengthening the democratic mechanisms, in step with the EU standards, including the restriction of military supervision, broadening the Kurdish rights and freedoms, and broadening religious freedoms. On the other hand, the term was not a complete example of objective control, because the military presented serious reactions to the government in some sensitive issues including the headscarf and Imam-Hatip issues.

⁸⁸² Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, 351. For a schematic analysis of Ozkok era see: Analytical Table 3, (p. 343-345).

7.3.5 Yasar Buyukanit Era (2006-2008) and the e-memorandum of 2007

During the Yasar Buyukanit era, the military strengthened its voice against political Islam, but this could not take longer. The military declaration known as the *e-memorandum* of 27 May 2007 did not make any remarkable impact on civilians; rather, it accelerated the depoliticisation of the military.⁸⁸³ In earlier days, Yasar Buyukanit gave a series of statements to remind people that the military was the ultimate guardian of Atatürk's reforms. However, he was not forgetting to add that the last words should belong to civilians in an ideal democracy. Indeed, Yasar Buyukanit's main aim was to give an impression that he was not as moderate as Hilmi Ozkok toward the alleged Islamic mobilisation:

*Protecting the fundamental principles of the Republic is not a matter of domestic politics, it is the army's duty (August 2006).*⁸⁸⁴

The Turkish Armed Forces is obliged by the relevant legislation to take action against all groups who target the unitary system of the state and act as the guardian of premises of the Turkish Republic, which are stipulated in the first three Articles of the Constitution. The military does not have the luxury of deciding itself which of its duties it will perform and which ones it will not (August 28, 2006).

Turkey is a democratic, secular, social and unitary state. There is no power which can divert Turkey from this path and there never will be. The Turkish Republic is the republic founded by Atatürk

⁸⁸³ See: Salih Akyurek, et al., *Civil-Military Relations and the Distance of Military-Society*, Bilgesam Press, p.159-161.

⁸⁸⁴ *Yasar Buyukanit*, 'Cumhuriyet'i Korumak Siyaset Degil Gorev' (Protecting the Republic is not a Matter of Politics; but it is a Duty', *Milliyet*. Available at: <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetayArsiv&ArticleID=169547&Kategori=siyaset&b=Org.%20Buyukanit:%20Cumhuriyeti%20korumak%20siyaset%20degil%20gorev> (accessed: August 2006).

*and this republic with endure, with its regime, with its founding principles until the end of time.*⁸⁸⁵

*There is no doubt that the individual is important. However, while deifying the individual how ... reasonable it would be to weaken the state? One should not forget what our sublime leader Atatürk once said: “If what is at stake is the fatherland, other considerations can be overlooked” (October 1 2007).*⁸⁸⁶

In these speeches, Yasar Buyukanit clearly states that it is a legal obligation for the military to preserve the secular regime and state unity. Therefore, the military interventions in politics could not be a non-democratic action. Furthermore, in September 2006, the commanders of the Turkish Land, Navy, and Air Forces gave public statements to warn citizens against Islamic fundamentalism. Buyukanit stated that the military will not allow anybody to erode secularism.⁸⁸⁷

Buyukanit’s determinant image in terms of Kemalist ideology positively affected the ‘Kemalist-nationalist’ commanders. For instance, the Ex-Chief of the General Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu once stated that, “At last our silence has been broken”.⁸⁸⁸ Thus, the military support for Buyukanit became even stronger in the following days.⁸⁸⁹ On the other hand, Yasar Buyukanit clearly declared that the military’s main intention was to work in harmony with the government. In addition to this, Buyukanit repeated the military’s determined support for EU membership and its will to be in harmony with the government on this issue. Accordingly, in the statements below,

⁸⁸⁵ ‘Cumhuriyet En Riskli Doneminde’ (The Republic Entered the Most Risky Term in its History), *Radikal*, 15 February, 2007 [Translated by Gareth Jenkins (2008)].

⁸⁸⁶ Yasar Buyukanit ‘Speech to the Military Academies’; full text available at: <http://www.guncelmeydan.com/pano/yasar-buyukanit-harp-akademileri-ne-sesleniyor-01-10-07-t13355.html> (accessed: 1 October 2007).

⁸⁸⁷ Jenkins, ‘Continuity and Change,’ 353.

⁸⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁹ Ibid., 354.

Buyukanit's support for EU membership and his intention to present a democratic image is observable:

*(For the) reform package, we conveyed our views to the government. Some are accepted, others are not. Now that the parliament enacted them into law, it is our duty to comply with them. We only hope that our concerns and worries prove to be groundless.*⁸⁹⁰

*(TAF is the) unyielding defender of ... (the) secular and democratic state. This fundamental stance of the military is in full concert with the EU world view.*⁸⁹¹

These two statements demonstrate that the military's general stance for the EU membership continued under Yasar Buyukanit. As with his predecessor Hilmi Ozkok, Buyukanit took EU membership as the ultimate aim of Atatürk's Westernist vision, and the most efficient way of embedding secular and democratic values into the entire Turkish society.⁸⁹² The speech also shows that the military conforms to the EU's main principles, such as liberty, human rights, and equality. However, Buyukanit gave the impression that he was more sensitive about secularism than Ozkok.

Before the presidential elections, some rumours alarmed the military – particularly rumours about removing the headscarf ban completely in the universities and replacing the constitution with a new one. Even these issues caused the opponents

⁸⁹⁰ See: Metin Heper, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model?', *Turkish Studies Vol:12, Issue: 2*, Taylor & Francis, 2011, p. 244.

⁸⁹¹ Ibid.

⁸⁹² Aydinli, 'A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey', 591. (In this article, Aydinli claims that, during the AKP rule, the military worked in harmony with the government in many ways. The only exception to that was the e-ultimatum on 27 April. Also, Aydinli notes that it is not clear whether Buyukanit prepared and confirmed the e-memorandum, because he has never spoken publicly about the incident.)

and civil societies to organise rallies to protest against the “Islamist threat” on the eve of the elections.⁸⁹³ As a result, on 27 May 2007, the military issued a website declaration.

Instead of Ahmed Necdet Sezer, the AKP government was considering Abdullah Gul (Minister of Foreign Affairs) as their candidate for the presidency. Abdullah Gul was known with his Islamic tendencies and if he became the new president, the military authorities assumed, there would be no obstacle against the AKP implementing any legislation they needed.⁸⁹⁴ Until that date, the military saw Ahmed Necdet Sezer as the balance against Islamic fundamentalism, because he stopped or postponed some proposals by using his power of veto.⁸⁹⁵ The website declaration was as follows:

The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. ... The Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender of secularism. Also, the Turkish Armed Forces is definitely opposed to those arguments and negative comments. It will display its attitude and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary ... Those who are opposed to Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's understanding “How happy is the one who says I am a Turk” are enemies of the Republic of Turkey and will remain so. The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable

⁸⁹³ Bardakci, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey under the AKP Government’, 32-33.

⁸⁹⁴ Aydinli, ‘A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey’, 585.

⁸⁹⁵ Bardakci, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey under the AKP Government’, 29.

*characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Their loyalty to this determination is absolute.*⁸⁹⁶

The declaration of 27 April 2007 can be seen as the most serious ultimatum by the military in the new decade. By this declaration, the military explicitly stressed that they are the guardians of secularism and they would not hesitate to move if there was a threat against secularism. They also mentioned that protecting republican ideals is the obligatory task of the military, as arranged in the constitution. Nevertheless, the memorandum did not make any deterrent impact, as the previous interventions had. Moreover, the government's spokesperson, Cemil Cicek, responded harshly, in an unprecedented manner, unlike the previous governments:

*In a democratic state governed by rule of law, it is unconceivable that the General Staff – which is subordinated to the prime minister – (can) make a statement against the government.*⁸⁹⁷

Ironically, the government applied to the same discourse with the military, because the military declared that it is their constitutional obligation to protect the democratic regime if there was a threat. However, the government replied by using the same excuse – by stating that Turkey was already a democratic state, and it was unreasonable in democratic states for a military to interfere in the domestic sphere. This can be seen as an ingenious move by the AKP: beating the military with its own weapon. All scholars agree that the e-memorandum and the government's response highly accelerated the military's depoliticisation. After that, the military rapidly isolated itself from making political statements.

⁸⁹⁶ *BBC News*, 'Excerpts of Turkish Army Statement'. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6602775.stm> (accessed 28 April 2007); Toktaş and Kurt, 'The Turkish Military's Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s', 394.

⁸⁹⁷ 'Government Hits Back at Military Interference in Election Process, *Today's Zaman*, April 28, 2007.

In the next elections, the AKP increased its power even further by getting 46.6 per cent of votes. In addition to this, the AKP's candidate, Abdullah Gul, was chosen as the next president. The military remained silent and could not show any resistance to his presidency.⁸⁹⁸ The presidency of Abdullah Gul epitomised a major change in Turkish politics. The military stepped back and presented an image of being weaker than the civilians, in the eyes of public. In March 2008, the Constitutional Court received an indictment from Turkey's Chief Prosecutor to close the AKP and to ban 71 of the leading AKP officials, including Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul. The indictment accused the AKP of violating the secularism principle. However, the indictment was refused by the Court. While the closure case was receiving support from the opponent parties – particularly the Republican Party – it was harshly protested by the EU.⁸⁹⁹

After the election, the military's political influence began to fade faster than before. Moreover, most of the left-wing citizens and the Republican Party explicitly showed their disagreement with any type of military interventions in many cases. Slogans such as “no coup, no sharia” became popular in the left-wing meetings.⁹⁰⁰ Since the 1970s, this is perhaps the first time the ruling party and the main opposition parties were in agreement against military coups. Maybe because of this heavy pressure against military politicisation, the military tended to work in harmony with the

⁸⁹⁸ Ibid.: 30-31.

⁸⁹⁹ Bill Park, ‘Turkey's Deep State’, *The RUSI Journal*, 153, No.5 (2008): 58 (As can be seen in the title of this article, some authorities went so far as to call Ergenekon Turkey's ‘Deep State’); Atasoy, ‘The Turkish Example’, 93; Umit Cizre and Joshua Walker, ‘Conceiving the New Turkey After Ergenekon’, *The International Spectator*, 45, No.1 (2010): 94.

⁹⁰⁰ Ersel Aydinli, ‘A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey’, 595.

elected president. Indeed, the military accepted civilian supremacy in important security issues, including the Kurdish issue.⁹⁰¹

*On 24th October 2007, the prime minister asked our opinions for the operation ... we submitted our opinions on 1st November 2007 ... The Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are currently working on these proposals ... Now, the authority resides with the government ... If they deem that an operation is necessary ... we will do what is necessary according to that directive. There is no delay in the process.*⁹⁰²

Nevertheless, the military still continued to present itself as the “guardian of Kemalism” for a while, in its formal declarations. Ultimate political isolation came after the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases.⁹⁰³

By and large, the *Buyukanit* term is important for indicating increased civilian supremacy. The AKP’s determinant manner after the website declaration in 2007 obliged the military to step back and to obey civilian rule. This event was perhaps the most determining resistance to the military involvement in politics to date. As a result, the process is associated with the *positive-democratic relationship*. On the other hand, the civil-military relations still had important weaknesses in terms of achieving objective civilian control, because the military continued to make harsh statements against some of the governmental policies.

⁹⁰¹ Aydinli, ‘A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey’, 591. (In this article, Aydinli implies that an ‘unprecedented’ harmony was seen between the military and the civilians during the operation against the Kurdish separatists, even to the degree that the military and the opposition parties disagreed with each other on the issue, which has rarely seen since the AKP; Aydinli: 592)

⁹⁰² “*Buyukanit: Direktif Bekliyoruz, geldiği an gireriz*” [“We Wait for the Directive: We Will Intervene As Soon As It Comes”], *Hurriyet*, November 9, 2007.

⁹⁰³ See: Analytical Table 3, (p. 343-345).

7.3.6 Ilker Basbug and Isik Kosaner Eras, Ergenekon and Balyoz Cases (2008-2011)

Ilker Basbug is known as a committed secular person and a Kemalist who has a good intellectual background.⁹⁰⁴ Therefore, when he became the Chief of the General Staff, everybody thought that he would become decisive in preserving the Kemalist ideals. Accordingly, he showed the military's commitment to Atatürk's principles in some of his earlier speeches. At an inauguration ceremony in August 2008, Basbug stated that:

*The concepts of ... nation state and secularism were defined as the founding principles of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Hence, the Turkish Armed Forces are always responsible for protecting and preserving Atatürk's principles.*⁹⁰⁵

In the statement above, Ilker Basbug recalls the military's traditional guardianship role. But the incident in the following period would oblige Basbug to be more cautious while speaking about guardianship and government. This notorious incident, during his tenure as Chief of the General Staff, is known as the *Ergenekon Case*. According to the Ergenekon investigations, some retired generals, retired officers, and non-commissioned officers allegedly prepared plans to overthrow the AKP government. In a short period, the Ergenekon situation turned into a big operation that involved people from different backgrounds, such as the military, politicians from opposition parties, journalists, writers, and media people.⁹⁰⁶ The interesting

⁹⁰⁴ Ilker Basbug's intellectual background can be seen from his works. He wrote a biography of Atatürk: *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: The greatest leader of the 20th century*.

⁹⁰⁵ The speech is available at: http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSLV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2008org_ilkerbasbug_dvrtslkonusmasi_28082008.html (accessed: January 18, 2010).

⁹⁰⁶ See: Ersel Aydinli, 'A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.63, No.4, Autumn 2009, p.592; Metin Heper, *Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model*, Bilkent University Press, p.245; For the list of charges see: Park, 'Turkey's Deep State', 56.

point is that most of the people in charge were known as “the AKP opponents” (mostly from the Republican Party, Nationalist Action Party, and Labour Party). Ilker Basbug would also be arrested later, but he was released, as were many of the people who were arrested during the process. As has been pointed out, the trials forced Basbug to act carefully in his public statements, declaring that the military’s aim was to work in harmony with the government and to accept civilian supremacy, as in all other democratic states. The statements of Basbug, below, indicate his purpose of achieving military professionalism. Additionally, Basbug considers Huntington’s objective model as the true definition of professionalism:

Democracy is the most important characteristic of the Republic.

Turkish Armed Forces have respect for democracy (August, 29 2008).⁹⁰⁷

According to Huntington, the most effective control over the military is “objective control”. Objective control means rendering the military a professional institution and thus putting a distance between the military and politics ... The military’s duty should be determining the military’s needs and formulating policy options and proposing them to the civilian government, and implementing the relevant decisions made by the government (April 14, 2009).⁹⁰⁸

It is not appropriate to perceive the Turkish Armed Forces as an obstacle to pluralism (April 14, 2009).⁹⁰⁹

⁹⁰⁷ NTV, ‘İrtica Endisesi Ciddiye Alınmalı’ (Religious Fundamentalism is a Serious Risk). Available at: <http://arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/457675.asp#storyContinues> (accessed: 29 August 2008).

⁹⁰⁸ NTV, ‘Org. Basbug’un Konusmasinin Tam Metni’ (Full Text of General Basbug’s Speech). Available at: <http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/org-basbugun-konusmasinin-tam-metni,tFcIj7N-w0On1jKf-AVMCw> (accessed: 14 April 2009).

⁹⁰⁹ Ibid.

These statements clearly show that Basbug is theoretically against military interventions in democracy and wishes to keep the military out of civilian spheres. The most important point within these statements for the direction of the thesis is Basbug describing professionalism with Huntington's definition. In the following part of the statement, Basbug considers that Huntington's definition of professionalism enables the military to focus on its own responsibilities to become ready for war. Basbug maintains that Huntington's theory enables the military to make recommendations to the government, but that it should leave the last word to the civilians. Accordingly, it was noted that Basbug held weekly negotiations with the prime minister for discussing security matters, and that he avoided making public statements himself.⁹¹⁰

In particular, during the Ergenekon affair, Basbug acted carefully while giving public statements. Although he tried to protect the military's image, he avoided attacking the government. Yet, many people criticised the media for being too offensive and prejudiced toward the military during this period.⁹¹¹ At the same time, the AKP government became careful while speaking about the military's image. Erdogan implied that actual Turkish officers were not involved in these type of illegal moves, by separating the Ergenekon trials from the Turkish military. Naturally, no politician could take the risk of being in conflict with the military, because they knew that the military had a special place and was still the most trusted organisation in the eyes of the public. Therefore, the prime minister once made this statement:

⁹¹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹¹ Ibid.: 246.

*If some people in an institution are engaged in some wrong-doings,
that institution as a whole should not be held responsible.*⁹¹²

In addition to the prime minister's speech above, President Abdullah Gul made this statement:

*Sometimes when engaged in a debate and/or expressing
themselves, some people go beyond what are proper limits. This is
particularly the case when it comes to the military. We should all
refrain from defaming the military as well as the police and
intelligence.*⁹¹³

The Ergenekon and Balyoz indictments caused a decrease in the level of public trust for the military. The surveys show that the military is still the most trusted organisation, but there is a significant decline in the findings.⁹¹⁴ As has been argued in Chapter 3, public support is the most important factor in the military's interventions in politics; it has always elaborated the citizens' reaction before making its previous interventions. Therefore, the assumed decrease in public trust can be one reason that compelled the military to retreat from politics. Accordingly, Ilker Basbug's and his successor Isik Kosaner's references to the "military-nation" idea during this period can be seen as an attempt to repair relations:

*The fundamental source of power for militaries are the weapons.
For the Turkish military, however, it is the nation's trust and love
for the military (Ilker Basbug, 2008).*⁹¹⁵

⁹¹² Ibid.

⁹¹³ Ibid.

⁹¹⁴ For a detailed analysis of public trust in the military in Turkey see: Zeki Sarigil, 'Deconstructing the Turkish Military's Popularity', *Armed Forces & Society*, 35, No.4, July 2009: 709-27.

⁹¹⁵ Zeki Sarigil, 'Civil-Military Relations beyond Dichotomy: With Special Reference to Turkey', *Turkish Studies*, 12, No.2, 2011: 274 (emphasised by the author).

The TAF cannot be compared to the armed forces of any other country due to our country's geographic location, its proximity to crisis zones, the threats and risks it faces, its socio-cultural structure; and the national and sentimental values of our public (Isik Kosaner's inaugural speech, 2010).⁹¹⁶

In these two statements, the commanders remind their listeners of the military-nation assumption, to recall the military's special position for the public. Additionally, Kosaner recalls Turkey's strategic structure and its security concerns as being the other factors that give the military roles beyond those of other militaries.

On the other hand, the weakening popular support was not the only factor that forced the military to stay away from politics. The trials of Ergenekon and Balyoz, the interrogations and arrests caused a big change in the General Staff. The top commanders of the Land, Naval and Air Forces, as well as the Chief of the General Staff, were replaced by other commanders.

Some of the famous people who were interrogated, detained, and tried were: Hursit Tolon (retired general), Tuncay Ozkan (TV presenter), Mustafa Balbay (journalist), Esref Ugur Yigit (retired navy general), Mehmet Haberal (TV station owner), Veli Kucuk (retired general), Bedrettin Dalan (owner of Yeditepe University and the ex-governor of Istanbul), Levent Bektas (retired major), Dursun Cicek (major), Saldiray Berk (retired general), Ilhan Cihaner (3rd Army Commander), Soner Yalcin (journalist), Nedim Sener (journalist), Ahmet Sik (author), Yalcin Kucuk (author), Hanefi Avci (author), Muzaffer Tekin (retired captain), Kemal Kerincsiz (lawyer), Dogu Perincek (Head of the Labour Party), Hasan Igsiz (retired General-Commander

⁹¹⁶ *The Turkish General Staff*, "General Isik Kosaner's Speech at the Chief of Staff's Transfer of Duty Ceremony". Available at: <http://www.tsk.tr> (accessed 2010).

of the 1st Army), Sener Eruygur (retired General-Commander of the Gendarmerie Forces), Arif Dogan (Commander of the Gendarmerie Forces), Fikret Emek (retired soldier from the Special Forces Command), Oktay Yildirim (Member of the Special Warfare Department) and Ilker Basbug (Chief of the General Staff). Some of these people were released without punishment, but some, including Chief of the General Staff Ilker Basbug, were sentenced to life imprisonment.⁹¹⁷

As aforementioned, Ergenekon was followed by the *Balyoz* (Sledgehammer) operation in 2010 during the new Chief of the General Staff Isik Kosaner's term. Balyoz is, just as the Ergenekon, an investigation into some military officers who allegedly intended to topple the government. The alleged plot was revealed by the *Taraf* newspaper, which claimed that the purpose of the plan was bombing some civilian places, such as mosques, to create chaos. Then, the military would find an opportunity to intervene. During the Balyoz process some other important military personnel were arrested, including: Cetin Dogan (retired general and Commander of the 1st Army), Ibrahim Firtina (retired general and Commander of the Air Forces), Ozden Ornek (retired admiral and Commander of the Navy), Engin Alan (retired general and Chief of Special Forces of the Turkish Army), Sukru Sariisk (retired general and the Secretary General of the National Security Council). The arrest of these key figures within the military can indeed be seen as the final act before complete military depoliticisation. The Chief of the General Staff decided to resign after the trials because he felt guilty at not being defending the rights of the military personnel:

⁹¹⁷ See: Sami Faltas, 'The General, the Prime Minister and the Imam: Civil-Military Relations in Turkey Today', *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 11, No.1, 2012: 135; *Today's Zaman*, 'Long Sentences for Ergenekon Suspects'. Available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-322781-long-sentences-for-ergenekon-suspects-life-for-ex-army-chief.html> (accessed: 5 August 2013).

*It has become impossible for me to continue in this high office,
because I am unable to fulfil my responsibility to protect the rights
of my personnel as the Chief of General Staff.*⁹¹⁸

Isik Kosaner still continued to make statements to imply the military's guardianship, and he was explicitly in an opponent position to the Ergenekon and Balyoz operations. Therefore, he refused to maintain his duty. Finally, Kosaner was succeeded by Necdet Ozel (2010-2015) as the new Chief of the General Staff. Under Ozel's command, the military ended making statements about politics. Except for small incidents, the military worked in harmony with the government and accepted civilian supremacy. However, because of the Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations, the opponents harshly criticised the government and the secret Fethullah organisation to create a *Kumpas* (which means "Trap") to eliminate the opposition. According to the retired generals, the left-wing activists, and the main opposition parties, the government used this process as an excuse to break the power of the military and opposition, in order to remove the obstacles against a Sharia regime. They claim that the biggest proof of this trap was that they not only arrested the military commanders but they also arrested journalists, lawyers, politicians, and media spokespersons to suppress all the opposition moves. Additionally, the opponents objected to the trials, because they claimed that there were not clear proofs to support the accusations and

⁹¹⁸ *BBC News*, 'Turkey: Military Chiefs Resign En Masse'. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14346325> (accessed: 29 July 2011); For the Ergenekon and Balyoz processes see: Yaprak Gursoy, 'The Final Curtain for the Turkish Armed Forces? Civil-Military Relations in View of the 2011 General Elections', *Turkish Studies*, 13, No.2, 2012: 194; F. Michael Wuthrich, 'Commercial Media, the Military, and Society in Turkey during Failed and Successful Interventions', *Turkish Studies*, 11, No.2, 2010: 229; Gursoy, 'The Changing Role of the Military in Turkish Politics', 748; Toktas and Kurt, 'The Turkish Military's Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s', 397; Ahmet T. Kuru, 'The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdism, and Communism', *Insight Turkey*, 14, No.2, 2012.

the indictments. They also accused the media of being sympathetic to the AKP, and of attacking to the military and opposition unfairly.⁹¹⁹

Furthermore, the detentions, trials, and imprisonments were cautiously followed by the foreign media. The US Ambassador Joseph Ricciardone also stated that the United States had some concerns about the detainments and the imprisonments of journalists by stating that this was not good for the freedom of speech. Additionally, the EU Commissioner Stefan Fule stated that the European Union was following the process with concern. In Turkey, the civil society organisations, intellectuals, journalists, businessmen, and media representatives struggled to increase their voice against the arrests. Strong protests were organised by the citizens, particularly in the big cities. Indeed, some liberal right-wing intellectuals, who are against military interventions, also showed their reactions to the arrests.⁹²⁰

As a result, one may argue that the Ergenekon and Balyoz process greatly damaged the military's constant supremacy over politics.⁹²¹ Similarly, the military's reaction to the operations supported that argument, because they did not make any further movement to break the trial process and accepted awaiting the judgement of the courts. During the process, the military gave several statements to show its concerns for the true working of the legal mechanisms, but it did not take any further action, such as using force or pressure.⁹²²

⁹¹⁹ See: Gursoy, 'The Changing Role of the Military in Turkish Politics', 748; and Gursoy, 'The Final Curtain for the Turkish Armed Forces?', 194-195.

⁹²⁰ Gursoy, 'The Final Curtain for the Turkish Armed Forces?', 195.

⁹²¹ See: Umit Cizre and Joshua Walker, 'Conceiving the New Turkey after Ergenekon', *The International Spectator*, 45, No.1, 2010): 89-98.

⁹²² David Pion-Berlin, 'Turkish Civil-Military Relations: A Latin American Comparison', *Turkish Studies*, 12, No.2 (2011): 302 (In this article, interestingly, the author asks whether the Turkish military would remain silent without applying force and pressure during the Ergenekon and Balyoz operations.); One of the examples where the military showed its concern for the trials was the statement on 5 April 2011: the military's official website declared that they had difficulties in understanding why the arrests were still continuing (Gursoy, 'The Final Curtain for the Turkish Armed Forces? Civil-Military in View of the 2011 General Elections', p.196).

As has been noted before, opposition to military coups increased even among the Kemalists and opposition parties. Although the main opposition parties – particularly the Republican Party – were extremely suspicious of the allegations, they clearly showed their support for a liberal model of CIV-MIL relations. More interestingly, the Republicans came with a proposal to limit the military's power over the civilians. The party programme stated that:

*Any force other than the democratic institutions and rules provided in the laws. In this scope, CHP (Republican Party) opposes ... the military's interference in politics. The armed forces should be under the control of civilian authority. To this end CHP starts out with an extensive demilitarisation programme.*⁹²³

The party's proposal included radical changes toward the liberal CIV-MIL model:

- Full control of the Armed Forces by the civilian government.
- Revision of Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, which gives the military the duty to protect and look after Turkish territory and the Republic.
- Enhancement of professionalism in the military.
- Reduction of military service to six months for everyone.
- Narrowing down of the jurisdiction of the military courts in general.
- Abolition of the Military High Administrative Court that reviews administrative cases involving military personnel, and which can currently overrule the decisions of the civilians if it wishes.⁹²⁴

⁹²³ See: Gursoy, 'The Final Curtain for the Turkish Armed Forces?', 197.

⁹²⁴ Ibid.

The proposal was broadened by the Democracy Report of the party by offering further ideas about the military, conscription, and the defence budget. According to some of these suggestions, parliament had to be more effective in detecting military expenditures, the military should be directly responsible to the Ministry of Defence, the Military Court of Appeals should be abolished, and the people who were responsible for the 1980 junta rule should be judged.⁹²⁵ That proposal is highly interesting, because it came from the main opposition party to the AKP. As one can notice, the proposal offered a complete democratic CIV-MIL model with all details. Interestingly, the Republican Party's proposal conformed with the AKP's previous attempts to restrict military power for toward the goal of EU membership, and even brought further suggestions. Also, it is worthwhile to mention that Kilicdaroglu asked why Yasar Buyukanit was not judged during the Ergenekon process, because he was the Chief of the General Staff during the website declaration in 2007.⁹²⁶

On the other hand, the second opposition party, MHP (the National Action Party), objected to these proposals for restricting military power over civilians. In parallel with their strong nationalist ideal, they strictly supported the military's privileged position. Ideologically, the MHP is closer to "militarism"; however, their ideology conflicts with the Kemalist legacy. Especially, some radical supporters of the MHP often refer to the successful days of the Ottoman Empire by glorifying it along with the jihad concept. Therefore, they are usually not as sensitive as the military about the secularism principle. Indeed, there were times when the MHP came closer to Islamist ideology. However, this time the conditions were different, because state unity and the Kurdish separation movement were the main concerns of the party programme, and they defended the view that only a strong military could preserve

⁹²⁵ Ibid.: 198.

⁹²⁶ Ibid.

the state from dissolving. Indeed, the MHP's main conflict with the AKP has never been on matters related to secularism and Kemalist reforms, but rather the Kurdish separation movement. The MHP criticised the AKP strictly because of their softened policy toward the Kurdish separatists. As a result, during the Ergenekon and Balyoz process, the party became supportive to the military.⁹²⁷

However, both the CHP and MHP strongly objected to the trials, interrogations, punishments, and the conditions of imprisonment during the Ergenekon and Balyoz period. Kilicdaroglu even stated that Erdogan created an "empire of terror" by suppressing freedom of expression. He explicitly declared that he did not believe in the existence of that organisation. Additionally, the CHP's former president, Deniz Baykal, presented himself as the "advocate of Ergenekon trials". Furthermore, he maintained that the AKP was creating its own "deep state" by appointing its sympathisers to the higher positions within the state departments.⁹²⁸ Similarly, the MHP Group Deputy Chairman Mehmet Sandir stated that it was not possible to create a true and advanced democracy by putting journalists in prison.⁹²⁹ Both parties criticised the process by claiming that the military's combat skills were weakened because its commanders were in prison and the state remained open to foreign attacks. Indeed, they went further by nominating some Ergenekon and Balyoz suspects for their election lists.⁹³⁰

⁹²⁷ Ibid.

⁹²⁸ 'Basbakan Ergenekon'un Savcisiysa Ben Avukatiyim' (If the Prime Minister is the Judge of Ergenekon, I am its Advocate), *Radikal*. Available at: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/basbakan-ergenekonun-savcisiysa-ben-avukatiyim-886827/> (accessed: 5 July 2008). Also see: Park, 'Turkey's Deep State', 58. (A journalist of the liberal *Star* newspaper, Samil Tayyar, claimed that the origins of Turkey's so-called 'military deep state' dates back to the Union and Progress era in the 1890s. That means the Kemalist state and its ideology was embedded in that so-called deep state establishment, which remained until the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials; Park, *ibid.*: 57.)

⁹²⁹ Gursoy, *ibid.*: 199.

⁹³⁰ Ibid.

As a result of the developments above, before the 2011 elections, parliament witnessed a tactical war between the government and the main opposition parties in terms of CIV-MIL relations. Although the main opposition parties criticised the developments within the Ergenekon and Balyoz processes, they had some worries because of the past experiences. They did not want to be in a position of being too persistent in defending the military, because the AKP could benefit from this by increasing its votes, as they had after the e-memorandum in 2007.⁹³¹ On the other hand, the AKP also adopted a similar policy with the opposition parties, by declaring that they would continue to make liberal reforms to restrict the military's autonomy, but they would also preserve the military's image. The AKP also declared several times that they would be very careful in sustaining the impartiality of the judiciary and would not intervene in any circumstances. Therefore, the government attacked the opposition by claiming that the opposition affects the impartiality of the judiciary by making statements and by giving support to the "juntaists".⁹³² Recep Tayyip Erdogan strictly criticised the opposition for giving their back to the juntaists to remain in power:

*When they could not find candidates from the outside they transferred candidates from the prison. I want to ask to the MHP and CHP ... are you representing the nation's will or the will of the gangs, mafia and junta? Are you taking your strength from the nation or from the gangs, mafia, and dark organisations?*⁹³³

⁹³¹ Ibid.: 201.

⁹³² Ibid.:202.

⁹³³ 'Ergenekonun İrtibat Ofisini Aciyorlar' (They are Opening the Ergenekon's Contact Office), *Aksam*. Available at: <http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/ergenekonun-irtibat-ofisini-aciyorlar--34215h/haber-34215> (accessed: 18 April 2011).

This speech also indicates that Prime Minister Erdogan was apparently convinced that the accusations were true, and that there was an illegal juntaist organisation. Nevertheless, the AKP appeared to be in harmony with the military during this era. They had the military's advice on important issues, particularly in foreign policy, and they opposed the CHP's proposal of shortening military service through payment. However, the military's periodic criticisms of the Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations, and its statements concerning the impartiality of the judiciary from its official website, were creating tensions between the military and the government. Once, Erdogan made a statement against the formal declarations from the military's website:

*My wish is that the (TAF) should not have made such a statement from their website. I assume that it was a mistake ... After the final decision was made, they can criticise it. But I do not find it appropriate at this time. This is an effort to influence the process.*⁹³⁴

However, the last strife between the military and civilians ended in a short time. The military's reactions were limited to website declarations, but, in a short period of time, these formal declarations also disappeared. Indeed, Erdogan stated how he was happy that the military were not intervening in politics anymore, and only replying to the issues that directly concern them. He noticed this development as a great step toward democratisation, and invited the media to be supportive to the military in this liberalisation process.⁹³⁵ Furthermore, Erdogan defined the separation of the military

⁹³⁴ See: Gursoy, *ibid.*: 203.

⁹³⁵ *Ibid.*

from politics as one of the greatest achievements of the government in an interview to an American channel.⁹³⁶

To sum up, the website declaration in 2007 and the Ergenekon-Balyoz prosecutions became a major turning point in civil-military relations. Starting from this period, the depoliticised transformation of the military gained momentum. On the other hand, the trials and replacements of the Kemalist commanders with allegedly more moderate ones, as well as the presumed Fethullah penetration into the military, may cause one to think that the AKP attempted to subordinate the military by “civilianising it” (subjective control). Yet, this possibility is also debatable given the limited empirical evidence. Overall, the process between Buyukanit and Necdet Ozel can be defined as a *negative-democratic relationship*. The prosecutions undermined the military’s political influence and image, and this development arguably enabled the AKP to increase its anti-secular and oppressive policies.

7.3.7 Necdet Ozel Era: Toward Depoliticisation?

As has been noted in the previous pages, the depoliticised image of the military started with the EU reforms. However, a complete depoliticisation became the case after the resignation of Isik Kosaner. After Kosaner, Necdet Ozel became the new Chief of the General Staff. During Ozel’s term in 2011-2015, Turkey did not see any remarkable political statement or activity from the military.⁹³⁷ It worked, at least ostensibly, in harmony with the government, in line with the advanced democratic models. Indeed, one may find similarities between the process and Huntington’s objective control model. However, according to Huntington, the civil and military spheres should be distinct, and the military should be professionalised in its own

⁹³⁶ Ibid., 203-204. See: Analytical Table 3, (p. 343-345).

⁹³⁷ Although Ozel’s term ended in 2015, the analytical concerns of this research ends with the Gezi Protests in 2013, because the same observable harmony continued to exist in the following process.

autonomous sphere to achieve this model. Therefore, it is still doubtful whether the current civil-military relations are exactly meeting those standards or not. Indeed, by taking into account the previous case studies and the crossing identities argument, one may associate the process with the subjective model, because events such as Ergenekon-Balyoz and the replacement of top commanders with new ones might cause one to think that the AKP side-lined or stripped of the opponent officers and replaced them with the AKP sympathisers. The assumed Fethullah penetration and its ideological closeness to the Islamist parties strengthen this argument. However, this approach is again questionable at this level due to the closeness of the case.

On the other hand, the above-mentioned harmony also continued in foreign policy issues, such as the Cyprus and Kurdish issues. In addition to these developments, the military occasionally used its formal website to prevent speculative news.⁹³⁸ Indeed, most military statements during Ozel's term were about the military's own (technical) professional obligations, such as campaigns, operations, ceremonies, and national holidays. The statements about political events were very limited, and they were mostly to mention the military's political neutrality. Apart from these, the public statements about politics almost disappeared. Moreover, a nationwide constitutional referendum took place in 2010 to change some articles of the 1982 constitution. One of these articles was Article 15, which banned the trial of the 1980 junta leaders. The referendum was accepted by the majority of the public and Article 15 was changed. The change opened the way to try the junta leaders for interfering in democracy and toppling the government. This change and the trial of the generals

⁹³⁸ For instance, shortly after the Gezi Protests, during a corruption allegation for the AKP government (17 December 2013), the military made a statement on its website to say that any attempt to pull the military inside the political strife would be unsuccessful because the military would preserve its politically neutral position. See: '*TSK'dan 17 Aralık Operasyonu İcin Aciklama*', (Statement by the Military for the Operation of 17 December), *CNN TURK*. Available at: <http://www.cnntrk.com/turkiye/tskdan-17-aralik-operasyonu-icin-aciklama> (accessed: 27 December 2013).

became a significant movement to break the military's immunity, because that article had a symbolic meaning, which indicates the military's autonomous position.⁹³⁹ Despite all these positive developments in terms of military depoliticisation, a remarkable increase in the AKP's authoritarian behaviour occurred. Especially, Prime Minister Erdogan strengthened his authoritarian and threatening tone in his speeches against opponents. In particular, some regulations of the AKP government were found to be anti-secular and anti-democratic by the opposition, such as the alcohol ban.⁹⁴⁰ Hence, if one considers a mutual relationship between the decreasing military supervision in politics and the increasing AKP authoritarianism, one may define the process as a *negative-democratic relationship*, in which the military stepped back but this retrenchment brought negative impacts for the democratic regime. In the absence of the military's traditional "guardianship of the regime" position, the government applied to anti-democratic methods to stay in power and to suppress its opposition.⁹⁴¹

The political passivism of the military also continued during the Gezi (Parki) protests in June 2013. This is especially remarkable because, in previous decades, it was hardly imaginable that the military would remain silent in such a kind of event. The mentioned incidents began with small protests against the government's attempts to establish a big shopping centre over a public park, which is known as "Gezi Parki". The demonstrations immediately turned into a big public demonstration toward the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, through the impact of social media. It started with a big participation in Istanbul's Taksim Square and rapidly spread to Istanbul's major centres, and to Ankara, Izmir, and the other cities. The main complaints of the

⁹³⁹ Ariana Keyman, *Civil-Military Relations in Turkey*, May 21 2012.

⁹⁴⁰ For the alcohol ban see: *Hurriyet*, 'Basbakandan Onemli Aciklamalar' (Important statements by the prime minister). Available at: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/basbakandan-onemli-aciklamalar-23357568> (accessed 24 May 2013).

⁹⁴¹ See: Analytical Table 3, (p.343-345).

demonstrators were the oppressive methods of the government and the limitations to individual liberties and on the media. On the first day, the demonstrations gave liberal and democratic messages to the international media. The movement received positive reactions from the European Union and United States – particularly, huge support from the EU. However, after several days, marginal groups, such as the extreme left and right groups, penetrated into the demonstrators and applied vandalism. The police responded to the vandalism by using tear gas, plastic bullets, and batons. The number of demonstrators was arguably over a million (perhaps more), all around the country.⁹⁴² One of the most interesting aspects of the demonstrations, for perhaps the first time since the Turkish Liberation War, was that different people from different ideologies came together, including Kemalists, Grey Wolves (ultra-nationalists), socialists, Islamists, Alevis, atheists, feminists, and Kurdish groups, as well as famous academics, artists, journalists, writers, and so on. For instance, when a group of religious people, who are known as the “anti-capitalist Muslims”, were praying during the Friday Prayer, the left-wing activist groups, known as staunchly secular, created a circle to protect the religious group against possible police attacks.⁹⁴³

The impact of the Gezi Protests is still being felt today. Around 10 demonstrators and one police officer died during the events, and many demonstrators are still under charge and being tried. Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the majority of the AKP strictly refused to admit that the demonstrations were democratic and peaceful. Some even

⁹⁴² The official number is not known.

⁹⁴³ For the Gezi Protests, see: *The Economist*, ‘Democrat or Sultan’, June 8-14 and ‘Timeline of Gezi Parki Protests’, *Hurriyet Daily News*. Available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/timeline-of-gezi-park-protests.aspx?pageID=238&nID=48321&NewsCatID=341> (accessed: 6 June 2013).

‘Anti-Capitalist Muslims’ is a political Islamist movement under the leadership of religious studies expert Ihsan Eliacik, who interprets Islam as a religion that is against the capitalist system and very close to socialism. For instance see: Ihsan Eliacik, *The Critique of Capitalism in the Light of Quranic Verses*. Available at: <http://www.ihsaneliacik.com/2015/10/01/the-critique-of-capitalism-in-the-light-of-quranic-verses/> (accessed: 1 October 2015).

claimed that the demonstrations were organised by “foreign actors”. The most important indication of the event, for the purpose of the thesis, is that the military did not make any statement. During the police intervention for dispersing the masses, some people were concerned about the military’s reaction. However, the military remained silent and made no move or statement about the Gezi Park situation.⁹⁴⁴

Apart from all these events, the military’s Kemalist references still continued to exist throughout Ozel’s term – at least symbolically – such as: commemorating Atatürk in ceremonies; putting his pictures, sayings, and statutes on every corner; and defining Atatürk as “the true guide and eternal leader”. On the other hand, these rituals have not gone further than being procedural, and the military has not made any statement to imply “guardianship”. Beyond all these developments, the most important reform for civilian supremacy was the change in Article 35. The main article in the military’s Internal Act Service was replaced by a new amendment (in July 2013) which stipulates:

*The duty of the Armed Forces is to protect the homeland against threats and dangers to come from abroad, to ensure the preservation and strengthening of military power in a manner that will provide deterrence, to fulfil the duties abroad....*⁹⁴⁵

The change to the aforementioned Article 35 of military’s Internal Service Act is perhaps the most radical step toward military depoliticisation, because now the military does not have a strong legal tool to legitimise its involvements in politics. Previously, the Article 35 had been offering the military an obligation of protecting

⁹⁴⁴ There is no formal evidence to demonstrate the military’s general stance toward these events. There is some ‘gossip’, which is social media-based and informal. Therefore, it is not known what the military thinks about the demonstrations in general.

⁹⁴⁵ *Hurriyet Daily News*, ‘Turkish Parliament Oks Coup Pretext Article’. Available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-parliament-oks-change-on-coup-pretext/article.aspx?pageID=238&nID=50706&NewsCatID=338> (accessed: 19 July 2016).

the constitution against the internal and external threats. The military interventions after the 1960 had always been carried out with reference to this article. Nevertheless, according to the new regulation in the Internal Service Act, the military's responsibilities are limited to defence of the state from external threats, by following governmental instructions. During the negotiations, the AKP received some criticisms from the opposition. Oktay Vural from the MHP (former Minister of Transport) objected to the changes in the Internal Service Act by assuming that the new regulation would weaken the military's national identity by making it an ordinary profession such as a "doctorate or carpentry".⁹⁴⁶ On the other hand, with this change, the military lost its main formal power to defend possible future interventions.

In the final analysis, although the overall analytical concerns of this research ends with the Gezi protests in 2013, the same stability in civil-military relations continued until the end of Necdet Ozel's term in 2015. In general, the recent depoliticisation is the result of a transformation that was started by the European Union candidacy in 1999. However, the developments, namely the unsuccessful website memorandum in 2007 and the Ergenekon-Balyoz processes, considerably accelerated this process.

Normally, the current harmony between the government and military along with the military's political passivism, lead one to think that the Turkish military absorbed the professional ethos to maintain a Huntington line of objective control. However, as aforementioned, this depolitical image is very recent and vulnerable. If one considers the Turkish military's praetorian legacy, associating this process with a Huntington type of normative professionalism can be premature and wrong. Therefore, instead of professionalism, I prefer to define this stage of military culture as 'depoliticisation'.

⁹⁴⁶ *Hurriyet*, '35. Madde Degistirildi' (The Article 35 has been changed). Available at: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/tsk-35-madde-degistirildi-23718265> (accessed: 13 July 2013).

There are several reasons to associate this stage with subjective control in that, following the Ergenekon and Balyoz operations, the key military figures who were closer to the Kemalist-revolutionist wing have been replaced by new commanders. At this point, by taking into account the Fethullah Gulen attempts to penetrate into the military, one may think that the AKP intends to make the military ‘the mirror of state’ by ‘civilianising it’, as suggested by Huntington’s subjective model. Yet, this consideration would also be speculative and premature at this level due to the absence of clear evidences.

Related to this, since the end of Cold War, it has been suggested that there is an increase in the level of technical professionalism. The campaigns and training sessions with the NATO armies and the military’s recent depoliticisation could have increased the level of technical professionalism. However, I argue that the Turkish military still has a long way to go for achieving technical and normative professionalism to reach Western standards. Lastly, I associated the process with the *negative-democratic relationship*, in that the military adopted a politically passive stance that seems stronger than the previous depoliticisations, but presumably the absence of military supervision as the traditional guardian of secularism enabled the AKP government to apply more authoritarian and oppressive policies, as happened during the Gezi Protests.

Last but not least, while the Turkish military was passing through a depoliticising process, theoretically in line with achieving a normative professionalism, the military’s efforts for intertwining secularisation with democratisation became far from successful with regard to its earliest revolutionist ideals. The recent depolitical status of the military arguably left Turkish democracy vulnerable to religious populism and authoritarianism. The main reason behind this failure is the shift in

military culture from revolutionism to guardianship, following NATO membership. After absorbing capitalism and anti-Communism as new ideologies, replacing Kemalist statism and populism, the liberal and progressive tendency of the military was replaced by a more conservative and authoritarian stance. At this point, each military intervention further closed Turkey to the Western bloc to be a modern capitalist state and also turned the military into a military-industrial complex. As a result, secularism and democratisation became an excuse for legitimising the military interventions. Especially, after promoting the Turkish-Islam synthesis and implementing a restrictive constitution, the 1980-83 Junta opened the path for political Islam and single-party authoritarianism. As a result, in the twenty-first century, while the military was gradually stepping back from politics, the Islamic-based AKP further increased its oppression by undermining the secular dynamics of the state.

Analytical Table 3:

PERIODS	MILITARY CULTURE	TYPE OF REGIME	TYPE OF ECONOMIC POLICY	TYPE OF SECULARISM	TYPE OF NATIONALISM	ANALYSIS
<p><i>1997-2002 (Coup in 1997)</i></p> <p><i>(The revival of Kemalist sensitivities among the officers finally led the military to force the Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to step down)</i></p>	<p><i>Guardian</i></p> <p><i>(The 1997 intervention rhetorically was implemented to guard secularism. Yet, its results are highly debatable. According to some authorities, this intervention could not stop the rise of political Islam – even accelerating it)</i></p>	<p><i>Democratic Republic</i></p> <p><i>(The military did not directly take over the rule. Rather, it urged civil institutions against the government and finally managed to force them to retire. Hence, democracy continued to work properly under a different civil government)</i></p>	<p><i>Statism</i></p> <p><i>(The national economy experienced a relative shift from liberal policies to a more statist approach after the resign of Erbakan)</i></p>	<p><i>Strict Secularism</i></p> <p><i>(The military's intolerance to Islamic mobilisation occasionally climbed to a very oppressive degree, which caused many innocent people to be in charge because of their religious personality)</i></p>	<p><i>Mixed Nationalism</i></p> <p><i>(Although the official definition of nationalism has never been changed, the innocent Kurdish citizens were frequently offended due to the military's high level of scepticism against the Kurdish separatists)</i></p>	<p><i>Variable Relationship</i></p> <p><i>(The impacts of the 1997 intervention are highly debatable. Hence, this period can be associated with either the negative or positive undemocratic models, depending on the point of view)</i></p>

<p>2002-2006</p> <p>(Apart from some minor events, the military and the new elected AKP government remained in harmony. Yet, the military periodically showed its intolerance to any type of Islamic mobilisation in the state)</p>	<p>Variable</p> <p>(A division of opinion among the officers became observable. While moderate officers were making efforts to professionalise the military, the radical Kemalists saw the Liberal-Islamic AKP as a potential threat to the secular regime)</p>	<p>Democratic Republic</p> <p>(Democracy worked properly after the election victory of the AKP. The AKP came to the political arena with a more liberal and secular discourse as opposed to its Islamic predecessors)</p>	<p>Liberal Economy</p> <p>(The AKP has made the most liberal attempts in the national economy since Turgut Ozal's rule during the 1980s)</p>	<p>Moderate Secularism</p> <p>(Although the AKP defined itself as secular, it worked on some reform programmes to satisfy its religious voters, including the freedom of turban wearing. Some of these attempts created tensions between the government and military)</p>	<p>Mixed Nationalism</p>	<p>Positive-Democratic Relationship</p> <p>(The military's harmony with the government in most cases brought positive results. The AKP brought a relative stability to Turkish politics after the years of tension. Also, the Turkish economy had a rapid development)</p>
<p>2006-2008</p> <p>(The military increased its opposition to the AKP by accusing it of damaging the secular dynamics of the regime)</p>	<p>Guardian</p> <p>(In 2007, the military gave a website declaration by threatening the AKP with a coup d'état. The AKP did not step back; rather, it replied harshly and dissuaded the military)</p>	<p>Democratic Republic</p> <p>(Despite the military attempting to intervene in 2007, it was unsuccessful. Democracy continued to work properly)</p>	<p>Liberal Economy</p> <p>(The AKP's achievements in liberal policies continued)</p>	<p>Moderate Secularism</p> <p>(The AKP's Islamic discourse began to be more intense. The military and secular wing regularly expressed their worries)</p>	<p>Mixed Nationalism</p> <p>(The AKP began to search for alternative solutions to the Kurdish issue without applying the force of arms)</p>	<p>Positive-Democratic Relationship</p> <p>(Although there was some increase in the AKP's Islamic discourse, the democratic regime was rooted on stable ground after a long time)</p>

<p>2008-2011</p> <p>(Several officers, including the top military commanders, were charged for allegedly making plans (known as Ergenekon and Balyoz) for overthrowing the AKP government. Top military commanders including the Commander in Chief were arrested. The military's image was seriously damaged before the Turkish people)</p>	<p>Variable</p> <p>(The Ergenekon and Balyoz trials simultaneously caused a remarkable change within the commanding elite of the military. Arguably, the commanders who were described as Kemalist-orientated and secular were gradually replaced by commanders who are defined as moderate and neutral)</p>	<p>Democratic Republic</p> <p>(Democracy continued to work properly. On the other hand, the opposition parties increased their criticisms of the government by accusing it of eliminating its opponents by illegal and authoritarian methods. The opposition also reacted harshly to the arrests of top commanders during the Ergenekon and Balyoz events)</p>	<p>Liberal Economy</p> <p>(Liberal attempts of the AKP in economic policies continued to grow)</p>	<p>Moderate Secularism</p> <p>(The opponents further increased their criticisms to the AKP because of their alleged religious populism, in order to maintain their existent support from the pious electors)</p>	<p>Mixed Nationalism</p> <p>(The AKP's alternative solutions to the Kurdish issue included a new suggestion known as the Democratic Initiative Process. According to this new suggestion, the government will search for diplomatic solutions to the Kurdish issue and will work for increasing individual freedoms of the Kurdish citizens)</p>	<p>Negative-Democratic Relationship</p> <p>(Arguably, this period brought some negative results for Turkish democracy. The Ergenekon and Balyoz trials caused the military to step back either by force or willingly. Nonetheless, in the absence of the military's coercive image, the AKP increased its anti-secular and authoritarian manner)</p>
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2011-2013	Depolitical	Authoritarian Republic	Liberal Economy	Moderate Secularism	Mixed Nationalism	Negative-Democratic Relationship
(After several events, The Turkish military adopted itself into a depolitical appearance, that trend would continue until the end of Necdet Ozel era in 2015)	(The military has stopped giving a political appearance by ceasing its statements and practices in that area. They usually appeared in harmony with the AKP government in domestic and foreign policies)	(The AKP explicitly increased its authoritarian manner over its opponents. Indeed, the EU began to be critical against the AKP due to its increasingly authoritarian manner)	(The AKP's ongoing liberal policies began to receive harsh criticisms from the opposition parties because of allegedly widening the income gap between rich and poor)	(The increasing Islamic emphasis in the AKP's rhetoric became clearly observable in both domestic and foreign policies)	(The Democratic Initiative Process of the AKP saw a relative lessening of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. However, through the end of 2015, the conflict would start again)	(The military depoliticisation arguably caused a severe increase in the AKP's authoritarian and anti-secular tendency. The Gezi Park events globally evidenced this transformation)

7.4 CONCLUSION

This has been the third and final case study of the empirical section of the thesis, which has analysed the years between 1999 and 2013. The history of the Turkish military has witnessed transitions between three distinct identities, which have been coded as revolutionism, guardianship, and depoliticisation. This chapter saw a process in which depolitical behaviour suppressed the other two identities and dominated military culture during the (ongoing) period of AKP rule. Indeed, there have always been some groups of officers in the military that were above politics (neutral) since the 1908 Revolution (the Declaration of the Second Constitutional Monarchy), but they have remained relatively limited in number. In previous decades, the officers who have had a more neutral political position, and who believed in civilian supremacy, tended to be named as moderate, neutral, or democrat officers. To the same extent, I have identified these neutral officers as depolitical throughout the thesis. Interestingly, the first significant representative of professional behaviour (both normatively and technically) in the military was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, with regard to his statements and writings. Accordingly, I have associated depolitical/depoliticised identity with the Kemalist legacy, which has prevented the

generals from applying long-term junta rules and has sustained their willingness for NATO and EU memberships.

As has been mentioned in the introduction, this chapter has made three important contributions to the thesis. Firstly, it has evaluated the main variables that pushed the military into a depoliticised position. One possible reason for depoliticisation can arguably be a possible increase in the number of officers who have a more neutral mentality. As was indicated above, the Kemalist legacy, which is deeply embedded in military culture, has preserved the Turkish officers' sensitivities in terms of maintaining the democratic and liberal dynamics of the Turkish state, in that an overwhelming number of officers have remained critical against long-term junta rules. Also, the military has always promoted Westernisation by decisively supporting the NATO and EU memberships. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the end of the Cold War, the failures in the previous coups d'état, and the long-term relationships with the NATO armies have made a new generation of officers more professionally orientated. Yet, it is worthwhile to mention that the unsuccessful website memorandum in 2007 and the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials accelerated the military depoliticisation by causing the replacement of the commanding elite with more moderate generals.

The second contribution of the chapter has been an exploration of the policy changes during the AKP tenure, in accordance with the military depoliticisation. Indeed, the military's increasing efforts for depoliticisation became observable during Hilmi Ozkok's tenure as Chief of the General Staff (2002-2006). Apart from some major events, such as the turban and Imam-Hatip Schools controversies, the military worked in harmony with the AKP, in both domestic and foreign policies. Most of these tensions remained at the level of giving statements to the media or showing

silent reaction by turning down formal invitations and leaving ceremonies. For instance, once the military authorities protested about the AKP government's spokesperson, Bulent Arinc's wife, because she did not remove her headscarf. Also, the head commanders boycotted the Assembly's opening ceremony for the same reason. Additionally, the military periodically showed its discontent with the opening of Imam-Hatip schools. Yet, Ozkok's reaction toward both the turban case and the Imam-Hatip schools remained at a relatively weaker level than in the previous decade. Indeed, Ozkok was occasionally criticised by the other commanders because of "his tolerance" to the Imam-Hatips.

On the other hand, these regular reactions to the government policies did not give serious harm to the military's increasing depolitical status because both the military and the civilians abstained from challenging each other at this level. The growing popular support for the AKP, as well as the increasing possibility of EU membership, made it harder for the military to challenge the government. As a result, the Hilmi Ozkok era can be seen as a transition to a more stable and harmonic civil-military relationship in which the civilian and the military sides did not cross each other's red lines. Arguably, the military feared the public support behind the government and appeared respectful to public sovereignty. On the other hand, the government also feared the military's weaponry power and past interventions and aimed to give a more secular, democratic, and Atatürkist image. Hence, Ozkok's term saw relatively increased depolitical behaviour.

In the following years, the military's subordination and civilian supremacy – for the reasons stated – were further strengthened. In this regard, there were important domestic and foreign policy changes during this process, which can arguably be associated with the demilitarisation of Turkish politics. If one considers that the

military has always remained the principal guardian of a secular regime, one may suggest a positive relationship between the increasing AKP authoritarianism and decreasing military supervision. Indeed, this case can be considered as one clear example of the *negative-democratic relationship*, in which the military adopts a more democratic attitude, but the results of this attitude tend to be negative in terms of the democratic regime.⁹⁴⁷ As mentioned above, during the AKP rule, Turkey saw important foreign policy changes that were seen as taboos by the military. Firstly, the AKP's decisive attempts to enter the EU caused the military to be more tolerant to the government, given their traditional support for Westernisation. However, in the following process, arguably in accordance with the military's decreasing influence, the AKP slowed its earlier intense efforts toward EU membership. Indeed, the AKP has made radical attempts to increase its regional influence in the previous Ottoman lands by taking into account a foreign policy goal titled "the new Ottomanism" by the authorities. According to this goal, Turkey was approaching the Islamic world and attempting a kind of leadership or mediator role in the Middle East and the Balkans, in parallel with the United States' efforts of making the AKP a role model of moderate Islam for the Muslim states. Naturally, the AKP's approach to the East by slowing its efforts for EU membership was a new kind of policy, which had been strictly refused by the military authorities in the previous decades. Lastly, the AKP's efforts for uniting Cyprus by following the Annan Plan, and the Kurdish Initiative Process, herald the breaking of past military taboos in foreign policy.

The final contribution of the chapter is in giving the answer to the key research question, namely defining the type of relationship between the military culture and Turkish politics. To do that, we divided the empirical process into three

chronological chapters. In general, the Turkish case indicated a typical example of the *variable relationship*, in that the previous terms have presented examples of the five different models, depending on the time and political circumstances.⁹⁴⁸

In Chapter 5, the *positive-undemocratic relationship* was the dominant relationship, in which the revolutionist transformation and politicisation in military culture led Turkey to be a secular-democratic state. In Chapter 6, the *variable relationship* became the dominant model, because there were sudden transitions from one model to another, given the ideological divisions within the military culture between the guardians and revolutionists, as well as the unstable nature of Turkish politics. In Chapter 7, there is a growing depoliticisation within the military culture, which leads to the model that we have titled the *negative-democratic relationship*, in which increasing military depoliticisation makes democratic dynamics vulnerable to the AKP's growing authoritarian manner. As a result, the Turkish model of civil-military relationship shows variability, depending on term and conditions.

There are some noticeable reasons behind this *variable relationship*. Firstly, given the roles and meanings that have been imposed on the military and militarism by the Turkish people centuries ago, and given the military's nation builder status because of the Liberation War, the Turkish military has had a highly political character. Secondly, because of these roles and meanings that society imposed on the military, a strong linkage appeared between the military and society that meant any change in military culture made consequent fundamental changes in the national politics. Thirdly, because of the highly political nature of the military, different ideologies and strife have always appeared among the officers. It is a historically rich and

unique set of circumstances that has led, in the twenty-first century, to this variable military culture and *variable* civil-military relationship.

Overall, after elaborating this thesis from beginning to the end, a fundamental change within Turkish civil-military relations is observable. Although Turkish military culture has shown variability since the Ottoman period, the recent depoliticisation of the military will arguably be more permanent than that seen in previous decades. Hence, the changes in national politics as a result of military depoliticisation can also be more radical and stable. In this regard, to stabilise and maintain the military's current depoliticised status, one main offering of this thesis is to embed the professional ethos into military culture by making necessary changes in the academy curriculum.

Considering my interviews and the statements of senior commanders, one may argue that the principle of civilian supremacy, political passivism, political neutrality, and sympathy for democratic and liberal values (professional ethos) should be absorbed by the officers to stabilise and transform current military depoliticisation into a form of normative professionalism. Related to this, the curricula should be broadened by the relevant civil-military theories, including Samuel Huntington's objective control and professional military ethic. In this way, the officer candidates will not only have an academic background in terms of civil-military theories, but they will also develop their own theoretical contributions to the relevant field. A similar enhancement to current educational practice should also be made in the military colleges for non-commissioned officers and in the military barracks for the privates. Additionally, the instructions, textbooks, and lectures should be inspected by the relevant civilian authorities to observe whether the military education is conforming to the principle of civilian supremacy or not. However, this civilian inspection should

be limited only to those instructions that are related to the civilian sphere, to prevent subjectivity. In other words, the military should have full autonomy in their own technical matters including combat training, war strategies and tactics, and so on.

On the other hand, if current military depoliticisation continues to remain, it can bring two different scenarios for the future of Turkish politics. The positive scenario is that, in the absence of military interventions, Turkey will implement a more stable democratic regime and will not experience periodic breakdowns. To achieve this positive scenario, the AKP (or its possible future successor) should decrease its recent authoritarian behaviour and should adopt a more tolerant policy toward individual rights and liberties. The negative scenario is that the AKP's increasing authoritarianism will continue to grow and the government will undermine the secular dynamics of the state. The main solution to this problem can arguably be the absorption of a stronger democratic political culture by the Turkish electors, to prevent any possible abusing by the civil authorities. In this regard, the military depoliticisation can be a good opportunity for the Turkish people to adopt a higher political culture.

Given the military's so-called position as the ultimate guardian of the Republic in previous decades, the Turkish people perhaps absolved themselves from taking responsibility in preserving the democratic dynamics of the state. Now, however, the Turkish people are in the position of being the ultimate defenders of democracy. Perhaps this case will obligatorily increase the people's interest in politics and will cause a maturity in Turkey's political culture, to the extent that the electors will need no further undemocratic measures such as military interventions in order to maintain the democratic character of the state.

CONCLUSION

Turkish military culture has been an arena of strife between three crossing identities namely the revolutionists, guardians, and depoliticals. The foundations of this division dates back to the first decade of twentieth century. The existence of the infamous Mektepli/Alayli dichotomy between the revolutionists and guardians was the first example of the crossing identities within the military culture. Following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, this division continued under different titles and political ideologies, but the unchanging fact was that one group has always been more progressive, liberal, and (mostly) left-orientated and the other group has been conservative, status quoist, authoritarian, and right-orientated. Also, the third group that has been defined as depolitical officers has been known as politically passive or neutral. Interestingly, the dominant group has always changed the direction of Turkish politics in parallel to their political ideals. In addition to this, the dominant group has benefited from every opportunity to side-line or to expel the active officers who belonged to the opposite wing. Hence, that strong and mutual relationship between the military culture and the Turkish politics can offer rich case studies to a civil-military researcher wishing to analyse military culture and the main ethoi that shape it.

At this point, the main purpose of this thesis was to explore the type of relationship between Turkish military culture and Turkish politics. To answer the research question, the thesis was divided into two distinct sections. The first section (Chapters 1-4) gave the necessary theoretical and conceptual backgrounds to use in the empirical process. Then, in the second section (Chapters 5-7) the thesis divided the puzzle into three case studies, which had been chosen according to the main transformations within military culture. The empirical chapters were analysed under

three titles: the *revolutionist* era (1908-1945); the *guardianship* era (1945-1999); and the *depolitical* era (1999-2013). The case studies were observed by employing the comparative historical analysis method. In this way, the thesis divided the case studies into different time periods and conclusions were drawn by employing the analytical framework. In general, Turkish military culture and its impacts on civil-military relations show a *variable relationship*, in which the mutual interactions between military culture and Turkish politics continues without breaking; but the impacts of this relationship can be either positive or negative with regard to the dynamics of the democratic regime.

Principally, the first part of the thesis gave essential theoretical and conceptual backgrounds about the relevant issues before tackling the main research questions. After giving a brief introduction to the main elements of the thesis, such as its importance, propositions, methods, and contributions, the Chapter 2 analysed the background literature around the definition of military culture and military professionalism. Chapter 3 specified the military culture context by discussing its relationship with Turkey, considering the ideas of Atatürk and the military-nation concept. Lastly, in Chapter 4, we elaborated on Atatürk's principles as being the main tenets of Turkish military culture were, by taking into account the relevant literature. Consequently, the first section provided the necessary information as a foundation before starting the empirical study.

The main ideas that are derived from the theoretical section can be summarised as follows. Military culture can be defined as the combination of specific martial ethoi, namely ideas, values, norms, rituals, objects, and ideals that embed themselves in the institution deeply, and shape its characteristic behaviours toward outside and inside variables. Military culture can be employed for understanding any kind of military

activity, including politics. Naturally, military cultures tend to be in close interaction with the social and political cultures, national ideals, and geopolitical vulnerabilities of the state. Arguably, because of the existence of more than one resistive variable that shapes them, military cultures tend to be resistant against changes and innovations. In other words, even during major national crises, including wars, economic deadlocks, and disasters, military cultures still tend to protect their main martial ethoi.

One important impact of military cultures is determining the officers' approach to politics. That is to say, the martial ethoi that shapes military culture simultaneously determines the military's position between praetorianism and professionalism. Praetorian armies involve themselves in politics in two different ways: either for preserving the status quo (guardian armies), or establishing a new regime to replace the old one (revolutionist armies). On the other hand, professional armies do not get involved in politics, in that the martial ethoi that shapes their military cultures are dominated by liberal and democratic ethoi, such as civilian supremacy, military subordination, political neutrality, and passivism. According to Samuel Huntington, the professional military ethic preserves the professional officer from involving himself in politics, because the officer ethically considers that the military's responsibility is protecting the state by following governmental instructions, and they do not have a right to take arbitrary decisions. To achieve a professional military ethic, Huntington suggests objective military control, which renders an autonomous sphere for the military and professionalises it within its own area. If civilians interfere in the military sphere to inject their own values, it becomes subjective control and undermines the military's professionalism by civilianising it.

Related to this, in Chapter 3 the thesis argued the main tenets of Turkish military culture by considering the ideas that had been derived from Chapter 2. The main contributions of Chapter 3 are establishing that there is a close linkage between the Turkish military and society. This close linkage dates back to the Central Asian Turks, a civilisation in which every member of society grew up under military discipline. Hence, every member of society was a warrior. This legacy was inherited by the following Turkish societies, in which the military has always been in a central position in the state establishments, as being the founder or ruler. Due to this close linkage, the military has always remained highly political. This chapter also explored three different cultural transformations within Turkish military culture since the foundation of Republic, which can be termed revolutionism, guardianship, and depoliticisation. Hence, this part became an introduction to the Mektepli/Alayli dichotomy and the crossing identities notion within the military culture. Another important contribution of the chapter was exploring Atatürk's ideas on civil-military relations. According to Atatürk's writings, statements, and practices, the military should be subordinated to the civilians for a sustainable parliamentary regime and better combat power. Indeed, it is possible to observe similarities between Huntington and Atatürk on the relevant issues.

Chapter 4 analysed Atatürk's principles, namely secularism, republicanism, populism, nationalism, statism, and revolutionism. Secularism, according to Atatürk, does not only aim to remove religious impact from the social domain but also aims to liberate people's minds from dogmatism. Nationalism aims to create a collective identity of Turk within the current borders of Turkey, without considering ethnic and religious differences. Populism aims to benefit the whole society in its laws and regulations without considering any differences, and without making any

discrimination among the different social groups. Republicanism refers to the principle of creating a regime based on public sovereignty. Hence, there is a natural connection between the republicanism and populism principles, in that a republican regime would be maintained by elected deputies who were chosen by the people's votes without consideration of ethnic, religious, and gender differences. Additionally, statism refers to the mixed economic model, namely the combination of state and private sectors. Hence, statism allows for private entrepreneurship, but it also suggests that the state should supervise any type of economic activities within its national borders. Lastly, revolutionism refers to the obligation of renewal depending on the changing circumstances of the time. This chapter basically brought two contributions. Firstly, it questioned whether the military was consistent or not while associating its interventions with the guardianship of Atatürk's principles. Indeed, the chapter showed that, during the periods of junta rule, the military occasionally acted against Atatürk's principles. Hence, that case indicates that Kemalist principles sometimes did not go further than being an excuse for the military authorities to legitimise their interventions. Secondly, the chapter became beneficial for the empirical chapters, in that most of the terms that were used in the analytical process are based on these principles.

The second part of this thesis, the empirical part, started in Chapter 5, which analysed the revolutionary transformation within military culture in parallel with Turkish modernisation by elaborating the background events that created the crossing identities notion. The chapter is particularly important for indicating the Mekteplis and Alaylis division between the revolutionist and guardian officers. Thus, the main results that came from the chapter can be summarised as this: there has always been a close relationship between military and civilian cultures in the Turkish

states. Also, the Turkish military has always remained highly political. Therefore, there have always been different ideological orientations among the officers. Thirdly, starting from the military reforms in the nineteenth century, revolutionism gradually became embedded in military culture, which suggests that the officers should involve themselves in politics and protect the Empire from collapsing. At this point, the 1908 Revolution was taken as a turning point for the military culture wherein the revolutionist identity began to dominate it. The revolutionist officers eventually founded the Turkish Republic under the leadership of Marshall Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Lastly, Chapter 5 gave a clear example of the *positive-undemocratic* model, in which the military involved itself in politics in an undemocratic way, but in the end created a secular parliamentary regime.

Chapter 6 analysed the period between 1945 and 1999, which witnessed a transformation from revolutionism to guardianship, wherein the military authorities gradually adopted a more conservative and status quo-ist ideology. That is to say, the military did not only protect the regime that it had founded but occasionally it gave a very different image to that of its revolutionist past. In these years, capitalism and anti-Communism became embedded in military culture in place of Kemalist populism and statism. After creating the OYAK, the military did not only become a military-industrial complex, but changed the direction of Turkish politics to make Turkey a modern capitalist state in parallel with the Western states. Additionally, the junta rules were hardly criticised because of their anti-democratic, oppressive practices and human-rights breaches. In the process, the military created two constitutions, in 1961 and 1982. Interestingly, these constitutions have different characteristics. In contrast to the 1982 constitution, the 1961 constitution is known for its extended individual rights and tolerance for political activism. However, the

military authorities found the 1961 constitution too liberal for Turkey, in that the extended individual rights caused Turkey to become an arena of conflicting civilian groups from different ideologies. Hence, in 1982, the military authorities created a new constitution which restricted some of the individual rights and liberties that had been gained by the 1961 constitution. Furthermore the promotion of a Turkish-Islam synthesis detached the military from Kemalist secularism. The increasing Islamic references in the new regulations to create a balance against Communism ironically undermined the secular characteristics of democracy and strengthened political Islam. As a result, the Chapter 6 gave us important evidences to indicate *variable* civil-military relations in Turkey, as the military created a more democratic constitution, which is an example of the *positive-undemocratic* model, and then introduced another new constitution, this time restricting the liberal rights that it had created, which is the example of the *negative-undemocratic* model.

Chapter 7 analysed the period between 1999 and 2013 – the years in which the military gradually isolated itself from politics and adopted an identity that has been defined as depolitical throughout this thesis. The process starts with Turkey's acceptance as a candidate for being a European Union member, and continues with the AKP's single-party rule until 2013. During the process, the military gradually steps back from politics and adopts a politically passive and neutral image. The aforementioned military depoliticisation gains momentum after a number of events, such as the EU negotiations, the 2007 website declaration, and the Ergenekon and Balyoz indictments. Accordingly, this process also gives us an example of the *variable* civil-military relationship, wherein, in the early terms of the AKP, the military subordination gives positive results regarding the democratic regime, which is indeed the model that has been defined as the *positive-democratic relationship*.

Yet, in the later terms of the AKP, the military's apolitical position arguably enables the government to implement more authoritarian and anti-secular policies, which conforms to the *negative-democratic* model. As a result, Turkey has been giving a typical example of the *variable relationship*, in which all five typologies of civil-military relationship have been observed in its history. Indeed, sometimes more than one model can be observed simultaneously. The main reason behind this *variable relationship* is the highly political nature of the Turkish military, which allows for the existence of different ideological trends among the officers at the same time. Also, Turkey's unstable democracy and political culture can be viewed as another reason behind this relationship. As has been mentioned by Samuel Finer, in mature political cultures, military interventions are less likely to happen. Hence, Turkish democracy and democratic political culture, perhaps, has not reached a high enough stage of maturity thus far to maintain a democratic civil-military relationship (*positive-democratic* model).

By and large, this thesis has brought two main contributions to the relevant studies, namely *conceptual*, and *analytical* contributions. The conceptual contribution is to the study of *military culture* with reference to the Turkish case. Although the military culture concept has significantly increased its importance in the civil-military literature, the Turkish case still requires further analysis in that sense. Hence, this thesis brought a new approach to the relevant studies by positioning military culture at the centre of the Turkish civil-military problematic. The difference in this thesis, as distinct from the relevant studies, is in observing military culture more technically, by taking into account relevant academic theories. Additionally, the thesis makes a new contribution by separating modern Turkish military culture into three different identities: *revolutionist*, *guardian*, and *depolitical*. Moreover, the thesis identified a

typology of five different civil-military relationships by considering the impacts of military culture on democratic regimes.

Additionally, the thesis employed Samuel Huntington's theory of *professional military ethic* to test professionalism in the Turkish military culture. After elaborating Huntington's theory, and the alternative definitions, the thesis separated the definition of professionalism into two namely *normative* and *technical* professionalism. The main reason for making this separation is the general criticism against Huntington's theory. According to the critical authors, professionalism in some militaries did not prevent them from involving themselves in politics. For instance, the Greek, Turkish, Chilean, German, and Japanese armies became more political after professionalising, in contrast to what Huntington had suggested. That case requires us to separate normative professionalism from technical professionalism. In other words, an army can have perfect professional education within the military academy, but it can still be politically active, because its military cultures have not yet been ethically professionalised. That is to say, military cultures should absorb the professional ethos irreversibly as a normative requirement. In some cases, some armies can be technically quite professional but ethically not. For instance, the Prussian Army was shown as a model of professionalism with its technical expertise and warfare discipline, but the same army at the same time was highly political, and this continued until the end of the Second World War. On the other hand, the British and American armies have had normative and technical professionalism at the same time and have remained politically neutral.

On the other hand, the aforementioned typology of five different civil-military relationships simultaneously became the analytical contribution of the thesis. The models have been drawn by considering the possible impacts of military cultures on

the civil-military relationship and the democratisation process. At this point, the first model is the *positive-undemocratic relationship*, in which the military tends to be political but its involvements in politics brings positive results for democratisation, such as creating a parliamentary regime or protecting an existing parliamentary regime. The second model is the *negative-undemocratic relationship*, which refers to the case in which the military is political and its involvements make negative impacts on democratic regimes. The third model is the *negative-democratic relationship*, which means the military becomes subordinated to the civilians but its political passivism brings negative results for the democratisation process, perhaps by making the regime vulnerable to outside or inside threats. The fourth model is the *positive-democratic relationship*, in which the military becomes politically neutral and passive, and the impacts of this political passivism also become positive for democratisation. The last model is the *variable relationship*, which refers to a case wherein there is more than one of the aforementioned models evident at the same time; or, rather, different types of relationship are likely to be seen in the same case periodically. To understand which model best explains a chosen case study, the researcher may follow two different paths. Firstly, the researcher can analyse the case historically, from the beginning to the end, and then come to a conclusion; secondly, the researcher can divide the case into different time periods, then analyse each case separately and then come to a final conclusion. The second way, naturally, is more applicable if there is variability in the relationship.

One proposition of the thesis is that the best way of embedding the professional ethos into military cultures (normative professionalism) is designing military curricula according to the liberal and democratic ethoi. In other words, the lectures, textbooks, and seminars can be designed according to the professional ethos, encompassing

civilian supremacy, political passivism, and political neutrality. Additionally, the officer candidates can receive a basic academic education in terms of civil-military theories, including Huntington's. That gives officer candidates the opportunity to make their own contributions to the literature, and to maintain civilian supremacy. In this way, the officer candidates can deeply absorb military subordination as part of professional military discipline. Naturally, this type of embedding requires periodic supervision by the civilian authorities. That is to say, the civilian authorities can regularly check the course books and lecture discussions to see whether the officers are trained according to the professional ethos, or are shirking. This type of civilian control over military academies should not be considered as subjective control, in that the civilian supervision can be limited only to the instructions that are related to politics, and not the parts which are specifically relevant to the military's own autonomous technical area.


Ultimately, Turkish civil-military relations have entered into a new process. The military's current depoliticisation seems more decisive and permanent than any changes witnessed in previous decades. On the other hand, it is still early to explain the current status of military culture with a Huntington model of normative professionalism. As has been mentioned several times in this thesis, military cultures are not likely to experience major changes in short periods. Hence, considering the strong praetorian legacy of the Turkish military, it is not easy to expect a sudden professionalism in such a short period. Additionally, considering the traditional Mektepli/Alayli conflict and previous identical transitions, one possibility can be the replacement of the commanding elite by the AKP sympathisers. Especially, the trials and arrests of the key military figures, that are known as Kemalist and left-orientated, as well as the alleged Islamic penetration into the military by the Fethullah

organisation, might cause one to think that a subjective control has happened by civilising the military and making it the mirror of the state. Yet, this suggestion can also be premature at this stage because we do not have clear empirical evidence. As a result, I preferred to describe this stage of military culture as depoliticisation.

On the other hand, recent depoliticisation and efforts for being a Western type of professional army leave an unanswered question: despite all the warnings and statements from the military for half a century, Turkish democracy is still far from being intertwined with secularisation. As was illustrated in Chapter 4, secularism is a crucial matter for Turkish modernisation in that it protects both democracy and human rights from authoritarianism and religious manipulation. As we have seen how the DP and AKP benefitted from peoples' religious sensitivities to increase and maintain their oppression over opponents, the depoliticisation of the military – as the major deterrent power against political Islam – would be a serious risk for the future of Turkish democracy. Ironically, the military itself is responsible for the current situation. After shifting from its revolutionary line, the junta rules became a tool for suppressing leftist moves. Furthermore, during the guardian era, the military's alleged commitment to Kemalist principles enabled it to maintain its political legitimacy. As a result, the current status of the regime indicates that the military's ostensible efforts for intertwining democracy with secularism have become a failure. That is to say, while the military was stepping back from politics, political Islam strengthened. At this point, current status of military can bring two different consequences for the future of Turkish politics. The first possible scenario is that Turkish democracy will strengthen in the absence of periodic military interruptions. The second scenario is that the AKP's current authoritarianism will continue to grow and undermine the democratic and secular characteristics of Turkey. To prevent this

negative scenario, there are two important requirements that are expected to happen: firstly, the AKP (or its possible future successors) will adopt a more democratic and tolerant policy, as they (AKP) did in their earlier years; secondly, the political culture of Turkish electors will develop enough to protect the fundamental dynamics of the democratic regime. Arguably, the current military depoliticisation can be a good opportunity for the Turkish people to absorb a more democratic political culture, because, in previous decades, the military's so-called status as the ultimate guardian of revolutions perhaps prevented the electors taking a more serious responsibility in this regard. In addition to this, the military's current depoliticised status can be an opportunity for the officers to achieve normative and technical professionalism, because now the military can focus on its own responsibilities instead of interesting itself in politics.

APPENDICES A.1



Definition A.1: This is the envelope of the letter that was sent to the Presidency of the General Staff for the purpose of research.

APPENDICES A.2

Genelkurmay İletişim Daire Başkanlığına

ANKARA

İki yıldan beri yurt dışında eğitim almakta olan bir kişiyim. Lisans eğitimimi Yeditepe Üniversitesinde, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler, Lisans üstü eğitimimi Galatasaray Üniversitesinde, Avrupa Birliği konuları üzerinde tamamladım. Şu anda İngiltere’de Bath Üniversitesinde doktora yapmaktayım.

Doktora tezimin konusu “ Türkiye de Askeri Kültür ve Sivil – Asker ilişkilerine Etkisi ” olup, TSK’nin ilgili ünitesinde, yetkili bir personeli ile aşağıda sıraladığım sorular çerçevesinde, TSK’nin Kurumsal görüşünü almak için görüşme yapmak veya yazılı bir cevapla bilgi almak, hazırlayacağım Doktora Tezi için gerekli olmuştur.

Söz konusu Akademik çalışmamda yararlanacağım görüşme için veya mümkün olamayacağı taktirde, yine yetkili bir personel tarafından yazılı bir cevap almak için izin verilmesi konusunda gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim. 23-07-2014

ADRES: Bahçelievler Mah. Abdülhakhamit Cad.
No:15, Daire:2, Celalbey Apt, İlkadım
SAMSUN

Hakkı Göker ÖNEN
TC no : 68440032456



Mail : goker.onen_fb@hotmail.com

Tel ev : 0362 234 83 15 Tel cep: 0542 784 34 55

GÖRÜŞ ALINMASI GEREKLİ KONULAR :

- 1- Profesyonel askerliği nasıl tanımlarsınız? Bu konuda Siyaset bilimci ve yazarların batı demokrasilerindeki yaygın anlayışına göre profesyonel asker siyasetle tamamen bağıni kesmiş, sivil hükümetlerin talimatlarını tartışmasız yerine getiren kişidir. Siz bu tanıma katılıyor musunuz?
- 2- Yukardaki tanımi ve geçmişteki olayları da dikkate alırsak, TSK’nde korumacı/müdahaleci anlayıştan profesyonel anlayışa doğru bir zihniyet değişimi var mıdır?
- 3- Cumhuriyet sonrası Türk Askeri Kültürünün oluşumunun Atatürk ilke ve devrimleri çerçevesinde şekillendiğini söyleyebilir miyiz? Eğer söyleyebilirsek bu anlayışta herhangi bir değişimin olması söz konusu mudur?
- 4- Ordu, Atatürk ilke ve devrimlerinin muhafaza edilmesi hususunda kendisi üzerinde bir sorumluluk görmekte midir?
- 5- Atatürkçülük, Atatürk ilke ve devrimlerinin önemi ve muhafazası hakkında subay ve astsubaylara gerek Harp okullarında gerekse filili hizmete başladıktan sonra diğer sivil okullardan farklı olarak özel bir eğitim verilmekte midir? Eğer verilmekte ise önceki yıllara oranla bu uygulamada bir değişim olmuş mudur?

Definition A.2:

This is the formal letter that I sent to the Presidency of the General Staff. The letter starts with a short summary of my educational background and continues with a brief explanation of the title and purpose of the thesis. Then, it requests permission to carry out interviews with the active officers and a formal answer to the five questions above. The questions can be summarised as follows:

- 1-) How do you define professional soldier? According to the Western resources, professional soldier remains politically neutral and implements the duties that he was ordered from the civilian governments without questioning and conditioning. Do you agree with this definition?
- 2-) Considering the definition above, can we assume a shift from interventionism (preatorianism) to professionalism in the Turkish military culture?
- 3-) Assuming that the Turkish military culture has been constructed according to Atatürk's revolutions and principles, is it possible to see a shift from these ideals?
- 4-) Does the Turkish military feel a responsibility on itself to guard Atatürk's revolutions and principles?
- 5-) Are there specific instructions to the officers and non-commissioned officers in the military academies and schools, related to Atatürkism and importance of protecting Atatürk's revolutions and principles, which are different than those in civil schools, either before graduation or after starting active duty?

APPENDICES A.3

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Definition A.3: This is a formal document from the Turkish Organisation of Post and Telegraph (PTT), which confirms that the letter was delivered to the Presidency of General Staff.

APPENDICES A.4

TASNİF DIŐI

TASNİF DIŐI

T.C.
GENELKURMAY BAŐKANLIĐI
ANKARA

GENSEK : 26702250-2850-93538-14/Hlk.İř.Ő.Tanıtım Kısmı 8373743 15 Ağustos 2014

KONU : Doktora Tezi Hk.

SAYIN HAKKI GÖKER ÖNEN'E

İLGİ: Hakkı Göker ÖNEN'in yazısı.

"Türkiye'de Askerî Kültür ve Sivil-Asker İlişkilerine Etkisi" konulu doktora tezinde kullanılmak üzere TSK'nın kurumsal görüşünü almak için ilgi yazıda belirtilen izin talebinin karşılanamayacağını bilgilerinize sunarım.


Ertuğrulgazi ÖZKURKÇU
Tuğgeneral
Başhalk Daire Başkanı

Definition A.4: This is the formal response from the Presidency of the General Staff to my aforementioned five questions. The answer states: "I confirm that the permission request for ensuring the Turkish Armed Forces' institutional view about the issues mentioned in the related letter for employing in the PhD thesis 'Turkish Military Culture and its Impacts on Turkish Civil-Military Relations' cannot be accepted."

APPENDICES B.1

A-6-8365

D-3-

F-27,

SÜRET

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi reisi Mustafa Kemal paşa hazretlerine Başkumandanlık bevacihı hakkında Büyük Millet Meclisinin 5/8/27 de ictimada ittifaikle kabul edilen kanun sureti aynen zirdedir. 27/8/6 Garp cephesinde kumandanı İsmet

SURET

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi reisi Mustafa Kemal paşa hazretlerine Başkumandanlık bevacihı hakkında Büyük Millet Meclisinden 27/8/... de kabul edilen kanun sureti aynen bir vace ile tamim ~~shanda~~ olunur

Erkanı-Harbiye umumiye reisi Fevzi

SURET

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi reisi Mustafa Kemal paşa hazretlerine Başkumandanlık bevacihı hakkında kanun

1- Millet in mukaddersıyla bilumum dahiliyede yegane kuvveti öliye olan azanın herbirinin kanunu esasi ve teşkilatı esasıyısı kanunu

... cümle mahfuz ve şahsiyeti husulu. Başkumandanlığına haiz bulunan

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi tahtı gayuolatında Başkumandanlığı ~~habe~~ vazifeyi kudsiyesine kendi reisi Mustafa Kemal paşayı memur etlemiştir.

2- Baş kumandan ordunun ve ... ve kuvveti azami suretde tezyid vagevken ve idaresini bir kış dıha techin hususunda Türkiye Büyük Millet meclisinin buna müteallik selahıyyeti meclis namına fiilen istimala meczundur.

Definition B.1:

FORM

The form that related to the appointment of the Chief of the Turkish Grand National Assembly his highness Mustafa Kemal Pasha to the position of Commander in Chief by the Ballot no: 5/8/27 of the Turkish National Assembly has been obtained.

Ismet

Fevzi

The Commander of the Western Front

The Chief of the General Staff


FORM

The regulation related to the appointment of the Chief of the Turkish Grand National Assembly his highness Mustafa Kemal Pasha as the Commander in Chief:

1-) The Turkish Grand National Assembly as being the only decision-maker for the issues related to the national destiny has charged its own chief Mustafa Kemal Pasha with the duty of Commander in Chief.

2-) The Commander in Chief (Mustafa Kemal) has the authority to use all the legal rights of the Turkish Grand National Assembly related to the issues that could increase the power of the military in the least possible time.

APPENDICES B.2



Definition B.2: The original copy of the letter in Appendices B.1

APPENDICES B.3

sûret

$\frac{6}{1}$

Büyük Millet Meclisinin uhde-i acizâne emretti buyurduğu Başkumandanlık vazifesinden dolayı varid olan tebrikâtı münasebet izhâr buyurulmuş olan beveceh-ü umuminin Allahın insiyeti ve peygamberin ruhaniyetini sığınarak ehemmiyetini tamamiyle müdrik bulunduğum hizmetime deruhala ederken aynı zamanda işbu imanda da istinada gıyâsı idim. Bütün ordu mensubuna, bilcümle memurin ve her ferd-i millete ayrı ayrı tesekkür ederim. Milletin ve ordunun bu azmi imanı ve kahramanlığı ile adâleti zâlelâtin hudûd-u milliyemize dahilinde istiklali tam temininden ibaret gaye-i meşruasında mutlaka ıyşal eyleyeceğine itimadım lâ yetezelteldir.

Büyük Millet Meclisi Reisi Başkumandan
Mustafa Kemal

Garaşmazlık

27/8/15

On birinci fışk Kumandanlığına

Garb cephesi kumandanlığından mübellig Başkumandanlığın tesekkürnâmesi sûreti bervechi mîlî mefadinin efrada kâdar iblağ buyurulmasını rica ederim.

12 nci grup kumandanı

Erkânı Harbiye

Definition B.3:

FORM

Due to the kindness of presenting the duty of Commander in Chief to my own personality by the Turkish Grand National Assembly ... I am extremely grateful to every member of the military, all the deputies of the Assembly and every person of the nation ... I have a crucial belief that the nation, with this kind of faith and bravery, will gain its independence back with the Lord the most merciful's wish.

The Chief of the Grand National Assembly, Commander in Chief

Mustafa Kemal

Karahamzali

27/8/15

APPENDICES B.4



Definition B.4: This is the formal copy of the original telegram by Mustafa Kemal that was defined in the Appendices B.3.

APPENDICES C.1

25/7/1324

ALTINCI

Osmanlı Devleti Humayunu
Başkumandanlığı Vekaleti

Şube

1-

Numara

4250

Vilayeti şarkiyenin herhangi bir mahallinde milli bir kongre tesisine teşebbüs edildiğine ve bu teşebbüsün meki-i fiile çıkması için yapılmış muhaberatı ciheti askeriyenin vasıta kılındığına ve hatta muavenetle bulunduğuna dair vesatige vurulmaktadır. Şu son on senenin yani vakayi-i hey-et-i askeriyenin siyasi cereyanlara karışmasından ne elim neticeler kış-dış edildiğine pek büyük bürhandır. Yalnız evamiri mübelligden resmîyenin kemali metameatle ıcrâ hususunun hey-et-i askeriyeye siyasi cereyanlara bir vazifesi namûsî olduğunun unutulmamasını tek-rör eder ve ordu ile mensûbiyetinin

Tebliğat - -

Ordu kumandanlığına

Kolordu kumandanlığına

Nezaret-i devaire mütehisliğine

Erkân-ı Harbiye Nezareti

Definition C.1:

25/7/1324

The Ottoman State's

Representative of Commander in Chief

Branch: 1 No: 4250


There are rumours that a national congress has been organised in the Eastern Region and some local military units have also been involved in this process. The disastrous results of the military's previous political interests, especially in the last ten years, have already become known (by the authorities) ... Hence, it should be reminded that the (military's non-political status) should be considered as a responsibility and a matter of honour (that should be preserved).

Declaration

To the Military Commandership

The Ottoman Ministry of War

APPENDICES C.2



Definition C.2: This is the original copy of the telegraph that has been mentioned in the Appendices C.1 by the Supervision of Ottoman Military College.

APPENDICES C.3

Harbiye Nezareti
Muâmelât-ı Daireyi Müdiriyeti
Şifre Sekizinci Ordu Kumandanlığına 8844

Zâta mahsuslar

Vâliyi sabık Rahmi bey tarafından bazı zabıtanın Osmanlı Hürriyet firkasına idhal veya vüsulüne teşvik eyledikleri tarafı âlilerinden bildirilmiştir. Ordu mensubundan siyasi firkalara dahil edenler ile buna teşebbüs ve teşvik edenler hakkında ihkâm-ı kanunînin bile tereddüt derhal tatbiki ve câlibi gatiyeden bulunduğundan bu babda hemen tahqiqat icrasıyla kimler dahil ve kimler ne suretle ... ise neticenin içhârı ve ebrası

19- Tesrini ... 1334-

Sadr-ı Azam ve Harbiye Nazırı

İMTZ -

Definition C.3:

The Ottoman Minister of War

To the Head of Eighth Army

It has been reported by the city administrator Mr Rahmi that some members of the military attempted to involve themselves in (political parties). (Therefore), the relevant legal mechanisms and regulations should be carried out for the soldiers who showed political interests in the least possible time without showing any hesitation.

19 Tesrini 1334

The Ottoman Grand Vizier and Minister of War

Signature

APPENDICES C.4

335/10/27
Harbiye Nazırı Cemal Paşadan

Osmanlı Devleti Hamayunu
Başkumandanlık Vekâleti
Şûbe-

Numara

- 1- Ordu mensubunun siyasetle iştigalinin ne vâhim neticeler tevliid eylediği hakkında ibretin olmak ıycaab ederken ve bunu pek yakın bir maziden geçmekte görüklükler isbat edip durarken bunun orduya mülk ve millet hak kindaki bahrihatkorluğunu isbat için başka birsey söylemeyeceğim. Yalnız kanun ve nizamlarımızın katiyyen men eylediği bu iştigalde bulunan ve bu lunacak olan ordu mensubıya tah behemhal terk ağır bir suretde tecziy olunacağına ihttar eylerim
- 2- Mefalibi şikayât vesaire gibi mevadı muhtelifeyi havi imzasız birçok mektuplar almaktayım bunları tevcihi makt — müddetde bulunanlar beghade zahmete girmiş ve ümide düşmüş olmuyorlarsa bu gibi mektupların muhteviyatını nazarı itibarı almak şöyle dursun okumuyorum bile. Esasen şahsiyel ve hüviyetini saklamağa mecburiyet gören kimsenin her türlü iddia ve mefalibi sahtedir. Resmen ve kanun dışıresinde vuku bulacak müracaatları dinlemek üzere nezarefin devşiri her zaman küssededir Kolordude kumandanlıklarına,

Harbiye Nazırı

Kolordu Kumandanlıklarına
Harbiye Nezareti Mufettişliklerine
" " " " " Şubesine
" " " " " devşirü mufettişliklerine
Erkânı Harbiye şubâtına

Definition C.4:

From Nazir Pasha, the Minister of War The Ottoman Chief of the
General Staff

Branch No.

It should be remembered what kind of disastrous consequences the military's participation in politics had brought in the recent past. If some members of the military continue to maintain their ongoing political activities or if they involve themselves in politics in the future, it should be considered that the related laws and regulations will punish those people with the heaviest sanctions.

The Minister of War

To the Head of Army Corps

To the Inspectorship of the Ministry of War

To the Presidency of the Chief of General Staff

APPENDICES C.5



Definition C.5: This is a copy of the original telegram by the Minister of War Nazim Pasha that was mentioned in the Appendices C.4.

APPENDICES C.6

MAHAL

Konyada ikinci ordu müfettişliğine

Edincede birinci bafsa ..ordu komandanlığına

Sivassın İkinci A. S. " " BÖNDEREN

... On ikinci ...
4250

Diğer bakırla en ilkin Yazılmıştır

Balikesirde on dördüncü 1) 27-temmuz-1325

... on beşinci "

57. ... firkant kumandantligens

Vilayeti şarkiyenin herhangi bir mahâlinde millî bir kongre tesisine teşebbüs edildiğine ve bu teşebbüsün mevkii fiile çıkması için yapılan muhaberatın ciheti askerîyenin vasıta kılınacağına muavenet ve inceletildi bulunan fırkaya dair ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Su son on senenin bazı vakayii hey'eti askeriye'nin siyasi cereyanları karışmasından ne elim neticeler tahvil etdiğine pek büyük burchandır. Yakın evamiri mübelligayı resmîyeyi kemali mef'ûmetle İera hususunun hey'eti askeriyece bir merkebî vazife namusu olduğunun unutulmamasına tekrar eder ve ordu ile mensubunun her türlü cereyanı siyasetiden uzak bulundurulmasını ehemmiyetle rica ederim.

Erkən Hərbiyə ümumiyyəti

Definition C.6:

OCCASSION 27 July 1325

To the Second Army Inspectorship in Konya

To the First Army in Edirne

To the Second Army in Sivas


.....

To the 57th Legion

For the rumours related to the attempt of organising a national congress in the Eastern Region and the assumed military involvements in this mentioned process ... I should remind that the military involvements in politics caused disastrous conclusions in the previous terms. Hence, I declare that the military should avoid itself every kind of political activity and attempt for the sake of military honour.

The Presidency of the Ottoman General Staff

APPENDICES C.7



Definition C.7: This is the original copy of the telegraph by the Presidency of General Staff that was mentioned in the Appendices C.6.

Ankara
27/8/15

-1-

Menzil müfettişliği Teklifi Harbiyesi
Adet: 18
100

27/8/15

Beğpazarı menzil hattı kumandanlığına

4
6515
41
5

Bu kere tebliğ edilmiş olan teklifi milliye emirlerinin terasında nazarı dikkate alınması muktezayı mevzu ile menzil hattının vekaleti hazinesine ilaveten işleyi icab eden hizmetleri aleyhe derc edilmiştir. Bunların sarfı sarfına icrasını ve icra edildiğinin vaktinde işârını rica ederim.

1- MEVAD-I İÂŞE:

Teklifi milliye komisyonları tarafından menzil hattı kumandanlığı muntikası dahilinde ki bu muntika 1-Agustos 27 senesi tarih ve 19 numaralı emirle bayin ve tebliğ edilmiştir. Derün menzil anbarlarına teslim veya münasip anbarlara eyleyecek olan mevzu-i işeden hat kumandanlığına işiyle mükellef olduğu kıtanın işesinin mükellefi ve kâfi mikdarı menzil muntikasında alıkonduktan sonra mütebaki Ankara sevk olunacaktır. Bu husus da nazarı dikkate alınacak mevzuatı mecranîdir.

1- Mihalicık muntikasında (Mihalicık ve Geyunazlı) birinci gurup için dört günlük, Beğpazarında ve Ayazda Ankara dörder günlük mevzuat işe bulundurulacaktır.

2- Menzil hattı kumandanlığı Beğpazarı ve Ayaz fırınlarında te-dâbir-i mukteziyeyi ihtisaz ile derhal peksimet imaline başlanacak ve bunları mevzuatı-i merkezdeki anbarlara idhal edecek ve imal edildikçe mikdarları hakkında hergün müfettişliğe malumat verecektir.

3- MEVAŞ: Teklifi milliye komisyonları tarafından emri mahsûsuna kâfifikan tedarikle ve menzile itfa kılınacak olan mevzuatı muntazam sūralara kâfrik edilip bunlardan bakiyadaki mevzuatı bildirilen menatikatı ki kıt'ına nakli bir haftalık et menzili muntikası dahilinde terk edildikten sonra her sürü kanzim ve bir zabıta mikdarı kâfi efradın tahfi idare ve muhafazasında olarak oda çayı vadisi meralarına gönderilecektir.

Gerek fazla mevzuat işesinin ve gerekse fazla mevzuatının gönderileceği geri mevzuatı ve muntikası Beğpazarı menzil muntikası haricinde olduğu için evvelden istihzâatı lazıme yapılabilmek onda bunların sevkleri vakti ve zamanıyla menzil müfettişliğine bildirilmelidir. Mevzuatı sevkinde hangi zabıta idaresinde ne kadar mevzuatının ne zaman ve istikametle sevk edildiği ayrıca tasrih

edilmelidir. Menzıl hıfzı kumandanlığı göreceği mevadî işareti . . .
yirmi dört saat mukaddem müfettişliğe ırsal edilebilecek surette mslumat
verecektir.

4- VESAITİ NAKLIYE: Menzıl hıfzı kumandanlığı elindeki vessiti nakli
yemin bugünkü nakliyatı idare eylemekte olduğu anlaşılmış ise de gerek
nakliyatı millîye komisyonları tarafından derç ve ita edilecek mevadîs
işinin nakli ve gerekse yeni tesisatın veya muhtemel hareketi işeşi in-
direceği nakliyatı icra edebilmek için mekur komisyonları tarafından cemî
nakliyatı tahsis edilmek üzere menzillere ita edilecek olan vessit nakli
yemin kanzımı bir teşkilatı bâhi olarak nakliyatı muntazam icra eyleye bil-
menin temini lazımdır. Bunun için hususî bir ayının nazarı dikkate alınması
ıgcâh eder:

Bir kaza veya nakliyat merkezinden diğer bir noktaya nakli nakliyatın
icrası için bir anda merkez nakliyatda mevcudiyeti lazım olan vessiti
nakliye miktarını tesbit etmek lazımdır, ve buna nazaran vessiti nakliye
kolları halinde teşkil eylemelidir. bekâli millîye emri mucibince ve-
saiti nakile eshabı her ay ordu maktemesinden

bir kısmını kendi vesaitiyle bütün köylülerimizden bir mesafeye meccanen nakle mecburdur.

Şu halde bñlşda zikredilen nakliyatın icrası için bu şekilde ^{zabıta} ~~memur~~ şu suretle mülhazat olunabilir:

Kazada toplanacak vessiti nakliye ile kazanın çıkarılabileceği araba yetünü 20 ye taksim olarak böyle çalışması lazım gelen miktar tayin olunur.

Bu miktar kavgı için 40 öküz, arabaları için 20, 2tlı arabaları için 20. merkeb 100, mekari 80'e bölüğü olursa bunlar bir kol adıyla başlama birer zabıta ve muhafız ikişer nefer ~~bebrak~~ olunacak, ve hergün gelecek olan bu kollar ihtiyaca göre ve menzile tayin olunacak vazife ve istikametlerde kullanicıdır. Bu suretle hergün gelecek olan bu kollar yetkiğini müteakip yük

. miktar tayin olunan esaslardan az olursa o halde ikişer günlük kolları birleştirmek suretiyle kollar teşkil ~~olun~~ olunur. Bu halde birinci günü bir kol hareket ederse ikinci kol üçüncü, üçüncü kol besinci günü hareket etmesi lazımdır.

Müstacil ve mühim anlarda bu kolların defaten istifade etmek durumu hasil olursa böyle araba miktarı tayin olunan esaslara nskil etmede olmesinde ihtiyaca göre birkaç günlük kol defaten celb olunarak istihdam olunabilice memafih mülhazatı salife sırf yapılacak teşkilat hakkında bir fikir esasiyan ibaret olup celb olunacak arabalardan ne kadarının ve hergün kaç kol çalışdırılacağı bilahere bildirilecektir.

Vesaiti nakliyenin yetdiği zamanlarda zabıta ve esraddan mürekkep olan kadro değişmez bazen vessütü nakliye tebedül olunur.

Menzil hattı kumandanlığı dahilinde kararlardan verilecek malumatı göre teşkilatı hazırlayarak bildirecektir. Tahkikatı Lazima icrasıyla bunlar için muktedayı zabıtanın hatda mevcüdiyesi vakti ve zamanıyla ~~adını~~ talep olunması ıycab eden.


Menzili mufettişi

Gaimakam

Definition D.1:

This long report is completely related to the collection of the National Taxes (Orders), which had been prepared by Mustafa Kemal Pasha and which were sent to the related administrative authorities (Kaymakams) of relevant cities and villages. As has been mentioned in Chapter 5, the 10 orders obliged people to deliver a particular quantity of their commodities including clothes, foods, vehicles, weapons, and other relevant necessities to the city governors for meeting military requirements. In the letter above, a city governor (Kaymakam) and a tax inspector give detailed information to the relevant military authorities about the collecting process. The information mentioned includes relevant details such as the collection of food and the availability of vehicles and roads, as well as the deliverance details.

APPENDICES D.2



Definition D.2: This is one page of the original copy of the report that was mentioned in Appendices D.1, which is related to the National Orders.

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